Women have a life-expectancy advantage over men, but a marked disadvantage with regards to morbidity. This is known as the female–male health-survival paradox in disciplines such as medicine, medical sociology, and epidemiology. Individual differences in physical and mental health are further notably explained by the degree of stress individuals endure, with women being more affected by stressors than men. Here, we briefly examine the literature on women’s disadvantage in health and stress. Beyond biological considerations, we follow with socio-cognitive explanations of (...) gender differences in health and stress. We show that gender roles and traits (masculinity in particular) explain part of the gender differences in stress, notably cognitive appraisal and coping. Stress in turn degrades health. Implications are discussed. In conclusion, traditional socialization is advantageous for men in terms of health. (shrink)

This paper launches a new criticism of Michael Smith’s advice model of internalism. Whereas Robert Neal Johnson argues that Smith’s advice model collapses into the example model of internalism, the author contends that taking advice seriously pushes us instead toward some version of externalism. The advice model of internalism misportrays the logic of accepting advice. Agents do not have epistemic access to what their fully rational selves would advise them to do, and so it is necessary for a model of (...) practical reason based upon advice to reflect the fact that agents take advice only from other people. This fact mayor may not support internalism. Whether it does depends upon the content of the good adviser’s advice, something we cannot know unless we ourselves are fully rational. We see in a new way, then, how the internalism/externalism debate depends upon the content of practical reason. (shrink)

La historia, afirma el autor, es la continuación de la evolución biológica del homo sapiens por otros medios; enfoque que aporta a los fundamentos teóricos de la historia ambiental, una historia que debiera ser como una tela indivisible donde se interconectan todas las actividades humanas. Esto –señala- lleva a examinar a través de la historia el conflicto o tensión entre, por una parte, las fuerzas responsables de la transformación del homo sapiens desde la humanidad del neolítico hasta la humanidad nuclear, (...) y por otra, las fuerzas que mantienen inmutables la reproducción y la estabilidad de las colectividades humanas y de los medios sociales, y que durante la mayor parte de la historia se han contrarrestado eficazmente. Postula además que los historiadores marxistas, que no entendieron las consecuencias involuntarias y no deseadas de los proyectos colectivos humanos del siglo XX, quizás puedan esta vez, enriquecidos por su experiencia práctica, ayudar a comprender cómo hemos llegado a la situación actual, y ayudar a descubrir las mejores formas de encarar esa situación de un modo que contribuya efectivamente al desarrollo de nuestra especie en armonía con el resto del mundo natural. (shrink)

RESUMEN Las tensiones y los vínculos posibles entre razón y violencia son un problema mayor para la filosofía. La obra de Eric Weil se consagra precisamente al análisis de las figuras históricas de dicha tensión, y su obra mayor, Logique de la Philosophie, desarrolla lo fundamental de dicho propósito. Se analiza la manera como Weil, desde la categoría de la acción -última categoría concreta de la filosofía-, en vínculo con las categorías precedentes (absoluto, obra, finito) y con (...) las categorías formales (sentido y sabiduría), enfrenta este desafío siempre nuevo para la filosofía. ABSTRACT The tensions and potential links between reason and violence are a significant philosophical problem. Eric Weil's systematic work, as well as his numerous articles and lectures, is dedicated to the analysis of the historical figures of such tensions. His major work, Logique de la Philosophie, develops that objective. The article analyzes how Weil faces this always new challenge for philosophy, on the basis of the category of action -the last concrete category of his philosophy-, together with the preceding categories (absolute, unmediated particular, finite) and the formal categories (meaning and wisdom). RESUMO As tensões e os vínculos possíveis entre razão e violência são um problema maior para a filosofia. A obra de Eric Weil se consagra precisamente à análise das figuras históricas dessa tensão, e sua obra maior, Logique de la Philosophie, desenvolve o fundamental desse propósito. Analisa-se a maneira como Weil, a partir da categoria da ação -última categoria concreta da filosofia-, em vínculo com as categorias precedentes (absoluto, obra, finito) e com as categorias formais (sentido e sabedoria), enfrenta esse desafio sempre novo para a filosofia. (shrink)

