This book makes explicit the ecological implications of Martin Heidegger. It examines how the trajectory of Heidegger's thinking harbors an "ecological turn," which comes to the forefront in his attempt to anticipate the impending crisis precipitated by modern technology. Schalow's emphasis on such key motifs as stewardship, dwelling, and 'letting be' serves to coalesce the problem of freedom in a new and innovative way, in order to expand the interpretive or hermeneutic horizon for re-examining Heidegger's philosophy. By prioritizing a response (...) to today's environmental crisis and the possible impact upon future generations, the author traverses a divide within Heidegger scholarship by developing a deeper, critical outlook on his philosophy--without either reiterating standard interpretations or rejecting it wholesale. He develops a trans-human approach to ethics, which, by prioritizing the welfare of the earth, nature, and animals, counters the anthropocentric bias and destructive premise of modern technology. Heidegger's Ecological Turn will be of interest to Heidegger scholars and researchers working in phenomenology, hermeneutics, continental philosophy, and environmental philosophy. (shrink)

This book addresses an epidemic that has developed on a global scale, and, which under the heading of “addiction,” presents a new narrative about the travails of the human predicament. The book introduces phenomenological motifs, such as desire, embodiment, and temporality, to uncover the existential roots of addiction, and develops Martin Heidegger’s insights into technology to uncover the challenge of becoming a self within the impulsiveness and depersonalization of our digital age. By charting a new path of philosophical inquiry, the (...) book allows a pervasive, cultural phenomenon, ordinarily reserved to psychology, to speak as a referendum about the danger which technology poses to us on a daily basis. In this regard, addiction ceases to be merely a clinical malady, and instead becomes a “signpost” to exposing a hidden danger posed by the assimilation of our culture within a technological framework. (shrink)

In this study, the author shows new entry points to the dialogue between Kant and Heidegger. Schalow takes up the question: "Why should a philosopher like Kant, for whom language seemed to be almost inconsequential, become the crucial counter point for a thinker like Heidegger to develop a novel way to understand and express the most perennial of all philosophical concepts, namely, 'being' as such?" This approach allows for addressing issues which are normally relegated to the periphery of the exchange (...) between Heidegger and Kant, including spatiality and embodiment, nature and art, religion and politics. (shrink)

This second edition of Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy examines the development of Martin Heidegger's thought in all its nuances and facets.

Brings Heidegger’s perspective to bear on questions of ethics, moral freedom, and its social implications, rooting much of Heidegger in his joining with or rejoinders to Kant.

This essay examines how being-historical thinking is enacted through specific motifs, which prompts an Auseinandersetzung with the modem age of machination. The earth is one such motif that arises in Contributions to Philosophy, calling for a nuanced language to enact being-historical thinking, on the one hand, and, on the other, marking a sharp divergence from the objectifying discourse of modern science and technicity. It is shown that Heidegger’s appeal to the earth not only yields a deeper meaning of what it (...) means to dwell in harmony with nature, but also that the proprietorship of dwelling provides a hint to reestablish the place of the political outside the rule of technicity. (shrink)

A groundbreaking exploration of Heidegger and embodiment, from which a radical ethical perspective emerges.

I address the ethical treatment of animals from a Heideggerian perspective. My argument proceeds in two stages. First, it is necessary to develop a nonanthropocentric concept of freedom which extends beyond the sphere of human interests. Second, it is essential to show that our capacity to speak must serve the diverse ends of “dwelling,” and hence can be properly exercised only by balancing the interests of animals with those of our own. Rather than point to naturalistic similarities between humans and (...) animals (e.g., the capacity to feel pain), or even ontological ones (e.g., the shared dimension of “care” [Sorge]), the better strategy lies in expanding the scope of moral agency in a way which allows the differences between humans and animals to suggest guidelines as to why the former should exhibit benevolence toward the latter. In this way, I show that the basic percepts of Heidegger’s philosophy support an ethic which can attend to, and speak in behalf of, the welfare of animals. (shrink)

Accordingly, this book will be of great interest and benefit to anyone working in the fields of phenomenology, hermeneutics, or Heidegger studies.

In his book Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos, Peter E. Gordon attempts to reconstruct the historical circumstances which shaped Martin Heidegger’s and Ernst Cassirer’s debate at Davos in 1929, as well as outline the key points of contention in their arguments. Gordon argues that the primary source of disagreement between Heidegger and Cassirer lies in their different concepts of what it means to be human. In this review essay, I argue that rather than a “conceptual” or “thematic” divide, the divergence (...) between them is primarily methodological, and, in Heidegger’s case, unfolds on two fronts: first, by shifting the focus of philosophy away from the modern concern for “man” in favor of the question of being, and, secondly, by pioneering a new strategy for reading the history of philosophy that emphasizes the “historical [geschichtlich]” as the recovery of the past in terms of its relevance for the future, versus providing a “historically [historisch]” accurate record of what has been. (shrink)

