Grue-Sørensen’s concept of ’educational teaching’ is traced back to an original infl uence from Herbart and Kant. On this background the article attempts to interpret, how one can understand a concept of educationalteaching today. With that, the concept is shown to have its root in a tradition of general education and Grue-Sørensen is shown to be a Danish representative of this. However, in research programs as well as educational programs this tradition has generally been under (...) increasing pressure the last approximately 30 years. Grue-Sørensen and his possible relevance today is discussed in connection with a potential revitalization of a general educational thinking in our current postmodern epoche of higher education. (shrink)

At the beginning of the 20th century, German-language kindergartens were completely overshadowed by Friedrich Froebel’s tradition. The search for new forms of teaching started mainly by taking over the body of thinking developed by teaching reformers. John Dewey’s work was only accorded marginal examination. The person who got to grips most intensively with John Dewey and the American tradition of kindergarten teaching during the first half of the 20th century is Emmy Walser, one of the leading personalities in the kindergarten (...) movement in Switzerland. As a result, the “free working method” developed in Switzerland as the new method. Dewey’s educational philosophy was reduced to the methodology of the free working method which had the effect of giving new life to Froebel’s ideas. (shrink)

This article highlights the educational and the aesthetic significance of the subject matter (i.e., “the third thing”) in the relationship between teacher and pupil. This, through a reading of two texts, one written by the 19th century educationist and German philosopher Johann Friedrich Herbart, and one written by the contemporary philosopher and political theorist Jacques Rancière. By emphasizing the third thing between pupil and teacher, the article intends to reimagine both the educative and aesthetic values of those timeless (...) things around us, such as objects of art and education, which give life a meaning beyond our limited socio-cultural desires, interests, concepts, and identities. Teaching, from this “fusion of the horizon” between Herbart and Rancière, is an activity created by the heterogeneity already integral to the “essence” of the subject matter. As such, the article also offers a fusion of the horizon between aesthetics and Didaktik. (shrink)

As a primary school teacher in Copenhagen, and, simultaneously, as a student of philosophy at The Universityof Copenhagen, Grue-Sörensen became so well acquainted with contemporary psychology that he, in theyears 1941-55, worked as a school psychologist in Copenhagen. Furthermore, from 1934 until 1955, he published 22 articles or chapters about psychological issues. The present contribution presents and characterizes the 22 publications categorized in works about developmental psychology, and works about central psychological issues – motivation, learning, and cognition. In the (...) last Section, Grue-Sörensen’s understanding of the relationships between the fields of education, philosophy and psychology is discussed, especially the question of the importance of psychology to education. Finally, it is concluded that, according to Grue-Sörensen, the value of philosophy to psychology is not to off er insight into theories of science but, rather, inspiration to use words and concepts in a clear and careful way. (shrink)

In his central educational work, The Science of Education (1806), J.F. Herbart did not explicitly develop a theory of listening, yet his concept of the teacher as a guide in the moral development of the learner gives valuable insight into the moral dimension of listening within teacher-student interaction. Herbart's theory radically calls into question the assumed linearity between listening and obedience to external authority, not only illuminating important distinctions between socialization and education, but also underscoring consequences for (...) our understanding of the role of listening in educational relations. In this inquiry, Andrea English argues that critical listening in teaching contributes to the moral education and development of the learner. To do this, she examines Herbart's view of the teacher's task as a moral guide in the realm of moral education. English contends that reexamining Herbart's theory of education (a theory that is, for the most part, no longer discussed in Anglo-American educational philosophy) can productively inform our understanding of moral education in democratic and pluralist societies. (shrink)

In this essay Gregory Bynum seeks to show that Immanuel Kant's thought, which was conceived in an eighteenth-century context of new, and newly widespread, pressures for nationally institutionalized human rights–based regimes (the American and French revolutions being the most prominent examples), can help us think in new and appreciative ways about how to approach human rights education more effectively in our own time. Kant's discussion of moral experience features prominently in Bynum's analysis, which emphasizes the following: Kant's conception of a (...) Categorical Imperative to treat humanity as an end in itself; his conscious avoidance of, and his discussion of the necessity of avoiding, the limitations of empiricist and rationalist extremes of thought; and his discussion of moral experience in interrelated individual, community, and global aspects. Bynum demonstrates the usefulness of Kant's approach by using it as a lens through which to appreciatively examine a Japanese-born university professor's account of her ultimately successful effort to teach American students about U.S.-instigated human rights violations abroad. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Music Education for the New Millennium: Theory and Practice Futures for Music Teaching and LearningSean PenderelMusic Education for the New Millennium: Theory and Practice Futures for Music Teaching and Learning, edited by David K. Lines. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005, 150 pp., $34.95 paper.Music Education for the New Millennium is a 150-page collection of essays focused mainly upon philosophical introspection into the current condition of the profession. Within (...) this volume there are eight philosophic essays and one quantitative research article, by Alastair McPhee, Peter Stollery, and Ros McMillan. Other essays, beyond the work of the editor, were contributed by Thomas Regelski, Wayne Bowman, Robert Davis, Lucy Green, David Elliott, Constantijn Koopman, and Janet Mansfield. This collection contributes to our contemporary quandaries about aesthetics and praxialism in addition to adding pertinent questions for both philosophy and music education.The overall purpose of this volume is to stimulate thinking in ways not accounted for in the classroom or studio environments and expand upon the broader discourses impacting the profession and society (3). Given that Lines organized this volume as a collection about a specified theme, I will approach this review threefold. First, I will examine overall features that were promising and those that were disappointing. Second, each chapter's contributions will be examined in light of the aim of the volume. Lastly, each essay will also be examined for its contributions apart from the volume, due to the fact that all of the works can stand alone.Within this framework, six themes continually emerged throughout the essays. These themes involved the use and abuse of musical meaning; the construction of musical meaning and understanding; language used within advocacy; the difficulties presented by both aesthetics and praxialism; the problems posed by our focus upon psychology; and lastly, the "what works" mentality of efficient systems. These themes are incredibly relevant to the contemporary discussion surrounding music education in addition to benefiting the whole of the profession. In some fashion or another, each author confronts one to many of these issues efficiently and effectively, to the point that the volume and its aim is solidified within Bowman's essay, "Music Education in Nihilistic Times." As a negative point, however, an internal organization around these themes never seems to appear, and without this the volume lacks a certain flow; each chapter stands alone. Although internal organization is petty globally for this volume, it does affect its readability.Regelski's essay appears first and critiques both traditional aesthetics and praxial philosophy. Interestingly, he weighs the potential dangers posed by both and drifts toward the notion of praxis while maintaining a certain aesthetic influence within his philosophy. Through music education's abuse of aesthetics, Regelski chronicles the elevation of experience beyond societal values of participation, production, and the process of music creation. Due to this, the profession has been subject to a certain dependency upon the positive aesthetic experience rather than on the participatory process of education. Furthermore, he notes that aesthetics, when stretched to its philosophic extreme, has had a tendency to become exclusive and elitist. I liken [End Page 117] this to the Gnostic practices within early Christianity. This sect valued a spiritual/aesthetic experience and its resulting "enlightenment," which occurred during a state of ecstasy, to the point of elevating those who had experienced this moment beyond those who had not.To curb this movement, Regelski suggests redefining aesthetics in the tradition of Dewey and Wittgenstein rather than that of Kant. In the former, the aesthetics are tied directly to the using of the object, or the practice of doing and creating. In contrast, in the Kantian tradition, which has dominated music philosophy, the experience becomes removed from the practice and is elevated to a position of esteem, beyond that of understanding. Likewise, praxialism, when taken to its extreme, has the potential to suffer from breadth without depth, which may result in a loss of content and depth of understanding. Regelski suggests that what needs to occur is a balance of depth and breadth with a focus on the development of musicianship. If this occurs then the experience will become valued as a result of participation in the... (shrink)