It is impossible to hold patently contradictory beliefs in mind together at once. Why? Because we know that it is impossible for both to be true. This impossibility is a species of rational necessity, a phenomenon that uniquely characterizes the relation between one person's beliefs. Here, Eric Marcus argues that the unity of the rational mind--what makes it one mind--is what explains why, given what we already believe, we can't believe certain things and must believe certain others in this (...) special sense. What explains this is that beliefs, and the inferences by which we acquire them, are constituted by a particular kind of endorsement of those very states and acts. This, in turn, entails that belief and inference are essentially self-conscious: to hold a belief or to make an inference is at the same time to know that one does. An examination of the nature of belief and inference, in light of the phenomenon of rational necessity, reveals how the unity of the rational mind is a function of our knowledge of ourselves as bound to believe the true. Rational self-consciousness is the form of mental togetherness. (shrink)

We often rely on others for guidance about what to do. But wouldn't it be better to rely instead on only your own solo judgment? Deferring to others about moral matters, after all, can seem to conflict what Enlightenment demands. In Guided by Voices, however, Eric Wiland argues that there is nothing especially bad about relying on others in forming your moral views. You may rely on others for forming your moral views, just as you can your views about (...) anything else. You can accept moral testimony without loss. Furthermore, there are several distinctive social goods attainable by being guided by what others say. Thus, it can be better to be guided by moral testimony than by your own moral lights. Wiland also argues that relying on others for moral advice has one advantage over relying on others for moral testimony. For when you trust your adviser's advice, you both thereby form a joint agent that can achieve autonomy, moral understanding, and morally worthy action. Sometimes taking another's advice is your only way to act well. Arguing against the presumption that moral reasoning is ideally done alone, Guided by Voices is the first book to significantly address both moral testimony and advice. (shrink)

"The king is dead. Long live the king!" In early modern Europe, the king's body was literally sovereign—and the right to rule was immediately transferrable to the next monarch in line upon the king's death. In The Royal Remains, Eric L. Santner argues that the "carnal" dimension of the structures and dynamics of sovereignty hasn't disappeared from politics. Instead, it migrated to a new location—the life of the people—where something royal continues to linger in the way we obsessively track (...) and measure the vicissitudes of our flesh. Santner demonstrates the ways in which democratic societies have continued many of the rituals and practices associated with kingship in displaced, distorted, and usually, unrecognizable forms. He proposes that those strange mental activities Freud first lumped under the category of the unconscious—which often manifest themselves in peculiar physical ways—are really the uncanny second life of these "royal remains," now animated in the body politic of modern neurotic subjects. Pairing Freud with Kafka, Carl Schmitt with Hugo von Hofmannsthal,and Ernst Kantorowicz with Rainer Maria Rilke, Santner generates brilliant readings of multiple texts and traditions of thought en route to reconsidering the sovereign imaginary. Ultimately, The Royal Remains locates much of modernity—from biopolitical controversies to modernist literary experiments—in this transition from subjecthood to secular citizenship. This major new work will make a bold and original contribution to discussions of politics, psychoanalysis, and modern art and literature. (shrink)

The question “are garden snails conscious?” or equivalently “is there something it’s like to be a garden snail?” admits of three possible answers: yes, no, and denial that the question admits of a yes-or-no answer. All three answers have some antecedent plausibility, prior to the application of theories of consciousness. All three answers retain their plausibility after the application of theories of consciousness. This is because theories of consciousness, when applied to such a different species, are inevitably question-begging and rely (...) crucially on dubious extrapolation from the introspections and verbal reports of a single species. (shrink)

