Ancient ethics was an exercise of good life. This study examines how this is reflected in the forms of speech that ancient ethics developed. It is shown that, in antiquity, discursive practices were not considered neutral methods of ethical thinking but rather ways of life to be cultivated as ethical practices in their own right. This book describes central aspects of this ethical culture of speech from the times of the sophists and Socrates up to hellenistic (...) philosophy. (shrink)

Book synopsis: This is the first volume of a two-volume introduction to and guide through philosophy. It is intended to orientate, assist, and stimulate the reader at every stage in the study of the subject. Eleven extended essays have been specially commissioned from leading philosophers; each surveys a major area of the subject and offers an accessible but sophisticated account of the main debates. An extended introduction maps out the philosophical terrain and explains how the different subjects relate to each (...) other. The first part of the book deals with the foundations of philosophical enquiry: epistemology; philosophical logic; methodology; metaphysics; and the philosophy of mind. The second part offers four historical chapters, two on ancient and two on modern philosophy, introducing great thinkers from the past, explaining and discussing their ideas, and showing the value of studying them today. The third part comprises two chapters devoted to questions of value, in ethics and aesthetics. Full annotated bibliographies are provided at the ends of chapters to serve as guides to further reading. This is real philosophy, not simplified philosophy; it will be accessible for the beginner but equally valuable for the third-year student. Deep and challenging questions are not shirked; the reader will be given a sense of involvement in the practice of philosophy today. (shrink)

Book synopsis: This is the first volume of a two-volume introduction to and guide through philosophy. It is intended to orientate, assist, and stimulate the reader at every stage in the study of the subject. Eleven extended essays have been specially commissioned from leading philosophers; each surveys a major area of the subject and offers an accessible but sophisticated account of the main debates. An extended introduction maps out the philosophical terrain and explains how the different subjects relate to each (...) other. The first part of the book deals with the foundations of philosophical enquiry: epistemology; philosophical logic; methodology; metaphysics; and the philosophy of mind. The second part offers four historical chapters, two on ancient and two on modern philosophy, introducing great thinkers from the past, explaining and discussing their ideas, and showing the value of studying them today. The third part comprises two chapters devoted to questions of value, in ethics and aesthetics. Full annotated bibliographies are provided at the ends of chapters to serve as guides to further reading. This is real philosophy, not simplified philosophy; it will be accessible for the beginner but equally valuable for the third-year student. Deep and challenging questions are not shirked; the reader will be given a sense of involvement in the practice of philosophy today. (shrink)

This book engages in cross-tradition scholarship, investigating the processes associated with cultivating or nurturing the self in order to live good lives. Both Ancient Chinese and Greek philosophers provide accounts of the life lived well: a Confucian junzi, a Daoist sage and a Greek phronimos. By focusing on the processes rather than the aims of cultivating a good life, an international team of scholars investigate how a person develops and practices a way of life especially in these (...) two traditions. They look at what is involved in developing practical wisdom, exercising reason, cultivating equanimity and fostering reliability. Drawing on the insights of thinkers including Plato, Confucius, Han Fei and Marcus Aurelius, they examine themes of harmony, balance and beauty, highlight the different concerns of scepticism across both traditions, and discuss action as an indispensable method of learning and, indeed, as constitutive of self. The result is a valuable collection opening up new lines of inquiry in ethics, demonstrating the importance of philosophical ideas from across cultural traditions. (shrink)

Both Ancient Chinese and Greek philosophers provide accounts of the life lived well: a Confucian junzi, a Daoist sage and a Greek phronimos. Cultivation in Early China and Ancient Greece engages in comparative, cross-tradition scholarship and investigates the processes associated with cultivating or nurturing the self in order to live such lives. -/- By focusing on the processes rather than the aims of cultivating a good life, an international team of scholars investigate how a person develops (...) and practices a way of life. They look at what is involved in developing practical wisdom, exercising reason, cultivating equanimity and fostering reliability. Using the thought of those thinkers central to both traditions, including Plato, Confucius, Han Fei and Marcus Aurelius, they examine themes of harmony, balance and beauty, and highlight the different concerns of scepticism across both traditions. They also discuss the action of doing as an indispensable method of learning. As a result, Cultivation in Early China and Ancient Greece is a valuable collection opening up new lines of inquiry in ethics and demonstrating the importance of drawing on philosophical ideas from across cultural traditions. (shrink)

