My dissertation, “Love, Self-Constitution, and Practical Necessity,” offers an interpretation of love between people. Love is puzzling because it appears to involve essentially both rational and non-rational phenomena. We are accountable to those we love, so love seems to participate in forms of necessity, commitment, and expectation, which are associated with morality. But non-rational attitudes—forms of desire, attraction, and feeling—are also central to love. Consequently, love is not obviously based in rationality or inclination. In contrast to views that attempt to (...) fit love into existing models of practical reasoning, I argue that love participates in a unique form of practical necessity, different from both moral and psychological necessity, yet bearing resemblances to each. Distinctive to this type of practical necessity is a direct appeal to another particular person that cannot be delivered in third-personal terms—that is, a non-moral yet normative type of expectation on another person. This type of expectation is predominant in loving relationships, but can also make better sense of the experiences of humor and beauty, as well as attitudes like forgiveness, gratitude, and agent-regret. I treat Immanuel Kant’s discussion of the experience of beauty in the Critique of Judgment and Christine Korsgaard’s work on self-constitution as fruitful starting points for this account of love. I conclude that our loving relationships enable us to have distinctive personal selves, and provide support for this account of love by offering a complementary theory of grief. In Part One of the dissertation, I focus on two prominent approaches to love characteristic of the sentimentalist and rationalist traditions. I begin with the work of David Hume, which treats desire (understood as something like a simple impulse or craving) as the paradigmatic mental state, and emphasizes our personal and affective dimensions. Hume has the valuable insight that loving someone affects our sense of ourselves. But Hume’s view becomes unsatisfying when he claims that love is essentially enfeebling, implying that to love is to be passive toward and readily overcome by another person. While this indicates Hume’s awareness that love involves being open and receptive to another person, the problem is that love is also a demanding attitude. Hume lacks the conceptual resources to offer a nuanced view of the self, in which we can—with one attitude—be both demanding of and vulnerable to another person. Hume’s model of a desire-based deliberative process has recently been revived in Harry Frankfurt’s discussions on love and rationality. Frankfurt, however, goes beyond Hume’s picture of the self by introducing a notion of “identification,” which he offers to make sense of our apparent ability to commit ourselves decisively to certain projects or people. I argue that active powers like identification and commitment cannot be accommodated within any basically Humean moral psychology. Such abilities, and with them the possibility of love, depend on something closer to a Kantian conception of rational agency. I next focus on the work of Kant, who provides the substantial counterpart to Humean-inspired moral theories, but is not known for his insight into our emotional lives. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant divides love into “practical love”—what we experience when we are morally motivated to help someone—and “pathological love”—what we experience when we feel fond of something. But in reality, we experience love neither as a mere preference for another person, nor as something that generates the kind of demands that would be binding on any rational creature. David Velleman attempts to remedy the deficiency of Kant’s dichotomy. Velleman offers a Kantian theory in which he describes love and respect as two ends of a continuum of attitudes that it is morally appropriate to have toward people. Velleman’s view has the peculiar implication that everyone deserves the love of everyone else, and I argue that this is a fatal flaw. Like Kant and Velleman, Korsgaard characterizes personal love as involving the treatment of other people as Kantian ends-in-themselves to a heightened degree. Korsgaard, though, also contends that our individual identities depend upon our personal relationships, and I take this position seriously for the remainder of the dissertation. Ultimately, however, characterizations of loving relations as subsets of moral relations can account for the authority of the demands of love, but not its particularity. The major conclusion of Part One is that any attempt to understand love primarily on a model of practical reasoning with which we are already familiar is doomed to fail. Our experience of love calls for a theory of a unique type of practical necessity. In Part Two I take seriously the possibility that love is simultaneously inescapable (in something