To advance the task of designing robots capable of performing collective tasks with humans, studies in human–robot interaction often turn to psychology, philosophy of mind and neuroscience for inspiration. In the same vein, this chapter explores how the notion of recognition and commitment can help confront some of the current problems in addressing robot-human interaction in joint tasks. First, we argue that joint actions require mutual recognition, which cannot be established without the attribution and maintenance of commitments. Second, we argue (...) that commitments require affective states such as social motivations or shared emotions. Finally, we conclude by assessing three possible proposals for how social robotics could implement an architecture of commitments by taking such an affective components into consideration. (shrink)

Les deux ouvrages conjoints de 1960 et 1962, Mathématiques et métaphysique chez Descartes et La Philosophie de l’algèbre, marquent dans l’oeuvre de Vuillemin un tournant qui peut éclairer le sens philosophique de la classification des systèmes. Nous présentons successivement la contribution de ces ouvrages à la définition de la méthode dite génétique en philosophie, le nouvel arbitrage « structural » attendu entre les deux histoires des sciences et de la philosophie, le rodage de l’idée de classe de systèmes entre annonce (...) et rejet de l’« intuitionnisme » ultérieur. (shrink)

Elisabeth Young-Bruehl illuminates the psychological and intellectual demands writing biography makes on the biographer and explores the complex and frequently conflicted relationship between feminism and psychoanalysis. She considers what remains valuable in Sigmund Freud's work, and what areas - theory of character, for instance - must be rethought to be useful for current psychoanalytic work, for feminist studies, and for social theory. Psychoanalytic theory used for biography, she argues, can yield insights for psychoanalysis itself, particularly in the understanding of (...) creativity. (shrink)

Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, Schwester und Nachlassverwalterin Friedrich Nietzsches, präsentiert im zweiten Band der Biographie ihres Bruders eine Beschreibung der zweiten Lebenshälfte Friedrich Nietzsches, die sie als Phase der Vereinsamung bezeichnet. Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg wurden ihre Fälschungen an Nietzsches Schriften und Briefen bekannt, was die Lektüre des vorliegenden Bandes auch heute noch so interessant macht. Sorgfältig nachbearbeiteter Nachdruck der Originalausgabe aus dem Jahr 1914.

Entre la première philosophie cavaillésienne de « l’expérience mathématique » et son réexamen au sein de l’œuvre posthume (Sur la logique et la théorie de la science), nous suggérons qu’il existe une différence radicale de statut, qui différencie de l’intérieur la philosophie du concept de celle de l’œuvre publiée. Le sens testamentaire du livre posthume comme sa conclusion hégélienne tiennent à cette différence. Le nouveau cadre construit pour la philosophie mathématique est celui d’un « Traité de logique », qui prend (...) la forme d’une histoire orientée par l’exigence de reconstruire le lien de la logique avec l’ontologie, alors que la première philosophie pouvait, à son niveau, sembler ignorer, ou même écarter cette exigence. Cette histoire de la logique n’annonce pas plus qu’elle n’offre la construction d’une dialectique identifiable à celle que Cavaillès avait d’abord reconnue dans la nécessité de l’expérience mathématique. Ses étapes, non chronologiquement ordonnées, sont celles de la préparation effective d’un passage de la conscience au concept en tant que principes de la doctrine de la science. Ce passage n’est pas un passage nécessité par la préexistence de contradictions à dépasser et la libre et créative réponse qu’elles demandent à la pensée humaine en mathématiques ; il est celui qui anime le libre choix de chercher, dans une Logique entendue comme théorie des formes de l’être, la liberté créatrice qui est définitoire de la pensée en tant que telle. (shrink)

Condillac a tenu à souligner l’originalité radicale de la thèse défendue dans l’ Essai au sujet du statut des signes dans leur rapport originaire à la pensée. Il la maintiendra jusque dans l’ Art de penser inchangée malgré de profonds remaniements intervenus avec le Traité des sensations quant au contenu de cette interaction, que sa Grammaire et sa Logique lui semblent avoir pourtant « achevé de démontrer ». Ce statut des signes se trouve soumis à la critique dès les Lettres (...) à Gabriel Cramer. Condillac y répond à une question concernant la prérogative des signes arbitraires sur les signes naturels par rapport à la maîtrise de nos opérations de pensée. Et il y voit une objection formelle au caractère « embrouillé » de cette origine, une difficulté de fond qu’il n’avait pas prévenue, et enfin « le point le plus délicat de mon système sur la nécessité absolue des signes ». On peut supposer 1) que cette difficulté est liée à, mais distincte de la question formelle, comme des difficultés de contenu qu’y voit alors Condillac travaillant à son Traité des sensations, 2) que ce « point le plus délicat » ne s’éclaire et ne se spécifie qu’au regard de l’arrière-plan leibnizo-wolffien commun à Condillac, Cramer et Mlle Ferrand, et 3) n’est surmonté que par l’évocation de quelques références absentes de l’ Essai, à la Grammaire de Du Marsais dans l’ Encyclopédie et à la méthode de l’Abbé de l’Épée, comme exemples de la méthode analytique mise au service d’une genèse naturelle des signes artificiels sur le modèle de l’art d’une Nature qui commence tout en nous à notre insu. Ainsi s’achève bien le système « démontré » d’une présupposition mutuelle de la Nature et de l’Art, dont le premier ouvrage avait offert l’essai inaugural. (shrink)