This book is an anthology with the following themes. Non-European Tradition: Bussanich interprets main themes of Hindu ethics, including its roots in ritual sacrifice, its relationship to religious duty, society, individual human well-being, and psychic liberation. To best assess the truth of Hindu ethics, he argues for dialogue with premodern Western thought. Pfister takes up the question of human nature as a case study in Chinese ethics. Is our nature inherently good (as Mengzi argued) or bad (Xunzi’s view)? Pfister ob- (...) serves their underlying agreement, that human beings are capable of becoming good, and makes precise the disagreement: whether we achieve goodness by cultivating autonomous feelings or by accepting external precepts. There are political consequences: whether government should aim to respect and em- power individual choices or to be a controlling authority. Early Greek Thinking: Collobert examines the bases of Homeric ethics in fame, prudence, and shame, and how these guide the deliberations of heroes. She observes how, by depending upon the poet’s words, the hero gains a quasi- immortality, although in truth there is no consolation for each person’s inevi- table death. Plato: Santas examines Socratic Method and ethics in Republic 1. There Socrates examines definitions of justice and tests them by comparison to the arts and sciences. Santas shows the similarities of Socrates’ method to John Rawls’ method of considered judgments in reflective equilibrium. McPherran interprets Plato’s religious dimension as like that of his teacher Socrates. McPherran shows how Plato appropriates, reshapes, and extends the religious conventions of his own time in the service of establishing the new enterprise of philosophy. Ac- cording to Taylor, Socrates believes that humans in general have the task of helping the gods by making their own souls as good as possible, and Socrates’ unique ability to cross-examine imposes on him the special task of helping others to become as good as possible. This conception of Socrates’ mission is Plato’s own, consisting in an extension of the traditional conception of piety as helping the gods. Brickhouse and Smith propose a new understanding of Socratic moral psychology—one that retains the standard view of Socrates as an intellectualist, but also recognizes roles in human agency for appetites and passions. They compare and contrast the Socratic view to the picture of moral psychology we get in other dialogues of Plato. Hardy also proposes a new, non-reductive understanding of Socratic eudaimonism—he argues that Socrates invokes a very rich and complex notion of the “Knowledge of the Good and Bad”, which is associated with the motivating forces of the virtues. Rudebusch defends Socrates’ argument that knowledge can never be impotent in the face of psychic passions. He considers the standard objections: that knowledge cannot weigh incom- mensurable human values, and that brute desire, all by itself, is capable of moving the soul to action. Aristotle: Anagnostopoulos interprets Aristotle on the nature and acquisition of virtue. Though virtue of character, aiming at human happiness, requires a complex awareness of multiple dimensions of one’s experience, it is not properly a cognitive capacity. Thus it requires habituation, not education, according to Aristotle, in order to align the unruly elements of the soul with reason’s knowledge of what promotes happiness. Shields explains Aristotle’s doctrine that goodness is meant in many ways as the doctrine that there are different analyses of goodness for different types of circumstance, just as for being. He finds Aristotle to argue for this conclusion, against Plato’s doctrine of the unity of the Good, by applying the tests for homonymy and as an immediate cons- equence of the doctrine of categories. Shields evaluates the issue as unresolved at present. Russell discusses Aristotle’s account of practical deliberation and its virtue, intelligence (phronesis). He relates the account to contemporary philo- sophical controversies surrounding Aristotle’s view that intelligence is neces- sary for moral virtue, including the objections that in some cases it is unnecessary or even impedes human goodness. Frede examines the advantages and disadvantages of Aristotle’s virtue ethics. She explains the general Greek con- ceptions of happiness and virtue, Aristotle’s conception of phronesis and compares the Aristotle’s ethics with modern accounts. Liske discusses the question of whether the Aristotelian account of virtue entails an ethical-psy- chological determinism. He argues that Aristotle’s understanding of hexis allows for free action and ethical responsibility : By making decisions for good actions we are able to stabilize our character (hexis). Hellenistic and Roman: Annas defends an account of stoic ethics, according to which the three parts of Stoicism—logic, physics, and ethics—are integrated as the parts of an egg, not as the parts of a building. Since by this analogy no one part is a foundation for the rest, pedagogical decisions may govern the choice of numerous, equally valid, presentations of Stoic ethics. Piering interprets the Cynic way of life as a distinctive philosophy. In their ethics, Cynics value neither pleasure nor tradition but personal liberty, which they achieve by self-suffi- ciency and display in speech that is frank to the point of insult. Plotinus and Neoplatonism: Gerson outlines the place of ordinary civic virtue as well as philosophically contemplative excellence in Neoplatonism. In doing so he attempts to show how one and the same good can be both action-guiding in human life and be the absolute simple One that grounds the explanation of everything in the universe. Delcomminette follows Plotinus’s path to the Good as the foundation of free will, first in the freedom of Intellect and then in the “more than freedom” of the One. Plotinus postulates these divinities as not outside but within each self, saving him from the contradiction of an external foundation for a truly free will. General Topics: Halbig discusses the thesis on the unity of virtues. He dis- tinguishes the thesis of the identity of virtues and the thesis of a reciprocity of virtues and argues that the various virtues form a unity (in terms of reciprocity) since virtues cannot bring about any bad action. Detel examines Plato’s and Aristotle’s conceptions of normativity : Plato and Aristotle (i) entertained hybrid theories of normativity by distinguishing functional, semantic and ethical normativity, (ii) located the ultimate source of normativity in standards of a good life, and thus (iii) took semantic normativity to be a derived form of normativity. Detel argues that hybrid theories of normativity are—from a mo- dern point of view—still promising. Ho ̈ffe defends the Ancient conception of an art of living against Modern objections. Whereas many Modern philosophers think that we have to replace Ancient eudaimonism by the idea of moral obligation (Pflicht), Ho ̈ffe argues that Eudaimonism and autonomy-based ethics can be reconciled and integrated into a comprehensive and promising theory of a good life, if we enrich the idea of autonomy by the central elements of Ancient eudaimonism. Some common themes: The topics in Chinese and Hindu ethics are perhaps more familiar to modern western sensibilities than Homeric and even Socratic. Anagnostopoulos, Brickhouse and Smith, Frede, Liske, Rudebusch, and Russell all consider in contrasting ways the role of moral character, apart from intellect, in ethics. Brickhouse / Smith, Hardy, and Rudebusch discuss the Socratic con- ception of moral knowledge. Brickhouse / Smith and Hardy retain the standard view of the so called Socratic Intellectualism. Shields and Gerson both consider the question whether there is a single genus of goodness, or if the term is a homonym. Bussanich, McPherran, Taylor, and Delcomminette all consider the relation between religion and ethics. Pfister, Piering, Delcomminette, and Liske all consider what sort of freedom is appropriate to human well-being. Halbig, Detel, and Ho ̈ffe propose interpretations of main themes of Ancient ethics. (shrink)

This study tries to show the relation between technê and the ethical sphere in the Ancient Greek through mythology and the philosophical literature. Both in mythology and in the philosophical framework the benefits of technê and the power provided by technê for humanity are emphasized. And technê is considered as competence increases the control of human beings in practical areas. However, the ambiguous character of the human experience related to technê and the morally problematic character of this field (...) is also pointed out in the literature. Because, if not controlled, technê has a potential to turn easily against humanity and to produce things that would harm human beings. At this point, ethical values have a crucial role in the control of technê. Technê as a type of knowledge which gives how to do things and how to control the environment but does not give why something is to be done and cannot give an ultimate goal should be subject to higher spheres in the philosophical framework. Therefore technê is subject to ethical and ultimately metaphysical sphere. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 126.1 (2005) 138-142 [Access article in PDF] Kathy L. Gaca. The Making of Fornication: Eros, Ethics, and Political Reformin Greek Philosophy and Early Christianity. Hellenistic Culture and Society 40. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003. xviii + 359 pp. Cloth, $60. As the current attention to same-sex marriage attests, religious communities and politicians today are concerned with sexual activity and rules, (...) viewing [End Page 138] them as correlated with particular kinds of social orders and values. Since second-wave feminism and Foucault, classicists and historians of early Christians have given considerable attention to how ancients themselves were concerned with sexual activity and its bearing on social, political, and religious life. Kathy Gaca's study contributes fresh insights about the saliency of religious ideology to understanding the different kinds of "sexual blueprints" produced by Greek philosophers, biblical authors and their interpreters, and early Christians. The Making of Fornication takes as its starting point a challenge to Foucault's argument for fundamental continuity in sexual morality between Greek and early Christian thought. Gaca argues instead that historically successful forms of Christianity are more discontinuous than continuous with Greek philosophy.Porneia exemplifies the break Gaca charts: "the Greek biblical sense of 'fornication' should not be confused with in the non-biblical Greek sense.... as 'fornication' requires biblical monotheism to be intelligible as a sexual rule, insofar as sexual intercourse and procreation are fornicating, and forbidden, by virtue of not being dedicated to the Lord alone. In the non-biblical Greek sense, however, means 'prostitution' and has nothing to do with worshipping God alone" (20). Sexual activity in non-biblical Greek understandings was nonetheless closely linked to piety, and philosophers crafted their moral sexual visions in accordance with their understandings of how sexual desires, practices, and reproduction relate to the gods and cosmic order. Gaca argues that the combination of Greek biblical ideas and non-biblical Greek associations of sex with the gods led to Christian "practices of intense sexual asceticism among converted Greeks and other gentiles.... Since alien gods such as Aphrodite remained so potent a presence in human sexuality, it seemed critical to put an end to exercising her sexual energy rather than to defy God" (304). She sees this ascetic trend differently expressed in the first-century writings of Philo of Alexandria and Paul of Tarsus and the second-century writings of the Christians Tatian and Clement of Alexandria.This three-part work unfolds as a study of different views about sexual activity, even as it builds a larger argument about "the motivating philosophical and religious principles behind Christian sexual asceticism" (9). In each part's chapters, Gaca charts the range of visions for how sexual activity does and should correlate with social order held by Greek philosophers (Part 1: Platonic, Stoic, and Pythagorean), biblical texts and their interpreters (Part 2: Septuagint, Paul of Tarsus, and Philo of Alexandria), and three second-century Christians (Part 3: Tatian, Clement of Alexandria, and Epiphanes).For Gaca, Tatian and Clement of Alexandria craft their respective Christian ideals in monogamous heteroerotic, reproductive terms adapted from biblical traditions as well as some aspects of Platonic and Pythagorean thought (notably an emphasis on the regulation of sexual desire and procreative ideal for sex, respectively); their two versions of sexual norms (Tatian rejecting all sexual activity, Clement conceding only non-libidinous procreative marital sex) should be understood as a response to the religious associations of sex and sexual desire [End Page 139] among gentiles, especially Greeks (303-304). Epiphanes represents a historically unsuccessful alternative trajectory for early Christian sexual norms, in its basic presuppositions (of egalitarianism as a norm for community which extends to a rejection of marriage), in its relationship to Greek philosophy (in continuity with many early Stoic ideals about egalitarian communalism), and in its interpretation of Paul (using Gal. 3:28 as an interpretive key over 1 Cor. 6:18).In Part 1 Gaca aims to correct for a lack of attention to early Stoic material among classicists and ancient historians... (shrink)