La publication de l'Emile a produit une rupture épistémologique qui n'a pas échappé à Kant. Mais, rejetant toute assomption philosophique, l'ouvrage de 1762 met en récit une méthode qui prétend accomplir l'homme en ce qu'il est, tout en même temps qu'en ce qu'il doit être. Consacrant le pouvoir d'autoformation du sujet, Rousseau ouvre pourtant, à son corps défendant, une nouvelle brèche philosophique dans le rapport que ce sujet triomphant entretient avec ce que le Genevois s'obstine à présenter comme " la (...) bonté absolue du projet ". C'est à penser cette brèche, et le chemin pour la franchir, que se consacreront un certain nombre de penseurs et acteurs pédagogiques, qui peuvent ainsi s'inscrire dans la postérité éducative de l'Emile, et que présentent des spécialistes de chacun d'entre eux : Condorcet (A. Trouvé), Kant (B. Vandewalle), Pestalozzi (M. Soëtard), Fichte (J: M. Lamarre), Herbart (J: F. Goubet), Dilthey (D. Moreau), Dewey (M. Fabre), Freinet (R. Hétier). Ont-ils réussi? Il se pourrait que l'Emile, avec le noeud de questions qu'il tisse, soit encore devant nous. (shrink)

This paper proposes laying the groundwork for principled moral reasoning as a seminal goal of ethics interventions in higher education, and on this basis, makes a case for educating future specialists and professionals with a foundation in philosophical ethics. Identification of such a seminal goal is warranted by the progressive dissociation of scientific practice and ethical deliberation since the onset of a problematic relationship between science and ethics around the mid-19th century, and the extensive mistrust of integrating ethics in science (...) and engineering curricula beyond its “applied,” “practical,” or “professional” implications. Although calls by international scientific and educational bodies to strengthen ethics teaching in scientific education over the past quarter century have brought about a notion of combining competence in a certain field with competence in ethics, this is neither entrenched in the academic community, nor fleshed out as regards its core or instruments to realize it. The legitimate goals of ethics teaching in higher education, almost settled since the 1980s, can be subsumed under the proposed seminal goal, and the latter also would safeguard content and methods of ethics interventions against the intrusion of indoctrinative approaches. In this paper, derivation of the proposed seminal goal rests on an interpretation of the Kohlbergian cognitive-developmental conception of moral adulthood consisting in autonomous principled moral reasoning. This interpretation involves, based on Kant’s conception of the virtuous person, integrating questions about the “good life” into the domain of principled reasoning. (shrink)

Both Rousseau and Kant wrote their works with the intention of contributing to the well-being of humans. The ways in which Kant followed Rousseau to achieve this aim were many and go beyond those easily recognized. This article presents evidence for Rousseau’s influence in the Discipline of Pure Reason chapter of the Doctrine of Method in the First Critique. Both Rousseau and Kant emphasized discipline as a necessary part of a proper education that leads to a well-ordered life. Kant’s form (...) of discipline is modeled on the education given to Emile. This approach to the Discipline chapter also affords an enlightening view of Kant’s position in Dreams of a Spirit-Seer. (shrink)

This book is an introduction to three important philosophies of education. It's main purpose, however, is to help teach the the student how to do philosophy of education.