This paper argues that Theodore Kisiel, in his article published in Studia Phænomenologica, vol. 5 (2005), pp. 277-285, completely overlooks the “hermeneutic principles” involved in translating philosophical texts when he arbitrarily denounces Parvis Emad’s and Kenneth Maly’s translation of Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis). By locating the distinctive place that translation occupies, this paper argues that the kind of “neologisms” which Emad and Maly employ are not only acceptable, but necessary, insofar as the translation of such an extraordinary work as (...) the Beiträge tests the limits of language where the word emerges from silence. (shrink)

In mid 1930's, Heidegger recognized that thinking must relinquish its claim to self-guidance in its hermeneutical mode in order to regather its impetus through an encounter with what is presumably antithetical to it, namely, the “systematic philosophy” of a figure like Schelling. By entering into this tension, it becomes possible to dislodge more fertile ways of speaking ; the opportunity arises to juxtapose apparently incongruous forms of discourse. These are as divergent as that aimed at in addressing the etymology of (...) the word “being,” or that involved in the exposition of the character of evil which is found in Schelling's Of Human Freedom. The linkage of these two forms of discourse allows for a reformulation of the question of being, whose hallmark lies in redirecting thought through the issuance of an attunement rather than through the self-guidance of hermeneutics. Schelling's question as to the enigmatic character of evil and the question of being do not even remotely seem to share the same kind of lexicon. The purpose of this paper is to show how the rekindling of the concern for evil as it arises in Heidegger's 1936 lectures on Schelling poses a special challenge; for it involves inscribing within Heidegger's discourse a set of assymetrical meanings to express the basic motifs of his thought. Such assymetry resounds with a special attunement by calling forth the tragedy of human being's imperfect kinship with the Divine, of our enduring the tension of a greater conflict as the counterpole of darkness against which to illuminate the essence of human freedom in a new way. The prospect of finding an index to correlate disparate terms proves far more difficult in this case than with Heidegger's dialogue with other thinkers like Kant and Nietzsche where he links more symmetrical terms such as temporal finitude/sensibilized reason or resolve/will to power. (shrink)

There is a plethora of literature addressing Martin Heidegger’s connection to, and influence upon environmental philosophy, deep ecology, and the corollary debate over whether animals deserve moral consideration.1 Yet, for the most part, scholars have either inadvertently or deliberately refrained from reopening these topics within the adjacent arena of the law or legality. There may be prima facie good reasons for this avoidance due to 1) the obvious disjunction between Heidegger’s thinking and the modern, legalistic tradition around which much of (...) the current debate over the possibility of ascribing “rights” to animals revolves (Radloff 2007, 257–69;.. (shrink)

There must be a forward trajectory to history, and not merely a connection to the chronology to past events, if history is to provide the stage for the disclosure of being. Conversely, if history does not merely reflect shifts in the course of human events, then the freedom to decide must originate from the reciprocity between being and Da-sein. In this essay, I outline the narrow passageway by which Heidegger shows how decision can unlock the transformative power of history, and, (...) reciprocally, how history grounds decision as a compliance or measured response to the claim ( Anspruch ) of being. I will center my inquiry on sections 45 – 48 of Contributions to Philosophy (Enowning), not only to provide a sharper focus, but also to bring into play the enactment of being-historical thinking as the key to coalescing the key motifs of history, decision, and freedom. (shrink)

Among modern philosophers, Immanuel Kant has few rivals for his influence over the development of contemporary philosophy as a whole. While the issue of language has become a key fulcrum of continental philosophy since the twentieth century, Kant has been overlooked as a thinker whose breadth of insight has helped to spearhead this advance. The Linguistic Dimension of Kant’s Thought remedies this historical gap by gathering new essays by distinguished Kant scholars. The chapters examine the many ways that Kant’s philosophy (...) addresses the nature of language. Although language as a formal structure of thought and expression has always been part of the philosophical tradition, the “linguistic dimension” of these essays speaks to language more broadly as a practice including communication, exchange, and dialogue. (shrink)

Schelling’s philosophy has been construed either as endorsing a Christian view of revelation or as setting the stage for an existentialist account of human freedom. There has been a tendency to ignore the interface of Schelling’s task, namely, as exploring the presuppositions that govern an attempt to rethink the affinity between the Divine and the human will. This paper aims to rectify the above deficiency; it shows how Schelling offers a more radical account of human freedom than can be found (...) in either a conventional Christian or in a secular account of the frailty of the human situation. The key to this interpretation lies in showing that Schelling developed a dialectic of human freedom which establishes how the self-devisiveness of evil can arise as a corollary to the harmony of love. Through his dialectic, Schelling cultivates the insights of German idealism in a manner which clarifies rather than undermines the basic motifs of Christianity. (shrink)