like the way morality is supposed to be), and yet ineluctably personal. In love, we experience an engagement with a person as essentially particular, rather than as an instance of a rational agent in general. To make sense of this direct attachment to an individual, I argue that love involves distinctive forms of expectation and disappointment. When those we love let us down, they hurt our feelings, which is not a response to a failed prediction, but nor is it a reaction to a moral insult or offense. According to Peter Strawson and Stephen Darwall, second-personal moral reactive attitudes (such as resentment) always have third-personal analogues (such as indignation). In contrast, I argue that the type of hurt feelings associated with love is a second-personal reactive attitude that does not have a third-personal corollary. I take this as evidence that the expectations involved in love are not objective in the way that the moral is objective. Nor, however, is love a matter of mere preference. On my interpretation, Kant introduces this different type of expectation in the Critique of Judgment. Whereas he characterizes moral judgments as universally communicable, judgments of beauty implicitly involve only second-personal address: I appeal to your direct experience with a particular object. This provides the conceptual space for an account of love according to which it involves a uniquely second-personal form of practical necessity. I contend that the second-personal addresses we make in love are appeals to strengthen the intimacy implicit in the loving relationship, and I identify three interrelated dimensions of that intimacy. First, those we love have the standing to interpret us in a constitutive manner. We fine-tune and make determinate the character of our concerns and interests in part by accepting the interpretations provided by those we love. In that way, the people we love have the normative power to constitute who we are. Second, we share a perspective with those we love in a way that is not reducible to or derivative of our independent perspectives. Loving someone centrally involves the activity of forming concerns together, and we do this in a mode best understood on the model of playing a spontaneous game or improvising music. Finally, being loved enables us to see ourselves as distinctive and special, because the concern those who love us have for us does not track the objective merit of our characteristics. These dimensions of the intimacy that characterizes a loving relationship reveal what it is that we appeal for in love, and how we are hurt when our appeals are rebuffed. In broad terms, this dissertation advocates the recognition of a non-moral yet normative type of expectation, which is predominant in loving relationships. Humor and beauty, too, make more sense when understood in terms of this non-moral yet normative type of expectation, as they involve appeals to others that are more than mere predictions of, but less than rational demands for, a certain kind of response. Introducing this alternative notion of expectation into the discourse of moral philosophy can shed light on other common attitudes that are clearly normative, but defy translation into objective, third-personal terms. Such attitudes include certain experiences of pride and shame, apology and forgiveness, the bestowing of mercy, gratitude, agent-regret, and perhaps a basic sense of trust we have in others. Ultimately, I situate love in respect to grief, which demonstrates my theory’s ability to make sense of related dimensions of our emotional lives. The people we love and grieve over give us a sense of who we are as distinctive, particular individuals, as the three interrelated dimensions of intimacy in loving relationships reveal. Consequently, grief is best understood as a type of practical disorientation—namely, a disorientation that involves the loss of the personal self. I present my account of grief against the type of account that would draw philosophical conclusions about the nature of love and grief from empirical psychological data alone. In particular, these data indicate that we recover quickly from the deaths of loved ones, and Dan Moller draws the philosophical conclusion that those we love fulfill certain roles in our lives and are replaceable. In contrast, I contend that while we should acknowledge the truth of the objective judgment, made in the third-person, that we will likely recover after the deaths of those we love, it does not follow that we must affirm such a claim from the internal perspective of one person who loves another. As a result, the case of love and grief supports a general claim concerning the proper work of moral philosophy, which is that the understanding of ourselves gained through empirical data is not a substitute for the normative conclusions that are revealed through first-personal reflections on our relationships. (shrink)

