The central conflicts of the world today are closely related to cultural, traditional, and religious differences between nations. As we move to a globalized world, these differences often become magnified, entrenched, and the cause of bloody conflict. Growing out of a conference of distinguished scholars from the Middle East, Europe, and the United States, this volume is a singular contribution to mutual understanding and cooperative efforts on behalf of peace. The term paideia, drawn from Greek philosophy, has to do with (...) responsible education for citizenship as a necessary precondition for effective democracy. (shrink)

An encyclopedic study on the role that fear and anxiety have played as the organizing motives of human existence and social life. Hankiss explains how human beings have surrounded themselves with protective symbols: myths and religions, values and belief systems, ideas and scientific theories, moral and practical rules of behaviour, and a wide range of everyday rituals and trivialities.

This article is an attempt to describe how far democracy has developed in Hungary since 1989. It takes an inventory of those factors that have been described by political scientists as essential criteria for a working democracy and considers how far these criteria have been satisfied in Hungary up to now. It concludes that every democracy in the world must struggle with deficiencies, every society must incessantly work to solve the emerging problems and to rearrange the pieces of the 'democratic (...) puzzle'. This is especially true of those East Central European countries that have emerged from 40 years of authoritarian rule. (shrink)

What are the taproots of estrangement among that breed of intellectual recognized as Jewish by accident of birth who have severed their religio-ethnic ties?

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Archive, The Native American, and Jefferson’s ConvulsionsJonathan Elmer (bio)1 Saxa loquunturTrauma theory proposes that there are inscriptions that befuddle any clean divide between present and past, records that have been neither selected nor destroyed by evolutionary veto but remain in some kind of limbo, “in abeyance,” as Jacques Lacan phrases it, “awaiting attention.” In a typical maneuver, Lacan emphasizes a double meaning in the French—the “reality” awaiting (...) attention is “en souffrance” [Lacan 56]. Lacan’s wordplay injects a note of pathos into what might otherwise seem a merely cognitive or epistemological question about how, or whether, we can adequately access the historical archive, whether of individuals or of cultures. At its most basic, the psychoanalytic concept of trauma insists on this ambiguous coupling between affect and event, feeling and knowing: trauma names a happening about which one never fully knows how to feel, or feels how to know. In trauma theory—as in its various avatars in current debates about canons, about historical memory and forgetting, about cultural identity as imperiled or reclaimed or repressed—this ambiguity about the relation between affect and event becomes codified as an entanglement between the ethical and the cognitive. In “Archive Fever,” Jacques Derrida notes that the term “archive” itself harbors this ambiguity: the archive is at once the beginning and the authority, it puts into play two “orders of order,” the “sequential” and the “jussive,” “the commencement and the commandment” [9]. The divine fiat of creation is an image of the perfect coincidence of these two orders of order, while historical consciousness, in the West at least, might be understood as the progressive elaboration of the dissociation of commencement and commandment. Such a dissociation is never, perhaps, complete, which is why the question of knowing the commencement, the order of sequence of past events, always seems shadowed by an encounter with commandment, authority, ethical obligation.Derrida emphasizes a drive toward unification in the archive, what he calls the act of “consignation,” or “gathering together signs”: “Consignation aims to coordinate a single corpus, in a system or a synchrony in which all the elements articulate the unity of an ideal configuration. In an archive, there should not be any absolute dissociation, any heterogeneity or secret which could separate... or partition, in an absolute manner” [10]. Because his primary topic in this essay is Freud, Derrida goes on to demonstrate how this practice and ideal of consignation deconstruct themselves in the psychoanalytic archive. On the one hand, Freud’s innovations “made possible,” or so Derrida contends, the notion of an archive that “cannot be reduced to memory: neither to memory as conscious reserve, nor to memory as rememoration, as act of recalling” [58]. On the other hand, and despite his development of this concept of an immemorial archive, however, Freud “was incessantly [End Page 5] tempted to redirect the original interest he had for the psychic archive toward archeology.” Derrida quotes an astonishing passage from the 1896 paper “The Aetiology of Hysteria,” in which Freud indulges in the fantasy that never leaves psychoanalysis, and that evinces the profound implication of this theory with other archival projects, here the imperialist dramas of ethnography. The fantasy is one in which “stones talk”:Imagine that an explorer arrives in a little-known region where his interest is aroused by an expanse of ruins, with remains of walls, fragments of columns, and tablets with half-effaced and unreadable inscriptions. He may content himself with inspecting what lies exposed to view, with questioning the inhabitants—perhaps semi-barbaric people—who live in the vicinity, about what tradition tells them of the history and meaning of these archaeological remains, and with noting down what they tell him—and he may then proceed on his journey. But he may act differently. He may have brought picks, shovels and spades with him, and he may set the inhabitants to work with these implements. Together with them he may start upon the ruins, clear away the rubbish, and, beginning from the visible remains, uncover what is buried. If his work is crowned with success, the discoveries are self-explanatory: the ruined walls are part of the ramparts of... (shrink)