Plato puts goodness at the center of all practical thinking but offers no definition of it and implies that philosophy must find one. Aristotle demurs, arguing that there is no such thing as universal goodness. What we need, instead, is an understanding of the human good. Plato and Aristotle are alike in the attention they give to the category of the beneficial, and they agree that since some things are beneficial only as means, there must be others that are non-derivatively (...) beneficial. When G. E. Moore proposed in the early twentieth century that goodness is, as Plato had said, the foundation of ethics, he rejected not only the assumption that goodness needs a definition, but also that goodness is beneficial – that is, good for someone. This article traces the development of this debate as it plays out in the writings of Prichard, Ross, Geach, Thomson, and Scanlon. (shrink)

This provocative work provides a radical reassessment of the emergence and nature of Christian sexual morality, the dominant moral paradigm in Western society since late antiquity. While many scholars, including Michel Foucault, have found the basis of early Christian sexual restrictions in Greek ethics and political philosophy, Kathy L. Gaca demonstrates on compelling new grounds that it is misguided to regard Greek ethics and political theory—with their proposed reforms of eroticism, the family, and civic order—as the foundation of (...) Christian sexual austerity. Rather, in this thoroughly informed and wide-ranging study, Gaca shows that early Christian goals to eradicate fornication were derived from the sexual rules and poetic norms of the Septuagint, or Greek Bible, and that early Christian writers adapted these rules and norms in ways that reveal fascinating insights into the distinctive and largely non-philosophical character of Christian sexual morality. Writing with an authoritative command of both Greek philosophy and early Christian writings, Gaca investigates Plato, the Stoics, the Pythagoreans, Philo of Alexandria, the apostle Paul, and the patristic Christians Clement of Alexandria, Tatian, and Epiphanes, freshly elucidating their ideas on sexual reform with precision, depth, and originality. Early Christian writers, she demonstrates, transformed all that they borrowed from Greek ethics and political philosophy to launch innovative programs against fornication that were inimical to Greek cultural mores, popular and philosophical alike. The Septuagint's mandate to worship the Lord alone among all gods led to a Christian program to revolutionize Gentile sexual practices, only for early Christians to find this virtually impossible to carry out without going to extremes of sexual renunciation. Knowledgeable and wide-ranging, this work of intellectual history and ethics cogently demonstrates why early Christian sexual restrictions took such repressive ascetic forms, and casts sobering light on what Christian sexual morality has meant for religious pluralism in Western culture, especially among women as its bearers. (shrink)

Virtue ethics has been charged with being unable to provide solutions to practical moral issues. In response, the defenders of virtue ethics argue that normative virtue ethics exists. The debate is significant on its own, yet both sides of the controversy approach the issue from the assumption that moral philosophy has to tell us what we should do. In this essay, I would like to examine the question regarding the practicality of virtue ethics in a different way. Virtue ethics is (...) an ancient approach shared by both ancient Greek philosophers and classic Chinese Confucians, and indeed, ancient Greeks call ethics practical science. How, then, do the ancients themselves view the issue of practicality? This essay shows that there is a notion of practicality which is prominent in both ancient Greek and ancient Chinese virtue ethics but is neglected in today’s ethics. According to this notion, ethics is to transform one’s life. The essay also raises a prospect of the revival of this notion. (shrink)

This article is a transcript of an interview with David Shaw, the author of the book, “An Ancient Greek Philosophy of Management Consulting: Thinking Differently about its Assumptions, Principles and Practice”, published with Springer in 2022. It discusses his reasons for looking to the ancient Greek philosophers for new ideas about management consulting, and how his papers for this journal have contributed to the development of the book.

Paper edition ($18.95) not seen. The essays in this collection have been selected from a much larger set of papers on Aristotle's ethics, presented before the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy during the past decade.

In this paper, I will explain how ancient Greek philosophy can be made relevant to our lives. I do this by explaining how an instructor of a course in ancient Greek philosophy can teach Greek philosophy in a way that makes its study relevant to how the students in the course live their lives. Since this is the most likely way in which its relevance to contemporary life might be realized in practice, I explain (...) its relevance from this perspective. I contrast the different ways in which ancient Greek philosophy is taught, and give examples of how it can be taught that calls attention to the ways in which what the Greeks said are relevant to how students live their lives. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 87 Rationalism in Greek Philosophy. By George Boas. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1961. Pp. xii + 488. $7.50.) This is an interesting and provocative work. It is not, as Boas warns his readers, a history of Greek philosophy in general. It is concerned, rather, with several large topics which the author uses to explicate the general theme of Greek rationalism. The topics chosen (...) are: the distinction between appearance and reality, the methods used to draw this distinction, the conception of human life, and ethics. The treatment of these topics, so central and important in the history of Greek thought, results in a work of very considerable scope. In temporal span also the work is substantial, for it studies and interprets these selected topics from the Pre-Socratics through the Neo-Platonists. The work is complex. Each chapter undertakes to resolve controversial questions both of textual and philosophical criticism. Boas's judgment in these matters is often insightful, always fresh and stimulating. In a difficult and compressed Preface, Boas explains what he understands by rationalism. Rationalism is described as a "systematic study" of accepted premises, which means, in part, the testing of the implications of accepted premises for logical consistency. A premise is, ideally, a generalization from experience, for "... general laws... are wanted in science and philosophy" (p. vii). But premises may sometimes be derivative from such sources as common sense or intuition. Whatever their source, premises and their implications must run the test of consistency and, in addition provide a "... verifiable account of an important set of facts" (p. x). Quite apart from the troubling remark about "general laws," two elements are mentioned in the Preface which constitute what Boas intends by "rationalism." One wonders at the beginning bow these methodological criteria will serve in the interpretation of Greek rationalism. Boas, in practice, uses a much more generous conception of rationalism as a method than that proposed in the Pre[ace.Sometimes rationalism stands for the appeal to reason or experience or both in contrast to the appeal to authority and revelation. It is toward the end of the book that one finds perhaps the best statement of rationalism as a method which has guided this study. Professor Boas writes, reflecting back on the course ol Greek thought: We know too little about the Milesians and the Pythagoreans to say more than that they translated the ancient myths of cosmic birth and decay into rational language. But when we come to the figures of lteraclitus, Parmenides, and Democritus, we meet with that independence of mind which seems to us characteristic of the great scientific investigators. The double role of reason, that of criticism and that of construction, was played wholeheartedly by them, and apparently the mere fact that a belief was traditional did not give it special plausibility. The same may be said of both Plato and Aristotle (p. ~54). It dearly requires some conception such as this, in contrast to that of the Preface, to understand, on the methodological side, Boas's strong claims that Plato and Aristotle are "... the greatest rationalists in the history of philosophy..." and that Plato is the "major defender of rationalism" (p. 128). One needs, however, much more than just the commitment of the "double role of reason" to understand these claims about Plato and Aristotle. Rationalism is also used to denote a number of philosophical doctrines, some of which Plato and Aristotle shared in common. It is carefully argued, for instance, that both Plato and Aristotle are committed to the epistemological view that reason alone is the source of knowledge in the strict sense, a doctrine, which in the case of Aristotle, is sometimes obscured. To this 88 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY basic feature of rationalism Boas adds the following: "The inability, or perhap the unwillingness, to conceive of anything transient as real is at the heart of the rationalist tradition..." (p. 184). It is this notion of rationalism as certain substantive philosophical doctrines which often dominates Boas's account of this central theme in the history of Greek thought. It becomes especially clear in an interesting chapter on Aristotle that it is adherence to certain philosophical doctrines rather than adherence... (shrink)