PDF with introduction and front and back materials. Abstract: A provocative examination of the consequences of Levinas’s and Adorno’s thought for contemporary ethics and political philosophy. This book unfolds a dialogue between Emmanuel Levinas and Theodor W. Adorno, using their thought to address contemporary environmental and social-political situations. Eric S. Nelson explores the “non-identity thinking” of Adorno and the “ethics of the Other” of Levinas with regard to three areas of concern: the ethical position of nature and “inhuman” material (...) others such as environments and animals; the bonds and tensions between ethics and religion and the formation of the self through the dynamic of violence and liberation expressed in religious discourses; and the problematic uses and limitations of liberal and republican discourses of equality, liberty, tolerance, and their presupposition of the private individual self and autonomous subject. Thinking with and beyond Levinas and Adorno, this work examines the possibility of an anarchic hospitality and solidarity between material others and sensuous embodied life. -/- “This is an extremely impressive, original, and thorough treatment of two key twentieth-century thinkers and their applicability to the most pressing social and political issues of our time.” — Jeffrey A. Bernstein, author of Leo Strauss on the Borders of Judaism, Philosophy, and History -/- “This book is an excellent and timely contribution to political and environmental philosophy, located around a nuanced historical and philosophical approach to Levinas and Adorno. It will be of great interest to anyone concerned with these figures or with the current moment.” — Martin Shuster, author of Autonomy after Auschwitz: Adorno, German Idealism, and Modernity. (shrink)

How diverse is philosophy? In this paper we explore recent data on the racial, ethnic, and gender diversity of philosophy students and faculty in the United States. We have found that women are underrepresented in philosophy at all levels from first-year intention to major through senior faculty. The past four years have seen an increase in the percentage of women philosophy majors at the undergraduate level, but it remains to be seen if this recent increase in the percentage of women (...) will eventually also show at more advanced stages. Temporal trends since 2000 also show substantial increases in the racial and ethnic diversity of philosophy majors at all levels of education from first-year undergraduate through PhD, with substantial declines in the percentage of non-Hispanic White philosophy majors and substantial increases in all other commonly measured racial/ethnic groups except for Native American / Alaska Native. Despite generally increasing diversity, people who identify as Hispanic (any race), or non-Hispanic Native American, Alaska Native, or Black remain substantially underrepresented in philosophy at all levels compared to their presence in the U.S. population, and in some cases also as compared to other majors. (shrink)

In On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life, Eric Santner puts Sigmund Freud in dialogue with his contemporary Franz Rosenzweig in the service of reimagining ethical and political life.

In a recent no-go theorem [Bong et al., Nature Physics (2020)], we proved that the predictions of unitary quantum mechanics for an extended Wigner’s friend scenario are incompatible with any theory satisfying three metaphysical assumptions, the conjunction of which we call “Local Friendliness”: Absoluteness of Observed Events, Locality and No-Superdeterminism. In this paper (based on an invited talk for the QBism jubilee at the 2019 Växjö conference) I discuss the implications of this theorem for QBism, as seen from the point (...) of view of experimental metaphysics. I argue that the key distinction between QBism and realist interpretations of quantum mechanics is best understood in terms of their adherence to different theories of truth: the pragmatist versus the correspondence theories. I argue that a productive pathway to resolve the measurement problem within a pragmatist view involves taking seriously the perspective of quantum betting agents, even those in what I call a “Wigner bubble”. The notion of reality afforded by QBism, I propose, will correspond to the invariant elements of any theory that has pragmatic value to all rational agents—that is, the elements that are invariant upon changes of agent perspectives. The classical notion of ‘event’ is not among those invariants, even when those events are observed by some agent. Neither are quantum states. Nevertheless, I argue that far from solipsism, a personalist view of quantum states is an expression of its precise opposite: Copernicanism. (shrink)