Kant scholars have paid relatively little attention to his raciology. They assume that his racism, as personal prejudice, can be disentangled from his core philosophy. They also assume that racism contradicts his moral theory. In this book, philosopher Huaping Lu-Adler challenges both assumptions. She shows how Kant's raciology--divided into racialism and racism--is integral to his philosophical system. She also rejects the individualistic approach to Kant and racism. Instead, she uses the notion of racism as ideological formation to demonstrate how Kant, (...) from his social location both as a prominent scholar and as a lifelong educator, participated in the formation of modern racist ideology. As a scholar, Kant developed a ground-breaking scientific theory of race from the standpoint of a philosophical investigator of nature or Naturforscher. As an educator, he transmitted denigrating depictions of the racialized others and imbued those descriptions with normative relevance. In both roles, he left behind, as one of his legacies, a worldview that excluded non-whites from such goods as recognitional respect and candidacy for cultural and moral achievements. Scholars who research and teach Kant's philosophy therefore have an unshakable burden to take part in the ongoing antiracist struggles, through their teaching practices as well as their scholarship. And they must do so with a pragmatic attention to nonideal social realities and a deliberate orientation toward substantial racial justice, equality, and inclusion. Lu-Adler pushes the discourse about Kant and racism well beyond the old debates about whether he was racist or whether his racism contaminates his philosophy. By foregrounding the lasting legacies of Kant's raciology, her work calls for a profound reorientation of Kant scholarship. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 38.1 (2004) 35-52 [Access article in PDF] Means Without End:Production, Reception, and Teaching in Kant's Aesthetics Gary Peters The Work of Art If aesthetics is to have a role within an art school context, it must be able to engage with the work of art as an ongoing and ontologically open productive enterprise. The reception of the artwork as a completed thing or act (...) and the aesthetic judgment necessary to take pleasure in the contemplation of it is largely irrelevant to the day-to-day work of the artist in the studio or onsite. Rarely do the tutor or student stand before a work that could be claimed to have reached completion or achieved what might be called "finality." On the contrary, in most cases an essential aspect of teaching practice is precisely to resist the impending closure of the work through a critical engagement which challenges the student to consider and reconsider the aesthetic possibilities of given forms within a situation of infinite reflection. Given this, it is important at the outset to consider Kant's notion of finality without end. So we may at least observe a finality of form, and trace it in objects — though by reflection only — without resting it on an end....Whenever an end is regarded as a source of delight, it always imports an interest as determining ground of the judgment on the object of pleasure. Hence the judgment of taste cannot rest on any subjective end as its ground. But neither can any representation of an objective end, i.e., of the possibility of the object itself on the principles of final connection, determine the judgment of taste. 1Echoing his famous description of art as "purposiveness without purpose," here the Kantian relation between finality and endlessness turns attention away from the art object, and the objective judgment determined by it, to the reflective process whereby the act of aesthetic judgment has primacy as that which acts upon the pleasure attending finality in the manner [End Page 35] of a tracing to be traced and retraced by the receiver. By thus denying finality an objective end, it is true that Kant removes the specter of desire from his aesthetics. But does this not also remove the originary work of the work of art, its eruptive production prior to reproduction in what might be called the "instant" of its creation outside of the "always already there" of what Jean-François Lyotard calls "aesthetic time?" 2 Indeed, to go further still, Maurice Blanchot famously conceives of the art work as harboring a radical "worklessness," a "neutral" absence that, nevertheless, is essential to its being a work, or its being as a work. 3 Does Kant's nonobjective account of aesthetic experience direct us, ultimately, toward this peculiar ontological neutrality, or does the communicative imperative at the heart of his aesthetics overlook what Blanchot would call the "fascination" of the work as the inscrutable presence of an absence? It is this problematic that weighs heavily upon the reading and teaching of Kant's aesthetics as presented here.In Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, Lyotard offers one solution to the problem. For him, reflective judgment is itself productive — "production that exceeds simple reproduction is an a priori condition for aesthetic judgment" (LAS, 67). That is to say, the power of the imagination and the pleasure associated with this power concern respectively the exercise and the registration of a productivity that is crucial for aesthetic reception to be possible. But does this playful enjoyment of our receptive/productive faculties and their beautiful attunement not obscure or distract us from the pure and immediate desire of the aesthetic where the concatenation of work and worklessness, that is to say, of production and reception, within the creative moment demands from the artist an interest in the ownership of, and responsibility for the work, as well as an absolute (one might say obsessive) commitment to the work of art — the labor of the aesthetic... (shrink)

In 1955 the fi rst Danish chair in education was set up at the University of Copenhagen and Knud Grue-Sørensen – Doctor of Philosophy – became appointed as holder of the chair. In 1965 the chair had an institute,Institute of Educational Th eory, connected to it.The following deals with the nineteen years in which Grue-Sørensen worked as a professor of educationat the university. The assumption upon which the essay rests is that his main ambition during theseyears was (...) to lay the scientific foundations of educational theory as a an autonomous discipline in its own rightnext to neighbouring disciplines like, say, psychology and sociology. Although well acquainted with those disciplineshe nevertheless consequently subjected their research results to critical examination of their relevanceto the solution of educational problems. Infl uenced in general by a strong interest in language matters andby English philosophers in particular he practiced a method of ordinarylanguage analysis and applied it to bring to light important language nuances often overlooked in empiricalresearch. Convincingly, he demonstrated this method in his analysis of the concept of learning. (shrink)

In this article, we try to understand the phenomenon of pedagogical tact as a particular form of power to judge. For this, we rehearse Immanuel Kant’s idea of Urteilskraft as it first appears in the Critique of Pure Reason, where it is also rendered in educational terms. However, the power to apply rules works without any rule governing its operations. Similarly, Hannah Arendt, in her work on judging, points to the groundlessness of judging – or to its self-grounding. We (...) follow these insights when rehearsing Johann F. Herbart account of pedagogical tact, in order to arrive at the question of how to theorise education from within the phenomenon of pedagogical tact. We take a clue from Herbart’s idea of range of thought (Gesichtkreis), a horizon within one can build one’s own understanding of education, one’s own sensibility towards each and every singular educational situation that imposes various demands on educators. (shrink)

The article covers the simulation approach as a part of communicative-oriented teaching, where its main task is to remove psychological barriers in education leading to the fast and effective language learning. The main aim of this method is to provide a life experience through the modern educational environment. Modeling creates situations which helps us to try other strategies while sinking into screenplay. An example in the article we consider a linguo-didactic resource "Время говорить по-русски". The research relevant is vivid: (...) the traditional forms of education are being replaced by the modern technologies. (shrink)

This paper considers how the United States does (and can better) ensure that members of the military accept moral responsibility for actions they perform in hostile and non-hostile situations. While the military education system offers soldiers a step-by-step approach to making ethical decisions, it is argued that this teaching is overly simplified as it fails to give enough guidance on how to choose an action that will best serve the nation. In addition to being able to recognize moral dilemmas, the (...) paper contends that understanding the basic principles behind Aristotle’s views on virtue ethics, Kant’s ideology concerning respect for persons, or Mill’s theory of utilitarianism could improve how soldiers go about making ethical decisions. (shrink)

칸트의 『도덕형이상학』 덕론 편에 있는 윤리학적 교수법은 윤리학적 방법론의 핵심으로서 덕의 획득에 대한 칸트의 교육방법을 이해하는데 필수적인 부분이다. 본 논문에서는 윤리학적 교수법에 대한 덕론의 설명에 포함된 모호하거나 논쟁적인 부분들을 검토하면서 윤리학적 교수법의 성격과 실천적 의의를 탐색한다. 먼저 덕이 획득되는, 일종의 후천적인 도덕성인 이유와 덕의 획득을 위해 이론적 가르침에 해당하는 윤리학적 교수법과 수양적 훈련에 해당하는 윤리학적 수양법이 필요한 이유를 살펴보면서 윤리학적 방법론의 구조를 탐색한다. 또한 목표와 내용, 그리고 방법의 차원에서 윤리학적 교수법을 면밀히 검토하여 그 성격을 규명하고 윤리학적 교수법을 대표하는 도덕적 문답법이 (...) 도덕원칙에 대한 이해라는 목표에 한정되지 않는다는 점, 강제적이거나 독단적이지 않다는 점, 그리고 소크라테스적 방법에 해당한다는 점 등을 밝힌다. 나아가서 도덕원칙과 덕규칙에 대한 이해에서 의무를 준수하려는 결단으로 나아갈 수 있도록 돕는 요인들 그리고 그러한 이해가 간접적으로 야기하는 감정 교육적 효과 등을 논의하면서 윤리학적 교수법의 실천적 의의를 고찰한다. (shrink)

The monographic section of Con-Textos Kantianos No. 4 entitled Kant in Eastern Europe provides an insight into the work of authors dealing with Kant’s philosophy in Russia and other Eastern European countries.

