The aim of this commentary is to contextualise the findings of the study “Emotional intelligence impact on half-marathon finish times”, which concluded that trait emotional intelligence predicted half-marathon finish times above and beyond training. The aim of this commentary is to highlight some methodological and interpretation limitations that may undermine the conclusions of this paper. These limitations are concerning the acknowledgement of previous research, the choice of the variables included in the study, and the over speculation of findings with respect (...) to study design. The first recommendation is related to the acknowledgement of previous research findings. The authors do not recognise several pieces of prior work, which would directly inform their research hypotheses and build on pre-existing knowledge within the field. The first paper of interest which was not mentioned is the systematic review of emotional intelligence in the field of sport and exercise (Laborde, Dosseville, & Allen, 2016). The systematic review discussed the theoretical implications of trait emotional intelligence on short-term and long-term sport performance outcomes. It concluded that trait emotional intelligence, given its trait nature, was more likely to have a stronger influence on long-term outcomes in comparison to short-term outcomes. Short-term outcomes may also be impacted, however it is then critical to provide a convincing rationale about why this may be the case, and to choose... (shrink)

It is often claimed that emotions are linked to formal objects. But what are formal objects? What roles do they play? According to some philosophers, formal objects are axiological properties which individuate emotions, make them intelligible and give their correctness conditions. In this paper, I evaluate these claims in order to answer the above questions. I first give reasons to doubt the thesis that formal objects individuate emotions. Second, I distinguish different ways in which emotions are intelligible and argue that (...) philosophers are wrong in claiming that emotions only make sense when they are based on prior sources of axiological information. Third, I investigate how issues of intelligibility connect with the correctness conditions of emotions. I defend a theory according to which emotions do not respond to axiological information, but to non-axiological reasons. According to this theory, we can allocate fundamental roles to the formal objects of emotions while dispensing with the problematic features of other theories. (shrink)

This monograph is a detailed study, and systematic defence, of the Growing Block Theory of time (GBT), first conceived by C.D. Broad. The book offers a coherent, logically perspicuous and ideologically lean formulation of GBT, defends it against the most notorious objections to be found in the extant philosophical literature, and shows how it can be derived from a more general theory, consistent with relativistic spacetime, on the pre-relativistic assumption of an absolute and total temporal order. -/- The authors devise (...) axiomatizations of GBT and its competitors which, against the backdrop of a shared quantified tense logic, significantly improves the prospects of their comparative assessment. Importantly, neither of these axiomatizations involves commitment to properties of presentness, pastness or futurity. The authors proceed to address, and defuse, a number of objections that have been marshaled against GBT, including the so-called epistemic objection according to which the theory invites skepticism about our temporal location. The challenge posed by relativistic physics is met head-on, by replacing claims about temporal variation by claims about variation across spacetime. -/- The book aims to achieve the greatest possible rigor. The background logic is set out in detail, as are the principles governing the notions of precedence and temporal location. The authors likewise devise a novel spacetime logic suited for the articulation, and comparative assessment, of relativistic theories of time. The book comes with three technical appendices which include soundness and completeness proofs for the systems corresponding to GBT and its competitors, in both their pre-relativistic and relativistic forms. -/- The book is primarily directed at researchers and graduate students working on the philosophy of time or temporal logic, but is of interest to metaphysicians and philosophical logicians more generally. (shrink)

Social learning is likely to include affective processes: it is necessary for newcomers to discover what value to attach to objects, persons, and events in a given social environment. This learning relies largely on the evaluation of others’ emotional expressions. This study has two objectives. Firstly, we compare two closely related concepts that are employed to describe the use of another person’s appraisal to make sense of a given situation: social appraisal and social referencing. We contend that social referencing constitutes (...) a type of social appraisal. Secondly, we introduce the concept of affective social learning with the hope that it may help to discriminate the different ways in which emotions play a critical role in the processes of socialization. (shrink)

It is not the purpose of this article to evaluate the techno-scientific claims of the transhumanists. Instead, I question seriously the nature of the ethics and morals they claim can, or soon will, be manipulated artificially. I argue that while the possibility to manipulate human behavior via emotional processes exists, the question still remains concerning the content of morality. In other words, neural moral enhancement does not capture the fullness of human moral psychology, which includes moral capacity and moral content. (...) In this article, I revisit the debate between Hume and Kant concerning the role of emotions and reason in moral philosophy. I do so with reference to the work of philosopher Alasdair McIntyre. His moral philosophy has long stood as an essential text in virtue ethics, which constitutes the basis for my critique of the promise to engineer virtues (what I call “neural moral enhancement”). First, I outline three specific shifts that occurred in the history of Western moral philosophy in order to contextualize current debates on the nature of morality/moral agency. Second, I summarize MacIntyre's critique of contemporary moral philosophy and show its relevance to an assessment of neural moral enhancement. Finally I argue that moral neuroenhancement is a one-dimensional conceptualization of moral agency that does not reflect the fullness of human moral psychology. It envisions a world in which individual moral capacities will be enhanced and controlled but says nothing about the nature of the morality. (shrink)