The Key Themes in Ancient Philosophy series provides concise books, written by major scholars and accessible to non-specialists, on important themes in ancient philosophy that remain of philosophical interest today. In this volume Professor Wolfsdorf undertakes the first exploration of ancient Greek philosophical conceptions of pleasure in relation to contemporary conceptions. He provides broad coverage of the ancient material, from pre-Platonic to Old Stoic treatments; and, in the contemporary period, from World War II to the (...) present. Examination of the nature of pleasure in ancient philosophy largely occurred within ethical contexts but in the contemporary period has, to a greater extent, been pursued within philosophy of mind and psychology. This divergence reflects the dominant philosophical preoccupations of the times. But Professor Wolfsdorf argues that the various treatments are complementary. Indeed, the Greeks' examinations of pleasure were incisive and their debates vigorous, and their results have enduring value for contemporary discussion. (shrink)

Promoting philosophical and ethical education in schools requires academic education of teacher candidates who are able to apply professional methods. In schools, information pills in contrast to the academy, advice philosophy and ethics need to be taught in a practical and interactive way.?Learning-by-doing?, more about as distinguished from philosophy according to the?scholastic concept?. Philosophy according to the?universal concept? deals with questions generally asked not only by philosophers, but by all thinking people.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Ancient Quarrel Revisited:Literary Theory and the Return to EthicsJoseph G. KronickThe modern quarrel between theory and practice, like the ancient one between philosophy and poetry, is at once a practical one—at its heart is the question how we should live—and a pedagogical one—who or what is the proper teacher of virtue? Today, the quarrel is between theory and literature rather than between philosophy and poetry, (...) a change that has not been beneficial. The modern complaint against the abstractions of theory reflects a diminution in the quality of the argument. For the ancient Greeks, to ask about the virtuous life was to inquire into what it is to be human, for aretê, which is typically translated as "virtue," but is understood to mean "excellence" or "goodness," meant acting in accordance with what it is to be fully human. 1 The notion that "real issues," as one prominent theorist argues, belong to the realm of action and epistemological and ontological questions to the abstract realm of theory is a simplification of the more serious question of the relation of particulars to universals. It reverses the Platonic and Aristotelian hierarchy that makes thinking the highest form of activity. But something else is going on in this call to action: in denigrating thinking as abstract, it elevates doxa, opinion, in its place. Under the regime of doxa, two things occur: philosophy and poetry are looked upon as useless because utility becomes the criteria for measuring value, and singularity is looked upon with disdain, if it is, indeed, acknowledged at all, because to the extent the world as it appears is common to us all, doxa is not distinct or individual but uniform or the same. Philosophy and poetry share not only the stigma of being deemed useless, but they are dismissed as odd, singular, not common.This essay is concerned with the status of the singular in philosophy [End Page 436] and poetry. The ancient quarrel has not been settled, which may indeed be a good thing because the quarrel keeps alive the question, who is to speak for that which cannot be spoken of, the singular? Silence may be the appropriate response, yet to preserve the experience of that which resists language is the task of philosophy and poetry, hence the quarrel. A long tradition has it that the philosopher seeks universals, while the poet offers particular images of virtue, but at the heart of this argument over ethics is the question of how to account for the singular or unique. To do so, I turn to Socrates, whose singularity remains unaccounted for to this day.Socrates may be said to embody the very problem of the relation between philosophy and literature, for he left us no writings and exists for us primarily through the writings of Plato. Yet there is widespread acceptance of Plato's portrait of him, particularly as to Socrates' method, the elenchus, and his principle of the priority of definitions. However, Socrates' insistence upon the priority of definition is not an example of the philosopher elevating theory over experience but a practical issue involving the care of the self. Furthermore, in ancient Greece, moral and philosophical questions concerning the soul were as much the provenance of poetry as they were of philosophy. The search for truth is a practical matter concerning the conduct of life, but the Platonic philosopher wishes to give a rational account, or logos, that would link conduct to knowledge, whereas the poet's examples are bound to their representations. Nevertheless, to presume that Socrates was seeking a definition of virtue on the grounds that possession of the definition would translate into a good life is an absurdity, for he could never have sought after the knowledge of virtue if his mode of life depended upon the definition rather than on his character. 2The error is to accuse Socrates of placing abstract knowledge before virtuous conduct. When Socrates asks for a definition of the beautiful, for instance, he does not reject the answer, "the beautiful is a beautiful woman," because it confuses a particular with a universal (when compared to the beauty of the gods, the woman is... (shrink)

This collection of eminently practical advice from the likes of Socrates, Plato, Diogenes, Pythagoras, and Aristotle covers subjects as diverse as money, child-raising, politics, philosophy, law, and relationships--all aspects of life and how to live it. Thomas Cleary has translated these sayings and aphorisms from the Arabic sources that preserved Greek thought throughout the Middle Ages. Many of the texts no longer exist in the original Greek. Included in the book is an appendix that presents resonant sayings and (...) fragments from Buddhist, Taoist, and Muslim sources, demonstrating the universal quality of the teachings of the Greek sages and hinting at the interaction between Western and Eastern cultures. (shrink)

The excuse for publishing a new anthology of texts in ancient philosophy is that the effort is not a duplication of previous attempts, either in terms of the texts offered or the interpretations tendered. It is impossible to meet the first criterion for the pre-Socratics, since there is a concise and relatively agreed upon canon of material. What then of the interpretations offered in this volume? They are scant, unimaginative, and, in some cases, misleading. This is especially true in (...) the case of the sophists. Thus, Callicles' long speech from the Gorgias is quoted as representative of sophistical doctrine on the antithesis between nature and convention. The practice of quoting Plato on the sophists is hazardous at best. Why not, instead, print and analyze those intriguing fragments one and two of Antiphon's Περὶ ληθείας? Or if Plato is to be trusted in regard to the sophists, why not quote Protagoras' remarks in the Platonic dialogue of that same name? Or the excursion in the Theaetetus? These selections would present a much more complete picture of Protagoras' doctrines than the seven lines from the doxographical tradition that the editors supply. In addition, there appears to be little logic in the bibliographies. The only secondary source suggested for the sophists is Untersteiner's book. Havelock's The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics is equally controversial, but certainly more reliable. Or if J. H. Loenen's "Was Anaximander an Evolutionist?" could be dredged up from Mnemosyne, surely some material from the other journals could have been found for the sophists. After the pre-Socratics, the book offers about eighty-five pages of selections from Plato, one hundred pages from Aristotle, twenty-five pages from Hellenistic stoicism, Epicureanism, and skepticism and a concluding twenty pages from Plotinus. A novel and quite useful feature of the book is a thematic table which topically indexes the texts according to the editors' conception of the main branches of philosophy.--E. A. R. (shrink)

