The paper compares two theories of the nature of logic: Penelope Maddy's and my own. The two theories share a significant element: they both view logic as grounded not just in the mind (language, concepts, conventions, etc.), but also, and crucially, in the world. But the two theories differ in significant ways as well. Most distinctly, one is an anti-holist, "austere naturalist" theory while the other is a non-naturalist "foundational-holistic" theory. This methodological difference affects their questions, goals, orientations, the (...) scope of their investigations, their logical realism (the way they ground logic in the world), their explanation of the modal force of logic, and their approach to the relation between logic and mathematics. The paper is not polemic. One of its goal is a perspicuous description and analysis of the two theories, explaining their differences as well as commonalities. Another goal is showing that and how (i) a grounding of logic is possible, (ii) logical realism can be arrived at from different perspectives and using different methodologies, and (iii) grounding logic in the world is compatible with a central role for the human mind in logic. (shrink)

In contemporary educational theory, the concept of ‘nature’ has been restricted to the ‘inner nature’ of humans, reflecting Western philosophy’s focus on introspection and essence. This shift has excluded the ever-growing natural world from the realm of inner nature, relegating it to an external entity and creating a divide between human nature and the natural world. This division has led to educational challenges because of the lack of references for self-reflection and guidance from the spirit of naturalness. In (...) contrast, traditional Chinese philosophy does not view ‘Ziran’ (often translated as ‘naturalness’) as a separate or dichotomous concept like Western ‘nature’. Instead, Ziran encompasses all things in the world as harmonious entities that embody the metaphysical Dao and spiritual essence. This holistic perspective represents the highest form of existential wisdom, bridging Dao’s realms and human experience and, guiding education toward spiritual transcendence. Ziran thus offers a fundamental value system for education, emphasizing relevance, process, and life-serving practices as essential models because of its enduring vitality. (shrink)

Gila Sher approaches knowledge from the perspective of the basic human epistemic situation—the situation of limited yet resourceful beings, living in a complex world and aspiring to know it in its full complexity. What principles should guide them? Two fundamental principles of knowledge are epistemic friction and freedom. Knowledge must be substantially constrained by the world (friction), but without active participation of the knower in accessing the world (freedom) theoretical knowledge is impossible. This requires a grounding of (...) all knowledge, empirical and abstract, in both mind and world, but the fall of traditional foundationalism has led many to doubt the viability of this ‘classical’ project. Sher challenges this skepticism, charting a new foundational methodology, foundational holism, that differs from others in being holistic, world-oriented, and universal (i.e., applicable to all fields of knowledge). Using this methodology, Epistemic Friction develops an integrated theory of knowledge, truth, and logic. This includes (i) a dynamic model of knowledge, incorporating some of Quine’s revolutionary ideas while rejecting his narrow empiricism, (ii) a substantivist, non-traditional correspondence theory of truth, and (iii) an outline of a joint grounding of logic in mind and world. The model of knowledge subjects all disciplines to demanding norms of both veridicality and conceptualization. The correspondence theory is robust and universal yet not simplistic or naive, admitting diverse forms of correspondence. Logic’s grounding in the world brings it in line with other disciplines while preserving, and explaining, its strong formality, necessity, generality, and normativity. (shrink)

Gila Sher interviewed by Chen Bo: -/- I. Academic Background and Earlier Research: 1. Sher’s early years. 2. Intellectual influence: Kant, Quine, and Tarski. 3. Origin and main Ideas of The Bounds of Logic. 4. Branching quantifiers and IF logic. 5. Preparation for the next step. -/- II. Foundational Holism and a Post-Quinean Model of Knowledge: 1. General characterization of foundational holism. 2. Circularity, infinite regress, and philosophical arguments. 3. Comparing foundational holism and foundherentism. 4. A post-Quinean (...) model of knowledge. 5. Intellect and figuring out. 6. Comparing foundational holism with Quine’s holism. 7. Evaluation of Quine’s Philosophy -/- III. Substantive Theory of Truth and Relevant Issues: 1. Outline of Sher’s substantive theory of truth. 2. Criticism of deflationism and treatment of the Liar. 3. Comparing Sher’s substantive theory of truth with Tarski’s theory of truth. -/- IV. A New Philosophy of Logic and Comparison with Other Theories: 1. Foundational account of logic. 2. Standard of logicality, set theory and logic. 3. Psychologism, Hanna’s and Maddy’s conceptions of logic. 4. Quine’s theses about the revisability of logic. -/- V. Epilogue. (shrink)

This bold and lively essay is one of those rarest of intellectual achievements, a big small book. In its short length are condensed enormous erudition and impressive analytical scope. With verve and self-assurance, it addresses a broad, central question: How can we improve our understanding of the large-scale processes and structures that transformed the world of the nineteenth century and are transforming our world today? Tilly contends that twentieth-century social theories have been encumbered by a nineteenth century heritage (...) of “pernicious postulates.” He subjects each misleading belief to rigorous criticism, challenging many standard social science paradigms and methodologies. As an alternative to those timeless, placeless models of social change and organization, Tilly argues convincingly for a program of concrete, historically grounded analysis and systematic comparison. To illustrate the strategies available for such research, Tilly assesses the works of several major practitioners of comparative historical analysis, making skillful use of this selective review to offer his own speculative, often unconventional accounts of our recent past. Historically oriented social scientists will welcome this provocative essay and its wide-ranging agenda for comparative historical research. Other social scientists, their graduate and undergraduate students, and even the interested general reader will find this new work by a major scholar stimulating and eminently readable. This is the second of five volumes commissioned by the Russell Sage Foundation to mark its seventy-fifth anniversary. "In this short, brilliant book Tilly suggests a way to think about theories of historical social change....This book should find attentive readers both in undergraduate courses and in graduate seminars. It should also find appreciative readers, for Tilly is a writer as well as a scholar." —Choice. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Phenomenology and Modern Behavioral PsychologyLindsay B. Fletcher (bio) and Steven C. Hayes (bio)Keywordsacceptance, contextualism, defusion, relational-frame-theoryPérez-Álvarez and Sass (2008) deserve praise for examining the philosophical roots of clinical psychological science. Modern psychology has moved away from the development of philosophy and theory that is needed to ground scientific investigation within a coherent system. The result is increasingly ill-defined constructs and research programs that each operate within their own divergent (...) paradigm. B.F. Skinner is one of the few modern experimental behavioral psychologists who attempted to build a coherent science of behavior based on observable events with testable hypotheses. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, and Wilson 1999) and its associated basic science of cognition, Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, and Roche 2001), build on Skinner’s work to produce a more progressive science.Psychology and philosophy are different disciplines and how they are approached is defined by the objective. The purpose of philosophy from a scientific point of view is not the same as from a philosophical point of view. It is fine to compare radical behaviorism and phenomenology, but it seems important to ask whether and how this will lead to a more progressive science of behavior.In this commentary, we discuss the philosophy and theory that underlie ACT/RFT and show how they reflect on the relevant points made by the authors regarding the shared features of phenomenology and radical behaviorism. We make two adjustments to the explanation of radical behavioral concepts presented in the current paper to create a more coherent analysis. Finally, we show here how the development of a theory based on applied goals directly informs the methods used in clinical settings.Philosophical AssumptionsThe field of behavior analysis that originated with Skinner has different strands. Some are holistic and pragmatic, whereas others are elementalistic and mechanistic (Hayes, Hayes, and Reese 1988). ACT is based on an a-ontological philosophy termed functional contextualism (Hayes 1993), which views behavior analysis from a holistic and pragmatic perspective. Functional contextualism (AKA radical behaviorism) shares some of the assumptions of phenomenology, as has long been noted (Day 1969). For example, Pérez-Álvarez and Sass (2008) identify a-dualism, or monism, as a common feature. In functional contextualism, the whole is divided into functional units for the purpose of prediction and influence. A three-term contingency (antecedent–behavior–consequence) in behavior analysis is viewed as a [End Page 255] whole event with pragmatically distinguishable aspects, not an assemblage. As the authors point out, this results in a dialectic tension between stimulus control, action, and reinforcer because none are distinct units, and each is defined with reference to the others much as the front of a coin cannot exist without the back. These are not ontological entities, but functional units that are abstracted from the whole for pragmatic purposes. What is “radical” about radical behaviorism is that the philosopher, psychologist, or researcher participates in the event they are observing, and their own acts of scientific observation are identified based on their own functional properties.Behavioral ThinkingIn the service of further developing this philosophical and theoretical foundation and considering it along side phenomenology, we need to examine two aspects of the target article. The first regards the role of the environment in shaping behavior that is central to behavioral and contextual theories. The authors object to behaviorism’s notion of environment and suggest replacing it with the concept of the world, stating that “animals have environment, but man has world.” What is missing is an account of that shift. We believe that modern behavior analysis provides that account.Similarly, the paper argues that “reinforcers are not just things that follow behavior, but also, and above all, values that guide our life.” Again what is missing is an account of the precise behavioral basis for the distinction.In an attempt to do this, the authors incorrectly analyze operant behavior as future oriented, even appealing to final causality. In the three-term contingency, the discriminative stimulus sets the occasion for reinforcement of a particular behavior. The behavior of interest has been reinforced in similar contexts in the past, which gives... (shrink)