Der Verfasser liefert nicht nur eine immanente Interpretation von Kants Padagogik, sondern er geht auch in hermeneutischer Absicht der Frage nach, inwieweit die Anthropologie Luthers und Rousseaus Einfluss auf die Ausbildung des padagogischen Systems bei Kant hatten, und ob auf der anderen Seite die Kant-Kritik Herbarts zu Recht besteht.".

Robin Barrow claims in his ?Moral education's modest agenda? that ?the task of moral education is to develop understanding, at the lowest level, of the expectations of society and, at the highest level, of the nature of morality???[that is, that moral education] should go on to develop understanding, not of a particular social code, but of the nature of morality ? of the principles that provide the framework within which practical decisions have to be made? [Barrow, R. 2006. Moral education's (...) modest agenda. Ethics and Education 1, no. 1: 3?13.]. Barrow's words are noteworthy not only because he sets out to define the ?modest? agenda of moral education in terms of principles, but also because he asserts that education is important for teaching students to understand morality in such terms. However, even though he is arguing that understanding morality is important in terms of principles, he says little about their function or status, or how we cultivate ourselves so that we act in agreement with and are motivated by the principles of practical reason. In this article I therefore discuss two distinctive features of human beings and offer a Kantian notion of morality as a response to Barrow's development of an understanding of morality in terms of principles. I argue that the principles Kant suggests are constitutive of action, and that we both develop our understanding and also value our humanity when we act in agreement with and are motivated by the suggested principles, and cultivate our predispositions (technical, pragmatic and moral). Moreover, I argue that we reach the goal of ?a progressive organization of citizens of the earth into and toward the species as a system that is cosmopolitically united? [Kant, I. 2006b. Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view. Trans. Robert B. Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.] when we, inter alia, value our humanity and comply with the principles of practical reason, in practice. (shrink)

A popular story about Kant's relation to Leibniz presents Kant as a Leibniz-Wolffian by education who, inspired by his encounter with the teachings of Newton and Hume, took on the project of reconciling Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics with Newtonian science and of responding to epistemological skepticism, a project that led him further and further away from his Leibniz-Wolffian roots and culminated in the total rejection of the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy in the Critique of Pure Reason. In this essay, four shortcomings of the popular (...) story are identified and several suggestions are made about how to amend and expand the story in order to overcome these shortcomings. Furthermore, some of the most important Leibnizian doctrines that influenced Kant are collected and their role in Kant's philosophy is discussed. (shrink)

This article examines trigger warnings, particularly the call for trigger warnings on university campuses, and from a Levinasian and Kantian ethical perspective, and addresses the question: When, if ever, are trigger warnings helpful to student's learning? The nursing curriculum is developed with key stakeholders and regulatory bodies to ensure graduate nurses are competent to deliver a high standard of care to patients and clients. Practical teaching practice and published research has uncovered an increasing use of ‘Trigger Warnings’ before a topic (...) is discussed, or used as warnings on core module texts. It is appreciated that some students have personal experience of psychological or physical trauma. However, apart from identifying these students through Mitigating Circumstances committees, or when the student feels confident to share this information with a personal tutor, this information remains strictly confidential. There is the potential for covert skills such as critical analysis and skilful discussion not being attained by the student. With the assistance of Kants moral theory, an argument will develop that the insidious use of Trigger warnings and the embargo of recommended reading, requires critical discussion with the public. This would involve the rationale and pedagogical justification for the use of texts, and the necessity within nursing education to address challenging clinical topics. To support students with PTSD this may involve the research discussed on personal educational needs analysis. (shrink)

Confronted with the thoroughgoing marketisation of education, scholars have revisited the nature of pedagogy. The work of Immanuel Kant is a resource for critiquing the channelling of the transformation of self and society into rapacious consumerism. Kant's exploration of the connection between inner freedom and political freedom has been recast as pedagogy of the oppressed. Countering the dismissal of the Enlightenment as an accomplice of colonialism and imperialism, Kantian pedagogy is enlisted in the struggle against the forces undermining the very (...) structure of liberal democracy and humanity on a global scale. This essay points to the limitations of this revindication on the grounds that it leaves undisturbed the formative complicities at work in the current crisis, complicities all too familiar to those who teach and learn. (shrink)

Many engineering ethics classes and textbooks introduce theories such as utilitarianism and Kantianism (and most others draw from these theories without mentioning them explicitly). Yet using ethical theories to teach engineering ethics is not devoid of difficulty. First, their status is unclear (should one pick a single theory or use them all? does it make a difference?) Also, textbooks generally assume or fallaciously ‘prove’ that egoism (or even simply accounting for one’s interests) is wrong. Further, the drawbacks of ethical theories (...) are underestimated and the theories are also otherwise misrepresented to make them more suitable for engineering ethics as the authors construe it, viz. the ‘moral reasoning’ process. Stating in what various theories disagree would allow the students to frame the problem more productively in terms of motive–consequence or society–individual dichotomies rather than in terms of Kant–utilitarian. (shrink)

Science teaching always engages a philosophy of science. This article introduces a modern philosophy of science and indicates its implications for science education. The hermeneutic philosophy of science is the tradition of Kant, Heidegger, and Heelan. Essential to this tradition are two concepts of truth, truth as correspondence and truth as disclosure. It is these concepts that enable access to science in and of itself. Modern science forces aspects of reality to reveal themselves to human beings in events of disclosure. (...) The achievement of each event of disclosure requires the precise manipulation of equipment, which is an activity that depends on truth as correspondence. The implications of the hermeneutic philosophy of science for science education are profound. The article refers to Newton’s early work on optics to explore what the theory implies for teaching. Modern science—as the event of truth—is a relationship between an individual student, equipment, and reality. Science teachers provide for their students’ access to truth and they may show how their discipline holds a special relationship to reality. If the aim of science teaching is to enable students to disclose reality, the science curriculum will challenge some of the current practices of schooling. If teachers base science teaching upon the hermeneutic philosophy of science, science will assert itself as the intellectual discipline that derives from nature, and not from the inclinations of human beings. Science teachers teach nature’s own science. (shrink)

