Robert Alexy has argued that the democratic objection to judicial review of legislation can be successfully addressed by assuming that judges exercise a special form of argumentative representation. In this article we argue that Alexy does not explain (as he should) under what circumstances judicial review tends to produce better decisions than parliamentary procedure, nor does he explain how judicial review can have a greater intrinsic value than parliamentary procedure. Subsequently, we argue that the intrinsic value of argumentative representation depends (...) on the promotion of citizen deliberation, whereas its instrumental value depends on judges being committed to the rights of discrete and insular minorities in the face of hostile majorities. (shrink)

En este artículo exploro algunos de los tópicos vinculados tradicionalmente con el problema de la normatividad del derecho: autonomía, racionalidad, relevancia práctica, razones para la acción y autoridad. Trataré de construir un marco conceptual que refleje la complejidad teórica del problema y las posiciones filosóficas desde los cuales puede ser abordado. Particularmente, me centraré en el análisis de las asunciones filosóficas relacionadas con ciertas posturas y la revisión de su coherencia mutua.

El lector se encontrará en el presente trabajo con dos capítulos en los cuales se aborda de manera clara e histórica el proceso de codificación europea en el periodo del iluminismo o siglo de las luces, sobre todo en lo que tiene que ver con la codificación en materia de Derecho Penal, en el segundo capítulo se aborda esa influencia del proceso de codificación europeo en el proceso de codificación en América Latina, haciendo énfasis en el impacto de dicho proceso (...) en la expedición de Primer Código Penal de 1837 de la República de la Nueva Granada esto a la luz de los aportes de dos estudiosos y juristas europeos: Cesare Bonesana Marqués de Beccaría y Jeremy Bentham. (shrink)

Among the phenomena that make up the mind, cognitive psychologists and philosophers have postulated a puzzling one that they have called ?epistemic feelings.? This paper aims to (1) characterize these experiences according to their intentional content and phenomenal character, and (2) describe the nature of these mental states as nonconceptual in the cases of animals and infants, and as conceptual mental states in the case of adult human beings. Finally, (3) the paper will contrast three accounts of the causes and (...) mechanisms of epistemic feelings: the doxastic account; the mental scanner account; and the heuristic mechanism account. The paper will argue in favor of the heuristic mechanism account. (shrink)

Recent debates on mental extension and distributed cognition have taught us that environmental resources play an important and often indispensable role in supporting cognitive capacities. In order to clarify how interactions between the mind –particularly memory– and the world take place, this paper presents the “selection problem” and the “endorsement problem” as structural problems arising from such interactions in cases of mental scaffolding. On the one hand, the selection problem arises each time an agent is confronted with a cognitive problem, (...) since she has to choose whether to solve it internally or externally. How does she choose? On the other hand, when confronted with the internally or externally retrieved solution to a cognitive task, the subject has to decide whether to endorse the information. How does the subject decide whether to endorse it or not? The last section proposes a solution to each problem in terms of metamemory and metacognitive feelings. Metamemory evaluates memory each time the subject is confronted with a memory task and elicits either a positive or negative metacognitive feeling that guides the decision. (shrink)

Two main theories about metacognition are reviewed, each of which claims to provide a better explanation of this phenomenon, while discrediting the other theory as inappropriate. The paper claims that in order to do justice to the complex phenomenon of metacognition, we must distinguish two levels of this capacity—each having a different structure, a different content and a different function within the cognitive architecture. It will be shown that each of the reviewed theories has been trying to explain only one (...) of the two levels and that, consequently, the conflict between them can be dissolved. The paper characterizes the high-level as a rationalizing level where the subject uses concepts and theories to interpret her own behavior and the low-level as a controlling level where the subject exploits epistemic feelings to adjust her cognitive activities. Finally, the paper explores three kinds of interaction between the levels. (shrink)

Philosophers of mind and epistemologists are increasingly making room in their theories for epistemic emotions (E-emotions) and, drawing on metacognition research in psychology, epistemic – or noetic or metacognitive – feelings (E-feelings). Since philoso- phers have only recently begun to draw on empirical research on E-feelings, in particular, we begin by providing a general characterization of E-feelings (section 1) and reviewing some highlights of relevant research (section 2). We then turn to philosophical work on E-feelings and E-emotions, situating the contributions (...) to the focus section (two articles devoted to E-feelings and two devoted to E-emotions) with respect to both the existing literature and each other (section 3). We conclude by brie y describing some promising avenues for further philosophical research on E-feelings and E-emotions (section 4). (shrink)