The book consists of 6 chapters. Chapter One explains the reason why SLA researchers should study the language learning environment in space: population movements associated with internal and external migration and social mobility such as the circuits of commodity production and distribution create much space, in which language learning environment become diverse and uneven. With the spatial perspective, we can fully understand the interactions between language learners and the world or environments.In Chapter Two, by introducing the brief history of (...) Critical Spatial Theory, the author wants to tell us one of the key ideas in the theory: the social production of space, which views space as the product of the social relations of its era. Based on it, the author adds that the production of languages is an integral aspect of the production of space on a global scale. It can help us to understand how social mobility shapes language learning environments. From this perspective, the local environments in which languages are learned are outcomes of the production of space under the influence of mobility. It reiterates the key view that the global mobilities of physical objects (people, goods and information) produce space.In Chapter Three, the author introduces the mainstream views held by modern linguistics: languages are conceptualized as objects in the space. They hold that the spatiality of language is given by providing correct writing systems and standardized rules for various languages. Influenced by mainstream conception of language from modern linguistics, SLA tends to regard languages as self-contained objects in space. However, this view neglects the relation between language and the learning environments. The author holds that the distribution and circulation of languages and their varieties in geographical space produce the spatiality of language, which clears the ground for an environment or object-as-space view of language in Chapter Four.In Chapter Four, the author develops an alternative "objects-as-space" view and introduces three concepts to illustrate spatiality of language: flat ontology, assemblage and mobilities. The concept of flat ontology helps explain what language is and how it comes into being in the world; From assemblage perspective, the author develops the idea that everything is an object, so are human beings and languages. Language (the non-physical object) interacts with various physical objects, forming the language-bearing assemblage. This assemblage is the form of spatiality of language. The mobilities theory explains how language-bearing assemblages develop or change on a global scale because of social mobility, emphasizing the importance of learning environment in SLA. All in all, the author outlines how language makes its way into physical space in the form of assemblages, or assemblages of assemblages.Chapter Five centers on language learning environment. First, the author explains the relation between language learners and their learning environment from an ecological view: the learner is a part of the language learning environment, and second language learning is a spatial interaction between the learners and the semiotic resources provided by environment. Then, the author discusses language environment from two different perspectives. From an 'individual' perspective, environments are assembled by individuals from the spatial resources available; from an 'areal' view, environments are shaped both by local circumstances and global circulations of language-bearing assemblages. Meanwhile, the author also discusses other language environments like the multilingual city and online resources. What the author hopes to develop in this chapter is an environment perspective that grounds the contexts of language learning in space, which helps the readers think about language learning from a spatial perspective.Chapter Six contains three parts. In the first part, it outlines the work of a number of researchers from sociolinguistics and the contribution they made to the spatial theory. In the second part, the author wants to tell us how the idea of language learning environment emerges from his own research. The last part discusses the four main researching routes (areal studies, studies of individuals learning in settings, studies of the construction of individual learning environment and design-based studies) that might influence SLA research on language learning environments and some research methods. The book is in alignment with several recent "turns" occurring in the field of SLA, such as "social turn" (Block, 2003) and "multilingual turn" (May, 2014), both of which bring to the fore the social aspects involved in language learning. While the first "turn" accentuates the role of social context in shaping and influencing learner cognition, the latter highlights how the physical multilingual world remold language learning experiences, and how the mental multilingual world helps raise learners' language awareness, and facilitates their successful construction of an identity of legitimate multi-language users. The book under review joins up the two "turns" in acknowledging that language learners are persons-in-context with organic interaction with social learning environment (Ushioda, 2021). This view has research and pedagogical implications. From the point of doing research, spatial perspectives, advocated in the book, afford huge research potentials for both language teachers and (instructed) SLA researchers to conduct situated investigations, exploring the complex and dynamic nexus between language learners and their surrounding environment (not restricted to people) that play a part in their learning experience, and thus gaining insightful understanding of how individuals and learning contexts are coupled with each other, how they evolve together, and how they constitute an ecosystem that generates affordances, facilitating or constraining language learning. Pedagogically speaking, the spatial perspectives encourage language teachers to hold an ecological view of language teaching and learning, directing their attention to the individuality of each language learner and their complex, dynamic and multifaceted relationality with other learners and the physical realities, rather than solely focusing on the abstract systems (e.g., the development of cognitive aspect). This holistic view allows language teachers to take measures to address concrete questions emerging in and out of the classrooms, and stimulates them to design and experiment with pedagogical interventions that help to create a favorable environment for language learning. This view also invites language teachers to take learner agency into account (Xu & Long, 2020) and to design pedagogical activities that enable learners to take agentive actions to adapt their environments as they actively create and seek their own language learning opportunities, making the world their own (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). In turn, teachers' agency-enabling activities will ultimately help learners to autonomously access a range of resources in this new affordance-rich era to improve their language skills, and thus become more independent in their pathway to life-long learning.Beside the above benefits, the book is also theoretically and methodologically friendly. In illustrating the role of space in SLA, the author invokes a plethora of theories from such disciplines as sociology, sociolinguistics, psychology, etc. This orientation helps readers to build a transdisciplinary framework to capture the multi-layered nature of SLA, and to acquire a nuanced understanding of how language learning is influenced by multiple scales of environmental factors. Methodologically, the author proposes several specific methods that are especially apt to investigate language learning environment. These methods, together with the theoretical foundation laid by the book, will definitely help researchers and language teaching practitioners to further delve into the complex interplay between context and language learners.Admittedly, the book is not without weaknesses. It spends most of its words on illustrating the importance of physical environment in SLA. Another essential component, the virtual environment is insufficiently referenced and discussed. This lacking is undoubtedly a regret the book leaves with us, especially in these years of pandemic, where language learning in virtual spaces is becoming a norm.All in all, the book is an invaluable contribution to the field of SLA, and is worthy of recommending to language teaching practitioners, researchers, and postgraduates in applied linguistics. (shrink)

Introduction. The article raises the problem of categorical expression of forming and preserving in active reproduction of the ecological worldview of the modern era man, oriented on building optimal human relations with the constantly technologicalizing and digitalizing world. The elaboration of the content of the main terms of the problem under consideration is reflected not only in the analysis of modern scientific and public discourse on the subject, but also in the materials of the All-Russian scientific-practical conference “Modern (...) materials and methods of solving environmental problems of post-industrial agglomeration”, in particular, the section “Humanitarian bases of nature-saving activity”. The purpose of the study is to clarify the semantic content of the concepts “ecological worldview”, “ecological consciousness”, “ecological thinking”, “environmentalism” in the modern scientific and public discourse not only in its published representation, but also in the praxis of the main ideas and key theses of the reports of the participants of the humanitarian section of the environmental conference, reflecting in a discussion format the scientific demand, the degree of clarity, dynamics and problematization of the interdisciplinary development of the categories of ecothematics. Methods. The methodological foundations of the research are related to clarifying the above concepts, their semantic emphases in scientific discourse, as well as eco-rhetoric in the Internet space. In addition, in order to reflect the key theses and main ideas of the papers, the methods of gen- eral scientific order (analysis, synthesis, abstraction, etc.) are used. Scientific novelty of the research. The content of the terms “ecological worldview”, “ecological consciousness”, “ecological thinking”, “environmentalism” in theoretical scientific and modern public discourse in their correlation with scientific interdisciplinary practices of the conference discussion platforms has been clarified. Results. A discursive field has been formed in the public Internet space, which can be thematically designated as “ecologization of digitalization”, according to which the latest digital technologies are capable of preventing and solving some environmental problems. In addition, it can be argued that the terms “ecological consciousness” and “ecology of consciousness” mean not only a careful attitude to natural resources, but also responsibility for one’s actions and a positive attitude to the world in the form of proactive thinking (instead of reactive) based on the worldview of ecohumanism and holism. Conclusions. Since the middle of the last century, domestic and foreign philosophical and scientific literature has noted the need for active formation of an ecological worldview, expressed in the preserving and reproducing the values of human concern for nature, society, culture and self. Today, in the conditions of aggravation of environmental risks, their scientific and public discussions, and the search for ways to mitigate them, the issue of changing the paradigm of thinking and activity of modern man in favor of a caring, careful and responsible attitude to himself and the surrounding world is actualized. In this regard, in the discourses discussed above, there is a demand for mental attitudes and everyday practices in which pro-ecological activity would be manifested as an attribute of an environmentally friendly person (homo ecologicus). The semantic field of the Internet space on ecothematics correlates with the scientific interdisciplinary discourses of conference discussion platforms, thus also reflecting the semantic demand for new categories in various discourses and scientific practices. (shrink)

For Heidegger, world is constitutively bound up with human being’s way of being. Yet after Being and Time he criticizes an excessively one-sided pragmatic reading of his concept of world, insisting that world is more than a referential totality of use involvements, tools, or existential projections. This article examines how Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis should be understood to promote both a practical orientation as well as a more transcendental dimension. The centrality of praxis in Heidegger’s work will not (...) be contested. What will be explored is whether what Heidegger calls “worldliness” or the “phenomenon of world” can be reduced to contexts of use relations or social practices and projects. The argument is made that world, for Heidegger, should be understood as an open space of meaning emergence through which diverse activities, some of which are practical, first become accessible to the human being. The claim will be advanced that world is more than the human being’s disclosive understanding and that an overly pragmatic interpretation circumvents the surpassive dimension of world. (shrink)

