By examining Klein’s discussion of the difference between Plato and Aristotle regarding the ontology of number, this article aims to spells out the significanceof that debate both in itself and for the development of the later mathematical sciences. This is accomplished by explicating and expanding Klein’s account of the differences that exist in the understanding of number presented by these two thinkers. It is ultimately argued that Klein’s analysis can be used to show that the transition from the ancient to (...) the modern number concept has some roots in this disagreement between Plato and Aristotle regarding number. This, in turn, sets up that dispute as an essential part of the background to the more general break between ancient and modern conceptuality, the uncovering of whichis Klein’s main concern. (shrink)

As Aristotle before him, Quine has earned a just renown for his exposure of untenable dualisms: he is best-known, of course, for his rejection of the ‘dogma’ of the radical distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. But another dualism which Quine has no use for has scarcely caused a murmuring in the assembly of philosophers, where Quine’s opposition to the analytic-synthetic dichotomy placed him on the far left, because on this matter he has aligned himself with the philosophical right, with (...) what has been the establishment since Hume. (shrink)

Accounts of theistic faith according to which it does not involve referring to or believing in God as existing independently of the life of faith are instances of theistic reductionism. Theistic reductionism, in holding that ‘God’ does not refer to reality outside the life of believers, holds thereby that theism is not rightly to be regarded as true or false. Such accounts may be proposed or used as defenses of theistic faith. They ‘defend’ faith insofar as they describe the form (...) of life faith involves and show that the human and cultural functions it performs are valuable. Examining several reductionist accounts, ordered from weaker to stronger, I argue that they fail as defenses of theistic life and language. Whereas the reductionist views claim to leave the practice of theism as it is, I argue that in fact they imply a different form of life from the one theism actually is. Thus reductionist defenses of religious practice fail and fail precisely where they insist on treating God in some way other than as existing outside of religious life. From this I infer that theism as it exists can only be defended in ways that include taking ‘God’ as referring to a God who is real outside the life which recognizes him. The religious reductionists discussed include R.B. Braithwaite, P.F. Schmidt, Paul Holmer, Paul van Buren, Gordon Kaufman, and D.Z. Phillips. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that w v quine's indeterminacy thesis can be devastatingly undercut by a straightforward survey of the details of one's own linguistic capabilities. However, Because any such survey must depend upon a repudiation of the quinean doctrines used to generate his thesis, Objections based upon introspective evidence remain question begging without a critique of those more central doctrines. Since such a critique would be sufficient in itself to undermine quine's thesis, Objections based upon introspective gleanings must be (...) abandoned as either question begging or superfluous. (shrink)

Jacques Derrida's claim that the Western tradition has privileged speech over writing runs into an objection from the history of British anthropology: the functionalist rejection of oral history.

I specify the grounds for Derek Parfit's hypothetical friendship with Chekhov: in short (!), common ground as pioneers in the use of short fiction.

This paper serves as a kind of field guide to certain passages in the literature which bear upon the foundational theory of abstract objects. The foundational theory assimilates ideas from key philosophers in both the analytical and phenomenological traditions. I explain how my foundational theory of objects serves as a common ground where analytic and phenomenological concerns meet. I try to establish how the theory offers a logic that systematizes a well-known phenomenological kind of entity, and I try to show (...) the various ways the theory systematizes the ideas of many analytic philosophers. The ideas of Plato, Leibniz, Frege, Russell, Goedel and even Kripke become connected through those of Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, and Mally. -/- The field guide will not only document the passages in which the distinction between two kinds of predication originates, but also document the other surprising, and often unrelated, contexts where the distinction reappears in the work of others. It will also document ways in which the theory can be used to represent precisely the ideas of the philosophers mentioned above. The resulting guide will bring together the works of many different authors, including some clearly within the analytic tradition, some clearly within the phenomenological tradition, and some who straddle the divide. (shrink)

A Paper on the Foundations of Projective Geometry - (Read before the Aristotelian Society, Dec. 13, 1897) is an unchanged, high-quality reprint of the original edition of 1898. Hansebooks is editor of the literature on different topic areas such as research and science, travel and expeditions, cooking and nutrition, medicine, and other genres. As a publisher we focus on the preservation of historical literature. Many works of historical writers and scientists are available today as antiques only. Hansebooks newly publishes these (...) books and contributes to the preservation of literature which has become rare and historical knowledge for the future. (shrink)

In the varying perspectives of theological thought the contrasting ideas of transcendence and immanence must inevitably be looked at together. To whatever extent they are held to be mutually compatible or mutually exclusive, neither can be considered without at least some cognizance being taken of the other. Nevertheless, in the swinging of the pendulum from era to era, first one and then the other theme receives the greater weight of attention. Thus, nineteenth-century liberalism placed more emphasis on immanence, whereas the (...) twentieth-century revolt against liberalism has concentrated on transcendence. In this book the author studies the transcendent aspect of God as developed by five contemporary theologians. Two of the men whose work Dr. Farley examines, Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich, are thoroughly familiar. The other three, Karl Heim, Charles Hartshorne, and Henry Nelson Wieman, have received less attention in recent studies. The five represent widely divergent traditions, but all of them agree in opposing immanentism. Moreover, they all deal with the tension between the philosophical and the Biblical affirmations of God's transcendence, and attempt to show, in their respective ways, how these types of ""beyondness"" are related. (shrink)

Summary Hermann Helmholtz has often been understood to have started research under the influence of Kant, and then to have made a transition to a later mature empiricist phase. Without claiming that in 1847 Helmholtz held the same positions that he later espoused, I suggest that already in his 1847 ‘Über die Erhaltung der Kraft’ one may find important aspects of his later empiricism. I highlight the ways in which, from early on, Helmholtz turned Kant to use in developing an (...) empirical program of inquiry into possible basic natural causes. To that end, I indicate how, throughout his arguments, Helmholtz employed, sometimes explicitly, but often tacitly, an empiricist logic, one that ran contrary to any form of transcendental deduction, and even to all a priori knowledge. Instead of deriving aspects about the ultimate constituents of nature, Helmholtz aimed to define the proper project for physical natural science. The first part of the paper describes the context of discussion in which Helmholtz entered. The bulk of the paper then analyzes Helmholtz's arguments in order to make space between (1) Kantian, and other, deductions of characteristics that must be true of nature and (2) Helmholtz's delineation of empirically determinable characteristics of presumed ultimate elements of nature, ones that he meant to be specified and delimited through future experimental research. The paper highlights that throughout his discussion Helmholtz meant to define the proper project for physical natural science, a project rife with empiricist aspects. (shrink)

I am in basic agreement with Professor Bowie’s position as outlined in his paper. Thus, my comments will consist mainly of caveats and qualifications, some of which I imagine Professor Bowie might have made himself had our format allowed more time for elaboration.