We argue that the main objections against two central tenets of a Jamesian account of the emotions, i.e. that (1) different types of emotions are associated with specific types of bodily feelings (Specificity), and that (2) emotions are constituted by patterns of bodily feeling (Constitution), do not succeed. In the first part, we argue that several reasons adduced against Specifity, including one inspired by Schachter and Singer’s work, are unconvincing. In the second part, we argue that Constitution, too, can withstand (...) most of the objections raised against it, including the objection that bodily feelings cannot account for the outward-looking and evaluative nature of emotions. In both sections, we argue that the kinds of felt bodily changes posited by a Jamesian account of emotions are best understood in terms of felt states of action-readiness. (shrink)

En 1995, le premier numéro de notre nouvelle revue Clio. Histoire, Femmes et Sociétés, s’attachait à comprendre ce que la guerre avait à voir avec le genre. L’éditorial de Françoise Thébaud inscrivait cette première livraison, intitulée « Résistances et Libérations France 1940-1945 » dans les cérémonies du cinquantième anniversaire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, regrettant le quasi oubli de l’instauration du suffrage universel en 1944 et la rareté des travaux français sur les femmes durant ce...

The most salient aspect of memory is its role in preserving previously acquired information so as to make it available for further activities. Anna realizes that something is amiss in a book on Roman history because she learned and remembers that Caesar was murdered. Max turned up at the party and distinctively remembers where he was seated, so he easily gets his hands on his lost cell phone. The fact that information is not gained anew distinguishes memory from perception. The (...) fact that information is preserved distinguishes memory from imagination. But how do acquisition and retrieval of information contribute to the phenomenology of memory?The exclusive aim of this chapter is to sketch a map of the phenomenology of memory. It is structured as follows. In section 1, I introduce the contrast between content (what is remembered) and psychological attitude (remembering). This distinction will be helpful in disentangling issues in the phenomenology of memory. Section 2 is devoted to the contribution of memory content to phenomenology, section 3 to the contribution of the attitude of remembering. (shrink)

Say that two sentences are factually equivalent when they describe the same facts or situations, understood as worldly items, i.e. as bits of reality rather than as representations of reality. The notion of factual equivalence is certainly of central interest to philosophical semantics, but it plays a role in a much wider range of philosophical areas. What is the logic of factual equivalence? This paper attempts to give a partial answer to this question, by providing an answer the following, more (...) specific question: Given a standard propositional language with negation, conjunction and disjunction as primitive operators, which sentences of the language should be taken to be factually equivalent by virtue of their logical form? The system for factual equivalence advocated in this paper is a proper fragment of the first-degree system for the logic of analytic equivalence put forward in the late seventies by R. B. Angell. I provide the system with two semantics, both formulated in terms of the notion of a situation’s being fittingly described by a linguistic item. In the final part of the paper I argue, contra a view I defended in my “Grounding and Truth-Functions”, that the logic for factual equivalence I advocate here should be preferred to Angell’s logic if one wishes to follow the general conception of the relationships between factual equivalence and the notion of grounding put forward in the 2010 paper. (shrink)

The fiduciary nature of the patient-physician relationship requires clinicians to act in the best interest of their patients. Patients are vulnerable due to their health status and lack of medical knowledge, which makes them dependent on the clinicians’ expertise. Competent patients, however, may reject the recommendations of their physician, either refusing beneficial medical interventions or procedures based on their personal views that do not match the perceived medical indication. In some instances, the patients’ refusal may jeopardize their health or life (...) but also compromise the clinician’s moral responsibility to promote the patient’s best interests. In other words, health professionals have to deal with patients whose behavior and healthcare decisions seem counterproductive for their health, or even deteriorate it, because of lack of knowledge, bad habits or bias without being the patients’ free voluntary choice. The moral dilemma centers on issues surrounding the limits of the patient’s autonomy (rights) and the clinician’s role to promote the well-being of the patient (duties). In this paper we argue that (1) the use of manipulative strategies, albeit considered beneficent, defeats the purpose of patient education and therefore should be rejected; and (2) the appropriate strategy is to empower patients through patient education which enhances their autonomy and encourages them to become full healthcare partners as opposed to objects of clinical intervention or entities whose values or attitudes need to be shaped and changed through education. First, we provide a working definition of the concept of patient education and a brief historical overview of its origin. Second, we examine the nature of the patient-physician relationship in order to delineate its boundaries, essential for understanding the role of education in the clinical context. Third, we argue that patient education should promote self-rebiasing, enhance autonomy, and empower patients to determine their therapeutic goals. Finally, we develop a moral framework for patient education. (shrink)

