This paper articulates two constraints on an acceptable account of meaning: (i) accessibility: sameness of meaning affords an immediate appearance of de jure co-reference, (ii) flexibility: sameness of meaning tolerates open-ended variation in speakers' substantive understanding of the reference. Traditional accounts of meaning have trouble simultaneously satisfying both constraints. I suggest that relationally individuated meanings provide a promising way of avoiding this tension. On relational accounts, we bootstrap our way to de jure co-reference: the subjective appearance of de jure co-reference (...) helps make it the case that two token representations really do co-refer. (shrink)

Frank Jackson and David Chalmers have suggested that the diagonal intensions defined by their two-dimensional framework can play the two key roles of Fregean senses: they provide a priori accessible extension conditions for a representation and they provide the identity conditions for meanings and thought contents. In this paper, I clarify the nature of the psychological abilities that are needed to underwrite the first role. I then argue that these psychological abilities are not sufficiently stable or cognitively salient to individuate (...) meanings or thought contents. (shrink)

In an interesting recent exchange, Antti Kauppinen (2007) disagrees with Thomas Nadelhoffer and Eddy Nahmias (2007) over the prospects of experimental methods in philosophy. Kauppinen's critique of experimental philosophy is premised on an endorsement of a priori conceptual analysis. This premise has shaped the trajectory of their debate. In this note, I consider what foes of conceptual analysis will have to say about their exchange.

The overall goal of this target article is to demonstrate a mechanism for an embodied cognition. The particular vehicle is a much-studied, but still widely debated phenomenon seen in 7–12 month-old-infants. In Piaget's classic “A-not-B error,” infants who have successfully uncovered a toy at location “A” continue to reach to that location even after they watch the toy hidden in a nearby location “B.” Here, we question the traditional explanations of the error as an indicator of infants' concepts of objects (...) or other static mental structures. Instead, we demonstrate that the A-not-B error and its previously puzzling contextual variations can be understood by the coupled dynamics of the ordinary processes of goal-directed actions: looking, planning, reaching, and remembering. We offer a formal dynamic theory and model based on cognitive embodiment that both simulates the known A-not-B effects and offers novel predictions that match new experimental results. The demonstration supports an embodied view by casting the mental events involved in perception, planning, deciding, and remembering in the same analogic dynamic language as that used to describe bodily movement, so that they may be continuously meshed. We maintain that this mesh is a pre-eminently cognitive act of “knowing” not only in infancy but also in everyday activities throughout the life span. Key Words: cognitive development; dynamical systems theory; embodied cognition; infant development; motor control; motor planning; perception and action. (shrink)

Article published in Stance by Wolfe and Grosz.

Background: Care ethical theories provide an excellent opening for evaluation of healthcare practices since searching for (moments of) good care from a moral perspective is central to care ethics. However, a fruitful way to translate care ethical insights into measurable criteria and how to measure these criteria has as yet been unexplored: this study describes one of the first attempts. Objective: To investigate whether the emotional touchpoint method is suitable for evaluating care from a care ethical perspective. Research design: An (...) adapted version of the emotional touchpoint interview method was used. Touchpoints represent the key moments to the experience of receiving care, where the patient recalls being touched emotionally or cognitively. Participants and research context: Interviews were conducted at three different care settings: a hospital, mental healthcare institution and care facility for older people. A total of 31 participants (29 patients and 2 relatives) took part in the study. Ethical considerations: The research was found not to be subject to the (Dutch) Medical Research Involving Human Subjects Act. Findings: A three-step care ethical evaluation model was developed and described using two touchpoints as examples. A focus group meeting showed that the method was considered of great value for partaking institutions in comparison with existing methods. Reflection and discussion: Considering existing methods to evaluate quality of care, the touchpoint method belongs to the category of instruments which evaluate the patient experience. The touchpoint method distinguishes itself because no pre-defined categories are used but the values of patients are followed, which is an essential issue from a care ethical perspective. The method portrays the insider perspective of patients and thereby contributes to humanizing care. Conclusion: The touchpoint method is a valuable instrument for evaluating care; it generates evaluation data about the core care ethical principle of responsiveness. (shrink)

Interviews with female impersonators reveal the social, cultural, and economic aspects of their occupation and the subculture of the homosexual transvestite.