A program for the simulation of rational social normative trust, predictive `trust,' and predictive reliance between agents will be introduced. It offers a tool for social scientists or a trust component for multi-agent simulations/multi-agent systems, which need to include trust between agents to guide the decisions about the course of action. It is based on an analysis of rational social normative trust (RSNTR) (revised version of M. Tuomela 2002), which is presented and briefly argued. For collective agents, belief conditions for (...) collective agency should be added. For the various forms of trust agents must have (at least) subjectively rational reasons to believe that the conditions of the trust account are fulfilled. A list of such reasons (of varied weights), e.g., given by empirical research, can manually be built into a parameter file or be generated by a calling program in a fixed format. From this list of reasons the program randomly generates a belief base for the agents of the artificial society. Reasons can be chained together so that one set of reasons satisfies several belief conditions. The program checks if the conditions are fulfilled for the artificial agents' social normative trust/predictive `trust'/`predictive reliance' in another agent that he will perform an action X. Each outcome is logged to a result file. In conclusion we discuss various aspects of the application of a trust component of the suggested kind in empirical research, social simulation, and multi-agent systems. (shrink)

Ethics in caring is what we actually make explicit through our approach and how we invite the suffering patient into a caring relationship. This phenomenological study investigates suffering and health and how this presupposes a deeper reflection on ethics in caring. The aim was to try to discover, describe and understand how patients experience their life situation three years after undergoing surgery. The theoretical approach is based on central aspects of Eriksson’s caritative theory (i.e. the view of the person as (...) body, soul and spirit). The informants were four women and four men aged between 55 and 77 years. The empirical material revealed suffering that was connected with both illness and life. Suffering involves experiences of grief, loneliness and struggling. Health implies a yearning for something beyond the current life situation, a yearning to experience some meaning in life. This leads to an awareness of unplumbed possibilities. Understanding the experiences of individual patients demands of us, as both researchers and nurses, to act, seeking after the scientific truth (i.e. a deeper reflection of the ontological, epistemological and methodological questions). The idea of responsibility helps us to interpret and meet the innermost desires of suffering patients in their true presence. Caritative caring ethics means ‘being there’, confirming patients’ absolute dignity; it is a manifestation of the love that ‘just exists’. Compassion requires an inner disposition to go with others to the places where they are weak, vulnerable, lonely and broken. An ontology of caring provides both a starting point and a context for reflection about ethics and the ethical life. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to portray the ethics of suffering based on the published literature. Narrative use has become common in the fields of nursing education and curriculum development and in the determination of practice competencies. Understanding the ethics of suffering implies a hermeneutic movement between alienation and dedication. To understand the ethical significance of human suffering, the scene of suffering is described through the concepts of: to endure, to struggle, to sacrifice life and health, and to become. (...) To respond, to discover, to approach, to touch and to shape patients' different patterns of life implies responsibility: to see, to affirm their dignity by being, and to express this in ethical words. Narration plays a crucial role in transforming suffering, that is, reformulating patients' stories. It is vital that educators should create a learning environment where students can find the courage and intention to be present and listen to patients' narratives. (shrink)

The Anschluss of Austria in 1938 was a major moment for Nazi expansion in Europe. This German annexation has often been framed to portray Austria as the “first victim” in Nazi aggression, placing blame for crimes agaisnt humanity on the Nazi ideology, rather than Austrian individuals or groups complicit with colaboration. This paper seeks to deconstruct this historiographical understanding based on ideology and analyze the impact of agency in examining Austria’s history with Nazism, the Holocaust, and coming to terms with (...) problematic history. (shrink)

W artykule analizowane są uwagi Henryka Elzenberga dotyczące znaczenia i funkcji muzyki dla człowieka. Muzyka ma zdolność antycypowania, wywołania, przekazywania i przekierowywania treści emocjonalnych, ale jaka jest jej rola w poznaniu i myśleniu? Problem jest omawiany w kontekście relacji muzyki z mistyką, z życiem, z niemoralnością, w odwołaniu do Beethovena i Wagnera oraz myśli Wittgensteina o muzyce.

The category of “former friend” is familiar, yet the nature of this relationship type remains underexplored. Aristotle, for example, poses but does not answer the question of what constitute appropriate relations between former friends. To elucidate post-friendship expectations, I promote an account of friendship according to which some of our most significant friendships participate in a type of intimacy characterized by having normative standing to interpret each other in a constitutive manner, which I call the “co-interpretation view” of friendship. Unchecked (...) powers of co-interpretation, however, invite and allow for violations of each friend’s personhood, so I draw on Kantian resources to guide the co-interpretation view and render it more plausible. These Kantian resources help to establish relevant expectations for co-interpretation between friends. This positions me to provide an account of appropriate expectations between former friends, which I analyze in three types of post-friendship circumstance: when the friendship has faded but the parties still share a general outlook; when the friendship has become damaging for the friends but not due to viciousness; and, when the friendship ruptures due to vicious behaviors. (shrink)

An account of the conflict between our positive and negative emotional relationships to the Earth and how they will be resolved for the Symbiocene, the next period in the history of the Earth.

Truth, semblance, reconciliation -- The dialectic of modernism and postmodernism -- Art and industrial production -- Ethics and dialogue.

Explores the theories of democratic individualism articulated in the works of the American transcendentalist writer Ralph Waldo Emerson, pragmatic philosophers William James and John Dewey, and African-American novelist and essayist Ralph Ellison.