Many philosophers consider that memory is just a passive information retention and retrieval capacity. Some information and experiences are encoded, stored, and subsequently retrieved in a passive way, without any control or intervention on the subject’s part. In this paper, we will defend an active account of memory according to which remembering is a mental action and not merely a passive mental event. According to the reconstructive account, memory is an imaginative reconstruction of past experience. A key feature of the (...) reconstructive account is that given the imperfect character of memory outputs, some kind of control is needed. Metacognition is the control of mental processes and dispositions. Drawing from recent work on the normativity of automaticity and automatic control, we distinguish two kinds of metacognitive control: top-down, reflective control, on the one hand, and automatic, intuitive, feeling-based control on the other. Thus, we propose that whenever the mental process of remembering is controlled by means of intuitive or feeling-based metacognitive processes, it is an action. (shrink)

The cognitive phenomenology thesis claims that “there is something it is like” to have cognitive states such as believ- ing, desiring, hoping, attending, and so on. In support of this idea, Goldman claimed that the tip-of-the-tongue phe- nomenon can be considered as a clear-cut instance of non- sensory cognitive phenomenology. This paper reviews Goldman's proposal and assesses whether the tip-of-the- tongue and other metacognitive feelings actually constitute an instance of cognitive phenomenology. The paper will show that psychological data cast doubt (...) on the idea that the tip-of-the-tongue and other metacognitive feelings are clear-cut instances of cognitive phenomenology. (shrink)

A partir de las interpretaciones de Peter Niesen y Reinhard Brandt, el presente estudio analiza el republicanismo kantiano en contraste con el republicanismo cívico, con el propósito de evaluar si el amoralismo metodológico de Kant resulta suficiente para motivar a un pueblo de demonios a establecer y conservar una constitución republicana. Las mejores razones parecen hablar a favor de Kant, no obstante, su propuesta requiere una mayor diferenciación de las motivaciones para aceptar tal constitución, así como de una mayor precisión (...) en cuanto a las condiciones para mantenerla. (shrink)

Mind-wandering seems to be paradigmatically unintentional. However, experimental findings have yielded the paradoxical result that mind-wandering can also be intentional. In this paper, we first present the paradox of intentional mind-wandering and then explain intentional mind-wandering as the intentional omission to control one’s own thoughts. Finally, we present the surrealist method for artistic production to illustrate how intentional omission of control over thoughts can be deployed towards creative endeavors.

En este texto se presenta una propuesta sobre cómo comprender la cognición off-line o no situada a partir de la noción de esquema corporal. Se expone qué es un esquema corporal y cómo, a partir de Jean Piaget, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Shaun Gallagher e Immanuel Kant, se puede ofrecer una noción de esquema corporal o esquema sensoriomotriz desde la cual marcar una ruta de investigación que permita responder a una crítica al enfoque enactivo de la mente, a saber, si este enfoque (...) sostiene que la cognición es situada, ¿cómo puede el enactivismo dar cuenta de los casos de la cognición que no es situada? (shrink)

Los diferentes estudios sociológicos contemporáneos en materia de religiosidad en España nos muestran una sociedad plural y diversa, característica propia de las sociedades postseculares es, como es bien conocido, la pluralidad. El actual pluralismo religioso de la sociedad española, que nadie discute, está muy alejado de la homogeneidad católica mayoritaria de 1980. Año en el que se aprobó la Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa, que es el instrumento esencial del desarrollo constitucional de la libertad religiosa y de gestión de la (...) diversidad religiosa. La doctrina ha puesto de manifiesto la falta de acoplamiento de la Ley Orgánica a la nueva realidad social. De ahí que se haya reclamado la necesidad de establecer una nueva Ley Orgánica de Libertad de Conciencia. Esa posibilidad entró en la agenda política en la última legislatura del Gobierno del Presidente José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, sin que llegase a concretarse legislativamente. Posteriormente, la cuestión ha desaparecido de la agenda política de los sucesivos Gobiernos, por lo que sería necesario recuperar esa iniciativa para una mejor gestión de la diversidad religiosa. No obstante, reconociendo que lo mejor sería la elaboración de una nueva Ley Orgánica, cabría la posibilidad, sin derogar la actual Ley orgánica, de elaborar una ley de bases de gestión de la diversidad religiosa, además, el Gobierno podría, mediante la publicación de diferentes Reales Decretos, corregir la falta de acoplamiento a la realidad social introduciendo desarrollos del contenido del derecho fundamental de libertad religiosa. Dichos Reales Decretos permitirían la asunción en España del acomodo razonable como mejor técnica de gestión de nuestra diversidad religiosa. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to clarify the relation between epistemic feel- ings, mental action, and self-ascription. Acting mentally and/or thinking about one’s mental states are two possible outcomes of epistemic or metacognitive feelings. Our men- tal actions are often guided by our E-feelings, such as when we check what we just saw based on a feeling of visual uncertainty; but thought about our own perceptual states and capacities can also be triggered by the same E-feelings. The first (...) section of the pa- per presents Dokic’s argument for the insufficiency of the “ascent routine” to account for non-transparent cases of self-ascription, as well as his account of E-feelings. The second section then presents a two-level model of metacognition that builds on Dokic’s account and my own view of the issue. The two-level model links E-feelings to a min- dreading capacity in order to account for non-transparent self-ascriptions. Finally, the third section develops a deeper characterization of the relation among E-feelings, mental action, and self-ascription of mental states based on epistemic rules. In the context of self-knowledge, these remarks suggest the existence of means of forming self-ascriptions other than the ascent routine. (shrink)