The paper outlines a deflationary interpretation of Hegel’s metaphysics, as presented in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. It focuses mainly on the Science of Logic as a theory of categories, which explores the movement of the Concept. The major idea is to read Hegel’s identification of logic and metaphysics as a thesis on deflating metaphysics into logic and semantics. Hegel’s metaphysics, which may better be called logico-metaphysics, does not describe the objective world directly. Rather, as a second-order theory, (...) it unfolds and makes transparent the fundamental concepts that are necessary for our understanding of the world and our orientation in it. -/- The paper begins with a brief discussion of Hegel’s idea of philosophy as system. The argument is made that Hegel should be interpreted holistically, in contrast to the popular approach of distinguishing between what is living and what is dead in his philosophy. In the second and third parts of the paper, an analysis is given of Hegel’s criticism of Kant, with an explanation of how Hegel’s Logic further develops Kant’s project of transforming traditional metaphysics. Here, the interesting fact that Hegel’s logical categories are not derived from an absolute first principle is pointed out. Instead, the task of Hegel’s Logic is to comprehend and systematize the concepts that have already been evolved in the history of philosophy. In the last part of the paper, the deflationary approach is extended to Hegel’s Realphilosophie. While Hegel’s Logic takes the place of ontology, his Philosophy of Nature and Spirit offers a comprehensive metaphysica specialis, laying conceptual foundations for understanding various dimensions of reality, from nature through the ethical-political world to different cultural domains. The paper takes Hegel’s Philosophy of Objective Spirit as an example to illustrate how the deflationary interpretation sheds light on Hegel’s “practical” philosophy as a second-order theory that does not aim to uncover first-order normative principles for guiding actions, but rather to develop the concepts necessary for normative judgments. (shrink)

In The Second Person Standpoint, Darwall charges that all value-oriented foundations for ethics make a category mistake. Calling it Strawson’s point, he argues these foundations explain moral authority, which concerns whether someone has standing to hold another accountable, in terms of a value, which essentially concerns what makes the world go best. However, whether it would be good for me to blame you simply asks a different question than whether I have standing to blame you. I defend a (...) valueoriented foundation for contractualism by identifying one way to overcome Strawson’s point. At bottom, Darwall’s objection relies on the assumption that all values are worldregarding. I argue that another class of values exists: second-personal values. Grounding morality in one of these values does not make the category mistake at the heart of Strawson’s point. In particular, I argue that grounding morality on one secondpersonal value, the ideal of acting justifiably towards others, better captures traditional contractualist ideals than Darwall’s formal foundation. (shrink)

Economics is often believed to be a `value-free' discipline, and even an `a-moral' one. My aim is to demonstrate that homo œconomicus can recover his ethical nature if the philosophical roots of contemporary economics are laid bare. This, however, requires us to look for an alternative foundation for the idea of `social order,' a foundation which economics is ill-equipped to provide because of its exclusive focus on calculative rationality. But a new ethical perspective on homo œconomicus and on the manner (...) in which he chooses his actions is possible. My aim here is to make this new perspective explicit.Two claims lie at the heart of this paper. The first claim is that economics as practised nowadays — that is, as a discipline concerned with the analysis of the interactions between individual decisions and the collective effects of these interactions — is a particular form of metaphysics, based on a particular articulation between self-centredness and other-centredness. The second claim is that, unbeknownst to the vast majority of economists, the basic principle of individual optimization contains the seed of a radical reformulation of what the emergence of `social order' is all about. More specifically, economics will be claimed to be a specific metaphysical discipline based on the monadological worldview inherited from Leibniz and re-arranged to fit the empiricist bias of 18th-century thinkers, and the principle of individual optimization will be claimed to be compatible with a very different metaphysical view of the human subject, a view which `turns subjectivity inside out', so to speak, and treats optimizing calculation as a response rather than as an initiative.The first claim is rather general, and not completely new — it has been hinted at, for example, by Jon Elster in an early book written in French, but it has received precious little attention among economists so far, with the result that economics has become increasingly blind to the philosophical roots of its most fundamental views on individual decision and on social order. The second claim applies to economics and homo œconomicus a general suggestion coming from Alain Renaut, that we ought to make good use of the accusations of incoherence voiced against the monadological scheme in order to re-think the way in which human subjectivity works. Renaut, however, remains at the level of the history of the philosophical concept of subjectivity. Although he does, in passing, make some mention of possible implications for the social sciences, he never goes into the full analysis of what the critique of monadological metaphysics implies for modern theories of society, and for economics in particular. One of my main goals here is to fill this gap.Let me now be more specific about the steps of my analysis. Defending my two claims will require, first of all, a rigorous understanding of the basic methodological stance adopted by economics, namely the idea that social order `emanates' from a bunch of self-centred subjectivities making separate optimizing decisions. Accordingly, in Section 2, I will trace out the analogy that exists between Leibnizian monadology and modern-day economics. The aim there will be to show that economics, unwittingly but for nevertheless deep ethical reasons, has remained `stuck' in a very specific metaphysical position which virtually no contemporary philosophy of subjectivity any longer acknowledges. Section 3, then, will show how the combination of monadology and empiricism which still prevails in contemporary economics can be overcome by entering an altogether distinct philosophical domain characterized by the primacy of Other over Self.While this alternative philosophical stance has experienced a surge of interest in recent decades, it has left the social sciences, and particularly economics, completely untouched. The reason is, I will claim, that this strand of philosophy adopts a form of methodological altruism which stands in contrast both to the methodological individualism of economics and to the methodological holism of various strands of post-Durkheimian sociology. In Section 4, then, I analyze some of the far-reaching consequences for economics which would flow from taking into account `non-I' motives which are not `We' motives, i.e., motives for action which are neither mere holist pastings onto individualism nor mere individualist mitigations of holism.The principle of choice of action through individual optimization will appear as the `hinge' between two worlds: although initially anchored within a worldview where social coexistence is a by-product of individual calculations, the idea of optimization will be seen to be compatible with a very different, and indeed almost reversed worldview, one where individual calculations emerge as by-products of social coexistence — the term `social' being itself radically re-thought in a non-holistic direction.The aim of my analysis, ultimately, is to formulate a challenge for contemporary economics and its implicit view of the interaction between individual and society: Can the combination of monadological and empiricist thinking so strongly ingrained in economics be overcome in the direction of a radically `other-oriented' view of the human subject? Many economists will doubtless believe it cannot; however, they will now, at least, have to explain why they hold to the older view and hence they will have to uncover their often hidden ethical and metaphysical presuppositions. I view this not as an undue disturbance or as mere conceptual hair-splitting, but as a timely opportunity to clarify some deep philosophical issues which haunt economics. (shrink)

SummaryThe foundations of modern international thought were constructed out of diverse idioms and disciplines. In his impressive book, Foundations of Modern International Thought, David Armitage focuses on the normative idioms of natural law and political philosophy from the Anglophone world, from Hobbes and Locke to Burke and Bentham. I focus on parallel developments in the empirically-oriented disciplines of history and historiography to trace the emergence of histories of the states-system in the Italian- and German-speaking worlds, from Bruni and (...) Sarpi to Pufendorf and Heeren. Taking seriously Armitage's remark that ‘the pivotal moments in the formation of modern international thought were often points of retrospective reconstruction’, I argue that the historical disciplines supplied another significant intellectual context in which the modern world could be imagined as ‘a world of states’. (shrink)

This article offers a comparative study of the views of Alexis de Tocqueville and those of several Chinese thinkers of the late Ming dynasty (1368–1644)—primarily Gu Yanwu, Huang Zongxi, Wang Fuzhi—on the socio-political processes of centralization. My central claim is that their views of political centralization and of the decentralized polycentric society that preceded it in their respective countries exhibit a remarkable array of analogous structural features. More specifically, both Tocqueville and his Chinese counterparts perceive in centralization an inherent unsustainability (...) driven by its self-destructive nature: since the foundation and strength of statism depends on its social resources, the centralization of power inevitably results in the weakening of its own basis. I conclude that through their nuanced reinterpretation of self-interest, both parties advocate a “small-community-oriented communitarianism” instead of the increasingly centralized modern state. (shrink)

The article examines and examines the research of foreign specialists in the field of economics and healthcare organization, who used a comparative approach to analysis in their works. The article examines the features of the application of mechanisms and models of health management characteristic of different countries, studied the experience of the UK, USA, Sweden, Finland, Germany and Japan. The article systematizes the views of scientists on the problem of applying comparative research in the field of healthcare. The article defines (...) generalizations that characterize almost all existing healthcare systems in the world today. Studies are shown that allow us to identify common principles of the organization of health systems in the world, but, at the same time, to identify specific regional and national conditions that become the basis of existing regional, subnational and national health systems. In Russia, at the same time, the healthcare system includes an insurance component and private medicine. The development of the modern healthcare system in Russia can be assessed as not very positive, since with a general reduction in the number of medical personnel and the number of medical institutions in the 90s, this trend is currently continuing, albeit in a more smoothed form. A common place in the development of the healthcare system remains the growth of paid medical services and the orientation of sectoral public authorities in the direction of the development of the health care market with the strengthening of the role of the private sector. The healthcare system is undergoing, on the one hand, an upswing due to the growth of investments caused by coronavirus infection, and, on the other hand, especially for "traditional" diseases, the trend outlined in previous years continues. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to discuss some of the foundational issues centering around the question of integrating education in human values with professional engineering education: its necessity and justification. The paper looks at the efforts in ‘tuning’ the technical education system in India to the national goals in the various phases of curriculum development. The contribution of the engineering profession in national development and India’s self-sufficiency is crucially linked with the institutionalization of expertise and the role of morality (...) and responsibility. This linkage can be created through a proper understanding of the social role of the profession—what motivates the professionals and what makes professional life meaningful. Value education facilitates the process of moral maturity and the development of a ‘holistic’ mindset. This paper deals with the need to create such a mindset, the human values associated with it and gives examples of efforts to impart such education through ‘action-oriented’ programmes introduced in some institutes of engineering in India. (shrink)