Arthur W. H. Adkins's writings have sparked debates among a wide range of scholars over the nature of ancient Greek ethics and its relevance to modern times. Demonstrating the breadth of his influence, the essays in this volume reveal how leading classicists, philosophers, legal theorists, and scholars of religion have incorporated Adkins's thought into their own diverse research. The timely subjects addressed by the contributors include the relation between literature and moral understanding, moral and nonmoral values, and the (...) contemporary meaning of ancient Greek ethics. The volume also includes an essay from the late Adkins himself illustrating his methodology in an analysis of the "Speech of Lysias" in Plato's _Phaedrus_. _The Greeks and Us_ will interest all those concerned with how ancient moral values do or do not differ from our own. Contributors include Arthur W. H. Adkins, Stephanie Nelson, Martha C. Nussbaum, Paul Schollmeier, James Boyd White, Bernard Williams, and Lee Yearley. Commentaries by Wendy Doniger, Charles M. Gray, David Grene, Robert B. Louden, Richard Posner, and Candace Vogler. (shrink)

Whatever one may think of Schmidt’s intuition, it is still nothing but intuition, and the variety of syntactic structures which εἶναι admits of is neither articulated nor unified. Kahn, on the other hand, by the use of Transformational Grammar, is able to a large extent to generate in a regular way from a posited notion of "kernel sentence" all the Greek sentences in which εἶναι occurs. Kahn’s original plan was "to correlate every intuitive difference of meaning in the use (...) of εἰμί with a formal description of the corresponding sentence-type", but he admits that he cannot always do so. Whether this is a failure inherent in Transformational Grammar itself, or in the version Kahn uses, can for the moment be left aside. First, an example of the success and another of the failure of the technique, as Kahn practices it, are in order. Kahn formulates the rule for the recognition of periphrasis somewhat as follows: εἶναι is used periphrastically with the participle if and only if it is impossible to obtain two kernel sentences, one of which has a finite form of εἶναι and the other a finite form of the participle, but if two kernel sentences can be so obtained, the usage is not periphrastic. This rule is both simple and elegant; it will no doubt become in time a standard part of Greek grammar. The enchantment, however, which mathematical clarity can cast is best illustrated in the case of another construction. ἔστιν ὅστις... is not uncommon. It looks like the existential operator of modern logic, and the fact that it occurs far more often with οὐκ than without seems to be, linguistically, irrelevant. Now, Kahn asserts that, though he looked hard for examples, he could only find one in which the second clause has the copula, and he offers a proof as to why this should be the case. He is mistaken. Euripides has οὐκ ἔστι θνητῶν ὅστις ἕστ’ ἐλεύθερος, and Sophocles καὶ οὐδὲν τούτων ὅ τι μὴ Ζεύς, and there are several examples in just one passage of Plato’s Charmides. The Sophoclean example is important since it illustrates a double "zeroing" of εἶναι, and whereas for traditional grammar such nominal sentences are treated as primary, with the insertion of ἐστί as a secondary development, in Kahn’s use of Transformational Grammar no distinction between the presence or the absence of the verb can be allowed. For deep structure, the verb is always present, and it might be no more than an apparent paradox that a verb, whose primitive meaning is said to designate presence, can in its absence make its presence equally felt. Can a verb which is almost always eliminable be the word for reality and truth? Or is it because "being" is the only word that cannot be just a word that it can so easily be suppressed in speech? (shrink)

This distinctive collection of original articles features contributions from many of the leading scholars of ancient Greek philosophy. They explore the concept of reason and the method of analysis and the central role they play in the philosophies of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. They engage with salient themes in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and political theory, as well as tracing links between each thinker’s ideas on selected topics. The volume contains analyses of Plato’s Socrates, focusing on his views of (...) moral psychology, the obligation to obey the law, the foundations of politics, justice and retribution, and Socratic virtue. On Plato’s Republic, the discussions cover the relationship between politics and philosophy, the primacy of reason over the soul’s non-rational capacities, the analogy of the city and the soul, and our responsibility for choosing how we live our own lives. The anthology also probes Plato’s analysis of logos which underlies his philosophy including the theory of forms. A quartet of reflections explores Aristotelian themes including the connections between knowledge and belief, the nature of essence and function, and his theories of virtue and grace. The volume concludes with an insightful intellectual memoir by David Keyt which charts the rise of analytic classical scholarship in the past century and along the way provides entertaining anecdotes involving major figures in modern academic philosophy. Blending academic authority with creative flair and demonstrating the continuing interest of ancient Greek philosophy, this book will be a valuable addition to the libraries of all those studying and researching the origins of Western philosophy. (shrink)

Notably since Thomas Hobbes, canonically with Benjamin Constant, and conventionally amid Nietzschean, Popperian, Straussian, Arendtian, liberal, republican, political, and sociological readings of ancient texts, contemporary scholarship on the ancients often has employed some version of the dichotomous ancient/modern or ancient/contemporary contrast as a template for explaining, understanding, and interpretively appropriating ancient texts and political practices – particularly those of ancient Greek philosophy and democracy. In particular, this has been done to argue for some conception (...) of political ethics and democracy. I argue that this rhetorical trope, often using Athens and Europe/America as synecdoches for antiquity and modernity, has generated narrow and distorted views of ancient texts and political practices, on the one hand, and their contemporary relevance, on the other – views that misinterpret the theoretical significance of historical phenomena and misread the potential lessons of ancient authorities. Instead, texts and practices should be read either with more qualifications or more fully against a historical dynamic of critical philosophy and political power – including its ethical, cultural, institutional, and governing elements – that is not framed by this dichotomy. (shrink)

This is a case study of my reflections on teaching a first-year undergraduate tutorial on Ancient Greek Philosophy in the UK. This study draws upon the notion of reflective practice as an essential feature of teaching, in this case applied to Higher Education. My aim is to show how a critical engagement with my teaching practices and the overall learning experience modified, developed, or strengthened my practices, attitudes, and teaching philosophy during the course of one term. Methods (...) for data collection included a weekly logbook, student questionnaires, teaching observations, reflective exercises, and peer discussions. The findings shed light on the complexities of teaching Greek philosophy to small groups and the challenges of the practitioner's reflective process in this teaching. (shrink)

The essays in this volume treat a wide variety of fundamental topics and problems in ancient Greek philosophy. The scope of the section on pre-Socratic thought ranges over the views which these thinkers have on such areas of concern as religion, natural philosophy and science, cosmic periods, the nature of elements, theory of names, the concept of plurality, and the philosophy of mind. The essays dealing with the Platonic dialogues examine with unusual care a great number of central (...) themes and discuss them in considerable depth: problems in language and logic, myth, reason, hypothesis, eros, friendship, reason, morality, society, art, the nature of soul, and immortality. In addition, they offer fresh discussions on a number of basic morphological, methodological, and philological issues related to philosophical arguments and introduce new aspects for a critical reexamination of controversies surrounding the doctrines and the authenticity of certain Platonic works. The essays on the philosophy of Aristotle are closely reasoned analyses of such basic themes as the universality of the sensible, the nature of kinesis, the problem of future contingencies, the meaning of qualitative change, the doctrine of phantasia, the essence of intelligence, and the metaphysical foundations for the ethical life. The essays on post-Aristotelian developments in ancient philosophy offer challenging and well-documented discussions on topics in the history of ancient logic, categorical thought, the ethical doctrines of ancient Scepticism, epistemological issues in the physical theory of the Epicureans, and basic concepts in the metaphysics of the neo-platonists. (shrink)