Zusammenfassung Nach Luther soll das Evangelium nicht nur in der persönlichen Meditation des Wortes, sondern auch in der öffentlichen Verkündigung, erfahrbar werden. Dies verlangt von der Verkündigung, kritisch zu rechtlichen und sozialen Verhältnissen Stellung zu nehmen. In Spannung zu diesem Anliegen tritt Luthers Instrumentalisierung des Sprachhumanismus für sein Interesse an der objektivierenden Absicherung seiner Lehre durch die äußere Klarheit der Schrift. Der darin gründende Machtanspruch lässt einen antidialogischen und aggressiven Kommunikationsstil und eine feindselige Haltung insbesondere gegen das Judentum und seine (...) eigenständige Schriftauslegung herrschend werden. Der Humanismus verliert damit seinen wesentlichen Gehalt. Doch eine Deutung der Schrift und der Wirklichkeit im Sinne der Christus-Mystik gewinnt erst durch einen offenen Prozess der Interpretation, durch Kontextualisierung, Selbstkritik und durch Dialog an Plausibilität. Die von Luther in der Christologie geforderten Perspektivenwechsel können nur so gelingen und ihre befreiende und Solidarität stiftende Kraft entfalten. Eine Abwertung des Judentums als Bundesvolk ist damit prinzipiell unvereinbar. (shrink)

Artur Blaim’s Gazing in Useless Wonder. English Utopian Fictions 1516–1800, the thirteenth volume of the esteemed Ralahine Utopian Studies series, has already received praises as a must-read monograph from such renowned utopian scholars as Lyman Tower Sargent and Gregory Claeys—and indeed it challenges anyone who would dare state otherwise. And even though such flawless pieces of research are not that common, Blaim’s book definitely has the potential to set a precedent in that regard, being a thorough and cohesive analysis of (...) rather sporadically interpreted utopian texts and novels from even less often studied historical periods.Already the book’s composition reveals a direct association between the emergence of... (shrink)

This paper examines an issue that is becoming increasingly relevant as the pressures of a warming planet, changing climate and changing ecosystems ramp up. The broad context for the paper is the intragenerational, intergenerational, and interspecies equity implications of changing the climate and the value orientations of adapting to such change. In addition, the need to stabilize the planetary climate by urgent mitigation of change factors is a foundational ethical assumption. In order to avoid further animal and plant extinctions, or (...) at the very least, their increased vulnerability to becoming rare and endangered; the systematic assisted colonization of “at risk” species is being seriously considered by scientists and managers of biodiversity. The more practical aspects of assisted colonization have been covered in the conservation biology literature; however, the ethical implications of such actions have not been extensively examined. Our discussion of the value issues, using a novel case study approach, will rectify the limited ethical analysis of the issue of assisted colonization of species in the face of climate change pressures. Beyond sustainability ethics, both animal and environmental ethical approaches will be used and intrinsic versus instrumental value orientations in the literature shall form the basis of our discussion. After the application of all the ethical approaches to the case studies, we conclude that without mitigation and the prospect of a future stable climate, assisted colonization will be involved in an inherently unethical process and a “move and lose it” outcome. With mitigation, there is wide-ranging ethical support for assisted colonization. (shrink)

The novel use of symbolism in early modern mathematics poses both philosophical and historical questions. How can we trace its development and transmission through manuscript sources? Is it intrinsically related to the emergence of symbolic algebra? How does symbolism relate to the use of diagrams? What are the consequences of symbolic reasoning on our understanding of nature? Can a symbolic language enable new forms of reasoning? Does a universal symbolic language exist which enable us to express all knowledge? This book (...) brings together a collection of papers that address all these and related questions which were initially posed at a conference held in Ghent (Belgium) in August 2009. Scholars working on philosophy of science, history of philosophy and history of mathematics provide an insight into the role and function of symbolic representations in the development of early modern mathematics. The papers cover the period from early abbaco arithmetic and algebra (14h century) up to Leibniz (early 18th century). (shrink)

Reconnection between producers and consumers is often presented as an integral part of the local food narrative. However, questions can arise as to whether local food producers and their food purchasers align in mindset and the value proposition that underpins their involvement. This paper draws on interview data collected from producers and consumers participating in direct-sell meat operations to explore so-called value propositions between these two actors in local food initiatives in Southwestern Ontario, Canada. We suggest that because producers and (...) consumers value their participation and associated ‘reconnection’ for different reasons and experience practical limitations in satisfying diverse expectations, the ‘reconnection’ metaphor is complex and contingent—especially at the level of the individual. The findings suggest that new roles, realities and beliefs for each party in regard to marketing, customer relations, distribution, and convenience might predispose participants to be in favor of other arrangements if they became more readily available and were capable of guaranteeing both profitability for the producer and healthy foods for the consumer. (shrink)

Responsibility is a central juridical, moral and social concept that calls on individuals to act in ways that are necessary and morally right. It represents a fundamental normative relationship that bridges abstract philosophical ideas with empirical social realities. Despite its everyday importance, the derivation and application of responsibility are complex and often contested. This article explores the meaning and conditions under which responsibility can be justifiably demanded, as well as its practical enforceability. Responsibility is understood as a normative relationship with (...) both moral and legal dimensions, constructed through social interactions. A responsible practice requires intersubjective agreement on the reasons and motives for actions, enabling the formulation and implementation of ethical justifications. (shrink)