This book defends Christian nurture and education against the frequently made charge of indoctrination. It argues that Christian education is fully compatible with a liberal education.

Megismerés és értékelés.--A komikus határhelyzet.--Donald kacsa és a szemiotika.--Hogyan fér bele egy táj egy háromsoros versbe?--Miért nem írhatott Shakespeare vagy O'Neill jobb tragédiákat mint Szophoklész?--Túl vagy innen jón és rosszon?--A halál és a happy ending.--Remekművek terrora.--A tanári pálya foglalkozśi ártalmairól.--Szentgyörgyök és sárkányok.--Az igazságosságról.--Mit tartunk majd jónak, igaznak és szépnek 2000-ben?

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:305 HUME, HENRY MORE AND THE DESIGN ARGUMENT This paper is a contribution to research on the sources of Hume's statement of the design argument, whose analysis is the great subject of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. My surmise is that Hume's statement is probably his own. It is not a direct quotation from any source, but more 2 likely a fabrication drawn from several sources which presents the strongest (...) statement Hume could devise. My aim here is to demonstrate that one of Hume's sources is the works of Henry More (16141687 ). By a comparison of their language I mean to show the extent to which Hume drew on More for his formulation of the design argument. One of More's works, Divine Dialogues (1688), could have been Hume's modern example for treating the design 4 argument in a dialogue. It could have given Hume pointers for the organization, tone and characters of his own Dialogues. On a large view, the whole of Pialogues Concerning Natural Religion, with their artful match of position and counter-position, can be seen as a statement of the design argument. But on a close view, we can distinguish specific elements in Hume's statement; and for three of these elements we can show a close parallelism between Hume and More. The elements in Hume's statement to be considered here are.· (1)Cleanthes' introduction of the design argument in Part II, paragraph 5; (P 143) (2)"instances of design" offered by Cleanthes; (D 154, 185) and 306 (3) completing Hume's exposition of the design argument, Parts X and XI of the Dialogues, with their questions about the implications of human misery and the ill-workings of the world for the wisdom and benevolence of the universe maker (D 193-213). In addition to parallelisms between Hume and More at these points, there are a few straws in the wind that are worthy of mention. To pave the way for these comparisons, let me set out More's statements of the design argument. There are three of them. (1) More's first statement of the design argument occurs in An Antidote against Athéisme, (1652). The second of this work's three books is devoted to the design argument. Here is one of the earliest statements of the design argument in English; and it may be its first statement in an English work that is philosophical, rather than devotional or theological, and intended to convince solely on the basis of reasonable arguments. More sets out of the argument in three parts. First, there is the introductory remark: "...I would have my atheist walk with me awhile in the wide theater of this outward world, and diligently to attend to those many and most manifest marks and signs that I shall point to in this outward frame of things, that naturally signify unto us that there is a God" (AA 37-38). The 'walk' covers the next sixty pages, wherein More lists feature after feature of the world that he finds to instance divine design. At the end of this extensive catalogue, More then draws his conclusion: Wherefore the whole creation in general and every part thereof being so ordered as if the most exquisite reason and knowledge had contrived 307 them, it is natural to conclude that all this is the work of a wise God, as at first sight to acknowledge that those inscribed urns and coins digged out of the earth were not the products of unknowing nature, but the artifice of man (AA 97). (2)More's second statement of the design 7 argument is in The Immortality of the Soul (1659). More establishes to his satisfaction that matter is in motion, because "...when God created it, he D superadded an impress of Motion upon it...." That conclusion paves the way for the following paragraph: We have discovered out of the simple phenomenon of motion, the necessity of the existence of some incorporeal essence distinct from matter: but there is a further assurance of this truth, from the consideration of the order and admirable effect of this motion in the world. Suppose matter could move itself, would mere... (shrink)