One of the deepest and longest-lasting debates in ethics concerns a version of the Euthyphro question: are choiceworthy things choiceworthy because agents have certain attitudes toward them or are they choiceworthy independent of any agents’ attitudes? Reasons internalists, such as Bernard Williams, Michael Smith, Mark Schroeder, Sharon Street, Kate Manne, Julia Markovits, and David Sobel answer in the first way. They think that all of an agent’s normative reasons for action are grounded in facts about that agent’s pro-attitudes (e.g., her (...) desires, valuing states, normative judgments). According to the most popular brand of internalism, idealizing internalism, an agent’s reasons are grounded, not in her actual pro-attitudes, but rather in what her pro-attitudes would be in suitably idealized conditions. Idealizing internalists presuppose that, for any agent with an irrational set of attitudes, there is one uniquely rational set that that agent would have if she were to undergo the relevant idealizing process. I argue that this assumption is false and that it raises two puzzles for idealizing internalism: one about the existence of practical reasons and another about their normative weight. I argue that idealizing internalists have an adequate solution to the first puzzle but not the second. Indeed, when they try to solve the second puzzle, they confront a dilemma. This second puzzle and the associated dilemma thus constitutes a powerful, but so far unnoticed, difficulty for idealizing internalism. (shrink)

In this article I will argue first that if ignorance poses a problem for valid consent in medical contexts then framing effects do too, and second that the problem posed by framing effects can be solved by eliminating those effects. My position is thus a mean between two mistaken extremes. At one mistaken extreme, framing effects are so trivial that they never impinge on the moral force of consent. This is as mistaken as thinking that ignorance is so trivial that (...) it never impinges on the moral force of consent. At the other mistaken extreme, framing effects are so serious that their existence shows that consent has no independent moral force. This is as mistaken as the idea that ignorance is so serious that its existence shows that consent has no independent moral force. I will argue that, instead of endorsing either of these mistaken extreme views, we should instead endorse a moderate view according to which framing effects sometimes pose a serious challenge for the validity of consent, just as ignorance does, but one which we can solve by eliminating the effect, just as we can solve the problem of ignorance by eliminating it. (shrink)

In his _Duino Elegies,_ Rainer Maria Rilke suggests that animals enjoy direct access to a realm of being—the open—concealed from humans by the workings of consciousness and self-consciousness. In his own reading of Rilke, Martin Heidegger reclaims the open as the proper domain of human existence but suggests that human life remains haunted by vestiges of an animal-like relation to its surroundings. Walter Benjamin, in turn, was to show that such vestiges—what Eric Santner calls the _creaturely_—have a biopolitical aspect: (...) they are linked to the processes that inscribe life in the realm of power and authority. Santner traces this theme of creaturely life from its poetic and philosophical beginnings in the first half of the twentieth century to the writings of the enigmatic German novelist W. G. Sebald. Sebald’s entire oeuvre, Santner argues, can be seen as an archive of creaturely life. For Sebald, the work on such an archive was inseparable from his understanding of what it means to engage ethically with another person’s history and pain, an engagement that transforms us from indifferent individuals into neighbors. An indispensable book for students of Sebald, _On Creaturely Life_ is also a significant contribution to critical theory. (shrink)

What are the meanings of number expressions, and what can they tell us about questions of central importance to the philosophy of mathematics, specifically 'Do numbers exist?' This Element attempts to shed light on this question by outlining a recent debate between substantivalists and adjectivalists regarding the semantic function of number words in numerical statements. After highlighting their motivations and challenges, I develop a comprehensive polymorphic semantics for number expressions. I argue that accounting for the numerous meanings and how they (...) are related leads to a strengthened argument for realism, one which renders familiar forms of nominalism highly implausible. (shrink)

The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations governing federally funded research on human subjects assumes that harmful research is sometimes morally justifiable because the beneficiaries of that research share a particular vulnerability with its subjects. In this article, I argue against this assumption, which occurs in every subpart of the Code of Federal Regulations that deals with specific vulnerable populations . I argue that shared vulnerability is no exception to the general principle that harming one person in order to benefit another (...) is no more justifiable if the two people have traits in common. Further, shared vulnerability is not a reasonable proxy for any morally relevant desideratum of research, in particular the desire to benefit the worst off, the desire to avoid exploitation, and the desire to use vulnerable populations in research only when necessary. (shrink)