Proponents of enactivism should be interested in exploring what notion of action best captures the type of action-perception link that the view proposes, such that it covers all the aspects in which our doings constitute and are constituted by our perceiving. This article proposes and defends the thesis that the notion of sensorimotor dependencies is insufficient to account for the reality of human perception, and that the central enactive notion should be that of perceptual practices. Sensorimotor enactivism is insufficient because (...) it has no traction on socially dependent perceptions, which are essential to the role and significance of perception in our lives. Since the social dimension is a central desideratum in a theory of human perception, enactivism needs a notion that accounts for such an aspect. This article sketches the main features of the Wittgenstein-inspired notion of perceptual practices as the central notion to understand perception. Perception, I claim, is properly understood as woven into a type of social practices that includes food, dance, dress, music, etc. More specifically, perceptual practices are the enactment of culturally structured, normatively rich techniques of commerce of meaningful multi- and inter-modal perceptible material. I argue that perceptual practices explain three central features of socially dependent perception: attentional focus, aspects’ saliency, and modal-specific harmony-like relations. (shrink)

I argue that Husserl’s concept of position-taking, Stellungnahme, is adequate to understand the idea of second nature as an issue of philosophical anthropology. I claim that the methodological focus must be the living subject that acts and lives among others, and that the notion of second nature must respond to precisely this fundamental active character of subjectivity. The appropriate concept should satisfy two additional desiderata. First, it should be able to develop alongside the biological, psychological, and social individual development. Second, (...) it should be able to underlie the vast diversity of human beings within and across communities. As possible candidates, I contrast position-taking with two types of habit-like concepts: instinct and habitus, on the one hand, and customary habits, on the other. I argue that position-taking represents the active aspect of the subject while the habit-like concepts are passive. A subject’s position-takings and ensuing comportments are tied together by motivations, which evince a certain consistency, and for this reason are expression of the subject’s identity. I conclude by nuancing the relation between Stellungnahme and passivity. Passivity is deemed necessary to action but subservient to it; position-taking is thought to be prior to passivity. (shrink)

Ouraiminthischapteristodelineatetheformofsharedagencythatwe take to be manifested in collective memory. We argue for two theses. First, we argue that, given a relatively weak conception of episodicity, certain small-scale groups display a form of emergent (i.e., genuinely collective) episodic memory, while large-scale groups, in contrast, do not display emergent episodic memory. Second, we argue that this form of emergent memory presupposes (high-level and possibly low-level) metamemorial capacities, capacities that are, however, not themselves emergent group-level features but rather strictly individual-level features. The form of (...) shared agency that we delineate is thus revealed as being minimal in three senses. First, the relevant groups are themselves minimal in terms of their size. Second, the form of memory in question is minimally episodic. And finally, the cognitive capac- ities attributed to the relevant groups are minimal, in the sense that they need not themselves be capable of metacognition. (shrink)

The theory of rights is crucial as a means of relieving the tension between basic rights and democracy, and as a means of resolving the problem of allocating competence between the constitutional court and the legislature. To some theorists, no tension between basic rights and democracy exists, for the latter presupposes the former. To others, among whom I include myself, tension does exist, for basic rights, in lending protection to certain persons and groups, limit the possibilities of political decision. In (...) this connection it is important to take up the problem of the necessary conditions for realizing basic rights. One of these conditions concerns the delimiting of the scope of institutional action that is found, so to speak, in the space between the constitutional justices and the legislature, the latter as representative of the popular will. (shrink)

I propose a version of teleosemantics for simple animal representations that combines Millikan’s suggestion that they represent the most crucial “normal conditions” required for them to bring about their beneficial behavioral effects with Neander’s suggestion that they represent their “normal causes”. The content of a simple representation is the most crucial among the normal conditions responsible for its tokens having beneficial behavioral effects that also causes such tokens. I argue that this version delivers more plausible contents than other versions of (...) teleosemantics. Frogs’ prey detectors represent the animals they prey on rather than nutritious or small moving things. (shrink)