We present the findings of a worldwide survey that was administered to business ethic scholars to better understand journal quality within the business ethics academic community. Based upon the data from the survey, we provide a ranking of the top 10 business ethics journals. We then provide a comparison of business ethics journals to other mainstream management journals in terms of journal quality. The results of the study suggest that, within the business ethics academic community, many scholars prefer to publish (...) in the top business ethics academic journals over other mainstream management journals. Furthermore, the results of the study suggest that within the business ethics academic field there are two dominant academic communities: one in Europe and one in North America. Each of these academic communities has its own preferred publication outlets, suggesting a potentially problematic bifurcation of business ethics scholarship. (shrink)

Tekst omawia myśl Henryka Bergsona na temat twórczości artystycznej jako efekt „ewolucji twórczej”. Wyłanianiu się dzieła twórczego towarzysza dwa główne procesy, które utrwalaja relacje świata duchowego i materialnego: sympatia i asymilacja. Tworzenie można opisać za pomocą różnych technik, np. skupianie, mentalizacja, wykraczanie poza plan, selekcjonowanie, odwracanie przebiegów fizycznych w stronę przeciwna, obramowanie dzieła itd. Na poziomie analizy metafizycznej Bergson opisuje twórczość nie tyle jako relacje artysta–człowiek, ale jako relacje duszy artysty i świata natury, które wymykają się regułom logicznym.

By the end of the twelfth century in the south of Europe, new methods of calculating with Hindu-Arabic numerals developed. This tradition of sub-scientific mathematical practices is known as the abbaco period and flourished during 1280–1500. This paper investigates the methods of justification for the new calculating procedures and algorithms. It addresses in particular graphical schemes for the justification of operations on fractions and the multiplication of binomial structures. It is argued that these schemes provided the validation of mathematical practices (...) necessary for the development towards symbolic reasoning. It is shown how justification schemes compensated for the lack of symbolism in abbaco treatises and at the same time facilitated a process of abstraction. (shrink)

No one has succeeded better than Theodor W. Adorno in analyzing modern culture with all its ambiguities — ambiguities which herald the possibility of an unleashing of aesthetic and communicative potentials as well as the possibility of a withering away of culture. Since Schopenhauer and Nietzsche — with whose aesthetics and epistemology Adorno's thought secretly communicates — no other philosophy of art, at least in Germany, has had such a sustained influence on artists, critics, and intellectuals. The traces of his (...) influence on the consciousness of those who, be it in a productive, critical, or purely receptive capacity, are involved with modern art cannot be overlooked. (shrink)

In this issue of Consciousness and Cognition, Bachmann comments on our study , which revealed two groups of observers with qualitative individual differences in metacontrast masking that are enhanced by perceptual learning. We are pleased that our study receives this attention and even more about Bachmann’s extremely positive comments. In this invited reply we argue that observers seem to be similar only at the beginning of the experiment but they have no choice as to which group to join. Findings strongly (...) recommend to look at the data of individual subjects. (shrink)

Bei den von Ingenieuren verwendeten Dezisionsmechanismen wird aufgrund der Fortentwicklung der Technik die methodologische Sicherung der Objektivität der Bewertungsverfahren immer dringlicher. Der Stand der Debatte zu diesem Problem wird knapp wiedergegeben. Besonders wird auf die Entwicklung in der DDR hingewiesen . Nach der Kritik der Hauptpositionen der Debatte wird der Charakter von Werturteilen anhand eines dreiteiligen Klassifikationsschemas näher analysiert. Als Bewertungshilfe wird auf dem Wege einer Analogiekonstruktion der Webersche Idealtypus für die methodologische Diskussion der Technik vorgeschlagen und seine potentielle Funktion (...) erörtert. (shrink)

This paper suggests a method to calculate a degree of validity for the proof of a statement which is derived from empirical statements by means of logic conclusions. The empirical statements are assumed not to be completely valid or their validity to be doubtful. The suggested rules are consistent with two-valued logic, yield decreasing validities with increasing number of applications of modus ponens and obey the law of the excluded middle. The actual calculation of validity values, the relation of the (...) suggested method to some truth tables of multi-valued logic and to fuzzy logic are discussed. (shrink)