Fabrice Teroni,Julien Deonna | : Selon l’analyse FA des concepts évaluatifs, notre conception d’un objet comme ayant une valeur donnée est la conception d’une certaine attitude évaluative appropriée à son endroit. Cet article examine deux défis que doit relever cette analyse. Le défi psychologique exige de l’analyse qu’elle fasse appel à des attitudes qui soient à même d’éclairer nos concepts évaluatifs, tout en ne présupposant pas la maîtrise de ces mêmes concepts. Le défi normatif réclame quant à lui que (...) la compréhension du caractère approprié des attitudes pertinentes s’articule autour d’une forme de normativité intimement liée à la nature de ces attitudes, sans pour autant dépendre de la maîtrise des concepts évaluatifs analysés. Afin d’établir si l’analyse FA peut relever ces défis, nous commençons par clarifier la nature des attitudes auxquelles il convient de faire appel. Dans la première section, nous considérons des attitudes génériques comme les désirs et présentons des raisons de privilégier des attitudes plus spécifiques, à savoir les émotions. La suite de la discussion évalue la plausibilité d’une analyse FA souscrivant à l’une ou l’autre des approches contemporaines en théorie des émotions. La deuxième section souligne qu’il est difficile d’associer l’analyse FA aux théories en termes de contenu évaluatif et la troisième présente les atouts d’une théorie en termes d’attitudes évaluatives. Dans la dernière section, nous revenons au défi normatif et esquissons une manière de le relever. | : According to the FA analysis of evaluative concepts, our conception of an object as having a given value is the conception of a given evaluative attitude towards it as being appropriate. In this paper, we explore two challenges that this analysis has to take up. The psychological challenge requires that the analysis appeal to attitudes that are apt to shed light on our evaluative concepts while not presupposing the mastery of these same concepts. The normative challenge requires that we understand the appropriateness of the relevant attitudes in terms of a kind of normativity intimately related to these attitudes, again without this presupposing the mastery of the relevant evaluative concepts. To determine whether the FA analysis can meet these challenges, we start by clarifying the sort of attitudes the analysis should appeal to. In section 1, we consider generic attitudes like desires and give some reasons to favor more specific attitudes, namely emotions. The ensuing discussion assesses the prospects of an FA analysis in light of contemporary accounts of emotions. In section 2, we argue that the FA analysis should not be combined with accounts according to which emotions have evaluative contents and then offer, in section 3, some reasons for combining the FA with an account in terms of evaluative attitudes. In section 4, we show how this allows for solving the normative challenge. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to explore in a systematic way the rationality of emotions elicited when we engage with works of fiction. I first lay out the approach to the emotions on which my discussion is premised. Next, I concentrate on two facets of emotional rationality—the first pertains to the relation between emotions and the mental states on which they are based, the second to the relation between emotions and the judgements and behaviour they elicit. These observations about (...) emotional rationality are then applied to emotions elicited by works of fiction. After having distinguished several families of emotions, I concentrate on what I call blob-emotions and emotions-for. I argue that, given their nature as direct responses to a restricted range of stimuli, blob-emotions are not irrational. As regards emotions-for fictional entities, I emphasize that a subject’s rationality shows in the way her emotions-for respond to evidence. On this basis, I discard an influential reason to think that emotions-for fictional entities are irrational. Finally, I offer an argument to conclude that they are typically correct and rational. (shrink)

Many philosophers hold that physical laws have a unique modal status known as nomic necessity which is weaker than metaphysical necessity. This orthodox view has come into question in the past few decades. In particular, the metaphysical view known as essentialism has provided an argument that the laws of nature are necessary in the strongest possible sense. It seems obvious to many that at least some essentialist arguments in favor of the necessity of scientific claims are going to be sound. (...) For example, the view that claims like "water is H2O" are necessary has itself 2 become an orthodox view. However, the question of whether laws, like the law of conservation of energy, or the law of gravity, are necessary is far more contentious. Philosophers divide roughly into two camps, law necessitarians1 who hold that the laws are necessary in the strongest sense and contingency theorists who hold that they are at least in some sense contingent. One argument for the necessitarian position is via an essentialist theory of the transworld identity of properties. In this paper I defend such a theory of the identity of properties and its necessitarian consequences from one major criticism. To focus the paper, I center the discussion on a single critic, E. J. Lowe. In his book, The Four Category Ontology, he offers a criticism of the essentialist argument for necessitarianism via an analogy with other forms of transworld identity and intuitions about the contingency of the physical constants2. I undermine the usefulness of Lowe's analogy by examining the purposes of attributions of properties. I also show that the essentialist's position can allow it to accommodate the intuitions of contingency in a way that fits best with the purpose behind property attributions. (shrink)

