Sztr la Moraie et les idLes cogfztses. A profios dztne note de M. A. Ledent.

RésuméLe degré de consistance d'un objet résulte de ses moyens de résister à l'assaut de l'extérieur.Il y a la consistance des ětres, la consistance des notions et la consistance des valeurs. Une notion peu consistante est celle dont le sens varie d'un discours à l'autre. Une valeur très consistante inspire une conduite indépendante des convenances particulières et favorables à l'accord des esprits.Les problèmes les plus fondamentaux sont des problèmes de hiérarchie selon la consistance et surtout des problèmes de promotion, passage (...) à un degré supérieur .Notion complémentaire: le degré de précarité.ZusammenfassungDer Grad der Konsistenz eines Gegenstandes ergibt sich aus dessen Widerstandskraft gegen äussere Einwirkungen.Es gibt die Konsistenz der Wesen, die Konsistenz der Begriffe und die Konsistenz der Werte. Ein wenig konsistenter Begriff kann je nach der Aussage, die ihn enthält, verschiedenen Sinn haben. Ein sehr konsistenter Wert begründet ein Verhalten, welches unabhängig ist von den besonderen Umständen, sogar wenn sie ungünstig sind für die Übereinstimmung der Geister.Die fundamentalsten Probleme sind diejenigen der Hierarchie bezüglich Konsistenz, und vor allem diejenigen der Beförderung, des Überganges von einer Stufe zu einer höhern .Komplementärer Begriff: Grad der Prekarität.The degree of consistence of an object results from its possibilities of resisting external attacks.There are: the consistency of beings, the consistency of notions and the consistency of values. A notion is not very consistent if its contents vary from one utterance to another. A very consistent value gives rise to behaviour independent of personal conveniency and conductive to the agreement of the minds.The most fundamental problems are those concerned with hierarchy according to consistence, and above all those concerned with promotion, the passing to a higher grade .Complementary notion: the degree of precariousness. (shrink)

Abordée pair le côté de la morale, on ne voit pas que la philosophie cartésienne soit ce qui a donné à la spéculation moderne son inflexion décisive. Ne renonçant sur aucun point à l’universelle autorité du Sage éclairé par la Science, l’esprit cartésien couronne l’âge classique, inauguré par la science grecque, et dont le postulat fondamental est l’unicité de la valeur. L’esprit moderne est un repli vers la pluralité des valeurs.

The aim of this paper is to make a comparison between two philosophical theories on convention, totally independent from each other, and produced by two thinkers of this century yet totally unknown to each other, in order to assess to what extent both theories meet the same facts or are verified by the same features. The result of this inquiry is that each theory is autonomous, but that both theories are quite compatible with each other, that they even fairly coincide (...) with each other, and that there where they emphasize different aspects of a convention they are complementary to each other. In a general introductory paragraph we lay stress upon the distinction between something conventional and something arbitrary and assign a place to conventionalism between rationalism and relativism. In the second part of the paper we examine D. K. Lewis's conception and analysis of the notion of a convention, which he defines in terms of the theory of games of pure coordination, in terms of coordination equilibrium, of orders of mutual expectations, of preferences and of regularities. In the third part of the paper we show that Dupréel's sociological concept of 'being of one mind' is the analogue of Lewis's definition. We also compare Lewis's remarks on the phenomenon of the imitation with Dupréel's theory of the consolidation and endorse the latter's view that a convention has a creative function so that it cannot be reduced to being a pure sign of something else. In the fourth part of our paper we analyze the relation between value and convention and claim that in Dupréel's philosophy the main values may not be identified with conventions. Lastly we justify our conclusion as already stated at the beginning of this summary. (shrink)

The purpose of the article is, firstly, to explicate and give a critical assessment of the methodological, epistemological, and philosophical foundations that led to the “rhetorical turn” in modern philosophy, and, secondly, to answer the question of how justified the grounds for such a “rhetorical turn” are. The answer proposed is based on a reconstruction of Eugene Dupréel’s critical arguments that were directed against the “classical philosophy” and their reception in Chaim Perelman’s works during his “turning point” period (1947 (...) – 1949). The article proves that these two scholars’ critique of classical philosophy proceeds from a realistic position, therefore it does not apply to the epistemological principles of idealistic philosophy. Their criticism of the classical theory of progress and the ideal of universally valid knowledge is “axiological” in nature and boils down to a reassessment of all traditional values. As a result of this reassessment, the methodological principles of sophistry (subjectivism, pragmatism, pluralism, relativism, conventionalism, etc.) are actually rehabilitated. The criticism of philosophy that appeals to spoken language and everyday knowledge, is not justified, since it is based on a misunderstanding of the conceptual and constructive nature of the philosophical language. Although the rhetorical analysis of philosophical texts should be recognized as fruitful and useful, rhetoric cannot be an instrument of philosophizing, since the interpretation of values depends on their understanding, which is given by “classical philosophy”. (shrink)

M. Dupréel est, avant tout, un moraliste et un sociologue, et sa théorie de la connaissance est, nettement, d'inspiration sociologique. En insérant les problèmes de la connaissance dans la trame de la vie sociale, en raisonnant sur une pensée complète, et non sur une pensée appauvrie et schématisée, M. Dupréel arrive à des conclusions qui sont souvent très proches de celles que le lecteur est habituéà lire dans Dialectica.Je fais précéder les extraits choisis d'indications bibliographiques qui concernent uniquement (...) les travaux dont ces fragments ont été tirés; il ne faudrait donc pas u voir la liste complète des œuvres de M. Dupréel. (shrink)