El Cuerpo sin Órganos tiene que herir. Lo cual significa, para el filósofo, que el CsO desorgan- izará su identidad filosófica. Como tal, el CsO estalla en medio de la obra de Gilles Deleuze y es la marca de una ruptura entre una Lógica del sentido y una Lógica de la sensación, entre una biofilosofía y una biopolítica, contemporánea de los acontecimientos de mayo del 68 y del comienzo de la colaboración de Deleuze con Félix Guattari. Mientras que antes de (...) la ruptura existe una superficie de singularidades móviles que expresa una deleuziana maquinaria estructuralista del sentido, después de dicha ruptura el pensamiento logra su auténtica materialidad en conceptos llenos de vida, conceptos que han sido construidos maquínicamente y que expresan acontecimientos. El pensamiento no es ya inmanente a la vida, sino que se trata de la dimensión vital de la vida que se arroja a lo impensado gracias a la ruptura producida por el CsO. Este arrojarse da lugar a la sensación, entendida como la dimensión tanto estética como política del CsO, que crea nuevas posibilidades para la vida. A la postre, la biopolítica resulta coextensiva tanto del arte como de la filosofía, haciendo válida como a ninguna otra la pregunta de Deleuze y de Guattari: «¿cómo hacerse un cuerpo sin órganos?». (shrink)

Résumé Leviathan Toth, la contre-“installation” que Ernesto Neto a suspendue aux voûtes du Panthéon à l’automne 2006 n’exploite pas l’espace de ce lieu de mémoire national pour s’exposer («art environnemental»). Il affronte toutes ses coordonnées physiques, esthétiques, politiques, métaphysiques, pour s’en prendre à l’Art de la représentation dont le frontispice du Léviathan montrait, au dire même de Hobbes, le rôle constitutif-constitutionnel pour la République. Mettant en scène une manière de Critique et Clinique de la Représentation dans toutes les acceptions du (...) terme à partir du court-circuit (qui est aussi le circuit le plus court) entre politique et esthétique, l’Opération-Neto vise à la dés-organisation expansive de la multitude vivant sous le régime «démocratique» de la représentation contractuelle dont le Panthéon est le temple. Elle donne corps à la perversion rhizomatique-bioénergétique de l’Image de l’État-Machine, de la Forme-État, en projetant un nouveau type de réalité, infra- et supra-organique, qui tire son «énergie» des forces de la multitudo dissoluta (Hobbes) dont elle propose une radicale re-composition vitale. Cette œuvre/non-œuvre qui relève d’un constructivisme politico-esthétique brésilien que l’on s’attache à redéfinir, ne peut dès lors faire l’«objet» que d’une pratique de déplacement incorporante et constituante du spectateur-participant. (shrink)

In this essay, I review the writings of three philosophers whose work converges on the insight that we must attend to and reconstruct culture for the sake of justice. John Rawls, John Dewey, and Richard Rorty help show some of the ways in which culture can enable or undermine the pursuit of justice. They also offer resources for identifying tools for addressing the cultural challenges impeding justice. I reveal insights and challenges in Rawls’s philosophy as well as tools and solutions (...) for building on and addressing them in Dewey’s and Rorty’s philosophy. (shrink)