There is a growing literature in neuroethics dealing with the problem of cognitive neuroenhancement for healthy adults. However, discussions on this topic have tended to focus on abstract theoretical positions while concrete policy proposals and detailed models are scarce. Furthermore, discussions tend to rely solely on data from the US, while international perspectives are mostly neglected. Therefore, there is a need for a volume that deals with cognitive enhancement comprehensively in three important ways: a) with conceptual implications stemming from different (...) points of view; b) with ethical, social and legal perspectives that would not be limited to one part of the world but reflect on the current situation in countries in Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America and South America; and c) with discussions of concrete law and policy options. Contributors for the conceptual implications section will elaborate an important general issue (e.g. ethical acceptability of direct-to-consumer-marketing in case of cognitive enhancement drugs). Contributors for international perspectives section will provide a clear discussion on normative issues and cultural values, along with an analysis of empirical data on public attitudes on cognitive enhancement and/or prevalence (specific to the country in question). Contributors for law and policy section will offer a justification for the general policy type they argue for (1. prohibition, 2. discourage use, 3. laissez-faire, 4. encourage use, and 5. mandatory use) in the case of specific cognitive enhancement measure. Furthermore, they would evaluate the possible impact of a detailed regulatory model on consumption and demand, fairness in competitive settings and the social pressure to enhance. (shrink)

Recent metaphysics has turned its focus to two notions that are—as well as having a common Aristotelian pedigree—widely thought to be intimately related: grounding and essence. Yet how, exactly, the two are related remains opaque. We develop a unified and uniform account of grounding and essence, one which understands them both in terms of a generalized notion of identity examined in recent work by Fabrice Correia, Cian Dorr, Agustín Rayo, and others. We argue that the account comports with antecedently (...) plausible principles governing grounding, essence, and identity taken individually, and illuminates how the three interact. We also argue that the account compares favorably to an alternative unification of grounding and essence recently proposed by Kit Fine. (shrink)

This paper explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology so as to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, we focus on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is angry at Maria’s nasty remark. The first feature relates to the fact that anger is a negative emotion, by contrast with positive emotions such as joy and admiration (valence). The second feature is how anger differs from other emotions such (...) as sadness, fear and joy (individuation). The third concerns the objects of anger and the sense in which anger discloses the significance of Maria’s remark to Sam (intentionality). Finally, there is anger’s relation to behaviour (motivation). Does focussing on emotional phenomenology encourage specific accounts of these features? We shall see that there are reasons to think it does. Still, are these reasons of sufficient import to dispel the scepticism of those who think that nothing of consequence plays out at the personal level of emotional experience? Given the role of emotional experience in our evaluative practices, we shall conclude that they are. Our discussion is structured as follows: section 1 focuses on feeling approaches to phenomenology, section 2 on componential approaches, section 3 on perceptual approaches and section 4 on attitudinal approaches. Section 5 concludes with some observations regarding the significance of emotional phenomenology. (shrink)

According to semantic antirealism, intuitionistic logic satisfies the requirement that truth should be constrained by provability in principle. Some philosophers have argued that semantic antirealism must be committed to effective provability and that the commitment leads to a stronger kind of logical revisionism exemplified by substructural logics. I shall take into account two different kinds of reply. The first is concerned with meaning per se and grasp or fixing of meaning. It rests on the idea that if we have a (...) method which may be used over some surveyable range, we have determined a way of applying the method everywhere in principle, and that this is enough as far as fixing or grasping meaning is concerned. The second concerns two radical antirealist principles disqualifying structural rules: Token Preservation and Preservation of Local Feasibility. Against criticisms, I shall argue that conceptual support may be provided for both. The main point in this debate is that there is a decisive difference between the rejection of classical logic via the curbing of the epistemic idealizations embedded in structural rules and the rejection of classical logic via the intuitionistic criticism of invalid introduction and elimination rules. It will be explained why the second rejection is stronger than the former. (shrink)

I provide and defend two natural accounts of fundamentality for facts that do justice to the idea that the “degree of fundamentality” enjoyed by a fact is a matter of how far, from a ground-theoretic perspective, the fact is from the ungrounded facts.

