v. 1. Il pensiero antico.--v. 2. Medioevo e Rinascimento.-- v. 5-7. La filosofia del novecento.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 279 shirted gangsters of the totalitarian regimes. Only gradually did Sorel come to seek his paragons of virtue among the proletariat, partly because of his disillusionment with Jean Jaur~s over the Dreyfus case. Sorel had been one of the first to champion Dreyfus, but felt that demagogues had transformed the latter's cause into a new dogmatism and a new establishment. Sorel was genuinely concerned about some of (...) the deepest problems facing modern industrial man. He could not believe that they could be solved, either by "demagogic plutocracy" or by orthodox Marxism. Hence he sought to synthesize Vico, Proudhon, Marx, and Bergson in a new movement that should be both liberal and revolutionary and heroically virtuous. The strongest influence upon his thinking, says Goriely, came from Vico, from whom he borrowed "the fundamental idea of his whole work: "Man does not know what he does' " (105). History can therefore be rational only after it has happened: "The future is the field in which we use our imaginations, not our understandings" (109). That Sorel anticipated many twentieth-century developments in philosophy and politics, there can be no doubt. The author says that he was "the first philosopher in France who sought not only to locate man in history and society, but also to locate history and society in man, to give them a significance which may be called existential" (148). Before William James's pragmatism reached European shores, Sorel had made such statements as "Science is a means of verifying the possibility of acting in a certain manner." 1Even some of his pessimistic fears anticipated such developments as Burnham's "managerial revolution," at the same time that he welcomed the growth of industrial techniques in other hands (155). Professor Goriely's careful tracing of Sorel's profusion of suggestions for the ethical redemption of mankind in a machine age reveals the unreconciled contradictions in his pluralism. In the R~[lexions he could resolve the conflicts of myth versus utopia, force versus violence, liberalism versus absolutism, says Goriely, only "'by a conceptual jugglery.., which sets the mind's teeth on edge rather than stimulates it" (200). Caught between the poles of an attachment to historical tradition and to liberty, Sorel celebrated the constant tension between the two. Man lives only to create; he "has no other end than the creative ~lan itself. Born of liberty, history can never block its course.., it is always a point of departure toward the future.... Human institutions, the products of an infinity of obscure causes, never realize any universal moral principle. They live in the relative, which man ought to accept with moderation and a sense of the limits of the possible, without ever losing the sense of the unlimited" (222). HAROLD A. LARRABEE Union College 1Georges Sorel, "Storia e scienza sociale," Rivista itallana di sociologia, March-June, 1902,p. 224. Storia Della Filosofia: La Filosofia del Novecento. By E. Paolo Lamanna. Intuizionismo, filosofia dell'azione e modernismo--Prammatismo--La problematica della scienza--La problematica della storla. (Firenze: Felice Le Monnier, 1963. 671 pp. 3800 L.) This first of three volumes describing the philosophies of the twentieth century, and the fifth volume in Lamanna's History of Philosophy, is truly a monumental and encyclopedic work. In this volume alone there are concise, clear, scholarly expositions of the important ideas of more than fifty philosophers, including biographical information and bibliographical references. The style is exceptionally intelligible and the organization of even complicated materials is well defined with good headings and with definitions that are intelligible 280 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY even to a layman. The work is not only very informative but amazingly objective and dispassionate. And despite its disinterestedness it is highly interesting, for it succeeds in presenting each philosopher's ideas as one imagines he would like to present them himself, sympathetically and persuasively. One leaves the book after reading about the achievements of our own little century marvelling at the variety and range of recent achievements. For over and above our follies and horrors, these thinkers emerge as men trying hard and ably to be sane and tell the truth. Lamanna himself emerges as a mind with an extraordinary critical ability to... (shrink)

Social factors have so far been neglected in embodied theories of perception despite the wealth of phenomenological insights and empirical evidence indicating their importance. I examine evidence from developmental psychology and neuroscience and attempt an initial classification according to whether social factors play a contextual, enabling, or constitutive role in the ability to perceive objects in a detached manner, i.e. beyond their immediate instrumental use. While evidence of cross-cultural variations in perceptual styles and the influence of social cues on visual (...) attention could not be said to play more than a contextual role, other factors such as the intricate developmental links between dyadic and triadic interactions in infancy, as well as episodes of peer-learning in children, play enabling roles. A common element in these factors is the presence and resolution of interpersonal conflict. Detached object perception could not develop without these social factors. I argue, in addition, that social skills such as managing partial social acts which are addressed to and completed by others, linguistic mediation, makebelieve play, and the ability to control perspectival switches are constitutive -- i.e. are of the essence -- of the ability to see objects as present with a detached attitude. I discuss the prospects of incorporating such social elements into dynamical interpretations of the sensorimotor approach through the enactive notion of participatory sense-making. (shrink)