The reductionist/holist debate seems an impoverished one, with many participants appearing to adopt a position first and constructing rationalisations second. Here I propose an intermediate position of pragmatic holism, that irrespective of whether all natural systems are theoretically reducible, for many systems it is completely impractical to attempt such a reduction, also that regardless if whether irreducible `wholes' exist, it is vain to try and prove this in absolute terms. This position thus illuminates the debate along new pragmatic lines, (...) and refocusses attention on the underlying heuristics of learning about the natural world. (shrink)

In _Reconstructing the Cognitive World_, Michael Wheeler argues that we should turn away from the generically Cartesian philosophical foundations of much contemporary cognitive science research and proposes instead a Heideggerian approach. Wheeler begins with an interpretation of Descartes. He defines Cartesian psychology as a conceptual framework of explanatory principles and shows how each of these principles is part of the deep assumptions of orthodox cognitive science. Wheeler then turns to Heidegger's radically non-Cartesian account of everyday cognition, which, he argues, can (...) be used to articulate the philosophical foundations of a genuinely non-Cartesian cognitive science. Finding that Heidegger's critique of Cartesian thinking falls short, even when supported by Hubert Dreyfus's influential critique of orthodox artificial intelligence, Wheeler suggests a new Heideggerian approach. He points to recent research in "embodied-embedded" cognitive science and proposes a Heideggerian framework to identify, amplify, and clarify the underlying philosophical foundations of this new work. He focuses much of his investigation on recent work in artificial intelligence-oriented robotics, discussing, among other topics, the nature and status of representational explanation, and whether cognition is computation rather than a noncomputational phenomenon best described in the language of dynamical systems theory. Wheeler's argument draws on analytic philosophy, continental philosophy, and empirical work to "reconstruct" the philosophical foundations of cognitive science in a time of a fundamental shift away from a generically Cartesian approach. His analysis demonstrates that Heideggerian continental philosophy and naturalistic cognitive science need not be mutually exclusive and shows further that a Heideggerian framework can act as the "conceptual glue" for new work in cognitive science. (shrink)

The construction of a systematic philosophical foundation for logic is a notoriously difficult problem. In Part One I suggest that the problem is in large part methodological, having to do with the common philosophical conception of “providing a foundation”. I offer an alternative to the common methodology which combines a strong foundational requirement with the use of non-traditional, holistic tools to achieve this result. In Part Two I delineate an outline of a foundation for logic, employing the new methodology. The (...) outline is based on an investigation of why logic requires a veridical justification, i.e., a justification which involves the world and not just the mind, and what features or aspect of the world logic is grounded in. Logic, the investigation suggests, is grounded in the formal aspect of reality, and the outline proposes an account of this aspect, the way it both constrains and enables logic, logic's role in our overall system of knowledge, the relation between logic and mathematics, the normativity of logic, the characteristic traits of logic, and error and revision in logic. (shrink)

This book provides a philosophical foundation to the theory and practice of education from the Indian perspective. It is guided by an 'axionoetic' approach to education and therefore it deals with the epistemological foundation and value orientation of education. The author discusses the ontological, epistemological, logical, ethical and axiological bases of education in a holistic and integrated manner. The author maintains that education is a planned, methodical and purposive enhancement of human potentialities as a natural development. This presupposes correct and (...) adequate formulation of the objectives and goals of education as per the needs and aspirations of pupils. Education also equips individuals for a good quality of life. Keeping in view the applied dimension of philosophy, this book analyses practical issues of moral education like character building value-negativism in the context of education. It also deals with issues concerning peace, sustainable development, sustainable judicious consumption etc. which should have a bearing on educational policies and programmes. (shrink)

An action-oriented perspective changes the role of an individual from a passive observer to an actively engaged agent interacting in a closed loop with the world as well as with others. Cognition exists to serve action within a landscape that contains both. This chapter surveys this landscape and addresses the status of the pragmatic turn. Its potential influence on science and the study of cognition are considered (including perception, social cognition, social interaction, sensorimotor entrainment, and language acquisition) and (...) its impact on how neuroscience is studied is also investigated (with the notion that brains do not passively build models, but instead support the guidance of action). A review of its implications in robotics and engineering includes a discussion of the application of enactive control principles to couple action and perception in robotics as well as the conceptualization of system design in a more holistic, less modular manner. Practical applications that can impact the human condition are reviewed (e.g., educational applications, treatment possibilities for developmental and psychopathological disorders, the development of neural prostheses). All of this foreshadows the potential societal implications of the pragmatic turn. The chapter concludes that an action-oriented approach emphasizes a continuum of interaction between technical aspects of cognitive systems and robotics, biology, psychology, the social sciences, and the humanities, where the individual is part of a grounded cultural system. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 26.2 (2002) 369-396 [Access article in PDF] Worlds or Words Apart?The Consequences of Pragmatism for Literary Studies:An Interview with Richard Rorty Richard Rorty, with E. P. Ragg ER: I WANTED TO ASK YOU first about holism. Clearly holism doesn't just mean being interdisciplinary. Nor, as you argue in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, is it merely a question of antifoundationalist polemic. Rather, you (...) say it marks "a distrust of the whole epistemological enterprise." 1 Could you explain what you mean by that?RR: If you weren't some kind of foundationalist you wouldn't bother to get into epistemology. Epistemology only looks attractive if you think that there is a topic called knowledge whose nature can be studied. The idea is that once you have learned its nature, you might get more of it than you had before. Only someone who thinks that knowledge has foundations located in sense perception, or pure reason, or divine revelation, or something, would take the idea of studying knowledge, its nature and limits, seriously. I think of holism as just the view that people change their beliefs in such a way as to achieve coherence with their other beliefs, to bring their beliefs and desires into some sort of equilibrium—and that that is about all there is to be said about the quest for knowledge. There are no rules for which beliefs you sacrifice in order to accommodate other beliefs, or which desires you change to accommodate changed beliefs. Because there aren't any rules, there aren't any methods you can study in order to improve the way you achieve equilibrium. The whole idea of studying how belief is changed is pretty hopeless. It's just too holistic a process to be an appropriate topic of study. [End Page 369]ER: Holism is obviously a natural corollary of pragmatism because pragmatists urge bringing as many different useful vocabularies to discussion as we can. This reminds me of your definition of "literariness." In Contingency, irony, and solidarity you describe literary skill as the ability to effect "surprising gestalt switches by making smooth rapid transitions from one terminology to another." 2 Would it be fair to say, then, that thinking holistically is, to some degree, literary?RR: No, I don't think so. It would be more appropriate to say thinking holistically, in the sense of not being limited to a given context or disciplinary framework, is a matter of thinking imaginatively. Politicians and theologians and engineers think imaginatively just as much as literary people do. To call it literary would be unduly to privilege literature.ER: Would you say that, as a writer, your own work has been treated holistically: first in the sense that your texts are seen as a growing body of thought—that is, that there is a difference between the writer of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and the author of Contingency, irony, and solidarity—and, second, in the sense that people have thought holistically about your ideas, have brought them to bear on literature, philosophy, social science, the very demarcations you want to transcend?RR: I think that the stuff I do is more interesting to people outside of philosophy than those inside it. This is an example of the same phenomenon that led Kuhn to be much more read by people outside the hard sciences than by people within them. My stuff, like Kuhn's, debunks certain views that various earlier philosophers, especially the positivists, had tried to impose on the culture. My readers are people who are looking for a way out from the view they absorbed, without much liking it, when they were young. People inside of philosophy, however, often regard all this debunking as endangering the problems to the solution of which they have devoted their lives. They do not want the problems dissolved, because that would dissolve their solutions as well. So they welcome it less than do outsiders.ER: One of the markers of your... (shrink)

"Hegel and the Foundations of Literary Theory: Do the various forms of literary theory - deconstruction, Marxism, new historicism, feminism, post-colonialism, and cultural/digital studies - have anything in common? If so, what are the fundamental principles of theory? What is its ideological orientation? Can it still be of use to us in understanding basic intellectual and ethical dilemmas of our time? These questions continue to perplex both students and teachers of literary theory. Habib finds the answers in theory's largely unacknowledged (...) roots in the thought of German philosopher Hegel. Hegel's insights continue to frame the very terms of theory to this day. Habib explains Hegel's complex ideas and how they have percolated through the intellectual history of the last century. This book will interest teachers and students of literature, literary theory and the history of ideas, illuminating how our modern world came into being, and how we can better understand the salient issues of our own time"--. (shrink)