This paper examines whether realists can explain co-reference without appealing to subjects’ ideal convergence in judgment. This question is particularly pressing in the normative domain, since deep disagreement about the applicability of normative predicates suggests that different speakers may not pick out the same property when they use normative terms. Normative realists, we believe, have not been sufficiently aware of the difficulties involved in providing a theory of reference-determination. Our aim in this paper is to clarify the nature of this (...) reference-fixing task and the challenges that arise for a non-convergentist normative realist. Our focal point will be Richard Boyd’s externalist account, which has been a model for non-convergentist theories of reference in metaethics. A close examination of Boyd’s account of reference and the ways it could be developed or supplemented, we’ll argue, suggests that explaining co-reference without convergence in the normative domain is a more challenging problem than many realists have supposed. (shrink)

This paper is a response to Niklas Möller’s (Philosophical Studies, 2013) recent criticism of our relational (Jazz) model of meaning of thin evaluative terms. Möller’s criticism rests on a confusion about the role of coordinating intentions in Jazz. This paper clarifies what’s distinctive and controversial about the Jazz proposal and explains why Jazz, unlike traditional accounts of meaning, is not committed to analycities.

Anti-individualists claim that concepts are individuated with an eye to purely external facts about a subject's environment about which she may be ignorant or mistaken. This paper offers a novel reason for thinking that anti-individualistic concepts are an ineliminable part of commonsense psychology. Our commitment to anti-individualism, I argue, is ultimately grounded in a rational epistemic agent's commitment to refining her own representational practices in the light of new and surprising information about her environment. Since anti-individualism is an implicit part (...) of responsible epistemic practices, we cannot abandon it without compromising our own epistemic agency. The story I tell about the regulation of one's own representational practices yields a new account of the identity conditions for anti-individualistic concepts. (shrink)

Children with hearing impairment (HI) show disorders in morphology and syntax. The question is whether and how these disorders are connected to problems in the auditory domain. The aim of this paper is to examine whether moderate to severe hearing loss at a young age affects the ability of German-speaking orally trained children to understand and produce sentences. We focused on sentence structures that are derived by syntactic movement, which have been identified as a sensitive marker for syntactic impairment in (...) other languages and in other populations with syntactic impairment. Therefore, our study tested the repetition and/or comprehension of subject and object relatives, subject and object Wh-questions, passive sentences, and topicalized sentences, as well as sentences with verb movement to second sentential position. We tested 19 HI children aged 9;5-13;6 and compared their performance with hearing children using sentence-picture matching and sentence repetition tasks. For the comprehension tasks, we included HI children who passed an auditory discrimination task; for the sentence repetition tasks, we selected children who passed a screening task of simple sentence repetition without lip-reading; this made sure that they could perceive the words in the tests, so that we could test their grammatical abilities. The results clearly showed that most HI children had considerable difficulties in the comprehension and repetition of sentences with syntactic movement: they had significant difficulties understanding object relatives, Wh-questions, and topicalized sentences, and in the repetition of object who and which questions and subject relatives, as well as in sentences with verb movement to second sentential position. Repetition of passives was only problematic for some children. Object relatives were still difficult at this age for both HI and hearing children. An additional important outcome of the study is that not all sentence structures are impaired—passive structures did not pose a problem for the HI children in comprehension, and caused fewer problems in repetition than other structures. (shrink)

It's widely accepted that social facts about an individual's linguistic community can affect both the reference of her words and the concepts those words express. Theorists sympathetic to the internalist tradition have sought to accommodate these social dependence phenomena without altering their core theoretical commitments by positing deferential reference-fixing criteria. In this paper, we sketch a different explanation of social dependence phenomena, according to which all concepts are individuated in part by causal-historical relations linking token elements of thought.

This volume frames the question of responsibility as a problem of agency in relation to the systems and structures of globalization. According to Ricoeur responsibility is a “shattered concept” when considered too narrowly as a problem of act, agency and individual freedom. To examine this Esther Reed develops a short genealogy of modern liberal and post-liberal concepts of responsibility in order to understand better the relationship dominant modern framings of the meanings of responsibility. Reed engages with writings by major (...) modern (Schleiermacher, Hegel, Marx, Weber) and post-liberal (Buber, Levinas, Derrida, Badiou, Butler, Young, Critchley) theorists to illustrate the shift from an ethnic responsibility built on notions of accountability and attributions to an ethic responsibility that starts variously from the 'other'. Reed sees Dietrich Bonhoeffer as the most promising partner of this theological dialogue, as his learning of responsibility from the risen Christ present now in the (global) church is a welcome provocation to new thinking about the meaning of responsibility learned from land, distant neighbour, (global) church and the bible. Bonhoeffer's reflections on the centre, boundaries and limits of responsibility remain helpful to Christian people struggling with an increasingly exhausted concept of accountability. (shrink)