This paper suggests that the enactive approach to ethics could benefit from engaging a dialogue with the phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas, a philosopher who has given ethics a decisive role in the understanding of our social life. Taking the enactive approach of Colombetti and Torrance as a starting point, we show how Levinas’ philosophy, with the key notions of face, otherness, and responsibility among others can complement and enrich the enactive view of ethics. Specifically, we argue that Levinas can provide, (...) on the one hand, a phenomenological characterisation of ethics itself, of its nature and fundamental meaning, and on the other, an account of how sociality, affectivity and embodiment, as presented in Colombetti and Torrance’s work, combine to bring about the ethical experience. However, we also point out that introducing Levinas to the enactive approach could be challenging. It is not obvious how sense-making and value-making, as centred on the precariousness and potential death of the subject, would account for the ethical experience as grounded on the precariousness and potential death of the other. (shrink)

The benefits of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in medicine are unquestionable and it is unlikely that the pace of its development will slow down. From better diagnosis, prognosis, and prevention to more precise surgical procedures, AI has the potential to offer unique opportunities to enhance patient care and improve clinical practice overall. However, at this stage of AI technology development it is unclear whether it will de-humanize or re-humanize medicine. Will AI allow clinicians to spend less time on administrative tasks and (...) technology related procedures and more time being present in person to attend to the needs of their patients? Or will AI dramatically increase the presence of smart technology in the clinical context to a point of undermining the humane dimension of the patient–physician relationship? In this brief commentary, we argue that technological solutions should be only integrated into clinical medicine if they fulfill the following three conditions: (1) they serve human ends; (2) they respect personal identity; and (3) they promote human interaction. These three conditions form the moral imperative of humanity. (shrink)

Fabrice Virgili (Q) : Elisabeth Elgán, comme historienne des mouvements sociaux et du féminisme suédois dans les années 1970, vous avez bien voulu à l’occasion du 2e Congrès de l’Institut du genre qui s’est réuni à Angers à la fin août 2019 revenir sur le #MeToo en Suède. Pouvez-vous d’abord nous rappeler dans quel contexte apparaît ce #? Elisabeth Elgán (EE) : Il est encore un peu tôt pour avoir des recherches approfondies sur ce mouvement, il s’agit donc d’une (...) réflexion fondée sur mes prop... (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers are attracted by the Indispensability Claim, according to which emotions are indispensable in acquiring knowledge of some important values. The truth of this claim is often thought to depend on that of Emotional Dogmatism, the view that emotions justify evaluative judgements because they (seem to) make us aware of the relevant values. The aim of this paper is to show that the Indispensability Claim does not stand or fall with Emotional Dogmatism and that there is actually an attractive (...) alternative way of developing it. We first argue that the Indispensability Claim requires a deflationary account of the cognitive bases of emotions, which we call the Simple View and defend against a variety of criticisms. Armed with the Simple View, we show that the Indispensability Claim is made true by three roles of the emotions: they help us access the relevant evidence, provide a needed hook-up between evidence and judgement, and contribute to evaluative understanding. (shrink)

We argue that sensitivity to the distinction between the tensed notion of being something and the tensed notion of being located at the present time serves as a good antidote to confusions in debates about time and existence, in particular in the debate about how to characterise presentism, and saves us the trouble of going through unnecessary epicycles. Both notions are frequently expressed using the tensed verb ‘to exist’, making it systematically ambiguous. It is a commendable strategy to avoid using (...) that verb altogether in these contexts and to use quantification and a location predicate instead. (shrink)

It would be a good thing to have at our disposal a general theory of location that is neutral with respect to the view that some objects have more than one exact location, the view that some objects are located without having an exact location, and the view that some objects are “spanners”—where a spanner is an object exactly located at a region that has proper parts but which has no proper part exactly located at a proper part of the (...) region. As far as I know, no theory of location that can be found in the literature has this feature. I put forward a new theory that does—or so I argue. The theory takes as its sole locational primitive the notion of being entirely located at. (shrink)

We argue that presentism, understood as a view about time and existence, can perspicuously be defined in opposition to all other familiar contenders without appeal to any notion of presentness or cognate notions such as concreteness. Given recent worries about the suitability of such notions to cut much metaphysical ice, this should be welcomed by presentism's defenders. We also show that, irrespective of its sparse ideology, the proposed formulation forestalls any deviant interpretation at odds with the view it aims to (...) capture. (shrink)

Rien de surprenant qu’à l’occasion du centenaire de la Première Guerre mondiale, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, qui a tant contribué depuis plus de deux décennies au renouvellement de l’histoire de ce conflit, publie un nouvel opus. L’auteur, qui a toujours défendu la dimension matricielle de la Grande Guerre pour le xxe siècle, l’envisage ici du point de vue de l’histoire personnelle, la sienne et celle de sa famille. Il nous livre donc un récit de filiation sur trois générations marquées par les...