A little bit more than twenty years ago, the attention of bioethics community was attracted by the discovery of the work of Fritz Jahr (1895-1953), a theologian and teacher from Halle (Germany), who had conceived both the term and the discipline of bioethics (Bio-Ethik, 1926) by broadening Kant’s categorical imperative onto animals and plants. Today, dozens of papers deal with Jahr’s bioethics ideas, but his work related to other topics remains almost unknown. In the present paper, we address Jahr’s article (...) from 1930, devoted to education ("Gesinnungsdiktatur oder Gedenkfreiheit? Gedanken über eine liberale Gestaltung des Gesinnungsunterrichts" [Dictatorship of worldview or freedom of thought? Considerations on the liberal structuring of teaching of attitudes]). In the article, published in Die neue Erziehung, Jahr advocates a set of ten quite progressive and free-minded principles, including objectivity, pluriperspectivism (verschiedene Gesinnungseinstellungen), tollerant dialogue, autonomy, rationalism, liberalism, and democratization of education system and of the development of worldview at school. We devote particular attention to the comparison of Jahr’s ideas to the doctrine of Pietism and August Hermann Francke, who established the Foundation in which Jahr spent a significant part of his life, first as a student, and later as a teacher. (shrink)

This paper discusses the most persistent controversial issue that occurred in Western educational philosophy ever since Socrates questioned the Sophists: the role of truth in teaching. Ways of teaching these kinds of controversy issues are briefly considered to isolate their epistemic characteristics, which will enable the interpretation of Plato and Dewey as exemplars of rationalism and empiricism regarding the role of knowledge in the curriculum and thus include their partial truths in the epistemic ethos of teaching. The consideration of (...) pedagogy will then include the partial truths of rationalism and empiricism in the epistemic ethos of teaching by following Kant's ‘Concepts without percepts are empty; perceptions without conceptions are blind’.This claim, however, is narrowed down in two ways compatible with postmodernism and the heavy emphasis on constructionism in faculties of education. After quoting Harry Broudy's statement that the educational epistemic ethos should be domain‐specific, guided by the experts’ inquiry protocols in each curricular area, it is narrowed down further with Maxine Greene's explication that it should be pluralistic and lesson‐specific. This epistemic ethos is not argued as a synthesis but as an aggregate of the partial truths of various epistemologies in the spirit of the postmodern doubt in any one theory of knowledge without throwing out the baby with the dirty bath water.Finally, the streams of consciousness involved in teaching and learning good knowledge are described phenomenologically to disclose how truth can be disclosed in teaching, thereby grounding propositional knowledge, for example, ontologically in the being of the student and in the being of the world. (shrink)

The availability of modern web resources has a significant impact on the effectiveness of education, since it allows the teacher to use and implement new teaching methods that provide several advantages in organizing the educational process. The article demonstrates the possibilities of online resources when teaching foreign language.

During the nineteenth century, German philosophy developed from a type of general knowledge to an academic discipline at the university. Changes across disciplines to the philosophy of science and psychological surveys created new challenges for the place and purpose of philosophy in the educational system. The content of logic courses for secondary schools (Gymnasiums) was centred on the dissociation of nature and the scale of logic. In this paper, I will examine a number of projects for teaching philosophy at (...) the secondary school level from new humanism to reduce philosophical to philological concerns about different projects offered by Niethammer, Hegel and Herbart. Then, I will focus on the most successful – Adolf Trendelenburg’s Elements of Aristotle’s Logic (1st edition of 1836). This work is a compilation of the logical texts of Aristotle, and for as long as sixty years, it was an official textbook in Prussian secondary schools. The aim of the paper is to show how the rethinking of Aristotle’s heritage affected the theoretical and ideological expectations of propaedeutic courses and transformed the image of logic as a philosophical discipline. (shrink)

The contradiction between the rapid mathematization of health care through the active introduction of modern technologies and methods based on mathematical achievements in the field of medicine and the lack of a system of training medical students corresponding to these scientific successes, which allows them to carry out mathematical modeling of complex physical, chemical and biological processes at the molecular level for the purpose of their analysis and subsequent forecasting,, problems that arise when teaching mathematical analysis in medical Schools, and (...) possible ways to solve them. The solution identified during the research of problematic issues of teaching of mathematical analysis in medical schools is offered by enhancing the quality of learning through the re-allocated for the development of the discipline course hours stimulate the motivation of students, adjusting content and methodical component of teaching and active introduction in educational process of modern information technologies, elimination of excessive mathematical formalism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 537 tion of his three dialogues, and of course there are several references to Hume's intern= parable Dialogues. The bibliographic essay is useful with respect to general works and period pieces but unfortunately does little to help those who are seeking further help in understanding an individual writer. Professor France's work is an invaluable guide nevertheless for those who realize that authors, even philosophers, do not write (...) in a cultural vacuum. NICHOLASCAPALDI Queens College, CUNY Die Auseinandersetzung yon ldealismus und Realismus in Fichtes Wissenscha/tslehre. By Ingeborg Schfissler. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972. Pp. 182. DM 24.50) For Fichte scholars this closely argued and well organized study of the foundations of Fichte's Wissenscha/tslehre is simply a must. American philosophers generally, however, will not become Fichte enthusiasts after reading this book. But this is not the fault of the authoress, but of Fichte. The key question which Dr. SchiJssler raises is, What role does realism play in Fichte's transcendental idealism? With this question in mind she examines Fichte's "foundation of the entire theory of science" of 1794-1795 and related matters, and the "theory of science" of 1804, together with the lecture of 1813. As Fichte originally saw the task of philosophy it was to explain theoretical, i.e., scientific, consciousness in terms of its own foundation. In 1804, however, the task was conceived as presentation of absolute truth; and in 1813, Fichte tried to understand the theory of science as a theory of appearances. Dr. Schfissler's thesis is that all three approaches are necessary; that, in fact, the changes in Fichte's conception of what a theory of science is or ought to be are grounded in the nature of transcendental philosophy itself. The book is not something one reads for relaxation; its sustained and detailed arguments militate against that. But it is a highly illuminating study, and well worth the effort of careful analysis. W. H. WE~mSTBR Florida State University The Manifold in Perception. Theories of Art.from Kant to Hildebrand. By Michael Pedro. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. Oxford-Warburg Studies) This is a survey of theories of art of Kant, Schiller, Herbart, Hildebrand, Schopenhauer and Fiedler. One may question the value of a re-statement of this sort, over simply another reading of the works of the authors themselves. Pedro's answer may be found in the Preface and again in a more extended statement in the conclusion. "German aesthetic theory from Kant through to the end of the nineteenth century seemed to contain valuable critical ideas quite absent from contemporary philosophical writing." Pedro's attempt has been to "re-locate notions in current use, like 'aesthetic detachment', within the sustained systematic discourse of which they were once part. This seemed a way both of uncovering a number of assumptions which have been constraining writing on art for some time, and of clarifying a number of crucial insights of earlier theorists." The author's account is almost entirely expository, its negative critical questions being limited almost exclusively to Herbart. Yet even here, when the author indicates that Herbart's theory of mind "exhibits certain very basic logical difficulties," he adds that 538 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY "they are difficulties which have a particular importance in the discussion of art.... " Podro's clarification is largely made through the asking of questions which the authors themselves did not ask and then suggesting answers to these questions in the light of what the authors did say. The two chapters on Schiller form the core of the book. Schiller's theory of art and aesthetic education of man is placed as central to Podro's account of an aesthetic tradition beginning with Kant and ending with Fiedler. The "tradition" detailed in Podro's book is described as having two underlying assumptions. The first was that any account of art must indicate distinctive or at least characteristic uses of our perception, uses which if not exclusive to art are at least necessary to it, and which are seen in art in a particularly striking way. The second assumption was that art involves our attitudes, in the sense of our serious purposes as... (shrink)

