This review of recent work in the philosophy of science motivated by a commitment to 'naturalism' begins by identifying three key axioms and one theorem shared by philosophers thus self-styled. Owing much to Quine and Ernest Nagel, these philosophers of science share a common agenda with naturalists elsewhere in philosophy. But they have disagreed among themselves about how the axioms and the theorems they share settle long-standing disputes in the philosophy of science. After expounding these disagreements in the work of (...) Boyd, Giere, Laudan, and Kitcher, I argue that naturalism needs to look for more than mere consistency in its foundations. (shrink)

In the insightful and searching paper of Mills and Beatty the following definition of ‘fitness’, as the term figures in the theory of natural selection, is offered:The [individual] fitness of an organism x in environment E equals n =dfn is the expected number of descendants which x will leave in E.

This paper argues that the consensus physicalist antireductionism in the philosophy of biology cannot accommodate the research strategy or indeed the recent findings of molecular developmental biology. After describing Wolperts programmatic claims on its behalf, and recent work by Gehring and others to identify the molecular determinants of development, the paper attempts to identify the relationship between evolutionary and developmental biology by reconciling two apparently conflicting accounts of bio-function – Wrights and Nagels (as elaborated by Cummins). Finally, the paper seeks (...) a way of defending the two central theses of physicalist antireductionism in the light of the research program of molecular developmental biology, by sharply reducing their metaphysical force. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between Friedrich Nietzsche's notion of the agon (Greek for contest) and the construction of athletic ability. In 'Homer's contest', Nietzsche claims that the ancient Greek agon was a contest that included only the most qualified competitors battling each other for honour and victory. Nietzsche seeks to restore the agon in contemporary society. Nietzsche believes that contests have lost this agonistic meaning since they are no more than contrived competitions between underqualified (...) opponents. I am extending the discussion to the domain of sport. If we stage an agon reminiscent of Greek antiquity, we could have a genuine competition between the most qualified athletes. (shrink)

During his atomistic period, Russell felt compelled to include negative facts in his ontology. In this essay, I diagnose the grounds of that compulsion, Assess the cogency of an ontology which includes negative facts, And, Finding it inadequate, Consider finally alternative solutions within the atomistic framework to the root problems of negation.

Philosophers and historians of philosophy have come to recognize that at the core of logical positivism was an attachment to prediction as the necessary condition for scientific knowledge.1 The inheritors of their tradition, especially the Bayesians among us, continue to seek a theory of confirmation that reflects this epistemic commitment. The importance of prediction in the growth of scientific knowledge is a commitment I share with the positivists, so I do not blanch at that designation, much less employ it as (...) a term of abuse. Precisely expressing and conclusively establishing the claims of prediction as a necessary condition for certifying claims as increments of knowledge is a goal that has so far eluded us post-positivists. Philosophers know the problems well: defining a positive instance, distinguishing projectible from nonprojectible predicates, deciding whether retrodiction is as epistemically probative as prediction. 2 But I can't help thinking that these problems are technicalities - important and arresting, but not impediments to embracing the positivist demand that increments in scientific knowledge withstand tests of predictive success. (shrink)

The simplistic assumption that replacing humans by intelligent artifacts or introducing such artifacts, or robots, into all aspects of human society will necessarily benefit society at large must be continually re-evaluated. Clearly, contributing factors will involve concerns of efficiency, the role of work as a component in human self-worth, the distribution of wealth generated by advanced technologies, the potential for growing divisions in society resulting from gross inequities in income and from the loss of work as a central fact of (...) life, and of course, the unpredictability of regular and widespread interactions between humans and artificially intelligent programs and devices. The focus of this paper is an exploration of the future relationship between people and their robots and the anticipated role of ethics. (shrink)

Regulation theories focus primarily on the behavior of regulatory agencies. In this article, the authors elevate the level of analysis to study the disputes these agencies address. This change of analytic level has two advantages. First, it highlights the importance of other forms of dispute resolution. Second, it provides for specific dispute resolution strategies. The article uses systems and behavioral theories as the underpinnings of a broad model of societal regulation that offers strategies for avoiding and managing societal disputes.