Human development takes place in an ornamented – redundantly patterned and highly repetitive – world. The emergence of knowledge takes the form of episodic unpredictable synthetic events at the intersection of the fields of internal and external cultural meaning systems – through the mutually linked processes of constructive internalization and externalization. Patterns of decorations – ornaments – are relevant as redundant “inputs” into the internalization/externalization processes. Ornaments can be viewed not merely as "aesthetic accessories" to human activity contexts but (...) as holistic devices of cultural guidance of human conduct that acts through the subjectivity of personal feelings. This guidance is peripheral in its nature – surrounding the ordinary life activities with affectively oriented textures of cultural meanings. (shrink)

Spirituality, in the broad sense, provides a deeper foundation for principles of international business ethics than legalistic, command-based ethics programs. Spiritual-based principles and values are presupposed and endorsed by established legal and ethical principles for international business. Identifying such spiritual-based principles and values requires the exercise of moral imagination and an openness to values embraced by the world's religions. Once identified, a new realm of moral freedom is attained for multinational corporations which may help them move beyond an "ethics (...) for sale" orientation. (shrink)

The problem of defining culture has exercised anthropologists but not cross?cultural psychologists because psychological science is based on quantitative forms of empiricism where the validity of categorical boundaries is determined by their predictive utility. Furthermore, many indigenous psychologies have been allied to nation?building projects in the developing world that choose to gloss over within state ethnic differences for the purposes of national strength and unity. Finally, Carl Martin Allwood?s target article ?On the foundation of the indigenous psychologies? (2011, Social (...) Epistemology 25 (1): 3?14) is grounded in western thinking about science that privileges analytical philosophy, particularly the importance of constructing definitional categories as the basis of its critique of indigenous psychologies. This is a limited basis for thinking about psychological science whose flaws have been exposed by highly visible critiques on analytical versus holistic thinking. From the point of view of Asian social psychologists, there is no analytical solution as to where to draw the boundaries of culture because culture is a social construction that will vary according to the situation and motives at play in different situations. But this is not an intractable problem because all human psychology is intentionally realized with elements of social construction that are part and parcel of experienced reality. (shrink)

This volume introduces philosophy as a foundational discipline of education. Taking a broadly inclusive approach to the branches of philosophy, it offers an accessible yet duly rigorous orientation to the field. Revealing the values, premises, arguments, and conclusions that inform contemporary philosophical discussions of education, this book equips its readers with the conceptual and analytical resources necessary to engage with and make meaningful contributions to that grand discourse for years to come. About the Educational Foundations series: Education, as an academic (...) field taught at universities around the world, emerged from a range of older foundational disciplines. The Educational Foundations series comprises six volumes, each covering one of the foundational disciplines of philosophy, history, sociology, policy studies, economics and law. This is the first reference work to provide an authoritative and up-to-date account of all six disciplines, showing how each field's ideas, methods, theories and approaches can contribute to research and practice in education today. The six volumes cover the same set of key topics within education, which also form the chapter titles: - Mapping the Field - Purposes of Education - Curriculum - Schools and Education Systems - Learning and Human Development - Teaching and Teacher Education - Assessment and Evaluation This structure allows readers to study the volumes in isolation, by discipline, or laterally, by topic, and facilitates a comparative, thematic reading of chapters across the volumes. Throughout the series, attention is paid to how the disciplines comprising the educational foundations speak to social justice concerns such as gender and racial equality. (shrink)

Cognitive Action Theory of Reality presents an original and thought-provoking theory of consciousness. Adopting a panpsychist approach, the book argues that a primitive consciousness takes place in all material, assuming the observer's existence is the foundational premise underlying all further scientific inquiry. The human brain is treated as the ultimate measuring instrument, creating objective reality as an explanation for sensory stimulation in an internal mental model. The book presents a truly multi-disciplinary approach to the study of consciousness, drawing on the (...) author's knowledge of psychology, physics, computer science, and philosophy. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to assess Arnason’s civilizational theory and methodology and their application to non-Western civilizations from a historical-comparative sociological perspective. Although civilizational analysis and historical sociology as historical-comparative orientations in sociology are closely connected, civilizational analysis concentrates particularly on the macro-history of civilizations, whereas historical-comparative sociology (particularly in its American variety) is orientated rather to a meso- and micro-analytical foundation of societal developments and therefore is more time- and context-sensitive. From such a perspective, the article reconstructs, (...) first, Arnason’s theoretical and methodological approach to civilizational analysis and discusses his contribution to the civilizational origins and dynamics of the West as a measuring rod for non-European societies. Second, it then assesses Arnason’s two major exemplary civilizational studies: the Soviet model in Russia, Eastern Europe and the non-European world as well as the Japanese civilization in the broader East Asian civilizational context. The article concludes with a critical summary of Arnason’s highly innovative approach from the vantage point of a recently developing global orientation in historical and comparative sociology. (shrink)

Scientific knowledge develops in an increasingly fragmentary way.A multitude of scientific disciplines branch out. Curiosity for thisdevelopment leads into quests for a unifying understanding. To a certain extent, foundational studies provide such unification. There is a tendency, however, also of a fragmentary growth of foundational studies, like in a multitude of disciplinaryfoundations. We suggest to look at the foundational problem, not primarily as a search for foundations for one discipline in another, as in some reductionist approach, but as a steady (...) revelation ofpresuppositions for individual scientific theories – which are boundto meet, sooner or later, in a common language. A decisive point hereis our holistic conception of language, as a whole of description-interpretation processes which are entangled(complementary) in the language itself. For every language there is alinguistic complementarity. We suggest this unique form ofentanglement as a unifying presupposition, ultimately foundational forall communicable knowledge. Involved is a linguistic realism, in terms ofwhich we critically examine ``language-world'' problems, as exposed byWittgenstein, and Russell, about a foundational interdependence of language andreality (world). Throughout, we attach to the developmentof foundational studies of mathematics, logics, and the naturalsciences. In particular, we study the interpretation problem foraxioms of infinity in some detail. We emphasize that the holistic concept of language contradicts Carnap's semiotic fragmentation thesis (thus, no clean cutbetween syntax, semantics, pragmatics). (shrink)

Geometry defines entities that can be physically realized in space, and our knowledge of abstract geometry may therefore stem from our representations of the physical world. Here, we focus on Euclidean geometry, the geometry historically regarded as “natural”. We examine whether humans possess representations describing visual forms in the same way as Euclidean geometry – i.e., in terms of their shape and size. One hundred and twelve participants from the U.S. (age 3–34 years), and 25 participants from the Amazon (...) (age 5–67 years) were asked to locate geometric deviants in panels of 6 forms of variable orientation. Participants of all ages and from both cultures detected deviant forms defined in terms of shape or size, while only U.S. adults drew distinctions between mirror images (i.e. forms differing in “sense”). Moreover, irrelevant variations of sense did not disrupt the detection of a shape or size deviant, while irrelevant variations of shape or size did. At all ages and in both cultures, participants thus retained the same properties as Euclidean geometry in their analysis of visual forms, even in the absence of formal instruction in geometry. These findings show that representations of planar visual forms provide core intuitions on which humans’ knowledge in Euclidean geometry could possibly be grounded. (shrink)

Cognitive science is experiencing a pragmatic turn away from the traditional representation-centered framework toward a view that focuses on understanding cognition as "enactive." This enactive view holds that cognition does not produce models of the world but rather subserves action as it is grounded in sensorimotor skills. In this volume, experts from cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology, robotics, and philosophy of mind assess the foundations and implications of a novel action-oriented view of cognition. Their contributions and supporting experimental evidence (...) show that an enactive approach to cognitive science enables strong conceptual advances, and the chapters explore key concepts for this new model of cognition. The contributors discuss the implications of an enactive approach for cognitive development; action-oriented models of cognitive processing; action-oriented understandings of consciousness and experience; and the accompanying paradigm shifts in the fields of philosophy, brain science, robotics, and psychology. ContributorsMoshe Bar, Lawrence W. Barsalov, Olaf Blanke, Jeannette Bohg, Martin V. Butz, Peter F. Dominey, Andreas K. Engel, Judith M. Ford, Karl J. Friston, Chris D. Frith, Shaun Gallagher, Antonia Hamilton, Tobias Heed, Cecilia Heyes, Elisabeth Hill, Matej Hoffmann, Jakob Hohwy, Bernhard Hommel, Atsushi Iriki, Pierre Jacob, Henrik Jörntell, Jürgen Jost, James Kilner, Günther Knoblich, Peter König, Danica Kragic, Miriam Kyselo, Alexander Maye, Marek McGann, Richard Menary, Thomas Metzinger, Ezequiel Morsella, Saskia Nagel, Kevin J. O'Regan, Pierre-Yves Oudeyer, Giovanni Pezzulo, Tony J. Prescott, Wolfgang Prinz, Friedemann Pulvermüller, Robert Rupert, Marti Sanchez-Fibla, Andrew Schwartz, Anil K. Seth, Vicky Southgate, Antonella Tramacere, John K. Tsotsos, Paul F. M. J. Verschure, Gabriella Vigliocco, Gottfried Vosgerau. (shrink)