La question n'est plus : 'L'écologie, pour ou contre?' Le label vert a partout remplacé le label rouge (ou bleu ciel). La question est : 'Quelle écologie?' Or il y a là un problème, et même un 'problème à cornes,' selon la formule de Nietzsche : peut-on vraiment fonder l'écologie sur la Nature, dont la notion est si ambivalente? Elle n'a pas attendu l'homme pour produire cinq extinctions massives. Laissée à elle-même, elle éteindra tout, y compris les étoiles. Par ailleurs, (...) s'il faut bien sauvegarder les espèces dans leur admirable diversité, est-ce uniquement dans un but de conservation? La seule conservation eût été la finalité de la Nature que la vie n'aurait même pas dû commencer: une pierre dès le départ était plus performante. Et si le sens du vivant ne se trouvait pas tant dans la conservation que dans l'exposition de soi--et une exposition glorieuse--, jusqu'au sacrifice? Si la Madone était plus vraie que la Méduse? Fabrice Hadjadj nous offre ici une puissante méditation sur le vivant, l'interdépendance spirituelle de l'homme et des bêtes, la relation entre écologie et eschatologie. A travers une approche à la fois philosophique et biblique, il pense une tragédie heureuse, où il ne s'agit pas de donner pour durer, mais de durer pour donner encore.. En bref, il prend le taureau par les cornes."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

A long-standing debate surrounds the question as to what justifies memory judgements. According to the Past Reason Theory, these judgements are justified by the reasons we had to make identical judgements in the past, whereas the Present Reason Theory claims that these justifying reasons are to be found at the time we pass the memory judgements. In this paper, I defend the original claim that, far from being exclusive, these two theories should be applied to different kinds of memory judgements. (...) The Past Reason Theory offers the most appealing account of justified propositional memory judgements, while the Present Reason Theory provides the best approach to justified episodic memory judgements. One outcome of my discussion is thus that memory is not epistemologically unified and my argument in favour of this conclusion connects with the issues of internalism, reliabilism and the basing relation. (shrink)

Realism about tense is the view that the contrast between what was, what is and what will be the case is real, and not merely a projection of our ways of thinking. Does this view entail realism about temporal passage, namely the view that time really passes, in the same sense of ‘real’? We argue that the answer is affirmative for many versions of tense realism, and indeed for all sensible versions. We thereby address an important conceptual issue regarding these (...) two forms of realism and rebut recent claims that tense realism is compatible with anti-realism about temporal passage. (shrink)

Grounding is a hyperintensional notion: necessarily equivalent sentences need not be equivalent from a ground-theoretic perspective. How fine-grained, exactly, is grounding? There is a striking lack of consensus on this question. In this chapter, I try to systematize and review the main options that have been put forward in the literature. For reasons that have to do with both naturalness and convenience, I for the most part take the question to be about what is sometimes called, following Kit Fine’s (2012a) (...) terminology, strict full grounding, and I take for granted a conception of grounding as a relation that is many-to-one and non-factive. I discuss the consequences of making alternative assumptions only in the very last section. (shrink)

Fabrice Jotterand; Bioethics and the Coming Age of Thresholding, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality, Volume 8, Issue 3, 1 January 2.