There are numerous books which seek to interpret Martin Heidegger’s seminal text, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), and others which address the question of how to translate his writings. By joining these two tasks, Translation and Interpretation: Learning from Beiträge, stands out from other such books in the field of Heidegger studies. The volume begins with Parvis Emad’s translation of an original essay by Martin Heidegger, “Contributions of Philosophy. The Da-sein and the Be-ing (Enowning).” -/- Through six carefully crafted essays, (...) Emad then takes the reader through a journey which examines the relationship between Heidegger’s being-historical thinking and such key figures—including Friedrich Nietzsche, Rainer Maria Rilke, and Friedrich Hölderlin—who either occupy the forefront at the end of metaphysics or mark the “crossing” to the “other beginning.” -/- This book will be of special interest to scholars and graduate students alike, whether in philosophy or such diverse fields as poetry and linguistics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.3 (2003) 425-426 [Access article in PDF] Martin Heidegger. The Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy. Translated by Ted Sadler. London: Continuum, 2002. Pp. xiv + 216. Paper, $29.95.Of the recently translated volumes comprising Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe, perhaps the volume whose importance is most underestimated contains his lectures from the summer semester of 1930 (Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit), which now appears (...) in English under the title On the Essence of Human Freedom. In this work, Heidegger complements his other attempts to retrieve Kant's transcendental philosophy—which primarily focused on reinterpreting the Critique of Pure Reason—by offering the fullest treatment of practical reason to be found in the Gesamtausgabe. As such, this translation of Band 31 of the Gesamtausgabe proves invaluable because it (1) provides another side to Heidegger's critical exchange (Auseinandersetzung) with Kant (198) and (2) yields some tantalizing clues as to a vestige of a Heideggerian ethic which can be developed by examining human freedom.In a lecture course from the winter semester of 1925-26 (Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit), Heidegger turned to Kant's doctrine of schematism in order to distinguish finitude as the key dimension of temporality. From that point until the publication of "Kants These über das Sein" (1961), the importance of retrieving transcendental philosophy surfaces at strategic places in Heidegger's thought, although he devotes most of his attention to unraveling the issue of temporality couched in the Transcendental Analytic of the first Critique. What sets The Essence of Human Freedom apart, however, is that it identifies freedom as a new locus from which to address the possibility of being's disclosure through time, which remains unthought in the Greek concept of ousia as "permanent presence": "The question of human freedom is the fundamental question of philosophy, in which is rooted even the question of being" (203). Human freedom, and the questioning of its finite origin in human existence (Dasein), thereby yields a wider topography within which to re-ask the question of being in light of its connection to time. The topography takes this form: the traditional, or "leading question of philosophy" (what are beings as such?), gives way to the "fundamental question of philosophy" (why is being disclosed through time?), which can be developed only by addressing freedom as the ground of human existence (23).In Part I of The Essence of Human Freedom, Heidegger shows how Kant's modern effort to define freedom epistemically as a form of causation must be recast in light of the ontological concern of the ancients to define movement as a determination of the dynamism of being. In Part II, Heidegger outlines Kant's attempt to establish the possibility of freedom in the Transcendental Dialectic, the enigma of how two apparently incompatible forms of causation—the determinism of nature and the spontaneity of will—can stand in a "double [End Page 425] relation to the same effect" (172). Heidegger offers his own resolution of the third antinomy. He argues that the apparent incompatibility of the preceding causalities can be resolved when reason reconciles itself with its own finitude: leaving open its possibility of serving as a spontaneous cause in the intelligible realm of morality, while restricting the scope of natural causality to the sensible realm of appearances. The need to establish the possibility of freedom must then give way to establishing its actuality as the self-legislative power of the will in the practical domain. "Pure willing is the willing of one's own essence as will.... Thus the fundamental law of a finite pure willing, i.e., of a pure practical reason, is a categorical imperative (190-1). Having then distinguished the occurrence of freedom in its practical domain, Heidegger identifies ethical praxis as the source of actuality for the spontaneous causality of a will, the self-legislation of the categorical imperative. "The factuality corresponding to the idea of freedom is that of praxis" (185). In one of the strongest statements to be found anywhere in his writings in... (shrink)

This paper develops the question of Heidegger’s stance toward evolutionary theory. It shows that evolutionary theory harbors its own set of presuppositions,which in turn can be explicated through Heidegger’s hermeneutic strategy of “formal indication.” The paper concludes that Heidegger’s account of animal lifediverges from that of evolutionary theory, not simply due to the naturalistic claims of the latter, but rather because the former places the openness of inquiry aheadof any theoretical concerns. As a result, Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology stakes out a (...) unique territory which stands apart from either a traditionally religious or secular viewpoint, each of which risks falling into the trap of dogmatism. (shrink)

(2009). Fantasies and Fetishes: The Erotic Imagination and the Problem of Embodiment. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology: Vol. 40, Tradition, Art & Sexuality, pp. 66-82.