The article addresses the issues of values in ancient philosophy. The aim of the study is to analyze and reflect on the views of ancient philosophers on values and to examine their influence on the development of moral philosophy. The following approaches and research methods were used: the historical-philosophical approach – to study the views of ancient philosophers on values in the context of their time; the comparative approach – to compare the views of different philosophers on (...) values; and the analytical approach – to logically analyze key concepts such as the Good, virtue, happiness, justice, etc. It has been established that in the history of European philosophy, the concept of “values,” as an embodiment of the term “the Good” (that which brings benefit), originates in ancient philosophy. Various approaches to understanding values that existed in ancient philosophy are characterized. It is noted that Seneca’s views on values combined key Stoic principles such as virtue and self-control; Plato regarded the Good as the highest value and the goal of human life, linking it to justice both at the individual and societal levels; for Aristotle, the highest value and the goal of human life was happiness, which a person strives for through their actions and moral deeds. It is emphasized that, unlike the Pre-Socratics, who focused on studying the natural world and cosmological questions, the philosophers of classical Greece turned their attention to society and the state, considering that a rational (just, ideal) state is the key to personal well-being. It is demonstrated that questions about the place of a person in the world, their path, the essence of good and evil, and moral guidelines unite Greek and Roman Stoics with the existentialist philosophers of the 20th century. The theoretical significance of the study lies in its ability to analyze the origins of fundamental philosophical categories – Good, virtue, justice, and happiness – and trace their influence on the further development of philosophy. The practical significance lies in the fact that the research materials can be included in lecture courses, allowing students to better understand the origins of modern ethical and moral principles. A promising direction for further research is considered to be the comparison of ancient and modern concepts of values. The article belongs to the theoretical type. (shrink)

Spanning a wide range of texts, figures, and traditions from the ancient Mediterranean world, this volume gathers far-reaching, interdisciplinary papers on Greek philosophy from an international group of scholars. The book's sixteen chapters address an array of topics and themes, extending from the formation of philosophy from its first stirrings in archaic Greek as well as Egyptian, Persian, Mesopotamian, and Indian sources, through central concepts in ancient Greek philosophy and literatures of the classical period and (...) into the Hellenistic age. Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy offers both in-depth, rigorous, attentive investigations of canonical texts in western philosophy, such as Plato's Phaedo, Gorgias, Republic, Phaedrus, Protagoras and the Metaphysics, De Caelo, Nichomachean Ethics, Generation and Corruption of Aristotle's corpus, as well as inquiries that reach back into the rich archives of the Mediterranean Basin and forward into the traditions of classical philosophy beyond the ancient world. Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy is of interest to students and scholars working on different aspects of ancient Greek philosophy, as well as ancient philosophy more broadly. (shrink)

Prologue -- The Greek stones speak : toward an archaeology of consciousness -- Singing the muses' song : myth, wisdom, and speech -- Physis, kosmos, logos : presocratic thought and the emergence of nature-consciousness -- Sophistical wisdom, Socratic wisdom, and the political life -- Civic wisdom, divine wisdom : Socrates, Plato, and two visions for the Athenian citizen -- Speculative wisdom, practical wisdom : Aristotle and the culmination of Hellenic thought -- Epilogue.

In his six 1983 lectures published under the title, Fearless Speech (2001), Michel Foucault developed the theme of free speech and its relation to frankness, truth-telling, criticism, and duty. Derived from the ancient Greek word parrhesia, Foucault's analysis of free speech is relevant to the mentoring of medical students. This is especially true given the educational and social need to transform future physicians into able citizens who practice a fearless freedom of expression on behalf (...) of their patients, the public, the medical profession, and themselves in the public and political arena. In this paper, we argue that Foucault's understanding of free speech, or parrhesia, should be read as an ethical response to the American Medical Association's recent educational effort, Initiative to Transform Medical Education (ITME): Recommendations for change in the system of medical education (2007). In this document, the American Medical Association identifies gaps in medical education, emphasizing the need to enhance health system safety and quality, to improve education in training institutions, and to address the inadequacy of physician preparedness in new content areas. These gaps, and their relationship to the ITME goal of promoting excellence in patient care by implementing reform in the US system of medical education, call for a serious consideration and use of Foucault's parrhesia in the way that medical students are trained and mentored. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.4 (2003) 554-555 [Access article in PDF] Nicholas White. Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics.New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 2002. Pp. xv + 369. Cloth, $55.00. This is a thoughtful book on an interesting subject by a well-known scholar of ancient ethical philosophy. However, the organization and mode of exposition is, in some ways, rather odd; and this rather (...) muffles the potential depth and impact.White challenges (what he presents as) a widespread current view about Greek ethical philosophy. This is that Greek philosophy does not contain the same kinds of moral conflict that we find in modern thought: namely, between the claims of the individual and the state, and between doing your duty, or what is best for others, and pursuing your own happiness. White, by contrast, believes that those conflicts do figure—as substantive, problematic issues—in Greek thought, and that they are conceived in a way that is broadly similar to modern thought, despite some other salient differences. Further, White maintains that the general denial of conflict in Greek thought has its roots in certain eighteenth- and nineteenth-century intellectual tendencies. A crucial factor was the Hegelian picture of Classical Greek thought as free from the conflicts between individual and state, and between happiness and duty that are central in modern thought and are articulated especially by Kant. White sees the Hegelian view as influential on late nineteenth-century readings of Greek philosophy by thinkers such as Sidgwick, on more recent anti-Kantian thinkers such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Bernard Williams, as well as on much current scholarship on Greek philosophy.White confronts what he sees as a mistaken tendency partly by charting its historical roots and partly by offering a competing (or at least "ground-clearing" [xiii]) reading of key relevant features of Greek ethics. Two crucial topics are Plato's presentation of the demand that the fully trained philosopher-rulers go back into the cave to direct the state rather than philosophizing, as they would prefer (Republic 219-21) and Aristotle's selection [End Page 554] of the philosophical life, rather than the ethical life of practical action, as the highest form of human happiness (Nicomachean Ethics10.7-8). White argues, first, that these are recognized as substantive and difficult issues by the two Greek thinkers and, second, that the way in which the issues are conceived is (roughly) in terms of the modern-style contrast between doing your communal duty and pursuing your personal happiness. The "eudaimonistic" (happiness-centered) outlook often seen as typical of Greek philosophy does not mean that these issues are therefore defused or resolved. Hellenistic (Epicurean and Stoic) philosophy does offer a unified ethical outlook, but not in a way that matches the Hegelian pattern. The influential Hegelian reading of Greek ethics is shown up as mistaken and the door is opened for interpretations which recognize and analyse these issues in more accurate terms.White's central claims are challenging, important and, in principle at least, plausible. How effectively is the case made? As indicated earlier, the organization of the book does not seem to me to support the argument as well as it could. The discussion of Plato and Aristotle, which forms the core of White's thesis, is preceded by an extended preparation, extending to nearly half of the book. This examines, in meticulous detail, the background in modern intellectual history to the tendency that White attacks. It also explores in general terms conceptual issues (about deliberative conflict, the role of imperatives and the city-state as a source of normativity) that bear on his claims about Greek thought. When White finally gets to detailed discussion of philosophical texts, he does not—surprisingly—try to show in specific ways how current leading scholarly interpretations are informed by the Hegelian pattern he has so elaborately described. His confrontation with the modern version of this pattern is generalized, with references to scholarly readings largely confined to footnotes. The thrust of his interpretative discussion is negative, ruling out the harmonizing, Hegelian... (shrink)