Throughout his forty-one years of teaching, Kant lectured on logic annually at Königsberg University. This faithfulness to the course was founded on his conviction that logic, taken as the science of the necessary formal laws of all thinking in general, serves as the reflective basis for exploring the use of understanding and reason in the sciences and other disciplines. Hence as their higher education proceeded, students would have the opportunity to consider formally, and not just psychologically or culturally, the more (...) general questions about concepts, laws, and methods of human cognition. Kant’s appreciation of what logic offers to university life was only fortified by his 1770 appointment as professor of logic and metaphysics, with the attendant teaching responsibilities in each field. However widely he ranged in lectures on the metaphysical principles of natural science and morality, he always returned to the home base of logical inquiry. (shrink)

Beauty is truth, truth beauty.If this epigraph only rarely escapes English class, something like it has fascinated philosophers for a long time. Iris Murdoch remembers that "Kant said that beauty was an analogon of good, Plato said it was the nearest clue."2 I want to go further and posit that our means of perception of the aesthetic and the ethical share an organic connection, an understanding of which will help elucidate moral perception, a critical component of moral education.Or moral education (...) as it should be. But what currently counts as such is, directly or almost directly, simple instruction. I ask why this does not work. I ask why Jane Austen said, "We all love to instruct, though we can teach only what is... (shrink)

In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant declares that virtue “can and must be taught.” This claim raises two problems. First, it is in tension with Kant’s emphasis on the absolute moral responsibility that each individual agent owes to her transcendental freedom. Second, it raises the question of how the empirical events that constitute moral education can have an impact on atemporal moral choices. Concerning the second issue, I argue that Kant has a coherent framework for representing how empirical conditions can (...) influence (“affect”) the noumenal will without determining it to action. Regarding the first problem, I argue that although a good moral education is mostly only a facilitating rather than a strictly necessary condition for moral virtue, there is one moral capacity that does require good moral teaching: namely, the practical power of judgment that correctly applies wide, general duties of virtue to particular cases. (shrink)