Si un philosophe a fondé son oeuvre sur la conscience historique, c'est bien Raymond Aron. Le rapprochement entre Aron et la post-modernité pourrait surprendre. Il en va tout autrement si l'on considère la conception historique de la post-modernité : celle-ci suit logiquement les Temps Modernes. Elle comprend alors les deux siècles de tensions idéologiques qui ont suivi 1789, jusqu'à la chute du mur de Berlin. Raymond Aron a commenté et pensé les convulsions apocalyptiques du dernier siècle post-moderne. D'où l'idée de (...) le considérer sous plusieurs angles : face au basculement du monde, la critique des idéologies (D. Steinmetz-Jenkins), la théorie des relations internationales (O. Rosenboim), son jugement sur la "tragédie algérienne" (O. Dard). Mais Aron est aussi sensible aux permanences, à ce qui ne bascule pas : c'est un penseur de la nation et des identités régionales, qui s'interroge sur sa propre judéité (G. De Ligio). La philosophie d'Aron, où l'historien est créateur et incarné, présente une analogie avec la théologie chrétienne : Pierre Manent décrit la relation d'Aron au christianisme. Enfin, Aron reste un intellectuel tout engagé dans la défense de la liberté, ce qu'explorent deux contributions : sur ce qu'il doit au libéralisme d'Edmund Burke (M. Oppermann), et sur sa recherche d'une stratégie modérée chez l'historien Hans Delbrück (J. Mouric). Encadrées par l'introduction de Fabrice Bouthillon et la conclusion de Pascal David, ces études esquissent les traits d'une pensée subtile : sceptique contre le dogmatisme des idéologies totalitaires, mais non relativiste, attachée à l'historicité, sans tomber dans le déterminisme historique. Ce volume est issu de la journée d'études du 18 novembre 2014 à l'Université de Bretagne occidentale à Brest."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Pour de nombreuses théories contemporaines, la nature est devenue le Deus ex machina. Nos sentiments, nos comportements et notre pensée dépendraient de la vie, des mutations, de la sélection naturelle, de la sélection de groupe. Adaptation, mutations, fonctions, utilité, rapport coût/bénéfice, régulation affective ou sociale : ce lexique n'est plus inconnu pour l'amateur. Cet ouvrage prétend repenser l'évolution de l'homme dans un contexte plus différent...

Some of the most eminent and enduring philosophical questions concern matters of priority: what is prior to what? What 'grounds' what? Is, for instance, matter prior to mind? Recently, a vivid debate has arisen about how such questions have to be understood. Can the relevant notion or notions of priority be spelled out? And how do they relate to other metaphysical notions, such as modality, truth-making or essence? This volume of new essays, by leading figures in contemporary metaphysics, is the (...) first to address and investigate the metaphysical idea that certain facts are grounded in other facts. An introduction introduces and surveys the debate, examining its history as well as its central systematic aspects. The volume will be of wide interest to students and scholars of metaphysics. (shrink)

This volume features essays about and by Paul Benacerraf, whose ideas have circulated in the philosophical community since the early nineteen sixties, shaping key areas in the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of logic, and epistemology. The book started as a worskhop held in Paris at the Collège de France in May 2012 with the participation of Paul Benacerraf. The introduction addresses the methodological point of the legitimate use of so-called “Princess Margaret Premises” in drawing philosophical (...) conclusions from Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. The book is then divided into three sections. The first is devoted to an assessment of the improved version of the original dilemma of “Mathematical Truth” due to Hartry Field: the challenge to the platonist is now to explain the reliability of our mathematical beliefs given the very subject matter of mathematics, either pure or applied. The second addresses the issue of the ontological status of numbers: Frege’s logicism, fictionalism, structuralism, and Bourbaki’s theory of structures are called up for an appraisal of Benacerraf’s negative conclusions of “What Numbers Could Not Be.” The third is devoted to supertasks and bears witness to the unique standing of Benacerraf’s first publication: “Tasks, Super-Tasks, and Modern Eleatics” in debates on Zeno’s paradox and associated paradoxes, infinitary mathematics, and constructivism and finitism in the philosophy of mathematics. Two yet unpublished essays by Benacerraf have been included in the volume: an early version of “Mathematical Truth” from 1968 and an essay on “What Numbers Could Not Be” from the mid 1970’s. A complete chronological bibliography of Benacerraf’s work to 2016 is provided.Essays by Jody Azzouni, Paul Benacerraf, Justin Clarke-Doane, Sébastien Gandon, Brice Halimi, Jon Pérez Laraudogoitia, Mary Leng, Antonio Leòn-Sànchez and Ana Leòn-Mejía, Marco Panza, Fabrice Pataut, Philippe de Rouilhan, Andrea Sereni, and Stewart Shapiro. (shrink)

Les livres consacrés à l’histoire du contrôle des naissances pullulent depuis plusieurs années mais rares sont ceux qui échappent à la simple monographie et fournissent des perspectives analytiques susceptibles d’enrichir le champ des recherches. L’ouvrage de Nicole Bourbonnais est de ceux-là et il mérite de trouver un public au-delà des spécialistes, sinon du sujet, du moins de l’aire considérée. Les quatre îles des « British West Indies » passées au crible (Bermudes, Barbade, Jamaïque et T...