The feeling of error (FOE) is the subjective experience that something went wrong during a reasoning or calculation task. The main goal of the present study was to assess the accuracy of the FOE in the context of mental mathematical calculation. We used the number bisection task (NBT) to evoke this metacognitive feeling and assessed it by asking participants if they felt they have committed an error after solving the task. In the NBT participants have to determine whether the number (...) presented in the middle of a triplet corresponds to the arithmetic mean of the two outer numbers (e.g., 07_16_25) with a Yes/No answer. Our results show that FOE reports were strongly correlated with arithmetic errors and numerical properties of the NBT, suggesting that the FOE accurately represents the error. This finding indicates that even very fast metacognitive feelings are reliable when it comes to evaluating one’s own mental performance. Moreover, our results suggest that the occurrence of FOEs is determined by the fluency with which each triplet was solved and the post-decision evaluation processes that occurred after the NBT was solved. Additionally, we asked participants to report their confidence in the given answer for the cases where they did not report FOEs. Participants reported less confidence for the (objectively) incorrect answers than for the (objectively) correct ones, suggesting that in cases where they did not have a conscious FOE they still were able to implicitly detect their errors. Remarkably, confidence was also determined by the fluency of the NBT. (shrink)

Nunca, como en nuestros días, han sido tan abundantes y prominentes las políticas de inmigración, y nunca se ha vivido ésta con tanta y tan generalizada insatisfacción. El artículo pretenden explicar las razones que subyacen a tal paradoja, con especial atención a las dificultades a las que se enfrentan las políticas de inmigración en nuestros días y los dilemas que las atenazan, en particular en el ámbito de la Unión Europea.

Basándome en la interpretación de Frederick Neuhouser 2014, examino varios aspectos usualmente no desarrollados en la literatura secundaria sobre una de las herramientas metódicas de la cual se sirve Rousseau en su Discurso sobre el Origen de la Desigualdad entre los Hombres : la así llamada “historia conjetural”. En concreto, examino las respuestas que daría Rousseau a las siguientes tres preguntas: 1) ¿cuáles son los criterios de éxito de tal artefacto metódico? 2) ¿hasta qué punto Rousseau puede estar seguro de (...) la superioridad de su posición frente a teorías alternativas? 3) ¿hasta qué punto es admisible sin objeciones la imagen que Rousseau nos presenta del estado puro de naturaleza? Respecto a la primera pregunta, ofrezco dos criterios cuya inspiración es el falsacionismo de Karl Popper. Respecto a la segunda pregunta, discuto principalmente con la interpretación de Nicholas Dent 2005. Finalmente, en la tercera pregunta considero tanto una objeción kantiana como una objeción hegeliana al DI, mostrando al mismo tiempo que estas objeciones no aplican si entendemos con mayor precisión el proyecto del DI. (shrink)

The objective of this research study was to determine if psychological distress, anxiety, and academic self-efficacy predict satisfaction with studies in Peruvian university students during the COVID-19 pandemic. A cross-sectional and predictive design was used, in which 582 Peruvian university students participated, 243 men and 339 women, between the ages of 16 and 41. Student’s t-statistics were used to analyze the differences in scores of psychological distress, anxiety, academic self-efficacy, and satisfaction with studies based on the sex of the participants, (...) Pearson’s R was used for the analysis of correlations between variables, and multiple linear regressions were used to evaluate the predictive model. In the analyses, the significance level was set at 0.05. The results show that men have higher levels of psychological distress, anxiety, and academic self-efficacy than women do ; high levels of psychological distress correlate with high levels of anxiety and low levels of satisfaction with studies and academic self-efficacy ; high levels of anxiety correlate with low levels of satisfaction with studies and academic self-efficacy ; and high levels of academic self-efficacy correlate with high levels of satisfaction with studies. Academic self-efficacy was also found to predict satisfaction with studies. This concludes that, although there are significant correlations between psychological distress, anxiety, academic self-efficacy, and satisfaction with studies, academic self-efficacy is the variable that most predicts satisfaction with studies in Peruvian university students. (shrink)

We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and – in case they win – later they fight it out among themselves. For three-player games, we find that it will not be in the interest of any two of them to form an alliance. We obtain this result under two different scenarios: equidistant preferences with varying relative (...) strengths, and varying vicinity of preferences with equal distribution of power. We conclude that the commonly made assumption of super-additive coalitional worth is suspect. (shrink)

Se examinan de modo sistemático las críticas de Merleau-Ponty, en la Phénoménologie de la perception, a la teoría kantiana de la experiencia, atendiendo al papel de los conceptos en la conformación de la experiencia objetiva, la relación entre la sensibilidad y el entendimiento, así como la redefinición del carácter formal de la sensibilidad. Se discuten posibles objeciones a la interpretación merleau-pontiana de la teoría kantiana y se evalúa, así mismo, el alcance relativo de ciertas referencias positivas de Merleau-Ponty a nociones (...) kantianas tales como afinidad, sinopsis e imaginación. (shrink)