The text was originally a conference speech. In principle, it was prepared for teachers of philosophy and people interested in philosophy, therefore it has the character of an essay and only to a small extent refers to the literature of the subject. However, I am deeply convinced of the validity of the thesis that I propose in it, even if they may seem only to a small extent supported by references to the state of research. -/- Synthetical studies take (...) a special place in the research on the history of ancient philosophy. They demonstrate the existing perspective by performing a selection and arrangement of the material, presenting the periodisation, accentuating and determining what is “philosophically significant.” This article points out that despite the great progress made in detailed research that has taken place over the last few decades, the general framework of development of philosophy, derived from Hegel’s thought, has remained unchanged for two centuries. Hegel’s perspective has instilled a certain pattern that encompasses a whole series of debatable solutions. These include (1) development of a certain understanding of what “philosophy” is and thus separating it from a wide spectrum of literature, rhetoric, medicine, and religion; (2) introduction of a dubious periodisation (e.g. the distinction between the Presocratic period and Socrates’ breakthrough in the form of a departure from the philosophy of nature and return to ethical considerations; (3) adoption of philosophy of Plato and Aristotle as the apex of thought. The author highlights the need to change the approach to the history of ancient philosophy and modify the existing paradigm. He calls for paying greater attention to the intertextual element and to the fact that the assessment of originality and relevance of preserved works is falsified due to the disappearance of comparative material. The proposal to establish a new reconstructive paradigm is based on the belief that during further research on ancient philosophy it would be advisable (1) to expand the research perspective and enrich it with the fields of education, medicine, the great sphere of literature, the spheres of fine arts and music, (2) to focus more on the issue of transmission and reception of texts thanks to which it is possible to deepen and extend the reconstructed context of philosophical discussions, (3) to come to the realisation that the abstract character of description, connected with all the syntheses of the philosophical thought in antiquity lead to its oversimplification and impoverishment by presenting it out of the context and depriving of what is individual and specific for a particular thinker. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyse the critical interpretation of Greek art and religion provided by Hegel in the “Religion in the form of art” section of Chapter VII of his Phenomenology of the Spirit. The study will, thus, commence with an overview of the role played by art in the religion of ancient Greece, and then examine the reasons for the historical decline of this special phenomenon and the rise of Christianity, a religion referred to (...) by Hegel as a “visible religion” as it is required to “disclose” and manifest its contents: the spirit. Having focused special attention on the relationship between the people of ancient Greece and their gods and the role played by the concept of the ethical life, the paper will then proceed to investigate the relationship between the individual, the population and the ancient polis or Greek State as illustrated in the early works of Hegel and in the Phenomenology of the Spirit, in which Hegel develops his theory of ethical relations in ancient Greece as exemplified in the model of sibling relations within the family. The paper continues with an examination of Hegel’s criticism of Greek rituals and the inability of the modern world to understand such practices from the perspective of the life of the time, concluding, in line with Hegel, that our experience is now an external process as we no longer embrace the interiority of the ethical life of the past. Indeed, as Hegel considers the “spirit of destiny offered by those [ancient] works of art” to go beyond the ethical life of a nation, the fact that those works of art are no more considered useful and important is a tragic event, even though this destiny has shown us the spirit within them, and thanks to this tragic end, we have finally been able to reunite all the Greek gods in a single Pantheon in which “the spirit is conscious of itself as a spirit”. (shrink)

We draw on ancient Greek philosophy and contemporary psychosocial theorists to analyse the ethical implications of social policies implemented through the welfare state with the espoused objective of achieving social inclusion. We argue that many such policies establish a boundary between domains of inclusion and exclusion that perversely maintains the very problem such policies are designed to solve. They then also provide ?rationalisations? for social exclusion which imply that such states can be explained?that they are ethical, and so (...) legitimate. We illustrate our argument with reference to a specific area of social policy?Improving Access to Psychological Therapies?and discuss how it impacts on our own area of practice as state employed psychotherapists. We analyse how this policy frames aspects of social exclusion (un(der)employment?) as a ?psychological? problem: a move that grants the excluded a specific kind of identity and then locates the problem of exclusion in this identity. We invoke Plato's Republic to show how this offer of psychological ?help? subliminally suggests that these mental disorders result from individuals' failures to ?know their place? and to ?mind their own business?, rather than as a consequence of complex networks of social (dis)orders, exclusions and injustices within which we are all embedded. (shrink)

This dissertation argues that a proper understanding of Aristotle's theory of the virtues and vices requires us to understand how practical science presupposes theoretical science, more particularly the science of the nature of the morally-developed person. It argues that by using the canons of the Posterior Analytics we can prove why the virtues are causally necessary for the morally-developed person. Further, by seeing the virtues and vices in the context of the Physics, we can see how the development of these (...) character traits might constitute the substrate principle which explains why different people respond to the world in the forms they do. ;Treating the virtues and vices as character traits and as the substrate principle underlying people's responses to the world points the way to treating them as the principle around which psychology, ethics and politics can all be integrated. The ethical virtues are rooted in the psychology of character while politics is a matter of organizing institutions so as to promote the development of determinate forms of character in given populations. Virtuous politics is taken to be that which organizes institutional structures and processes around the goal of human development. ;Throughout the dissertation I related Aristotelian insights to contemporary work in the realist philosophy of science, psychoanalysis, developmental psychology and Marx. ;This is a speculative work which, though inspired by Aristotle, is not presented as an exegesis of Greek texts. (shrink)

Ancient Greek thought saw the birth, in so-called Western philosophy, of the study now known as moral psychology. In its broadest sense, moral psychology encompasses the study of those aspects of human psychology relevant to our moral lives—desire, emotion, ethical knowledge, practical moral reasoning, and moral imagination—and their role in apprehending or responding to sources of value. This volume draws together contributions from leading international scholars in ancient philosophy, exploring central issues in the moral psychology of Plato, (...) Aristotle, and the Hellenistic schools. Through a series of papers and responses, these contributions challenge and develop interpretations of ancient views on topics from Socratic intellectualism to the nature of appetitive desires, from the role of pleasure and pain in virtue, to our capacities for memory, anticipation and choice, and their role in a flourishing human life. (shrink)

This article restores the peculiar ethical-cultural cartography from the philosophical fragments of Ancient Greek Cynicism. Namely, the fragments of Anthistenes, Diogenes of Sinope, Crates, Dio Chrysostom as well as of the ancient historians of philosophy are mainly analyzed and interpreted. The methods of comparative analysis as well of rational resto-ration are applied in this article. The authors of the article concentrate on the main characteristics of the above mentioned cartography, that is, the contradiction between maps of nature (...) and civili-zation. The article comes to the conclusion that the basis of this contradiction is the concept of the main value as well as virtue in the above mentioned cynicism, namely, natural radical temperance. According to ancient cynics, this virtue is absolutely incompatible with pleasure-driven civilization, as the latter annihilates the former. Therefore, cynics interpreted the whole territory of the world known at that time as divided between maps of nature and civilization that never overlap or even intersect. Moreover, according to ancient cynics, the territory covered by maps of civilization is considerably smaller than that enframed by the maps of nature. Moreover, the areas of nature are continuously being diminished, as civilization resolutely goes ahead. In such a situation that threatens survival of human nature the only possible way out is a return to the natural value of radical temperance. After cynics, the only effective strategy of achieving that challenging goal is askesis as excercises of temperance dedicated both to body and spirit. The authors of the article also give a certain SWOT analysis of the above mentioned cartography in the context of contemporary society. According to them, such a cartography possesses both strong and weak points. The main weak point is the contradiction itself between maps of culture and civilization. As a matter of fact, civilization does not annihilate the possibility of natural temperance, whereas a human being, according to his/her nature, is a creator of culture and civilization. On the other hand, the main positive aspect is an emphasis on virtue of temperance, which is actual, significant and relevant in any epoch, culture and civilization, and which is pretty much forgotten nowadays. (shrink)