This is a reply to the article by A.M. Dorozhkin, S.V. Shibarshina “Epistemological Randomization, or On Creativity in Science”. The comprehension of the general philosophical problems of scientific rationality is inextricably linked with the creative development of the world. An actual philosophical position can be formed on the basis of the intersection of several alternative approaches. The first is connected with the understanding of rationality as a special style of thinking of the epoch, in which the coordinate system of (...) the worldview is set. Such rationality sets general ideas about the cognizability of the world, and forms methodological and theoretical scientific strategies. Rationality outlines the boundaries of a scientist’s creative thought. Addressing the problem of the rationality of scientific creativity involves the use of a second approach, on the basis of which we can talk about the use of a variety of logics in describing the world. At the same time, confidence in their connection with reality allows us to hope for the formation of a holistic description of the problem in the future. In this case, we are dealing with an act of cognitive activity, as a result of which our consciousness throws a rational construct as a network on a situation of uncertainty, explaining and mastering it – the picture of the world is ordered. According to the third position, the evaluation of scientific results is flexible, plastic in nature: what is perceived as methodologically erroneous today may turn out to be a scientific discovery tomorrow. Thus, it can be stated that the creative thinking of the researcher is inscribed in certain cultural conditions of understanding reality, and this situation has a rationally given meaning. At the same time, the human mind always strives beyond the limits of the definable and categorically set, with the help of rationality, progressively groping the boundaries of the unknown and going beyond the limits of the possible. (shrink)

Many edusemiotic writers have begun to closely align edusemitoics to biosemiotics; the basic logic being that, if the life process can be defined through the criterion of semiotic engagement, so can the learning process :373–387, 2006). Thus, the ecological concept of umwelt has come to be a central area of investigation for edusemiotics; allowing theorists to address learning and living concurrently, from the perspective of meaning and significance. To address the conceptual and experiential foundations of the edusemiotic perspective, this paper (...) will focus its attention on the basic semiosic processes that sustain the learner’s primary modelling system or umwelt—the world of meaning and sensory engagement that the organism is immersed in. This focus enables us to identify and explore four basic principles that an ecologically concerned edusemiotic perspective can be said to rest upon; the Iconicity Hypothesis, the Principle of Suprasubjective Relation, the Natural Learning Flow Principle, and the Continuity Principle. The identification and elaboration of these basic philosophical orientations will help establish the importance and relevance of the edusemiotic perspective for educational philosophy and theory in general. This task requires the methodological framework of Sebeok and Danesi’s Modelling Systems Theory, which; provides a biosemiotically grounded approach to understanding the diversity of modelling phenomena across all species, and; contextualizes the specific focus of this study within the broader forms of learning and knowing encompassed by a semiotic theory of learning. Hopefully such attention to the foundational doctrina of this new perspective will encourage more educational research to take what Semetsky has called the edusemiotic turn. (shrink)

The roles played by physics in the study of the life sciences have taken many forms over the past 100 years. Here we analyze how physics can be brought to bear on the contemporary study of morphogenesis, where new tissue-scale forms arise out of simpler, more homogenous, initial structures. We characterize how morphogenesis has been studied through reductionist approaches and discuss their limitations. We suggest that an alternative way of approaching morphogenesis that begins with a consideration of the whole may (...) also serve as a fruitful mode of scientific inquiry. Through historical analysis of concepts relevant for contemporary systems biology, we illustrate how physical thinking oriented toward the biological whole (“holistic biophysical thinking”) was exemplified in the biological theories presented earlier by D’Arcy Thompson (1860–1948) and Pere Alberch (1954–1998). We contrast the use of physics to develop the conceptual foundations of holistically oriented systems biology with the more prevalent contemporary use of physics that focuses on technological development and quantification, embedded within reductionist strategies. As an in-depth contemporary case study, we describe how in our research we have used holistic biophysical thinking to develop biological theories of vertebrate morphogenesis that account for and extend beyond genetic, molecular, and cellular processes. We propose a theory of skin development where _both_ molecular _and_ morphological patterns are orchestrated by emergent physical processes at the supracellular scale. We further posit that holistic biophysical thinking at the supracellular scale may advance theories of diseases such as cancer. (shrink)

In the ancient civilizations, the sky has been observed in order to understand the motions of the celestial bodies above the horizon. The study of faiths and practices dealing with the sky in the past has been attributed to the sun, the moon, and the prominent stars. The alignment and orientation of constructions to significant celestial objects were a common practice. The orientation was an important component of the religious structure design. Religious buildings often have an intentional orientation to fix (...) the praying direction. In Islam, a sacred direction towards Kaaba located in the courtyard in the Sacred Mosque in Mecca has been used for praying and fulfilling varied ritual tasks. Therefore, the mosques had then to orientate towards the Qibla direction, being designated by a focal niche in the Qibla-wall, wherever they were built on Earth. In this study, the orientations of the historical Grand mosques in Turkey are surveyed with regard to the folk astronomy derived from pre-Islamic Arabian sources, early traditions of the Islamic period, and geometric-trigonometric computation in mathematical astronomy inherited and developed mostly from Greek sources according to the Islamic view of the World geography. (shrink)

The research programme of the philosophy of information (PI) proposed in 2002 made it an independent area or discipline in philosophical research. The scientific concept of ‘information’ is formally accepted in philosophical inquiry. Hence a new and tool-driven philosophical discipline of PI with its interdisciplinary nature has been established. Philosophy of information is an ‘orientative’ rather than ‘cognitive’ philosophy. When PI is under consideration in the history of Western philosophy, it can be regarded as a shift of large tradition. There (...) are three large traditions at large, known as Platonic, Kantian and Leibniz-Russellian. In the discussion of the position of the possible worlds, we have modal Platonism and modal realism, but both of the theories are made in the framework of Western philosophy. In this essay, it is argued that possible worlds could be seen as worlds in information, which is then an interpretation of modal information theory (MIT). Our interpretation is made on the basis of Leibniz’s lifelong connection with China, a fact often overlooked by the Western philosophers. Possible world theory was influenced by the Neo-Confucianism flourishing since the Song Dynasty of China, the foundation of which is Yijing. It could be argued that Leibniz’s possible world theory was formulated in respect to the impact of the thoughts reflected in Yijing, in that one of the prominent features is the model-theoretic construction of theories. There are two approaches to theory construction, i.e., axiom-theoretic and model-theoretic. The origin of the former is from ancient Greece and the latter from ancient China. And they determined the different features of theoretic structures between the oriental and occidental traditions of science and technology. The tendency of the future development of science and technology is changing from the axiom-theoretic to the model-theoretic orientation, at least the two approaches being complementary each other. To some extent, this means the retrospective of tradition in the turning point of history, and some of the China’s cultural traditions might become the starting points in formulating the future Chinese philosophy of science and technology. (shrink)

Twenty first century is posing unprecedented challenges for the human existence and development. This era has witnessed awesome economic & technological growth, increased connectedness but great poverty, malnutrition, anxiety, mental stress and environmental degradation. Thus, this time depicts great contradiction, uncertainty, and risk. Accordingly, in this era a holistic education system has to deal with the challenges such as population growth, terrorism, environmental degradation, hegemony of machines, mental stress, cultivating creativity, bridging the skill and wisdom gap, and expanding human potential (...) etc. To find a sustainable solution to such challenges, we need to develop a holistic education system which acknowledges various dimension of human being. For this task, this paper will try to highlight some philosophical themes which are commonly suggested by various prominent thinkers such as M.K. Gandhi, R.N. Tagore, J. Krishnamurti, S. Radhakrishnan etc. in India, and J. Dewey, I. Illich, and B. Russell etc. in the west. They have put forward their philosophy to discuss the aims of education which are relevant to this century. In this paper, we will analyze their views from the perspective of the challenges that the twenty-first century world is going to face. Our investigation will analyze agreements and disagreements among the approaches taken by these educators. However, the focus will be on the commonalities, so that we can identify some philosophical themes which can work as the solid foundation for holistic model of education. (shrink)

More and more these days it is asked whether aesthetics is still possible. A question that, given the context and phrasing, seems to direct us towards its answer. Conferences and meetings, books and journal specials examine the issue of aesthetics, talk about rediscovery or return of aesthetics. Well known philosophers and aestheticians underscore the need to reconsider the foundations of aesthetics and set new directions for aesthetics today (Berleant, 2004) or attempt to expand aesthetics beyond aesthetics–like Welsch, for example who (...) tries to extend aesthetics beyond art to society and the life-world (Welsch, 1997). Others underline the need to revisit the aesthetic experience (Shusterman, 1999; Iseminger, 2002, Fenner, 1996) and examine the relevance or irrelevance of the aesthetic with art (Carroll, 2001). It seems that it is strongly recommended to turn to aesthetics on the condition however to carefully re-approach the meaning and import of the term in the present situation. The aesthetic that Passmore condemned as “dreary”(Passmore, 1954), the one Sparshott considered a formless conception, vague and loose in application (Sparshott, 1982), the same that Danto emphatically argues that has nothing to do with the definition of art or arts in general (Danto, 1981) returns to claim its rightful place in the fields of philosophy and critical theory (Levine, 1994, Michaud, 1999), as well as artistic creation. And one cannot but wonder: what does this return mean? What was the degree of aesthetics decline that we need to discuss about recovery or for new implementations of aesthetics? (shrink)