A l'âge où les sciences du cerveau et de la cognition apportent de fascinantes révélations sur les fondements matériels de la nature humaine, est-il possible pour la sociologie de continuer à réfléchir en vase clos, hors de l'effervescence scientifique qu’entraînent ces découvertes? Les auteurs qui s’expriment dans cet ouvrage exposent leurs points de vue argumentés sur le lien entre sciences de la cognition et sciences du social et sur les conditions d’élaboration d’une véritable sociologie cognitive. La diversité des perspectives offre (...) un état des lieux passionnant sur une "querelle des disciplines" qui n’a jamais vraiment cessé de hanter la sociologie. (shrink)

North American Indians have often been perceived as violent, bloodthirsty human beings. The horrified fascination exerted by this violence on the European imagination takes hold of all historical accounts and lies at the heart of the smallest social productions. The sports games, whose imposing corpus is intriguing to the colonists, are also perceived as a cultural element of this gratuitous violence, a biological one, even, as inherent to their “wild nature”. And yet, far from being instinctual, this violence takes on (...) a ritual and propitiatory dimension that is at the same time at the service of private interests, but also, and especially so, of tribal ones. By taking possession of the lacrosse game through its institutionalization, Canadians hope to control the violence of this emblematic game-ritual. Despite a deep transformation of the game, the instinctual manifestations in the human relationships that are supposed to decline through the internalization of restrictions subsist. The original game still seems to express itself through this violence-based relationship, no matter how codified. Drawing on archives ranging from missiological writings to anthropological documents, as well as on recent academic studies, this article tries to dispel the defining halo of a violence sometimes confused with distinct forms of aggressivity. (shrink)

La fin du marxisme en tant qu'"horizon de notre temps" a ouvert une période souvent appelée "post-moderne". Elle couvre approximativement les années 1970 à 2000 et se caractérise par la déconstruction. On observe ensuite un attrait renouvelé de la synthèse, pour diverses raisons : l'expérience totalitaire n'est plus aussi centrale, pour les nouvelles générations ; la multiplication des approches et la déconstruction généralisée a aussi fait perdre le sens global de notre époque, débouchant sur ce que certains auteurs appellent le (...) parcellitarisme ; l'émergence des anciens pays en développement sur la scène internationale apporte un regard neuf et partiellement extérieur à l'Occident, mettant en lumière ce que cette zone culturelle a de particulier et mettant à mal l'universalisme revendiqué. Cet ouvrage entend contribuer à l'effort et tenter un bilan synthétique et dialectique de la question de l'émancipation, à l'époque de la mondialisation et de la crise écologique. Il procède en trois étapes : un bilan du libéralisme, dans sa critique du conservatisme (thèse) ; un bilan des marxismes et post-marxismes, dans leur critique du libéralisme (antithèse) ; et une troisième partie de synthèse, se situant dans le prolongement théorique d'un ouvrage précédent sur l'écologisme, où l'auteur propose de réarticuler des concepts tels qu'autorité, religion, politique, science, culture et sacré, afin d'éclairer d'un jour nouveau la question de l'émancipation. La conclusion rejoint Gramsci et d'autres pour qui l'émancipation réside dans le fait d'agir en vérité. Cette affirmation apparemment simple se fonde sur un concept cosmologique de vérité élaboré principalement sur la base des travaux de Laclau, Sartre et de Whitehead. Il ouvre des pistes pour penser l'articulation de l'un et du multiple, dans une perspective résolument non relativiste."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

L'ouvrage invite à penser l'épistémologie non classique des mathématiques comme une construction épistémique des mathématiques quasi empirique qu'Imré Lakatos a réalisé au moyen des présupposés ontologiques (comme la redécouverte du temps, le passage du déterminisme à l'indéterminisme, etc.) et qu'il réussit grâce à l'implémentation du principe de complexité dialectique de l'esprit mathématique. L'auteur étudie la thèse selon laquelle, depuis le début du XXe siècle, la science est aussi bien objective que subjective. Et c'est à partir de celle-ci que le principe (...) de "la complexité dialectique de l'esprit mathématique" est mis au jour pour dévoiler le constructivisme de Lakatos. (shrink)

Anti-realists about the past claim that no one has yet manifested a knowledge of the truth of tensed instances of the realist schema '‡,' instances such as '‡. It is true that we cannot decide specific instances of the realist schema and that, consequently, neither our understanding of these instances, nor our knowledge of their truth may be constituted by the recognitional and executive capacities which, according to Michael Dummett's antirealism, constitute grasp of meaning. Although we cannot decide these issues, (...) we can meet Dummett's anti-realist's manifestability challenge by arguing for them from contingency. While no recognitional and decisional skills may constitute our knowledge that their truth-conditions are satisfied, we can, without begging the question, derive that knowledge from our folk and scientific theories of the workings of nature. The evidence we have in favor of the fact that evidential relations between us and past facts are naturally contingent allows us to infer tensed instances of the fundamental realist modal claim. The joint possibility of truth and undecideability pro tempora is a natural possibility and, thereby, a logical and metaphysical possibility. (shrink)