In the context of a broad welcome to Bullot & Reber's (B&R's) proposals concerning the incorporation of contextual awareness into the study of the psychology of art appreciation, I raise two concerns. First, the proposal makes no allowance for degrees of relevance of contextual awareness to appreciation. Second, the authors assume that and can be maintained as separate phases or modes, but this may be more problematic than anticipated.

On se propose de montrer d’abord l’effectivité du concept d’intentionnalité dans la revendication par l’Aufbau de la pratique husserlienne de la réduction, et de son programme de constitution, alors même que ce programme débouche chez Carnap sur une neutralisation terminale du sens métaphysique de la relation intentionnelle. On précise ensuite le rôle que joue le concept philosophique de constitution, dans la mise en œuvre des méthodes logiques. On suggère l’effectivité d’une constitution intentionnelle au sens husserlien, mais armée des méthodes de (...) la logique mathématique, sur trois séries d’indices, pris dans l’exercice même des méthodes logiques dans l’Aufbau. Mais on voit par là que cette référence de l’intentionnalité carnapienne à la distinction aristotélicienne entre l’objet et le vécu intentionnel de la sensation et de la pensée en neutralise la dimension ontologique liée chez Aristote au concept métaphysique d’energéia, tout autant qu’à l’analyse catégoriale de la relation ici drastiquement réduite à une unique «relation fondée». Ainsi se trouve en définitive neutralisé plutôt que constitué dans l’Aufbau le sens d’un legs aristotélicien en matière d’intentionnalité. (shrink)

RésuméL'héritage kantien dans la philosophie fregéenne de la connaissance est aujourd'hui largement reconnu. La présente analyse porte sur la point, déjà réputé central par J. Vuillemin , du jugement de recognition. On tente de montrer: °) le style transcendantal du traitement fregéen du problème des objets logiques, dont la nécessité s'introduit a partir des Grundlagen avec celle des extensions de concept, absentes de la première idéographie; style dont on tente d'expliquer les changements qu'il opére dans le modèle de la Begriffsbildung (...) kantienne. 2°) l'ambiguité de la recognition fondée par la source logique de connaissance d'objets logiques, ou par un principe d'image logique, qu'explicitera Wittgenstein, des invariants les plus généraux des opérations de pensée dans l'idéolographie. 3°) le lien du principe de recognition avec une supposition de détermination complète et son ultime formulation dans la théorie de la source géométrique; ses racines dans la formation mathématique de Frege. On conclut par la question posée par l'algébrisation de la logique, étrangére au style transcendantal de l'une des œuvres qui lui ont, fût‐ce de manière voilée par un principe de recognition, donné naissance. (shrink)

The principal concern of my paper is a distinction between two ways of appreciating works of art, characterised here in terms of the phrases ‘seeing is believing’ and ‘believing is seeing’. I examine this distinction in the light of an epistemological requirement at times at least grounded in what David Davies, in his Art as Performance , refers to as the ‘common sense theory of art appreciation’ in order to assess exactly what aspect of the philosophical approach generally known as (...) aesthetic empiricism his account commits him to reject. I argue that the ‘experiential requirement’, if only conceived in a slightly broader way than is usual, might very well have an important role to play not only in the appropriate appreciation of works that do not demonstrate the need for such a requirement (primarily works of late modern and conceptual art), but also in the ontological account Davies himself favours. (shrink)

Tradução de correspondências trocadas entre Descartes e Elisabeth no ano de 1643, nas quais discutem a tese cartesiana da alma como imaterial e inextensa. [Trad. Marcelo Fischborn].