To achieve more cost-effective deterrence of unreasonable risktaking through civil liability, I propose and demonstrate previously unrecognized benefits of using simple random sampling to resolve multiple claims against a business or government defendant in the aggregate. I show that counter to intuition and prevailing assumptions and practice, simple sampling will enhance, not compromise, deterrent results regardless of the number of claims and the variety and significance of differences among them. Indeed, it can be used to resolve multiple claims that bear (...) no resemblance to one another except for targeting the same defendant. The proposal can thus be employed to increase the efficiency of resolving relatively similar claims in class and consolidated actions and, by extending the application of such collectivizing processes, lower the cost of resolving all other claims that would be adjudicated as separate actions. I close by sketching a design for a reformed civil liability system that fully integrates and exploits the law enforcement benefits of sampling to better achieve the primary social objectives of accident risk deterrence and insurance. (shrink)

Since the 1970s, the United States has adopted a trade policy agenda that has forced countries to trade away flexible patent provisions for access to US markets. While pharmaceutical companies have argued that the recognition of patent rights is essential for recovering investments in research and development of pharmaceuticals and incentivizing future innovation, the lack of competition has had damaging consequences for public health, as companies tend to set the prices of treatments beyond the reach of consumers and government programs. (...) Thailand and Brazil are bound by law to provide universal access to anti-retroviral treatment (ART) to People Living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA). This has been made possible in part due to the universal health care systems in each country and the countries' local technical and industrial capacities that provide the government with affordable generic medicines. The introduction of stronger intellectual property protection laws however, has limited possibilities for procuring generic medicines and inflated the cost of treatment. Between 2006–2008, Thailand and Brazil used compulsory licensing to authorize generic competition against the consent of the pharmaceutical companies in order to guarantee the right to health and ensure the viability of government health budgets. This paper will demonstrate how the interaction between individual / collective action and structural and institutional elements in Thailand and Brazil produced propitious conditions for each country to assert the primacy of health over patent rights. (shrink)

Drafting a code of ethics for a professional society is a daunting and exhausting task. Whereas the basic components of a professional code of ethics or professional standards are reasonably well understood, the specific details require careful tailoring to meet the needs of a given profession. The difficulty of this process probably explains why such codes are rarely updated. Furthermore, once having produced an updated ethics code, many professional organizations, or perhaps better the associated executive, feel that their work has (...) been completed and that they can now present themselves to their countries and the international community as responsible and even concerned societies. But is their work really over? The answer proposed in this paper is a resounding no. I argue that a professional society must provide active and comprehensive support to its members as they seek to do the right thing. In this regard, the Web pages of the ACM and the IEEE are compared as evidence of each society's commitment to its members. I also argue that professional societies must make this commitment and as importantly, be seen to be making it. (shrink)

As the view that the mind has a physical cause becomes increasingly more difficult to refute, both philosophy and science must face the fact that having experiences, qualia, consciousness in short, is simply not deducible from within our physical theories. Indeed, all the power physics shows for qualitative explanation is adduced from outside the actual formality of its theories. Our physical theories describe vibrations and stochastic correlates of motion, and there is no principled way to explain awareness or the existence (...) of experiencers by mere vibrations or motions. The problem arises because the objectivity of the language of physical theory is antithetical to the subjectivity of consciousness. The gap between them can be understood analogously to the gap between ''is'' and ''ought'' reasoning in ethics. One solution may be to bypass formal languages that attempt to purely deduce consciousness from without, and instead explain it using a pseudo- poetic language that can withstand both physical and introspective interpretation. This paper introduces such a language, and it uses the new language to define an "Ontological Principal." Preface This essay is an attempt to fit consciousness into a physical worldview by expanding our ideas of the nature of the physical world to encompass more than just the descriptions of physics. This is not a reductionist argument in the sense put forth by Fodor in The Language of Thought. Such arguments from the special sciences to physics are of the form 1 ? 2, where the left side of the bi- conditional contains the laws of the special science and the right side contain some kind of bridge laws that lead towards the laws of physics. Fodor gives a convincing argument as to why we should not expect such a reduction for cognitive psychology. The strategy taken here is to explain consciousness by immersing physics inside a larger and less formal view of. (shrink)

In this paper I bring together and discuss claims that David Lewis has made in Counterfactuals, and in “Causation,” and explore a number of difficulties which the views of these two works make for each other. If these difficulties are as serious as I suggest, they will require revision or rejection of the view of causation that Lewis defends.

It is widely held that (1) there are autonomous levels of organization above that of the macromolecule and that (2) at least sometimes macromolecular processes are best explained in terms of such autonomous kinds. I argue that molecular developmental biology honors neither of these claims, and I show that the only way they can be rendered consistent with a minimal physicalism is through the adoption of controversial claims about causation and explanation which undercut the force of these two antireductionism claims.