The most up-to-date philosophical discussion of the quasi-historical fantasy television show Game of ThronesThe Ultimate Game of Thrones and Philosophy treats fans to dozens of new essays by experts who examine philosophical questions raised by the Game of Thrones story.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:113 HUME ON LIBERTY, NECESSITY AND VERBAL DISPUTES Although Hume's discussion "Of Liberty and Necessity" in Section VIII of the first Enquiry has become a paradigm of compatibilism with respect to the issue of free will and determinism, it is not without its perplexing features. For instance, it is far from clear how Hume's arguments and illustrations help to establish his claim that "The same motives always produce the (...) same actions: The same events follow from the same causes." Nor is it obvious that Humean liberty is reconcilable with Humean causation or constant conjunction, or that the latter takes the sting out of determinism and makes the case for compatibilism more plausible. In this paper I want to examine a further, perhaps related, perplexing feature of Hume's discussion, namely, his contention that the dispute concerning liberty and necessity has been a merely verbal one. Although perhaps portions of the dispute may turn "merely upon words" as Hume contends, still it seems extreme to claim that the "whole controversy" is of this nature. I shall begin by examining the notion of a merely verbal dispute as it is discussed by Hume in other parts of his philosophy, and shall isolate three conditions for such a dispute. I shall then show why the dispute over liberty and necessity as presented in the Enquiry fails to meet these conditions. I want to suggest that there is a tension between Hume's psychological account of particular mistaken beliefs or natural illusions and his views about particular verbal disputes involving these beliefs. Even if this tension can be eased or eliminated, it will not make the dispute about liberty and necessity verbal. 114 Before we can hope to assess Hume's claim that the dispute about liberty and necessity is a merely verbal one, we must be clear on what hé understands by such a dispute. Fortunately, the notion is discussed in each of his four most important philosophical works — the Treatise, the two Enquiries and the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Perhaps the most detailed discussion is found in the Appendix to the second Enquiry, where Hume examines an apparent disagreement discovered in a comparison of various natural languages over the question of whether particular personal qualities are virtues or rather talents (and the corresponding question of whether other qualities are vices or rather defects). In contending that the disagreement is merely verbal, Hume has two important things to say. First, he notes that "I do not find that in the English, or any other modern tongue, the boundaries are exactly fixed between virtues and talents, vices and defects, or that a precise definition can be given of the one as contradistinguished from the other." (E 313) Secondly, he states, "...it is no wonder that languages should not be very precise in marking the boundaries between virtues and talents, vices and defects; since there is so little distinction made in our internal estimation of them." (E 314) Hume goes on to point out that the sentiments which arise from the contemplation of qualities that are designated virtues are similar to those which arise from the contemplation of qualities which in some languages are designated talents. (E 316) 115 The preceding comments suggest an account of the nature of verbal disputes along the following lines. In a verbal dispute there is an underlying agreement about specific impressions, perceptions or experiences of objects. Thus, in the case of the dispute about whether specific qualities are talents or virtues, this would include the fact that the qualities elicit a similar feeling of approval for Hume whether they are designated in one way or the other. Moreover, Hume's comment about the lack of a clear distinction between "virtue" and "talent" implies that the terms express or refer to ideas that are compatible, that is, both of which can apply to a given object. Hence, there can be instances of qualities which fall under both designations. Given the underlying "factual" agreement between the parties to the dispute and given the compatibility of ideas, it would seem that for Hume in a verbal dispute there is no real disagreement between them and neither party is mistaken. Consequently... (shrink)

Recently a gender-selective harvesting strategy has been proposed for possible control of aquatic invasive species, wherein females of the invasive species are harvested, whilst stocking the males (abbreviated as FHMS strategy) (Lyu et al. in Nat Resour Model 33(2):e12252, 2020). We consider the FHMS strategy with a weak Allee effect, and show that its extinction boundary need not be hyperbolic. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first example of a non-hyperbolic extinction boundary in two-compartment mating models structured (...) by sex. The model possesses a rich dynamical structure, with several local co-dimension one bifurcations occurring. We also show the occurrence of a global homoclinic bifurcation, which has applicability for large scale strategic bio-control. (shrink)

It is surely not coincidental that the term "soul" should mean not only the center of a creature's life and consciousness, but also a thing or action characterized by intense vivacity ("that bike's got soul!"). It also seems far from coincidental that the same contemporary academic discussions that have largely cast aside the language of "soul" in their quest to define the character of human mental life should themselves be so--how to say it?--bloodless, so lacking in soul. This volume arises (...) from the opposite premise, namely that the task of understanding human nature is bound up with and in important respects dependent upon the more critical task of learning to be fully human, of learning to have soul. The papers collected here are derived from a conference in Oxford sponsored by the Centre of Theology and Philosophy and together explore the often surprising landscape that emerges when human consciousness is approached from this angle. Drawing upon literary, philosophical, theological, historical, and musical modes of analysis, the essays of this volume vividly remind the reader of the power of the ancient language of soul over against contemporary impulses to reduce, fragment, and overly determine human selfhood. (shrink)