Today's climate models are supported in a couple of ways that receive little attention from philosophers or climate scientists. In addition to standard 'model fit', wherein a model's simulation is compared to observational data, there is an additional type of confirmation available through the variety of instances of model fit. When a model performs well at fitting first one variable and then another, the probability of the model under some standard confirmation function, say, likelihood, goes up more than under each (...) individual case of fit alone. Thus, two instances of fit of distinct variables of a global climate model using distinct data sets considered collectively will provide stronger evidence for a model than either one of the instances considered individually. This has consequences for model robustness. Sets of models that produce robust results will, if their assumptions vary enough and they each are observationally sound, provide reasons to endorse common structures found in those models. Finally, independent empirical support for aspects and assumptions of the model provides an additional confirmational virtue for climate models, contrary to what is implied by some current philosophical writing on this topic. (shrink)

Desde o ano de 1643, Descartes (1596-1650) e a princesa Elizabeth (1618-1680) já trocavam cartas a respeito da geometria, da metafísica e até da física cartesiana. Todavia, no ano de 1645, por conta de um grave estado melancólico da princesa, houve uma intensa correspondência entre ambos. À princípio, o debate se mantinha em torno das condições especificas da princesa. O tema central girava em torno de questões fisiológicas e morais (ou psicofisiológicas). À medida, porém, em que a troca de correspondência (...) se intensificava, o debate ia tornando-se cada vez mais teórico, passando pela discussão da Vida Beata, de Sêneca, até forçar Descartes a apresentar os primeiros esboços de sua própria concepção moral. Dessa troca de correspondência, escolhemos duas cartas de setembro de 1645: uma do filósofo a Elizabeth (carta CDIII) e outra da princesa a Descartes carta (CDVI). (shrink)

Does thought precede language, or the other way around? How does having a language affect our thoughts? Who has a language, and who can think? These questions have traditionally been addressed by philosophers, especially by rationalists concerned to identify the essential difference between humans and other animals. More recently, theorists in cognitive science, evolutionary biology, and developmental psychology have been asking these questions in more empirically grounded ways. At its best, this confluence of philosophy and science promises to blend the (...) respective strengths of each discipline, bringing abstract theory to bear on reality in a principled and focused way. At its worst, it risks degenerating into a war of words, with each side employing key expressions in its own idiosyncratic way – or worse, contaminating empirical research with a priori dogmas inherited from outmoded philosophical worldviews. In Baboon Metaphysics (2007), Dorothy Cheney and Robert Seyfarth offer an analysis of baboon cognition that promises to exemplify the very best interaction of philosophical theory and empirical research. They argue that baboons have a language of thought: a language-like representational medium, which supports the sophisticated cognitive abilities required to negotiate their complex social environment. This claim is intended to be surprising in its own right, and also to shed light on the evolution of spoken language. Because our own ancestors likely lived in a similarly complex social environment, Cheney and Seyfarth propose that the earliest humans also developed language first as a cognitive medium, and that spoken language evolved as a means to express those thoughts. There are two potential difficulties here. First, ‘Language of Thought’ (LOT) is a term of art, with much associated theoretical baggage and often comparatively little careful exposition. Thus, evaluating the claim requires getting clearer about just what LOT implies in this context.. (shrink)

This paper offers a critical discussion of Searle's account of collective intentionality. It argues Bratman's alternative account avoids some of the shortcomings of Searle's account, over-intellectualizes collective intentionality and imposes an excessive cognitive burden on participating agents.Tthe capacities needed to sustain collective intentionality are examined in an attempt to show that we can preserve the gist of Bratman's account in a cognitively more parsimonious way.

This chapter aims at investigating the phenomenology of joint action and at gaining a better understanding of (1) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs from the sense of agency one has for individual actions and (2) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs according to the type of joint action and to the role one plays in it.

Elisabeth Lloyd is an American philosopher of science whose work is centered in the field of philosophy of biology. The material in this archive documents her work in philosophy of biology. The materials extend over the whole of her career and include manuscript materials, working notes on articles and books in progress, professional correspondence, teaching materials, documents relating to work with professional organizations, talks given to professional audiences, as well as annotated books, manuscripts and preprints. Elisabeth Lloyd's publications (...) include both books and professional articles. (shrink)

The paper discusses the role affective factors may play in explaining why, in Capgras'delusion, the delusional belief once formed is maintained and argues that there is an important link between the modularity of the relevant emotional system and the persistence of the delusional belief.

Metaphor is a pervasive and significant feature of language. We use metaphor to talk about the world in familiar and innovative ways, and in contexts ranging from everyday conversation to literature and scientific theorizing. However, metaphor poses serious challenges for standard philosophical theories of meaning, because it straddles so many important boundaries: between language and thought, between semantics and pragmatics, between rational communication and mere causal association. ;In this dissertation, I develop a pragmatic theory of metaphorical utterances which reconciles two (...) apparently incompatible intuitions. The first is that metaphors are vehicles for undertaking speech acts with a propositional content distinct from their conventional sentence meaning. The second is that metaphors are tools for inducing the essentially non-propositional effect of 'seeing things in a new light' or under a new aspect. These intuitions seem to be incompatible because it is assumed that only one can capture the essential function of metaphor. I propose instead that non-propositional 'seeing-as' or aspectual thought serves as the means by which speakers intend to accomplish their end of communicating content. This does not imply that speakers are not interested in and even committed to the effects of aspectual thought as well, only that it is not their sole, ultimate intention. ;In order to substantiate this proposal about how metaphor works, I develop an account of the psychological structures on which aspectual thought operates and the changes it engenders; I then show how the content of the speaker's intended speech act is determined by the aspect the sentence generates. By bringing propositional content and non-propositional aspectual thought together in this way, my account can treat the full range of metaphors, from 'ordinary' to 'poetic', within a unified theory. Armed with this account, we have the explanatory resources necessary to acknowledge both that ordinary conversational metaphors are efficient and sometimes essential vehicles for communicating determinate propositional contents, and also that rich, poetic metaphors are invitations to an open-ended contemplation of the subject under discussion. These apparently very different effects turn out to be manifestations of the same basic process of comprehension. (shrink)