The organization of the modern police is a contingent social choice about how to engage in the process of governance when regulating public order on the street. The police are the agency authorized to act upon the state’s duty to govern in response to public emergencies. The duty to govern exists when there is some urgent social need that could be resolved by acting, and some person or institution has the resources and ability to do that act. The duty is (...) impersonal: anybody with the relevant skill set is obligated to act to address the relevant need. Problems can arise, however, when too few individuals respond or too many compete to resolve the need. A core feature of governance, then, is to create publicly recognized institutions with special authority, resources, and abilities to address the demand for public services when someone needs to step in and do something to the exclusion of ordinary members of the public. Police agencies are further characterized by various powers and duties. These powers are normative powers to change the legal status of the people with whom the police interact, rather than physical powers to use some amount of violence to coerce individuals to comply with police demands. The core powers of the police include the powers to make authoritative determinations about how to respond to an emergency, to detain individuals, and to trespass upon their person or property, along with conjoined duties to govern, to protect, and to intervene at risk to themselves. The dominant approach attempts to distinguish the police from other institutions using the police ability to use violent to respond to public emergencies. On the governance based model of the police, however, the ability to use force is simply one of the resources available to the police, and does not mark them off as different from other public governance agencies. (shrink)

One potentially ethically relevant feature of an utterance is that utterance's influence on the likelihoods that our future discourses wind up with one Stalnakerian ‘common ground’ or body of shared information rather than another. Such likelihoods matter ethically, so the ways our utterances influence them can matter ethically, despite the fact that such influences are often unintended, and often hard to see. By offering a relatively neutral descriptive framework that can enhance our collective sensitivity to and discussion of ethically, socially, (...) and politically important features of language use, this paper contributes to the ethics of language use. It discusses ways in which utterances can influence the likelihoods of future common grounds by deploying one system of categorization rather than another, and argues that language’s effects on the evolution of discourse can affect the paths to and probabilities of different sorts of consensus. (shrink)

Subsequent consent can be morally efficacious. First, it licenses nostalgia and dismissiveness no more than its prior cousin does. Second, it's coherent because linked to the mental state of not minding. Third, it's just as vulnerable to bilking as prior consent is, as is clear once we distinguish between basing moral assessments on expectations versus on actual outcomes. Fourth, mind control is illegitimate because it short circuits the subject's will, not because its consent is subsequent. Finally, our intuitions about rape (...) show that dissent sometimes outweighs consent in matters of sex, not that subsequent consent is always inefficacious. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 1, Page 63-70, January 2022.

Despite such widespread acclaim, there are some influential theater critics who have panned Qualia!

An integrated representation of large‐scale space, or cognitive map, colled PLAN, is presented that attempts to address a broader spectrum of issues than has been previously attempted in a single model. Rather than examining way‐finding as a process separate from the rest of cognition, one or the fundamental goals of this work is to examine how the wayfinding process is integrated into general cognition. One result of this approach is that the model is “heads‐up,” or scene‐based, because it takes advantage (...) of the properties of the human visual system and, particularly, the visual system's split into two pathways. The emphasis on the human location or “where” system is new to cognitive mapping and is port of an attempt to synthesize prototype theory, associative networks and location together in a connectionist system. Not all of PLAN is new, however. Many of its parts have analogues in one or another preexisting theory. What makes PLAN unique is integrating the various components into a coherent whole, and the capacity of this resulting system to speak to a wide range of constraints. Our approach emphasizes adaptiveness; thus, our focus on such issues as ease of use and efficiency of learning. The result is a model that has a stronger relationship both to the environment, and to the ways that humans interact with it, compared with previous models. The resulting model is examined in some detail and compared to other systems. (shrink)

The mechanistic approach in philosophy of science contributes to our understanding of experimental design. Applying the mechanistic approach to experimentation in computing is beneficial for two reasons. It connects the methodology of experimentation in computing with the methodology of experimentation in established sciences, thereby strengthening the scientific reputability of computing and the quality of experimental design therein. Furthermore, it pinpoints the idiosyncrasies of experimentation in computing: computing deals closely with both natural and engineered mechanisms. Better understanding of the idiosyncrasies, which (...) manifest in terms of a nonstandard role for experimentation, are interesting both for computer scientists and for philosophers of science. Computer scientists can think more clearly about their experimental choices. The role of experimentation elucidated by computer science merits further study from philosophers of science generally, as it highlights a role for experimentation hitherto unrecognized by philosophers: demonstration that activities exist. (shrink)