Two-dimensional (2D) semantics is a formal framework that is used to characterize the meaning of certain linguistic expressions and the entailment relations among sentences containing them. 2D semantics has also been applied to thought contents. In contrast with standard possible worlds semantics, 2D semantics assigns extensions and truth-values to expressions relative to two possible world parameters, rather than just one. So a 2D semantic framework provides finer-grained semantic values than those available within standard possible world semantics, while using the same (...) basic model-theoretic resources. The 2D framework itself is just a formal tool. To develop a semantic theory for someone’s language, a proponent of 2D semantics must do three things: (i) explain what exactly the two possible world parameters represent, (ii) explain the rules for assigning 2D semantic values to a person’s words and sentences, and (iii) explain how 2D semantic values help in understanding the meanings of the person’s words and sentences. (shrink)

According to philosophical orthodoxy, the parties to moral or legal disputes genuinely disagree only if their uses of key normative terms in the dispute express the same meaning. Recently, however, this orthodoxy has been challenged. According to an influential alternative view, genuine moral and legal disagreements should be understood as metalinguistic negotiations over which meaning a given term should have. In this paper, we argue that the shared meaning view is motivated by much deeper considerations than its recent critics recognize, (...) and that much would be lost in opting for the explanation of normative disputes as metalinguistic negotiations. (shrink)

The Generalized Integration Challenge is the task of providing, for a given domain of discourse, a simultaneously acceptable metaphysics, epistemology and metasemantics and showing them to be so. In this paper, we focus on a metaethical position for which seems particularly acute: the brand of normative realism which takes normative properties to be mind-independent and causally inert. The problem is that these metaphysical commitments seem to make normative knowledge impossible. We suggest that bringing metasemantics into play can help to resolve (...) this puzzle. We propose an independently plausible metasemantic constraint on reference determination and show how it can provide a plausible response to for this brand of normative realism. (shrink)

This note argues that Laura Schroeter's [2005] critique of David Chalmers's epistemic two-dimensional semantics is not touched by a reply by Edward Elliott, Kelvin McQueen, and Clas Weber [2013].

It would be nice if good old a priori conceptual analysis were possible. For many years conceptual analysis was out of fashion, in large part because of the excessive ambitions of verificationist theories of meaning._ _However, those days are over._ _A priori conceptual analysis is once again part of the philosophical mainstream._ _This renewed popularity, moreover, is well-founded. Modern philosophical analysts have exploited developments in philosophical semantics to formulate analyses which avoid the counterintuitive consequences of verificationism, while vindicating our ability (...) to know a priori precisely what it is our words and thoughts represent._ _Despite its apparent promise, however, I. (shrink)

Thomas Reid: Theory of Action Thomas Reid made important contributions to the fields of epistemology and philosophy of mind, and is often regarded as the founder of the common sense school of philosophy. However, he also offered key arguments and observations concerning human agency and morality. Reid carefully criticized the views of his contemporaries, and defended … Continue reading Reid: Theory of Action →.

In Our Knowledge of the Internal World, Robert Stalnaker presents a sophisticated new defense of a radically externalist and contextualist approach to mental content. Stalnaker holds that unstructured propositions—sets of possible worlds—can provide a complete account of mental content, including Fregean cognitive significance phenomena. So there is no theoretical job for concepts to fulfill. Stalnaker sees concepts as ‘creatures of darkness’ that encourage theoretical confusion. Concepts are a vestige of the mistaken internalist picture of the mind: internal states that are (...) supposed to ensure transparent access to the objects, kinds, or properties our thoughts represent. I argue there are better reasons for positing concepts—reasons that are independent of the internalist project. (shrink)

Abstract[I] want to single out one phenomenon that could be called the ‘politics of sources’. It points to the extent to which the histories that both scientists and historians can write are artifacts of the available sources. The Rockefeller Foundation not only opened its archives very early on for historical work but also invested a lot in making the archives readily available for historical exploration. During the 1980s, many young historians took advantage of this opportunity. Thus, in a relatively early (...) phase of the professional historiography of molecular biology, one could have gained the impression that the development of the new biology as a whole was a bio‐politically directed enterprise of the Rockefeller Foundation sustained by the vision that social processes could ultimately be controlled by biological processes. (shrink)

Perhaps the fundamental question involved in assessing research can best be summarized as follows: On the basis of what criteria must the long-term accountability of public funds allocated for research be measured, and who should determine these criteria? Should these criteria be based on the quality or the quantity of research produced; on the actual utilization of the research results; on the relevance of research to one or more aspects of “development”; or on the medium- or long-range “potential” impact of (...) research results? Should these criteria be in accordance with “international” standards or reflect primarily national goals and objectives? In addition, there is the complex issue of knowledge integration, an understanding of which is a prerequisite for the generation of a “generic frame-work” designed to focus on the organization of communication between science and the social environment. Given that research and knowledge generation are becoming increasingly international in scope and impact, it is insufficient to merely contend that knowledge integration must occur through various forms of collaboration involving cross fertilization and interdisciplinary perspectives. This is already complicated at the national—let alone the international—level. Unfortunately, none of these issues have thus far been solved by the ever-expanding range of tools available for assessing research. (shrink)

This book traces the evolution of Holocaust memory through the prism of place as it passes from survivors to their children and grandchildren.