Reflection has been proclaimed as a means to help physicians deal with medicine’s inherent complexity and remedy many of the shortcomings of medical education. Yet, there is little agreement on the nature of reflection nor on how it should be taught and practiced. Emerging neuroscientific concepts suggest that human thought processes are largely nonconscious, in part inaccessible to introspection. Our knowledge of the world is fraught with uncertainty, ignorance and indeterminacy, and influenced by emotion, biases and illusions, including the illusion (...) of not having illusions. Neuroscience also documents that lifelong learning processes may hone nonconscious cognition to high levels of sophistication, allowing rapid and precise perceptions, judgments and actions in complex situations. We argue that knowledge of mechanisms underlying human thought may be useful in designing educational programs to foster desired attributes such as curiosity, critical self-awareness and intuitive acumen in medical professionals. The juxtaposition of neuroscientific insights with ideas from Kant on reflective judgement, van Manen on tact, and Aristotle on phronésis, supports a concept of reflection that manifests as wise practice. We suggest that reflection in medical education should be an imperative for educators seeking to guide learners to manage the complexity and “messiness” of medical practice, and a role-modelling mode of medical practice characterized by self-correcting behaviors that culminate in good and right professional actions. An example illustrates reflective practice in the teaching and learning of physicianship. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Coleridge, Schiller, and Aesthetic EducationGary PetersColeridge, Schiller, and Aesthetic Education, by Michael John Kooy. New York: Palgrave, 2002, 241 pp.Who reads Friedrich Schiller today? With the Aesthetic Education of Man struggling to remain in print in the English-speaking world (at least in the UK, from where I am writing this) it would seem fewer and fewer readers are prepared to engage with (or be educated by) this once (...) influential aestheticization of the world; and as for Marcuse on Schiller, or the young(er) Frederic Jameson on Schiller and Marcuse, they, too, seem to be speaking from another era, an ancient time when the humanist utopian promise could still be taken seriously. Promises are made to be broken, of course, especially the promesse de bonheur, but are we right to feel betrayed by the assorted Schillerians who so passionately raised our hopes, only to fall silent when they were so comprehensively dashed? Perhaps betrayal is putting it too strongly, but the fact remains that we seem to have ended up with a notion of aesthetic education that educates nobody, not even those within art education who need it more than most. But then perhaps the whole notion of aesthetic education as a promise is itself fundamentally flawed, the product of a political reading—the politicization of the aestheticization of the world—that casts the lessons of the aesthetic into the future rather than engaging with the event of the artwork as it erupts in a "now," which is aporetic in the extreme, and thus ill-equipped [End Page 119] to radicalize the unradic1al mind or mobilize the immobile.Clearly, Michael John Kooy reads Schiller today, but, having said that, it is never made entirely clear who he is writing for. Indeed, we may ask, does he have much of an audience at all or is he speaking too long and too late into the vacuum left by the collapse of humanist optimism? His own position is an interesting one, as both a literary theorist and a philosopher; one of the real strengths of the book is Kooy's pursuit of philosophical ideas in the body of Schiller's and Coleridge's dramatic and poetic work, often to good effect, but, to ask the question again, who is listening? Philosophers? Writers? Professional academics or the nonacademic audience that one would assume was always the intended beneficiary of the concept of aesthetic education?To attempt to think around some of these questions, without necessarily trying to answer them, we might start by considering who the philosophical audience for this book might be. My guess is that the philosophy of education, the subgenre of philosophy that might benefit from an aesthetic education itself, will be largely deaf to the message running through these pages. Long dominated by an ethical, religious, and liberal political agenda, the philosophy of education in its hegemonic Anglo-American guise has never made much room for the aesthetic, particularly in its "continental" radical incarnation—far too woolly, idealist, utopian, far too "arty." So, not much of an outlet here, but, having said that, the recent Anglo-American fascination with the very "continental" notion of Bildung might prove to be a fruitful point of contact, and Kooy does devote some useful pages and a substantial epilogue to a discussion of this thorny subject. There is a problem here, however, in that while Kooy is excellent when thinking through the dissonance between the teleological purposiveness of Schiller's and Coleridge's conceptions of universal history, so important to their notion of aesthetic education as a cultural model, and the very different self-substantiating autonomy of Bildung, he is much less engaged with the more fundamental pedagogical issues that arise within the particularity of the teaching encounter: How is the necessary autonomy of aesthetic education to be taught without thereby jeopardizing that very autonomy? It is at this point that a philosophical audience (one engaged in continental philosophy, that is) might have expected a more thorough account of the deeply problematical relationship between the Schillerian notion of aesthetic education and the aesthetics to be found in Kant's Critique of Judgement, its acknowledged source. This is not... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Paradox of Education:A ConversationHumberto R. Maturana and Bernhard PoerksenResponsibility of the TeacherPoerksen: Immanuel Kant writes in his essay Über Pädagogik that the wide field of education is governed by a fundamental paradox. On the one hand, we want free and self-determined individuals to leave our schools; on the other, we impose a syllabus on the future individuals, force them to attend schools, punish their failures, and persecute their (...) noncompliance. There is, if we follow Kant, an inescapable relationship of tension between the goals and the means of educational efforts: They contradict each other. Would you agree?Maturana: No. Education, the commentary of an observer, is the process of transformation resulting from the co-existence with adults. We become the adults we have been living with. This means: If freedom and self-determined thinking are the goals of educational activity, then we have to live together in a way that is supported by the mutual respect for the autonomy of the other. In my view, the paradox formulated by Kant does not exist at all. The way of life, the manner of living together, shapes and transforms people. If you want to teach autonomy and reflection, you cannot use force as a method but must create an open space for communal reflection and action. There must be no contradiction between goals and means.Poerksen: Surely, there must also be constraints? It must be laid down when everybody has to be present, what the task is, who the teacher is, who has authority.Maturana: Compulsion will emerge if the teachers do not succeed in presenting their material in a thrilling way and in making school an attractive place of being together. Their failure will lead to force.Poerksen: The teacher is totally responsible for everything that may happen in school. Is this not an exaggerated claim?Maturana: No. If a teacher behaves respectfully, if he does not intimidate his pupils, if he listens, encourages cooperation and reflection, then a special form of interaction will emerge. The way of living practiced by the teacher, including the goals of teaching, will be the source of profitable learning for the pupils. This also implies that three questions and tasks must be sorted out cooperatively in education. First it seems necessary to me to debate the educational ideal to be chosen—what should the future adults be like when leaving the school one day? Should they be democratically minded and responsibly acting citizens? Or are they to be authoritarian and commandeering hierarchs, lords who feel superior to everyone else? It is then necessary to anchor a way of life in the school that permits acting and thinking according to that ideal. Finally, there is the essential task of preparing the teachers for their job in such a [End Page 25] way as to do justice to the desired goals—to enable them to live what they have to achieve.Poerksen: This would mean that teaching has nothing to do with the stepwise elimination of ignorance, as is commonly thought. The transmission of knowledge is secondary. The primary requirement is a way of life that corresponds with one's ideals, a particular form of living together, out of which the material topics will arise in due course.Maturana: Exactly. The children do not learn mathematics in school; they learn how to live together with a mathematics teacher. Perhaps they will one day carry on this enjoyable and exciting kind of being together independently—and become mathematics teachers or mathematicians themselves. Teachers do not simply transmit some content; they acquaint their pupils with a way of living. In the process, the rules of arithmetic, the laws of physics, or the grammar of a language will be acquired. My claim is: Pupils learn teachers.Poerksen: What about children who systematically refuse to cooperate? What is to be done with them? The classical answer is, of course: bad marks, relegation, exclusion from the winning circles.Maturana: The so-called difficult children about whom teachers keep complaining often only struggle to be seen and accepted, while the whole world expects them to behave in a calculable manner and to adapt to strange demands. Asking... (shrink)

