Der deutsche Philosoph und Charakterkundler Ludwig Klages kann als ein Pionier des ökologischen Denkens angesehen werden. Vor allem mit seinem Aufsatz „Mensch und Erde“, verfasst für das Bundestreffen der Freideutschen Jugend 1913 auf dem Hohen Meißner bei Kassel, prangerte er in einer bis dahin beispiellosen Schärfe die Naturzerstörung der modernen Welt an. Klages stand dabei durchaus in einer Traditionslinie, die mit der Romantik einsetzte und durch die frühen Naturschützer des 19. Jahrhunderts wie Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl und Ernst Rudorff verkörpert wurde. (...) Anders als diese benannte er aber die geistige Ursache für die Entfremdung des Menschen von der übrigen Natur klar beim Namen: den Anthropozentrismus. Dieser sei der Wesenskern sowohl der monotheistischen Religionen wie auch der seit dem Zeitalter der Aufklärung dominierenden materialistischen Fortschrittsgläubigkeit. War Klages zu Lebzeiten damit noch ein „einsamer Rufer in der Wüste“, so wurden mit der in den 1970er Jahren aufkommenden Umweltbewegung viele seiner Aspekte – vom Biozentrismus bis hin zur Ökologie als einer Leitwissenschaft – neu thematisiert. (shrink)

In this article, we present an argumentative approach to normative reasoning. Special attention is paid to deontic conflicts, contrary-to-duty and specificity cases, which are modelled by means of argumentative attacks. For this, we adopt a recently proposed framework for logical argumentation in which arguments are generated by a sequent calculus of a given base logic of Argument & Computation ), and use standard deontic logic as our base logic. Argumentative attacks are realized by elimination rules that allow to discharge specific (...) sequents. We demonstrate the usefulness of our approach by means of various well-known benchmark examples, and show that this approach is rich enough to capture a variety of paradigms for handling conflicting norms such as reasoning with maximally consistent sets, prioritized norms and deontic formalisms based on I/O logic. (shrink)

The publication includes an essay by the late Bohumil Fiser "The policy from the perspective of a naturalist," which examines the relationship between natural and social laws in the past and present. The publication also contains a legal essay by Zdeněk Koudelka "Repeal of Constitutional Law by the Constitutional Court", which deals with the events of the abolition of the constitutional law on the reduction of the term of office of deputies in 2009.

Autor se zabývá základními otázkami marxistické ontologie. Hlavním tématem práce je kritika tzv. substančního modelu v ontologii. Sleduje jeho genezi v dějinách lidského myšlení a chce dokázat jeho historicko-společenskou.

本书讨论的内容有:生存的背景、生存的误区、生存的悖谬、现实生存、社会生存、细节生存、我的境界就是我的生存等。.

Mador ʻinyene teshuvah -- Mador ʻinyene ha-moʻadim -- Mador maʻalot ha-Torah -- Mador ʻinyene emunah -- Mador Torah u-maʻalote' -- Mador ʻinyene ha-musar ṿe-tiḳun ha-midot -- Mador zikhron ḳedoshim -- Mador be-shule ha-mesilah.

Donald Davidson denied convention any interesting role in the philosophical theory of meaning: Conventions are neither necessary nor sufficient to account for communication by language. This anticonventionalism is part of Davidson's more general individualism about meaning. According to Davidson, notions such as that of a shared language, shared practices of use, and the attendant notions of standard meaning and linguistic mistake, are as uninteresting to the philosophical theory of meaning as that of convention. The chapter starts with a sketch of (...) the meaning theoretical background for Davidson's anticonventionalism, arguing that Davidson ultimately motivates both anti‐conventionalism and individualism by the social or public nature of language. After quickly taking up Davidson's arguments against attempts to conventionally link semantics to nonsemantic purposes, the chapter then focuses on his attack on the idea that literal meaning is conventional meaning and the surrounding discussion. (shrink)

According to the received view the later Wittgenstein subscribed to the thesis that speaking a language requires being guided by rules (thesis RG). In this paper we question the received view. On its most intuitive reading, we argue, (RG) is very much at odds with central tenets of the later Wittgenstein. Giving up on this reading, however, threatens to deprive the notion of rule-following of any real substance. Consequently, the rule-following considerations cannot charitably be read as a deep and subtle (...) defense of (RG) against the threat of paradox, as proponents of the received view are wont to do. Instead, we argue, the rule-following considerations provide Wittgenstein's deep and subtle reasons for rejecting the very idea that speaking a language involves rule-guidance. Although Wittgenstein subscribed to (RG) during his middle period writings, his later remarks on rules, far from being a clarification and elaboration of his earlier views, are directed against the claim of the middle period that speaking a language is an essentially rule-guided activity. (shrink)

We translate unconstrained and constrained input/output logics as introduced by Makinson and van der Torre to modal logics, using adaptive logics for the constrained case. The resulting reformulation has some additional benefits. First, we obtain a proof-theoretic characterization of input/output logics. Second, we demonstrate that our framework naturally gives rise to useful variants and allows to express important notions that go beyond the expressive means of input/output logics, such as violations and sanctions.

Lou Goble proposed powerful conditional deontic logics (CDPM) that are able to deal with deontic conflicts by means of restricting the inheritance principle. One of the central problems for dyadic deontic logics is to properly treat the restricted applicability of the principle “strengthening the antecedent”. In most cases it is desirable to derive from an obligation A under condition B, that A is also obliged under condition B and C. However, there are important counterexamples. Goble proposed a weakened rational monotonicity (...) principle to tackle this problem. This solution is suboptimal as it is for some examples counter-intuitive or even leads to explosion. The paper identifies also other problems of Goble’s systems. For instance, to make optimal use of the restricted inheritance principle, in many cases the user has to manually add certain statements to the premises. An adaptive logic framework based on CDPM is proposed which is able to tackle these problems. It allows for certain rules to be applied as much as possible. In this way counter-intuitive consequences as well as explosion can be prohibited and no user interference is required. Furthermore, for non-conflicting premise sets the adaptive logics are equivalent to Goble’s dyadic version of standard deontic logic. (shrink)

Donald Davidson famously held that only beliefs provide reasons for belief. Perceptual experiences, he held, are not even propositional attitudes, and thus doubly disqualified from being reason providers. John McDowell and others have tried to restore the intuitive reason-providing role of experience by suggesting that experiences do have contents. However, on McDowell’s account, experiences provide ‘reasons’ in a sense very different from the Davidsonian. In this paper, I argue that there is a better way of rescuing the reason-providing role of (...) experience: Construed as a (special) kind of belief, experience provides reasons for belief in precisely the Davidsonian sense. Moreover, the doxastic account of experience I suggest integrates naturally both with the Davidsonian picture of content determination and, consequently, with Davidsonian anti-skepticism. (shrink)