Galvanic vestibular stimulation is a non-invasive method of electrically stimulating the vestibular system. We investigated whether the application of GVS can alter the learning of new functional mobility and manual control tasks and whether learning can be retained following GVS application. In a between-subjects experiment design, 36 healthy subjects performed repeated trials, capturing the learning of either a functional mobility task, navigating an obstacle course on a compliant surface with degraded visual cues or a manual control task, using a joystick (...) to null self-roll tilt against a pseudo-random disturbance while seated in the dark. In the “learning” phase of trials, bilateral, bipolar GVS was applied continuously. The GVS waveform also differed between subjects in each task group: white noisy galvanic vestibular stimulation at 0.3 mA high-level random GVS at 0.7 mA, or with the absence of stimulation. Following the “learning” trials, all subjects were blindly transitioned to sham GVS, upon which they immediately completed another series of trials to assess any aftereffects. In the functional mobility task, we found nGVS significantly improved task learning. Further, improvements in learning the functional mobility task with nGVS were retained, even once the GVS application was stopped. The benefits in learning with nGVS were not observed in the manual control task. High level GVS tended to inhibit learning in both tasks, but not significantly so. Even once the high-level stimulation was stopped, the impaired performance remained. Improvements in learning with nGVS may be due to increased information throughput resulting from stochastic resonance. The benefit of nGVS for functional mobility, but not manual control nulling, may be due to the multisensory, strategic, motor coordination, or spatial awareness aspects of the former task. Learning improvements with nGVS have the potential to benefit individuals who perform functional mobility tasks, such as astronauts, firefighters, high performance athletes, and soldiers. (shrink)

Notion complexe et problématique objet de crainte et de crispation, la stásis renvoie tout autant à la discorde, à la sédition, à la guerre civile, qu'à la division. Loin de lire dans cette équivocité le signe de son indétermination, cette enquête se propose de mettre en lumière l'unité et la cohérence de ce concept dans la philosophie pratique d'Aristote. Sans être banalisée, comment la stásis devient-elle le corrélat direct et explicite de la cité? En quel sens la théorie aristotélicienne rompt-elle (...) avec la tradition grecque, pour laquelle la stásis, figure du mal absolu, constituait pourtant un impensé de la cité grecque? (shrink)

Reasoning about bedrock abstract concepts such as time, number, and valence relies on spatial metaphor and often on multiple spatial metaphors for a single concept. Previous research has documented, for instance, both future-in-front and future-to-right metaphors for time in English speakers. It is often assumed that these metaphors, which appear to have distinct experiential bases, remain distinct in online temporal reasoning. In two studies we demonstrate that, contra this assumption, people systematically combine these metaphors. Evidence for this combination was found (...) in both directly elicited and spontaneous co-speech gestures about time. These results provide first support for the hypothesis that the metaphorical representation of time, and perhaps other abstract domains as well, involves the continuous co-activation of multiple metaphors rather than the selection of only one. (shrink)

This paper is a critique of Ralph Wedgwood's recent attempt to use the framework of conceptual role semantics in metaethics. Wedgwood's central idea is that the action-guiding role of moral terms suffices to determine genuine properties as their semantic values. We argue that Wedgwood cannot get so much for so little. We explore two interpretations of Wedgwood's account of what it takes to be competent with a thin moral term. On the first interpretation, the account does not warrant the assignment (...) of a normative property as the semantic value of the target expression. On the second interpretation, the account presupposes that the subject has a prior understanding of normative notions. (shrink)

Unlike traditional sentimentalists, sophisticated sentimentalists don’t think that the main linguistic function of evaluative terms is simply to express emotional responses. Instead, they contend that to predicate an evaluative term to an object is to judge that a particular emotion is justified toward that object. I will raise a fundamental difficulty for the sophisticated sentimentalists’ attempt to provide a credible account of the meaning of our most important evaluative terms. A more careful examination of the relations between the affective and (...) the reflective elements characteristic of our evaluative thinking will suggest that the emotions play a less central role in an account of the meaning of evaluative terms than sentimentalists have assumed. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new relational account of concepts and shows how it is particularly well suited to characterizing normative concepts. The key advantage of our ‘connectedness’ model is that it explains how subjects can share the same normative concepts despite radical divergences in the descriptive or motivational commitments they associate with them. The connectedness model builds social and historical facts into the foundations of concept identity. This aspect of the model, we suggest, reshapes normative epistemology and provides new resources (...) for a vindication of realism in ethics. (shrink)