We live in a world of crowds and corporations, artworks and artifacts, legislatures and languages, money and markets. These are all social objects — they are made, at least in part, by people and by communities. But what exactly are these things? How are they made, and what is the role of people in making them? In The Ant Trap, Brian Epstein rewrites our understanding of the nature of the social world and the foundations of the social sciences. (...) Epstein explains and challenges the three prevailing traditions about how the social world is made. One tradition takes the social world to be built out of people, much as traffic is built out of cars. A second tradition also takes people to be the building blocks of the social world, but focuses on thoughts and attitudes we have toward one another. And a third tradition takes the social world to be a collective projection onto the physical world. Epstein shows that these share critical flaws. Most fundamentally, all three traditions overestimate the role of people in building the social world: they are overly anthropocentric. Epstein starts from scratch, bringing the resources of contemporary metaphysics to bear. In the place of traditional theories, he introduces a model based on a new distinction between the grounds and the anchors of social facts. Epstein illustrates the model with a study of the nature of law, and shows how to interpret the prevailing traditions about the social world. Then he turns to social groups, and to what it means for a group to take an action or have an intention. Contrary to the overwhelming consensus, these often depend on more than the actions and intentions of group members. (shrink)

The place and impact of large, elite business schools is hotly debated. Compared to such establishments, little has been written about smaller, regional, community-oriented business schools that serve and interact with their various communities at home or abroad. Focusing on one of the smaller regional business schools in the UK, and incorporating perspectives from further afield, this book seeks to redress that balance. This local focus enables a more holistic understanding of what really goes on in terms of the (...) complex relationships, practices, challenges and contexts at play in such an arena. The book, conceived throughout the Covid-19 pandemic, reverberates with a multiplicity of voices, perspectives and narratives, and reflects a process of collaborative autoethnography and critical friendship. It will be of great value to academics, students and others who are interested in optimising the benefits of regional business schools around the world. (shrink)

The last years’ achievements in neuroscience are key for a philosophical analysis focused on the mind-body problem, such as the phenomenological approach.The digital evolution, on the one hand, faces us with the interaction between the world of reality and the world of possibility. This means more than a mere coexistence between these two dimensions. Rather, a concrete feedback occurs among them, and this brings out unprecedented and unavoidable issues with regard to perceptual processes. On the other hand, the (...) digital evolution allows for analyzing data and monitoring environmental systems, thus reasoning in a predictive way, anticipating problems, and checking ex ante their evolution and outcomes.Neuroscience, for its part, with the experiments of Libet and their subsequent interpretations, has highlighted a consciousness of the unconscious made of ballistic and automatic processes, which constitutes the starting phase of our decisions and actions. This further confirmed that sequential and linear thinking is unable to address the brain-environment relationship that is key in understanding any cognitive process.This analysis confirms the relevance of different aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology. There is, however, a “but,” which significantly reduces the extent of adherence to his point of view. Husserl assumed that an implicit horizon precedes or accompanies the acts of conscience. This is the material, impressional, passive, receptive, and, in some way, tacit dimension, strictly connected to the issue of genesis, i.e. the process of constitution of the analyzed entities. Thus, he drew a clear dividing line between this dimension and the phases of the self-controlling, vigilant conscience and its activity. In fact, his approach to the phenomenological problem is mainly oriented toward these phases. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to develop a valid and reliable measurement tool for determining students' spiritual health and life orientation. For this purpose, the Spiritual Health and Life-Orientation Measure (SHALOM) inventory developed by Fisher (2010) is adapted to Turkish. The adaptation study was carried out on 1591 high school students in three study groups studying in Ankara and Muş. The original English measure consisting of four dimensions and twenty items was translated into Turkish, factor analysis, validity and reliability (...) tests were conducted on the sampling data. As a result of the study, the Turkish-adapted inventory consists of four dimensions (personal, social, environmental and transcendental) which resemble the original inventory. In addition, internal consistency coefficients of the inventory dimensions were in perfect harmony with the original inventory and served the purpose of the scale. In Conclusion The Turkish adaptation of the SHALOM Inventory can be used in different disciplines of psychology, educational sciences, and social sciences. Summary: The concept of religion, which is an important dynamic and carrier of the social field, has gone into a double distinction since the second half of the 18th century; the concept of spirituality has begun to be refined from the concept of religion. The concepts of religion and spirituality are very difficult to define; While the concept of religion focuses ideology and rules of belief, spirituality centers on individual experiences and interrelationships that extend religion. For this reason, different spirituality and religion definitions are made from different perspectives and different spirituality scales were developed within this framework. However, the results of these studies differ significantly from each other; this means that spirituality was defined and conceptualized based on the scale that was used. Early period studies on spirituality mostly focus on religion, health, psychology and work life. In these studies, after defining the concept of spirituality; the relationship between the concept and health, religion, psychology and business life or necessity for human life is discussed. In the West, until the 1950s, the concepts of religion and spirituality were used interrelated. However, today these two concepts are almost completely separated from each other.Literature consists of numerous inventory development studies to measure spirituality. The fact that the inventory works based on different conceptual foundations makes it difficult to draw a general, meaningful and consistent conclusion about spiritual health and life orientation. Furthermore, spirituality measurements reflecting the religion and values ​​of a particular culture cannot be comprehensive or universal. At this point, Fisher criticizes the measurement tools developed for the purpose of measuring spirituality: in terms of "mixing religion and spirituality", "relying on the world of values", "not taking into account cultural differences", "and questioning only the mystical/spiritual experience". As a result, it can be said that no measurement developed in the conceptual structure of the West does not take into account the cultural flexibility and accept its spiritual values as universal or prevalent.The SHALOM inventory developed by Fisher, which adapted to the Turkish culture in present study, is based on four basic (individual, social, environmental and transcendent) areas that constitute the world of interpersonal relationship. In this study, spirituality, as in Fisher's work, emphasizes the interaction with certain concepts of different intensities that are considered as independent from religion and above religions. In this context, the concept of spirituality communicates with one's personal space, social position, nature, and transcendental power. This adaptation study will provide useful information and comments on the students' spiritual health levels. This is the most important motive behind the idea of adapting the SHALOM inventory developed by Fisher to the Turkish culture. In addition, by adapting the SHALOM inventory, which is emphasized to have cultural flexibility and adapted to different languages, a new and different measurement tool will be available to understand the nature of the concept of spirituality.This research was carried out to adapt the inventory of Spiritual Health and Life Orientation scale developed for students to Turkish culture. This inventory adaptation study was performed with the data collected from three working groups in Ankara and Muş provinces and 1591 high school students. The first study group was carried out with 414, the second study group with 788, and the third group with 389 high school students. While the data collected from 414 students were used for Exploratory Factor Analysis (AFA) analysis, data collected from 788 students were used for Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). In addition, 389 students were used to determine the criterion validity of the inventory. The original language of the SHALOM inventory, which is intended to be adapted into Turkish, is English, and translation studies are conducted separately by three linguistic experts who know the grammar and semantic characteristics of both languages. After the translation studies, the scale was applied to the sampling group and AFA was performed on the sample data. The AFA results showed that a factor roof resembling the original inventory was formed. Determining factors are given appropriate names (personal, enviromental, social and transcendental) by taking into consideration the theoretical names and the dimension names in the original form of the SHALOM. The structure was confirmed by DFA, and as a result of the DFA, X2/sd (1.72) ratio and IFI (0.96) fit indicator was found to be the appropiate fit for the model tested. As a result, it is understood that the Spiritual Health and Life Orientation Inventory consists of four dimensions as in the original inventory, the internal consistency coefficients of the inventory dimensions are in harmony with the original inventory and serve the purpose of the scale. In conclusion the Turkish adaptation of the SHALOM Inventory can be used in different disciplines of psychology, educational sciences, and social sciences. Spirituality should not only be defined within the framework of Western theories, but the nature and likelihood of the spirituality predicted by Islam should be discussed. Moreover, the types and dimensions of Islamic spirituality should be determined by taking into account the cultural subjectivity of an Islamic character. In the study of spirituality, the human model which modernity presents universally should not be accepted as the only truth. It should be tried to develop human models that come from Islamic culture and history and which are specific to us and define us. This should be taken into account not only in mental health / religious studies, but also in psychology of religion in general. In addition, culture-specificity should be given importance, and the experience gained from the cultural accumulation developed by the Turkish civilization with the Islamic doctrine should lead to the studies of spirituality. In this respect, this study aims to adapt the value and spiritual orientation of a different culture to Turkish culture, but it is problematic to construct the concept with Western values. Although Western values are similar to Islamic values and principles, it is envisaged that it may be difficult to measure the concept of spirituality in practice. (shrink)