Through his innovative study of language, noted Heidegger scholar Lawrence Hatab offers a proto-phenomenological account of the lived world, the “first” world of factical life, where pre-reflective, immediate disclosiveness precedes and makes possible representational models of language. Common distinctions between mind and world, fact and value, cognition and affect miss the meaning-laden dimension of embodied, practical existence, where language and life are a matter of “dwelling in speech.” In this second volume, Hatab supplements and fortifies his initial analysis by (...) offering a detailed treatment of child development and language acquisition, which exhibit a proto-phenomenological world in the making. He then takes up an in-depth study of the differences between oral and written language (particularly in the ancient Greek world) and how the history of alphabetic literacy shows why Western philosophy came to emphasize objective, representational models of cognition and language, which conceal and pass over the presentational domain of dwelling in speech. Such a study offers significant new angles on the nature of philosophy and language. (shrink)

Mass ideology is unique to modern society and rooted in early modern philosophy. Traditionally, knowledge had been viewed as resting on metaphysics. Rejecting metaphysical truth evoked questions about the source of "truth." For nineteenth-century ideologists, "truth" comes either from dominating classes in a progressively determined history or from a post-Copernican freedom of the superior man to create it. In From Physics to Politics Robert C. Trundle, Jr. uncovers the relation of modern philosophy to political ideology. And in rooting truth in (...) human nature and Nature by modal reasoning, he resolves the problem of politicized truth. Our concepts of scientific truth, logic, and necessity are essentially connected. Modern philosophy restricts our understanding of necessity to the political dreams and aspirations of Enlightenment intellectuals. As a result, these intellectuals refuse to acknowledge as factual or meaningful whatever is not intelligible within the practical goals of establishing science as a system of enlightened ideas. The effect of these ideas is that in our time metaphysical principles, speculative truths, our understanding of science, and the nature of logic have become subordinated to ideological dreams. Fascism, Nazism, Marxism, political correctness, and moral relativism are not historical aberrations but essential consequences. Trundle's work is groundbreaking and daring, and his underlying thesis demonstrates why scientific truth demands a modal defense. The defense not only integrates science, ethics, and politics, but shows how "truth" may be ascribed to moral and scientific principles in contrast to a modern philosophical tradition. Since this tradition is the origin of political ideology, it has led to an irrational politicization of truth. The book will appeal particularly to those interested in political history, histories of philosophy, the philosophy of sciences, and ethics. Robert C. Trundle, Jr. is a member of the New York Academy of Sciences and the Scientific Research Society of Sigma Xi, an affiliate scholar for Idealistic Studies, and has served as reader for University de Laval's Laval Theologique et Philosphique. His publications include over three dozen articles in Res Publica, Logique et Analyse, Thought, Philosphy in Science, and New Horizons in the Philosophy of Science. His books include Beyond Absurdity (with R. Puligandla), Ancient Greek Philosophy, and Medieval Reasoning. He is currently professor in the department of social sciences and philosophy at Northern Kentucky University. (shrink)

Michel’s Foucault’s later work has been the subject of much critical interest regarding the question of whether it provides a normative stance that prescribes how the self ought to act. Having first outlined the nature of the debate, I engage with Foucault’s comparative analysis of the ethical systems of ancient Greeks and Christianity to show that he holds that the former maintains that the ethical subject was premised not on adherence to a priori rules as in Christianity, but from (...) and around an on-going process of practical experimentation. From this, Foucault goes on to describe the practices through which the self acted to make and re-make itself, which leads to the question of whether such descriptions also contain prescriptions as to how the self should act. I argue that they do contain a prescriptively normative stance, but in a very specific sense. Rather than delineating the specific ethical commitments we should adopt, Foucault takes off from the example of the ancient Greeks to insist that individuals should adopt an indeterminate orientating principle based on absolute openness to each context, with this principle given content through a context-specific, spontaneous, on-going, and inherently individual, albeit socially situated, process of practical experimentation. The result is a highly original account of normativity that makes individuals absolutely responsible for themselves and their ethical activities in each moment. (shrink)

This paper will discuss and analyze specific arguments concerning moral virtue and action that are found within the ten books of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Eudaimonia, i.e. well-being, or happiness, is the highest good for people, and in order to achieve this, a virtuous character is necessary. A virtuous character is cultivated, and the life of a virtuous human is a life that is lived well, and is lived according to moral virtues which are developed through proper habits. It is through (...) this development and practice of moral virtues by which one achieves eudaimonia, for this well-being is achieved by partaking in actions that are virtuous. The study of ethics for Aristotle is a practical science. Although through the study of ethics one may acquire theoretical knowledge, it is practical knowledge, or practical wisdom, that is most important for Aristotle when engaged in a search to define and cultivate a life that is well-lived. The topics and arguments contained within this paper will be of interest and relevance to both those who are interested in ancient Greek philosophy and to those that are concerned with ethics in the modern world. For this paper will also present situations from the modern world that are either examples of virtuous activity or its opposite. Such a study into Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics will offer insightful perspectives on proper action and virtue that is rooted in ancient Greek philosophy and remains relevant in our modern world. (shrink)

This volume presents some discourses (or. 54, 55, 70, 71 and 72) written by the orator and philosopher Dio of Prusa (about 40 - after 111 AD), who was also called Chrysostomos ("Golden Mouth"). Of these texts there have never been detailed commentaries up to now. They draw an image of the philosopher not as an abstract thinker but as a new Odysseus, Heracles, but also as a new Socrates or Diogenes, who purposely interferes in people's affairs and by his (...) mere appearance and demeanour provokes them and prompts them to rethink and change their lives. They also outline an ideal of practical ethics to which Dio himself felt obliged; this ideal can still have an effect far beyond Dio’s times and the diverse society of the Roman Empire. (shrink)

Through a close reading of the works of the Ancient Greek Cynics , the Marquis de Sade , and Friedrich Nietzsche , this dissertation explores "ethics of destruction" that undermine set goals and determinate approaches to the world and that confront dominant social-historical institutions while privileging an approach to philosophy as a way of living and of relating to the world. Ethics of destruction affirm difference and irreducible singularities and undermine inherited beliefs and traditions; they reject prescribed social (...) values set on universality, transcendence, and fixity, and embrace singularity, indeterminacy, and transformation. ;The ethics of destruction described in this dissertation involve practices that oppose any domination and that attempt to do justice to what is "hidden and forbidden" and "ex-communicated" in the name of what has been constructed as life. The Cynics, Sade, and Nietzsche engaged in different ethics of destruction that led them towards transforming themselves and towards "becoming tyche," "becoming chaos," or "becoming fatum" respectively. These ethics privilege the multiple, unlimited, and indeterminate at the basis of something that can no longer be called "ontology" but that can be designated as "ways of living." They also accentuate the permeation and stratification of an unlimited, or rather an ungraspable, multiplicity of sensations, feelings, emotions, events, interpretations, etc., at the basis of what can no longer be called "epistemology" but that can be designated as "ways of relating to the world." The particular ways of living and of relating to the world associated with ethics of destruction are shown to privilege practices that open pathways towards "multiplicity.". (shrink)

The study of the virtues has largely dropped out of modern philosophy, yet it was the predominant tradition in ethics fom the ancient Greeks until Kant. Traditionally the study of the virtues was also the study of what constituted a successful and happy life. Drawing on such diverse sources as Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Shakespeare, Hume, Jane Austen, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Sartre, Casey here argues that the classical virtues of courage, temperance, practical wisdom, and justice centrally define the good for (...) humans, and that they are insufficiently acknowledged in modern moral philosophy. He suggests that values of success, worldliness, and pride are active parts of our moral thinking, and that the conflict between these and our equally important Christian inheritance leads to tensions and contradictions in our understanding of the moral life. (shrink)