In light of the proposed expansion of eligibility for physician aid in dying (PAD) in Canada to people with psychiatric disorders, there is a new subset of individuals seeking PAD—those with poverty-induced depression. The dominant account defending the expansion is known as the “parity argument.” Defenders of the parity argument maintain that the expansion of PAD to those with psychiatric conditions is needed to reflect that the seriousness of a patient's suffering does not depend on the cause of that suffering. (...) Parity accounts, as they stand, would allow cases of poverty-induced depression to qualify. I raise a moral dilemma that the parity theorist must face considering this new subset of cases—expanding access to PAD, without adequate social protections, could produce more social inequality by aiming to reduce it. I propose six recommendations that policy-makers should consider before expanding PAD given these cases, social injustice, and the social determinants of mental health. (shrink)

Retold of Kālajñāna mattu tatvabōdhāmr̥ta by Kaivāra Nārēyaṇa, active 18th century-19th century; on the philosophy of life. Kannada novels contributed to art and culture of Karnataka.

Many think that equality is an intrinsic value. However, this view, especially when based on a consequential foundation, faces familiar objections related to the claim that equality is sometimes good for none and bad for some: most notably the levelling down objection. This article explores a unique (consequential) conception of equality, as part of a more general conception of fairness concerning the resolution of interpersonal conflicts, which is not exposed to these objections.

Discrimination is a central moral and legal concept. However, it is also a contested one. Particularly, accounts of the wrongness of discrimination often rely on controversial and particular assumptions. In this paper, I argue that a theory of discrimination that relies on premises that are very general (rather than unique to the concept of discrimination) and widely accepted provides a plausible (exhaustive) account of the concept of wrongful discrimination. According to the combined theory, wrongful discrimination consists of allocating a benefit (...) that is not supported by a morally significant fact (a valid reason), or in a way that involves distributive injustice, or both. (shrink)

The general assumption that underlines Richard Posner’s argument in his book Not a Suicide Pact is that decisions concerning rights and security in the context of modern terrorism should be made by balancing competing interests. This assumption is obviously correct if one refers to the most rudimentary sense of balancing, namely, the idea that normative decisions should be made in light of the importance of the relevant values and considerations. However, Posner advocates a more specific conception of balancing, both substantively (...) and institutionally. Substantiality, he argues for balancing based on a consequential moral theory that rejects the ideas of deontological rights and particularly absolute or very weighty deontological rights. More specifically, it seems that Posner assumes a utilitarian theory that also rejects intrinsic concern for distributive justice. Institutionally, Posner argues that this method of reasoning should be adopted by judges when interpreting the constitution. These substantive and institutional background assumptions are of course controversial, but I do not dispute them in this Article. My critique concerns Posner’s conclusions based on these assumptions. Posner’s main claim is that given the magnitude of the danger of modern terrorism, even a small probability that an act of terror may occur justifies extreme anti-terror measures. While the general idea that even a slight risk of very serious harm justifies significant cost is plausible, I doubt Posner’s assumptions regarding the cost of various means of preventing these dangers, his claim that judicial review in this context should be very limited, and his suggestion of an absolute formal prohibition that is not strictly enforced in the context of measures such as interrogational torture. (shrink)

Your session will time out in 5 minutes. Tip: Save your search strategies for future use at Recent Searches. Your APA PsycNET session timed out because it was inactive for 30 minutes. Ellis, Willis D. (Ed). (1938). A source book of Gestalt psychology. (pp. 210-216). London.

How should a democratic state fight terrorism? This is the question discussed by Michael Ignatieff in his latest book. Ignatieff explores several possible positions as a response to this question. The review considers the analysis of these positions.

According to an appealing and common view, the moral status of an action – whether it is wrong, for example – is sometimes important in itself in terms of the moral status of other actions – especially those that respond to the original action. This view is especially influential with respect to the criminal law. It is accepted not only by legal moralists but also by adherents of the harm principle, for example. In this paper, I argue against this view. (...) The main arguments emphasize the distinctions between the moral status of actions, consequences, and agents. I argue that what matters, in terms of other actions, is not the moral status of the original action but rather other factors that may be confused with it, such as the moral status of its consequences – whether they are good or bad – and the moral status of the agent – whether she is praiseworthy or blameworthy. The intuitive appeal of the common view is, I argue, at least partly due to a conflation of these factors. Most importantly, once we recall the distinctions between these factors, we can see more clearly that this view lacks a compelling rationale. Or, at least, that it is based on assumptions that, first, are much more controversial than their conclusion, and, second, do not support every aspect of this view – and thus do not offer a unified foundation for this view. (shrink)

-- -- sefer 2. Śiḥot musar ṿe-hitbonenut she-neʼemru bi-Yeshivat Ponivez' -- sefer 3. Elul, Yamim noraʼim.

This is Re'em Segev's contribution to the symposium on Douglas Husak's book "Overcriminalization.".

We study the Medvedev degrees of mass problems with distinguished topological properties, such as denseness, closedness, or discreteness. We investigate the sublattices generated by these degrees; the prime ideal generated by the dense degrees and its complement, a prime filter; the filter generated by the nonzero closed degrees and the filter generated by the nonzero discrete degrees. We give a complete picture of the relationships of inclusion holding between these sublattices, these filters, and this ideal. We show that the sublattice (...) of the closed Medvedev degrees is not a Brouwer algebra. We investigate the dense degrees of mass problems that are closed under Turing equivalence, and we prove that the dense degrees form an automorphism base for the Medvedev lattice. The results hold for both the Medvedev lattice on the Baire space and the Medvedev lattice on the Cantor space. (shrink)

Should the input data of artificial intelligence (AI) systems include factors such as race or sex when these factors may be indicative of morally significant facts? More importantly, is it wrong to rely on the output of AI tools whose input includes factors such as race or sex? And is it wrong to rely on the output of AI systems when it is correlated with factors such as race or sex (whether or not its input includes such factors)? The answers (...) to these questions are controversial. In this paper, I argue for the following claims. First, since factors such as race or sex are not morally significant in themselves, including such factors in the input data, or relying on output that includes such factors or is correlated with them, is neither objectionable (for example, unfair) nor commendable in itself. Second, sometimes (but not always) there are derivative reasons against such actions due to the relationship between factors such as race or sex and facts that are morally significant (ultimately) in themselves. Finally, even if there are such derivative reasons, they are not necessarily decisive since there are sometimes also countervailing reasons. Accordingly, the moral status of the above actions is contingent. (shrink)

The article explores the Israeli Supreme Court main judgment regarding the legality of the use of special interrogation methods in order extract information concerning future acts of terror. The Judgment's main conclusion was that while there might be a justification for using exceptional interrogation measures in order to save lives, based on the concept of lesser evil as embedded in the criminal defense of necessity, the government is nevertheless not authorized to use such means in the absence of explicit legislation (...) to that effect. The article presents and evaluates the Judgment, particularly the relation between the substantive moral questions involved and the aspect of authorization. (shrink)

Definition and Development of Ethics The word 'ethics' comes from the Greek word 'ethos' which means customs or behaviour. The adjectival form in Greek is ...

Study with reference to philosophy of Joseph F. Fletcher on christian ethics.