What are the brain and cognitive systems that allow humans to play baseball, compute square roots, cook soufflés, or navigate the Tokyo subways? It may seem that studies of human infants and of non-human animals will tell us little about these abilities, because only educated, enculturated human adults engage in organized games, formal mathematics, gourmet cooking, or map-reading. In this chapter, we argue against this seemingly sensible conclusion. When human adults exhibit complex, uniquely human, culture-specific skills, they draw on a (...) set of psychological and neural mechanisms with two distinctive properties: they evolved before humanity and thus are shared with other animals, and they emerge early in human development and thus are common to infants, children, and adults. These core knowledge systems form the building blocks for uniquely human skills. Without them we wouldn’t be able to learn about different kinds of games, mathematics, cooking, or maps. To understand what is special about human intelligence, therefore, we must study both the core knowledge systems on which it rests and the mechanisms by which these systems are orchestrated to permit new kinds of concepts and cognitive processes. What is core knowledge? A wealth of research on non-human primates and on human infants suggests that a system of core knowledge is characterized by four properties (Hauser, 2000; Spelke, 2000). First, it is domain-specific: each system functions to represent particular kinds of entities such as conspecific agents, manipulable objects, places in the environmental layout, and numerosities. Second, it is task-specific: each system uses its representations to address specific questions about the world, such as “who is this?” [face recognition], “what does this do?” [categorization of artifacts], “where am I?” [spatial orientation], and “how many are here?” [enumeration]. Third, it is relatively encapsulated: each uses only a subset of the information delivered by an animal’s input systems and sends information only to a subset of the animal’s output systems. (shrink)

In this work, the first of two volumes, Harris attempts to explicitate the world-view implicit in modern science. The second volume, adumbrated at the conclusion of this study, will develop a philosophical synthesis consistent with this world-view. The survey of science, which occupies the bulk of the book, is a masterful tour de force which stresses the striving of every level of reality toward completion on a higher level. His interpretation of physics is generally competent, but tends to (...) rely too heavily on Eddington and on speculative interpretations of general relativity and of the Pauli principle. His evolutionary biology is a sober critical redevelopment of views similar to those which Teilhard de Chardin sketched in glowing prose. In interpreting the findings of neurophysiology and psychology he utilizes Gestalt theory and Piaget's idea of developmental stages. His general conclusion is that mind and thought, the ultimate terms of evolutionary development, must be immanent in every preceding stage, not as consciousness but as rationality. Accordingly, the philosophy modern science requires must be a synthesis, along Hegelian lines, of monism and pluralism, of process and holism. Any philosophy which rests on atomic facts or atomic propositions is, in Harris's opinion, radically incapable of supplying such a synthesis.—E. M. M. (shrink)

In this article, we try to study Clark Pinnock’s point of view in explaining the methodological foundations of the Open Theism Theory with a descriptive-analytical method so that we can have a fair critique of the strengths and weaknesses of this theory while also understanding it correctly. Pinnock can be considered one of the most important theorists and founders of Open Theism. In his view, Open Theism is one of the theological-philosophical theories that have emerged in the critique of the (...) teachings of traditional Christian theology and consider its claims to be logically and narratively contradictory. Pinnock believes that open theists sanctify God as acknowledged in the Bible and that some of the attributes of God in traditional theology should be revised and modified based on the text of the Bible. They believe that God is the God of the Bible; someone who is truly connected to the world, a relationship that requires the most mobility, not immobility. In this view, God is portrayed as a triune relationship-oriented truth, which seeks romantic relationships with human beings and thereby grants them true freedom. Finally, since open theists believe that theology should be understood by the people of the present age, a better explanation of theology depends on reliance on modern philosophy and its effects. In modern philosophy, method and methodology have become very important. In general, methodology is the knowledge that recognizes “how to go” and the fundamental methodology reveals the hidden principles of each theory and creates the basis for its basic critique. Of course, the purpose of this article is specifically to examine the “basics” of Pinnacle’s method, not his “method.” In fact, the report presented by his method is a platform for examining the basics. From the author’s point of view, most of the mistakes that have been made in traditional theology are also reflected in Open Theism; leading in another way! That is to say, most of the objections that Pinnock made to traditional theologians also apply to him. For example, why is it bad to be influenced by Greek philosophy, but Open Theism’s claims can be influenced by modern philosophy? Do ancient philosophy and modern philosophy have precise and acceptable boundaries at all? On what basis do open theists claim that modern philosophy is more acceptable to modern people than ancient philosophy? Can mere simultaneity justify it? If we take as a basis the claim of open theists – that every thought comes “from somewhere” and that no thought is pristine – the encounter of open theists with the text of the Bible is also done with the presuppositions of modern philosophy, and their pivotal mindset has influenced their understanding of the Bible. How can one be sure that the path taken by theology is more correct than the path taken by its predecessors? Since a better understanding of each theory is gained by reflecting on its foundations, in this article we intend to examine the methodological foundations of Open Theism by looking at the book Most Moved Mover. In general, from Pinnock’s point of view, the method of open theism can be based on the three main bases of the critical study of the interpretation of traditional theologians, return to the Bible and overcoming Hellenism, and attention to modern philosophy, which we will describe and critique. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Beyond EngelClinical Pragmatism as the Foundation of Psychiatric PracticeDavid H. Brendel (bio)Keywordsbiopsychosocial model, pluralism, pragmatism, psychiatryFor many years now, there has been growing recognition of the powerful role of pragmatic reasoning in numerous disciplines, including bioethics, medicine, law, political science, and philosophy (Dickstein 1998; Rosenthal, Hausman, and Anderson 1999). But until recently, philosophical pragmatism was neglected by scholars exploring the clinical challenges and theoretical underpinnings of psychiatry. In his (...) noteworthy article The Biopsychosocial Model and Philosophic Pragmatism: Is George Engel a Pragmatist?, Bradley Lewis offers a significant contribution to the small but gradually increasing literature in this area. Lewis appropriately presents Engel as a major figure in twentieth-century American medicine and psychiatry, a critic and a visionary who dared to question the dominant paradigm of biomedical reductionism (Engel 1977)—a paradigm that led to important scientific advances, but also restricted the physician’s understanding of the patient as a complex individual with an inner world and interpersonal relationships. Lewis argues that medicine and psychiatry a generation after Engel’s seminal 1977 paper can be revitalized by reinterpreting Engel in the intellectual tradition of classical American pragmatism and neo-pragmatism. Placing Engel in the pragmatic tradition, Lewis suggests, could enhance the biopsychosocial model and have substantial benefits for both individual patients and society as a whole.There is no disputing Lewis’s argument that a pragmatic philosophy of medicine and psychiatry is a noble goal. In fact, in my book Healing Psychiatry: Bridging the Science/Humanism Divide (Brendel 2006), I present philosophical pragmatism as the most compelling theoretical approach to clinical psychiatry in the twenty-first century—the approach that is most likely to empower the clinician and the patient to collaboratively develop a treatment plan that heeds the multidimensional complexity of the patient’s life, recognizes the confusion and uncertainty that grows out of this complexity, and aims for a favorable therapeutic outcome. Drawing on work of the classical American pragmatists and contemporary pragmatic bioethicists, I identify four dimensions of philosophical pragmatism that provide a sound foundation for clinical work, which I call the “four ps”: (1) diagnostic formulations and treatment plans in psychiatry are practical insofar as they focus on results rather than a commitment to any particular theory; (2) they are pluralistic [End Page 311] insofar as they incorporate explanatory concepts that span the biopsychosocial spectrum; (3) they are participatory and collaborative, not imposed authoritatively by the clinician; and (4) they are provisional, open-ended, and malleable to newly acquired information and evolution of the patient’s condition.Lewis casts Engel as a philosophical pragmatist who battled the Goliath of biomedical reductionism that had come to dominate American medicine and psychiatry in the latter half of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, however, regardless of how elegantly Lewis reinterprets Engel, he cannot render him a full-blown pragmatist for the medicine and psychiatry of the twenty-first century. Lewis provides quotations to suggest that Engel valued a results-oriented clinical sensibility, for example “the value of a scientific model is measured not by whether it is right or wrong but by how useful it is” (Engel 1980). But Engel was not fully committed to clinical outcome as the supreme judge of theory in medicine and psychiatry. Lewis notes that Engel understood the biopsychosocial model as less “a matter of compassion and humanity” and more a matter of “rigorous application of the principles and practices of science”; he was a man of his time who could not fully escape the scientism of the day. Working within this scientistic world, he distinguished himself by reintroducing psychological, sociological, and humanistic concepts into clinical medicine, which had become obsessed with the power and robustness of the natural sciences but had neglected the suffering human subject and the social context of illness. Engel undoubtedly hoped the biopsychosocial model would lead to better clinical results but, unlike the classical American pragmatists and contemporary pragmatic bioethicists, he did not make a systematic case for privileging clinical outcome above strict adherence to scientific theory.In fact, Engel’s biopsychosocial model runs the risk of becoming a reified end in itself; those who unquestioningly espouse its basic tenets are in danger of... (shrink)

Recent anthropological studies consider the corporal experience as an indispensable attribute of a person’s life world. They declare to go beyond the dichotomy of body and mind and present a modern person as a complex integrity of all systems and characteristics of a living organism. Body and mind are a union of vitality with different forms of their manifestation. The corporal is not regarded as an essential complement to the mental, the corporal is the mental, just in a different (...) form of its manifestation. The implementation of a methodological turn from a rationalcognitive approach to a holistic understanding of human nature and the peculiarities of cognitive processes outlines the problem of education transformation in both theoretical and practical terms. Taking into account the complexity and multiplicity of tasks in solving this problem, the guideline in defining conceptual ideas is the understanding of a person as a multi-temporal being who lives simultaneously in multiple hierarchical levels, ontological time and the scale of processes. It is a question of necessity to construct educational activity in semantic planes: mindbody- culture, mind-body-activity, body-consciousness-reaction and others. (shrink)