This chapter situates John Rawls’ just savings principle in a discussion about how much a nation-state should save. The main question addressed is whether this principle is a viable alternative to the dominant utilitarian theory of optimal growth. Rawls certainly gives savings a different aim (i.e., to create and maintain just institutions) and introduces additional permissibility conditions on reaching this goal (i.e., the necessary burdens should be fairly shared between generations). He thereby gives rise to the field of research now (...) known as intergenerational justice. To assess the relative merits of the just savings principle, however, more details are needed; and this chapter aims to supply some of them. First, the principle of just savings is given a more determinate form whereby it is understood as a two-stage combination of a priority principle at the stage of institutional development and a difference principle at the maintenance stage. Second, some of its practical bearings are explored (i.e., its implications for real-life savings decisions). Among other things, the idea that the principle leads to a steady-state economy is problematized, and its relevance to concrete problems, such as climate change and the design of pension schemes, is assessed. (shrink)

This chapter explores Nagel’s polemics. It shows these have a two-fold character: (i) to defend liberal civilization against all kinds of enemies. And (ii) to defend what he calls ‘contextual naturalism.’ And the chapter shows that (i-ii) reinforce each other and undermine alternative political and philosophical programs. The chapter’s argument responds to an influential argument by George Reisch that Nagel’s professional stance represents a kind of disciplinary retreat from politics. In order to respond to Reisch the relationship between Nagel’s philosophy (...) of science and his politics is explored and this chapter shows how both are anchored in what Nagel once called his ‘contextual naturalism’—a metaphysics that resists imposing the unity of the world and treats all entities as embedded in a wider network of entities. Part of the argument traces out how Nagel’s views on responsible speech and professionalism reflect a distinct understanding of the political role of philosophers of science. (shrink)

Several approaches to implementing symbol-like representations in neurally plausible models have been proposed. These approaches include binding through synchrony, “mesh” binding, and conjunctive binding. Recent theoretical work has suggested that most of these methods will not scale well, that is, that they cannot encode structured representations using any of the tens of thousands of terms in the adult lexicon without making implausible resource assumptions. Here, we empirically demonstrate that the biologically plausible structured representations employed in the Semantic Pointer Architecture approach (...) to modeling cognition do scale appropriately. Specifically, we construct a spiking neural network of about 2.5 million neurons that employs semantic pointers to successfully encode and decode the main lexical relations in WordNet, which has over 100,000 terms. In addition, we show that the same representations can be employed to construct recursively structured sentences consisting of arbitrary WordNet concepts, while preserving the original lexical structure. We argue that these results suggest that semantic pointers are uniquely well-suited to providing a biologically plausible account of the structured representations that underwrite human cognition. (shrink)

Pluralism is widely appealed to in many areas of philosophy of science, though what is meant by ‘pluralism’ may profoundly vary. Because explanations of behaviour have been a favoured target for pluralistic theses, the sciences of behaviour offer a rich context in which to further investigate pluralism. This is what the topical collection The Biology of Behaviour: Explanatory pluralism across the life sciences is about. In the present introduction, we briefly review major strands of pluralist theses and their motivations. We (...) highlight three distinct types of pluralisms—type pluralism, fragmentation pluralism and insular pluralism—and introduce the articles of the topical collection. (shrink)