One aspect of Richard Shusterman’s work is indicative of a broad movement to develop a robust philosophy of embodiment. Thinkers from diverse fields—such as feminism, pragmatism, and continental philosophy—have criticized Western philosophy’s suppression of embodiment and have gone on to suggest how the philosophy of the body can enrich our understanding of issues that arise within traditional fields such as ethics and aesthetics. Further, work in this area can provide novel insights into personal identity, gender, linguistics, and philosophy of mind. (...) Shusterman’s contribution to the field is somaesthetics, the critical and meliorative study of embodied experience that views the human body as a locus of .. (shrink)

as de michelis has argued, americans have been fascinated by the psychosomatic discipline of yoga since the turn of the twentieth century.1 The transcendentalists Thoreau and Emerson were influenced by Vedantic philosophy, and William James was intrigued by neo-Vedantic yogic practices as promulgated by Swami Vivekananda.2 Since then, yoga has become a global phenomenon with approximately 20.4 million Americans regularly practicing the discipline.3 In this essay, I will consider the implications of yoga practice for pragmatist philosophy and, more specifically, for (...) the discipline of somaesthetics as developed by Richard Shusterman. (shrink)

During the campaign of may 1940 and the following month, King Leopold III had as principal political counsellor Henri De Man. He played a primordial role during that period, which was rich with extremely important events for the future of Belgium, such as the surrender of the army and the problem of the King reassuming or not his constitutionalprerogative during the occupation. The former socialist minister did not accidentally hold the situation of confident of the King. Indeed, both men became (...) friends before the war.They shared similar conceptions about interior and foreign policyproblems.In fact, Leopold III supported De Man in his attempt, during the winter 1938-1939, to convoke a peace conference. On the other end early 1939 they both expressed rather similar conceptions on the functioning of the Belgian institutions and especially on the lack of authority of the executive power. The projects of manifestoes by De Man concerning the political future of Belgium were grounded on a reinforcement of the executive power. So the manifesto of june 1940, a consequence of De Man's contacts with the King, reveals the role which the King should or could have assumed if Hitler had permitted it. (shrink)

This chapter considers the view that we are literally brains. It argues that the view is best supported by the claim that brains are the primary subjects of mental properties, giving a “thinking‐brain problem” analogous to the thinking‐animal problem that supports animalism. The brain view is shown to have implausible consequences about our identity through time, and to presuppose that something is a part of a thinking being if and only if it is directly involved in that being's mental processes. (...) It is then argued that the notion of direct involvement is too interest‐relative to give this principle any useful content, and that the principle is in any case unfounded. (shrink)

Assuming the position that takes properties to be tropes rather than universals and takes ordinary objects as bundles of tropes, the essay first argues that the Law of the Identity of Indiscernibles survives the challenge raised by Black's "two-sphere universe". It is because the Law of Indiscernibles becomes a trivialconsequence of the assumed trope ontology. The essay then considers four construals of the thesis of Uniqueness differing in strength. The construals are developed in terms of both the possibility that tropes (...) of an object may be transferred to another object and the possibility that objects may survive cross-worldproperty changes. Finally, the essay argues that a trilemma arises from three intuitively innocent claims: (1) that same world objects do not share tropes, (2) that cross world objects may share some (but not all) tropes, and (3) that objects may survive cross-world property changes. And, unfortunately, Indiscernibles plays a role in giving rise to one horn of the trilemma. The essay suggests "ultraessentialism" as a possible way out of the trilemma. (shrink)

As duas formulacoes do imperative categorico de Kant, leativas a universalizabilidade de aco e a direcao da acao para os fins em si mesmos, nao sao logicalmente equivalentes. John Rawls e Jurgen Habermas exploram a divisao de Kant em seus esforcos para promover politicas liberais e politicas justificaveis na justica processual. Mas, ao mesmo tempo, levam a um rompimento com a abordagem de Kant – a aceitacao de uma divisao entre o etico e o legal. O presente artigo argumenta ser (...) possivel reconstruir a posicao de Kant sem cair em um postivismo legal e, simultaneamente, manter restricoes racionais a acao de entidades corporativas. (shrink)

Theistic religions are not the only religions in the West. Many nontheistic religions are religions of energy. This energy is ultimate, optimizing, impersonal, and natural. Although it cannot be worshiped, this energy can be aroused, directed, and shaped. Hence the energy religions involve tools and techniques for the therapeutic application of the ultimate energy to the self. They are technologies of the self. Attention is focused here on four new types of energy religion. These include the religions of consciousness (e.g. (...) the New Stoicism, Westernized Buddhism); the religions of vision (involving the ethical use of entheogens); the religions of dance (e.g. religious raves); and the religions of beauty (e.g. Burning Man). (shrink)

Masoch emerging from the Text for a Life-Experiment: what Deleuze delivers to us is a political program, because « there is no other danger but the father’s return. ».