The limits of sentimentalism

Ethics 116 (2):337-361 (2006)
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Abstract

Unlike traditional sentimentalists, sophisticated sentimentalists don’t think that the main linguistic function of evaluative terms is simply to express emotional responses. Instead, they contend that to predicate an evaluative term to an object is to judge that a particular emotion is justified toward that object. I will raise a fundamental difficulty for the sophisticated sentimentalists’ attempt to provide a credible account of the meaning of our most important evaluative terms. A more careful examination of the relations between the affective and the reflective elements characteristic of our evaluative thinking will suggest that the emotions play a less central role in an account of the meaning of evaluative terms than sentimentalists have assumed.

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Francois Schroeter
University of Melbourne

References found in this work

Frege on demonstratives.John Perry - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.
On sense and intension.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:135-82.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2004 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (2):381-381.
Sentiment and value.Justin D’Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Ethics 110 (4):722-748.
Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):211-215.

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