Predictivism asserts that novel confirmations carry special probative weight. Epistemic pluralism asserts that the judgments of agents (about, e.g., the probabilities of theories) carry epistemic import. In this paper, I propose a new theory of predictivism that is tailored to pluralistic evaluators of theories. I replace the orthodox notion of use-novelty with a notion of endorsement-novelty, and argue that the intuition that predictivism is true has two roots. I provide a detailed Bayesian rendering of this theory and argue that pluralistic (...) theory evaluation pervades scientific practice. I compare my account of predictivism with those of Maher and Worrall. Introduction Why construction is a red herring for pluralist evaluators The unvirtuous accommodator Virtuous endorsers and the two roots of predictivism The two roots in Bayesian terms: the priors and background beliefs of endorsers Who are the pluralist evaluators? Two contemporary theories of predictivism 7.1 Maher: Reliable methods of theory construction 7.2 Worrall: The confirmation of core ideas Conclusion. (shrink)

Offers a history of the philosophy of time and a comparison of the ways of conceiving the temporal, concentrating on European philosophy and its impact the connection between time and money in Western civilization.

Avons-nous une bioéthique véritablement canadienne – et pas seulement une pratique de la bioéthique au Canada? Cette question, et le présent article, portent sur le lien entre la bioéthique et les expériences réelles des Canadiens en matière de soins de santé, de recherche et de santé publique. En l’abordant, je m’inspire du pragmatisme philosophique qui souligne l’importance de l’expérience quotidienne comme point de départ de l’éthique, et de l’épanouissement humain comme objectif de l’éthique. À travers cette optique, un idéal bioéthique (...) canadien est un idéal qui s’enracine dans les expériences vécues par les Canadiens ; il reflète l’idéal d’épanouissement projeté par les individus canadiens, y compris leurs opinions sur leurs communautés politiques. Toutefois, il n’est pas certain qu’une bioéthique canadienne à part entière ait pris forme, étant donné l’uniformisation croissante des recherches dans le monde entier, qui crée des attentes quant aux types de problèmes moraux qui méritent d’être étudiés et aux types de solutions à adopter. Dans un esprit de réflexion sur cette question, j’aborde les aspects de la société canadienne qui pourraient façonner le développement d’une bioéthique canadienne : (a) l’existence de récits politiques canadiens concurrents, (b) le caractère distinct des systèmes de santé et des expériences en matière de soins de santé au Canada, (c) l’engagement des Canadiens envers certaines valeurs et aspirations, (d) les aspects institutionnels et procéduraux de la sphère publique canadienne, (e) les défis posés par l’uniformisation croissante de l’enseignement dans les différents contextes géographiques et nationaux, et (f) les obstacles pratiques au développement d’une bioéthique canadienne. Ces défis auxquels la bioéthique canadienne fait face sont probablement pertinents à l’échelle internationale pour tous les contextes dans lesquels des problèmes moraux d’origine sociale sont discutés et des solutions envisagées. (shrink)

The nature of necessary truth was a central concern of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It was present in his early reflections on logic, a core motif of the Tractatus, and a topic he returned to over and again in his reflections on language, logic, and mathematics. This chapter explores the aspects of Wittgenstein's account of necessity and apriority, beginning with the Tractatus, where many of his core insights received their first expression. It discusses two more contemporary accounts of these topics: conceptual role (...) semantic theories of the a priori, and the arguments for divorcing apriority from necessity. Necessity in the Tractatus appears at two locations. One is at the level of individual elementary propositions. The other is at the level of the inferential connections between propositions. The chapter looks at the Tractatus theory of the proposition. Wittgenstein saw an important difference between the formulations of the rules of grammar and descriptions of states of affairs. (shrink)

This paper examines Charles Peirce's graphical notation for first-order logic with identity. The notation forms a part of his system of "existential graphs," which Peirce considered to be his best work in logic. In this paper a Tarskian semantics is provided for the graphical system.

Scientific modelling is a value-laden process: the decisions involved can seldom be made using 'scientific' criteria alone, but rather draw on social and ethical values. In this paper, we draw on a body of philosophical literature to analyze a COVID-19 vaccination model, presenting a case study of social and ethical value judgments in health-oriented modelling. This case study urges us to make value judgments in health-oriented models explicit and interpretable by non-experts and to invite public involvement in making them.