In correspondence with Mersenne in 1629, Descartes discusses a construction involving a cylinder and what Descartes calls a “helice.” Mancosu has argued that by “helice” Descartes was referring to a cylindrical helix. The editors of Mersenne’s correspondence (Vol. II), and Henk Bos, have independently argued that, on the con- trary, by “helice” Descartes was referring to the Archimedean spiral. We argue that identifying the helice with the cylindrical helix makes better sense of the text. In the process we take a (...) careful look at constructions of the cylindrical helix available to Descartes and relate them to his criteria for excluding mechanical curves from geometry. Résumé Dans sa correspondance avec Mersenne en 1629, Descartes discute d’une construction qui fait intervenir un cylindre et ce que Descartes appelle une “hélice”. Mancosu a argumenté que Descartes faisait référence à une hélice cylindrique. Les éditeurs de la Correspondance de Mersenne (vol. 2), et Henk Bos, ont indépendamment affirmé que, au contraire, par “hélice” Descartes faisait référence à la spirale d’Archimède. Nous affirmons qu’identifier l’hélice avec l’hélice cylindrique est plus cohérent avec le texte. Dans le même temps nous examinons soigneusement les constructions de l’hélice cylindrique que Descartes avait à disposition et nous les mettons en relation avec son critère d’exclusion des courbes mécaniques de la géométrie. (shrink)

This review article offers an examination of some of the major recent writings (2007-2011), that bring the empirical sciences of mind into relationship with phenomenological investigations. It considers works and papers by Evan Thompson, Shaun Gallagher, Dan Zahavi and Alva Noë.

After giving a brief overview of the renewal of interest in logic and the foundations of mathematics in Göttingen in the period 1914-1921, I give a detailed presentation of the approach to the foundations of mathematics found in Behmann's doctoral dissertation of 1918, Die Antinomie der transfiniten Zahl und ihre Auflösung durch die Theorie von Russell und Whitehead. The dissertation was written under the guidance of David Hilbert and was primarily intended to give a clear exposition of the solution to (...) the antinomies as found in Principia Mathematica. In the process of explaining the theory of Principia, Behmann also presented an original approach to the foundations of mathematics which saw in sense perception of concrete individuals the Archimedean point for a secure foundation of mathematical knowledge. The last part of the paper points out an important numbers of connections between Behmann's work and Hilbert's foundational thought. (shrink)

Logical forgetting is NP-complete as a decision problem even in the simple case of propositional Horn formulae, and may exponentially increase their size. A way to forget is to replace each variable to forget with the body of each clause whose head is the variable. It takes polynomial time in the single-head case: each variable is the head of at most a clause. Some formulae are not single-head but can be made so to simplify forgetting. They are called single-head equivalent. (...) The first contribution of this article is the study of a semantical characterization of single-head equivalence. Two necessary conditions are given. They are sufficient when the formula is interequivalent, that is, the formula makes two sets of variables equivalent only if they are also equivalent to their intersection. All acyclic formulae are interequivalent. The second contribution of this article is an incomplete algorithm for turning a formula single-head. In case of success, forgetting becomes possible in polynomial time and produces a polynomial-size formula, none of which is otherwise guaranteed. The algorithm is complete on interequivalent formulae. (shrink)

A growing body of literature documents the important role played by moral outrage or moral anger in stakeholders’ reactions to cases of corporate social irresponsibility. Existing research focuses more on the consequences of moral outrage than a systematic analysis of how appraisals of irresponsible corporate behavior can lead to this emotional experience. In this paper, we develop and test, in two field studies, an extended model of moral outrage that identifies the cognitions that lead to, and are associated with, this (...) emotional experience. This research contributes to the existing literature on reactions to corporate social irresponsibility by explaining how observers’ evaluation of irresponsible corporate behavior leads to reactions of moral anger. The paper also helps clarify the difference between moral outrage and other types of anger and offers useful insights for managers who have to confront public outrage following cases of irresponsible corporate behavior. Finally, the analysis of the causes of stakeholders’ anger at irresponsible corporations opens important avenues for future research that are presented in the paper. (shrink)

A recent article of Chernikov, Hrushovski, Kruckman, Krupinski, Moconja, Pillay, and Ramsey finds the first examples of simple structures with formulas which do not fork over the empty set but are universally measure zero. In this article we give the first known simple $\omega $ -categorical counterexamples. These happen to be various $\omega $ -categorical Hrushovski constructions. Using a probabilistic independence theorem from Jahel and Tsankov, we show how simple $\omega $ -categorical structures where a formula forks over $\emptyset $ (...) if and only if it is universally measure zero must satisfy a stronger version of the independence theorem. (shrink)