The discovery of mirror neurons has given rise to a number of interpretations of their functions together with speculations on their potential role in the evolution of specifically human capacities. Thus, mirror neurons have been thought to ground many aspects of human social cognition, including the capacity to engage in cooperative collective actions and to understand them. We propose an evaluation of this latter claim. On the one hand, we will argue that mirror neurons do not by themselves provide a (...) sufficient basis for the forms of agentive understanding and shared intentionality involved in cooperative collective actions. On the other hand, we will also argue that mirror neurons can nevertheless play an important role in an account of the production and understanding of joint action, insofar as they provide the basic constituents of implicit agent-neutral representations and are useful elements in a process of online mutual adjustment of participants' actions. (shrink)

Context: Cognitive science, as an interdisciplinary research endeavour, poses challenges for teaching and learning insofar as the integration of various participating disciplines requires a reflective approach, considering and making explicit different epistemological attitudes and hidden assumptions and premises. Only few curricula in cognitive science face this integrative challenge. Problem: The lack of integrative activities might result from different challenges for people involved in truly interdisciplinary efforts, such as discussing issues on a conceptual level, negotiating colliding frameworks or sets of premises, (...) asking profound questions challenging one’s own paradigm, and differences in terminologies, as well as from the “personal” challenge of realising one’s own limits of knowledge and, hence, the need to trust in another person’s expertise. This implies that the proposed curriculum structure provides an “epistemic laboratory”: a space for experiencing and negotiating, as well as constructing different viewpoints in a trustful setting. Approach: A newly-designed interdisciplinary cognitive science curriculum is presented that is based on a constructivist epistemology. We suggest that a careful construction of the learning space is a necessary requirement. The MEi:CogSci curriculum is designed and structured in such a way that enables didactical measures that allow for collaborative construction of meaning by discussing concepts, methods and terminologies and also hidden assumptions. Findings: The experience with four cohorts of students has shown that a truly interdisciplinary approach to cognitive science demands a different attitude towards knowledge as well as towards teaching and learning on both sides: the teacher and the student. The research orientation promotes an understanding of knowledge as something that is actively constructed, rendering the role of the teacher that of a co-learner rather than a transmitter of knowledge, thereby also changing the responsibility of students. (shrink)

The first Ukrainian translation of Elizabeth Badenter's work "Condorcet, Prudhomme, Guyomar... Paroles d’hommes (1790-1793)".

Dominant normative theories of armed conflict orientate themselves around the ultimate goal of peace. Yet the deployment of these theories in the international sphere appears to have failed in advancing toward this goal. In this paper, we argue that one major reason for this failure is these theories’ use of essentially contested concepts—that is, concepts whose internally complex character results in no principled way of adjudicating between rival interpretations of them. This renders the theories susceptible to manipulation by international actors (...) who are able to pursue bellicose policies under the cover of nominally pacific frameworks, and we show how this happened historically in a case study of the Korean War of 1950–1953. In order to better serve the goals of peace, we suggest, the rules of war should be reframed to simpler, but more restrictive, normative principles. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to investigate what becomes of normativity in naturalistic epistemologies. What particular stand a given naturalistic epistemology takes on normativity will depend both on what it thinks is wrong with traditional epistemology and on what level of normativity is at stake. I propose a tentative typology of possible attitudes towards normativity from within naturalistic epistemology. In section I, I give a brief presentation of traditional epistemology, stressing the dimensions of this approach that may appear (...) problematic to naturalists. In section II, I present and discuss the naturalist project in its radical form, as personified by Quine, who questions not only the way in which traditional epistemology proceeds in order to attain its objectives, but also the validity of these objectives. The last two sections concentrate on more moderate versions of naturalism. Section III investigates the various possible roles that may be assigned to psychology in these moderate forms of naturalism and the ensuingconsequences vis-a-vis the problem of normativity. In section IV, I distinguish between two levels of normativity in epistemology, what I call the normativity of means and the normativity of ends and I discuss the prospects of a naturalization of epistemic ends. (shrink)