This article critically examines Saul Kripke's (1972) argument for the separability of necessary truths from truths known a priori, focusing on his criticism of the standard meter case presented by Wittgenstein (1968). It attempts to show that Kripke's argument is unworkable on any of several readings. Wittgenstein's own broadly conventionalist account of necessary truth is then considered in the light of the standard meter example.

Recently, research into the possibilities of developing solar radiation management and other geoengineering technologies has gained new momentum. Just last year, Cambridge University announced the opening of a “Centre for Climate Repair” as part of the university’s Carbon Neutral Futures Initiative. Recent modeling work gives hope that SRM could confer more benefits than previously thought. But opposition to even conducting research into SRM remains strong. I use the case study of SRM to develop a framework, based on a theorem by (...) I.J. Good, for thinking about the benefits and costs of acquiring new evidence and for thinking about the conditions under which new evidence could be harmful. I argue that the expected benefits of supporting public research in SRM technologies outweigh the expected costs and harms. (shrink)

Recent work in the cognitive sciences has argued that beliefs sometimes acquire signaling functions in virtue of their ability to reveal information that manipulates “mindreaders.” This paper sketches some of the evolutionary and design considerations that could take agents from solipsistic goal pursuit to beliefs that serve as social signals. Such beliefs will be governed by norms besides just the traditional norms of epistemology. As agents become better at detecting the agency of others, either through evolutionary history or individual learning, (...) the candidate pool for signaling expands. This logic holds for natural and artificial agents that find themselves in recurring social situations that reward the sharing of one’s thoughts. (shrink)

Earp and colleagues make a strong case for the complete decriminalization and even the legalization of recreational drug use based on the negative impact of the “War on drugs” on racialized...

Let X be an infinite set and let and denote the propositions “every filter on X can be extended to an ultrafilter” and “X has a free ultrafilter”, respectively. We denote by the Stone space of the Boolean algebra of all subsets of X. We show: For every well‐ordered cardinal number ℵ, (ℵ) iff (2ℵ). iff “ is a continuous image of ” iff “ has a free open ultrafilter ” iff “every countably infinite subset of has a limit point”. (...) implies “every open filter on extends to an open ultrafilter” implies “has an open ultrafilter” implies It is relatively consistent with that (ω) holds, whereas (ω) fails. In particular, none of the statements given in (2) implies (ω). (shrink)

Volume 6 of The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin offers the first translation of the full German text of Anamnesis published in 1966.

Critical reception of Marcel Duchamp since the 1970s has tended to elevate him into the very figure of the Artist he sought to attack. One aspect of this domestication has involved neglecting Duchamp’s fin de siècle ‘eroticism’ with its sexual innuendos and double-entendres. Yet this very readymade vulgarity allows us to recover a Duchamp still capable of disrupting the genres of Art and the gendered Artist, by revealing a theory embedded in his work which continually reverses and displaces phallocentrism in (...) a game consisting of the confusion of genders and genres. We argue that Duchamp’s disruption of the discursive typologies of the genre of art can be profitably read through this apparently trivial sexualized wordplay, particularly in the transgender passage into Rrose Sélavy. Reading this aspect of Duchamp after, i.e. within and against, Lacan demonstrates how Duchamp’s singular regime of signs governed by equivocity and indetermination subverts the ‘phallic function’ of the signifier. (shrink)

Discussions of reproducibility are casting doubts on the credibility of experimental outcomes in the life sciences. Although experimental evolution is not typically included in these discussions, this field is also subject to low reproducibility, partly because of the inherent contingencies affecting the evolutionary process. A received view in experimental studies more generally is that standardization (i.e., rigorous homogenization of experimental conditions) is a solution to some issues of significance and internal validity. However, this solution hides several difficulties, including a reduction (...) of external validity and reproducibility. After explaining the meaning of these two notions in the context of experimental evolution, we import from the fields of animal research and ecology and suggests that systematic heterogenization of experimental factors could prove a promising alternative. We also incorporate into our analysis some philosophical reflections on the nature and diversity of research objectives in experimental evolution. (shrink)