There is a classical paradox in education that also affects the epistemic virtues: the paradox inherent in the demand to develop general strategies for training persons to be free and creative individuals. This problem becomes particularly salient with respect to the epistemic virtue ofcreativity, the more so if we consider a radical form of creativity, namely,genius. This paper explores a historical constellation in which rigorous claims about the standards for knowledge and morality were developed, along with a highly influential notion (...) of genius: the philosophy of Kant and of immediate post‐Kantian philosophers. The paper shows how in this historical moment came together a new notion of “science,” a theory of “genius” and of virtues, and an analysis of the promises and difficulties inherent in educating a virtuous or creative individual. In this constellation of ideas, there also emerges a potentially fruitful account of how to teach intellectual creativity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Embedding Creativity in Teaching and LearningHoward Cannatella (bio)IntroductionCreative teaching ranges from the view that creativity is necessary for a changing knowledge economy to a more individualized view that encompasses a person-centered approach. None of these views are advanced in this essay, as I feel that there are important weaknesses in taking either position. Instead, my main purpose is to discuss how certain kinds of creative activity can substantially transform (...) educational practice without necessarily succumbing to any of the above conceptions of creativity. My educational approach to creative activity relates to one aspect of Alasdair Macintyre's, After Virtue; the notion that creativity only flourishes via a devotion to a particular practice.1 For such practice to flourish it has to immerse itself in a type of personal address that revolves and combines in various ways what Maurice Merleau-Ponty refers to as "self-others-things."2Any claim to suggest that education should engage creativity more than it currently does can stir some reasonable criticism, for there are clearly a plethora of other important factors to consider in student learning. Yet, to a degree, the practice of creativity is, I think, being dissipated and weakened, where ambivalence and ill-informed ideas are increasingly obscuring its place. My own thinking on this displacement which has some connections with John White's view and in a different sense with Howard Gardner's, is that if we offer via teaching situations geometrical puzzles, visual problem solving exercises and the like, such exercises although perhaps amusing in themselves are hardly taking up the same refined order of creative display exhibited by those most credited as being creatively talented.3 Indeed, to surmise that creativity is a construal of left hand side verses right hand side brain activity; that one can show different color cards on a monitor or play a short excerpt of Beethoven's Pastoral symphony in order to accelerate student learning are at the very least questionable creative assumptions. In [End Page 59] contrast, what I aim to show from one perspective as a crucial distinction is how creativity is involved in fundamental painstaking ways with the phenomenological. When the landscape of this kind of learning presupposes the opening of oneself to the world, the stretching of a mind, the thickening of one's perceptions, and the discovery of a deeper and richer self through living, one will tend to experience as life enhancing more of nature, previously unfelt and articulated modes of being in the world.Clearly, as a lecturer one has to inspire students. One of the best ways I know of doing this is through satisfying and intensifying students' creative appetite. Although I will not discuss it here there is some evidence to suggest that the need for creativity is biologically, physically, and psychologically an essential part of human nature, necessary for human-reproduction, growth, and cultural striving.4 The lecturer who fails to stimulate students' creativity, their being in the world, may be unwittingly inhibiting their cognitive, emotional, and physical well-being; preventing them from realizing their potential. Indeed, some learning problems can be attributed to the unconscious or deliberate stifling of creativity in student lives. We can see this happening when one feels emotionally or intellectually repressed, unable to express oneself openly, to take delight in what one has achieved, to note one's own unique sensitivity, and to experience personally the many wonders in the world. Although we may not articulate it, without a modicum of creative outlet, life can appear very cruel. Further, some of the benefits of creativity can be seen in studio teaching situations in which, as Charles Bingham and Alexander Sidorkin imply, the dynamics of aesthetic creativity encourage power-sharing and the fostering of non-dominated pedagogical relationships.5 As both Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Schiller realized two centuries ago, creativity has the capacity to foster educationally a particular kind of freedom essential to sustaining an alert, liberal, and questioning mind.6 There is also much empirical evidence, at least in the arts, to show how creative practice can assist the clarification of ideas, advancement in thought, and concentration in learning. The notebooks, papers, and recordings of Mozart... (shrink)

Most of us would agree with the almost trite saying that “life is a journey”. Of course it is, unless it ends tragically at birth, and even then it is a very short journey. All of us can describe how we got from one stage in life to another, whether personal, family, education or career. Many journeys seem to be in an almost straight line while others meander from one place to another, changing direction and alternating goals, sometimes zigging back (...) and forth. I have had many wonderful journeys in my life; the choice to change career aspirations from engineering to medicine, the choice the study in medicine in Scotland, the choice to focus on geriatrics and then the choice to branch out into medical ethics to add more depth to clinical medicine. The early undergraduate study of philosophy planted the seed that eventually grew into my completing a Master’s in Medical Ethics; and then expanding my teaching and practice to include palliative care and end of life-decision-making, to most recently participating in the assessment of those requesting medical assistance in dying (MAID in Canada). (shrink)

The editors of this book of readings have packed in a wealth of material in a way which evinces an imaginative conception of, as well as an ambitious program for a course in the philosophy of education. There are forty-three selections of varying completeness from thirty-six different authors; among the philosophers included are Kierkegaard, Schlick, Kant, Ayer, Blanshard, Scheffler, Stace, Moore, Feigl, Russell, Lewis, Dewey, James, Royce, and Peirce. Plato is the only pre-Kantian philosopher to make an appearance. Half of (...) the selections do not concern education or the philosophy of education directly. Rather, they consider one or more of the four main problem areas of philosophy which the editors have decided gear into problems in the philosophy of education most directly. These areas are the nature of philosophy, metaphysics or the nature of reality, the nature of knowledge, and the nature of value. The section on metaphysics is epistemologically slanted, as might be expected where the concern is for the relation of teaching and learning to the nature of reality. The statements of the philosophers on the general philosophical problems are given at the beginning of each of the sections and then followed by applications of the philosophical position by philosophers, once again, and educational theorists to the field of education. Since too often the philosophy of education is taught in the education rather than the philosophy department, the liberal dose of straight philosophy should prove extremely helpful to the student of education who is accustomed to receiving the philosophy appropriate to the philosophy of education in a highly diluted form.—E. A. R. (shrink)

The point of departure in this article is the Danish debate about democracyin schools. This article presents a first step in a study of how the relationshipbetween democracy and education can be understood. A juxtaposition of thetwo concepts requires, first of all, an analysis of how the concept of democracyis used in the educational debate. In this article three models of democracy areapplied as an analytical framework: a liberal model (Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Rawls,Dworkin), a communitarian model (MacIntyre, Sandel, Nussbaum) (...) and a communicative/deliberativemodel (Walzer, Benhabib, Taylor, Habermas). Numerous contradictions and tensionsbetween concepts of democracy and education can be found in such a juxtaposition,depending on which conception of democracy one chooses to apply. In this articleI discuss which conception affords us the most meaningful concept of democraticteaching. As an introduction, a brief historical overview of the interplay betweendemocracy and education in Danish school is provided. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps, and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may (...) freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

The purpose of the study is to determine the methodological features of the organization of design engineering activities when teaching physics at school. The article focuses on the formation of design and research skills of students, which is a mandatory requirement of the Federal State Educational Standard of the General Education. From our point of view, one of the stages of the implementation of project activities should be design, so the formation of design skills is also reflected in the (...) FSES BGE. The scientific novelty of the research lies in the definition of the concept of "project design activity", the definition of the methodology of the organization of project design activity in teaching physics at school. As a result, the requirements for the content and organization of design engineering activities in teaching physics at school are identified, a model of the methodology of its organization is proposed; the program of the circle is developed and an example of one of the implemented projects is given. (shrink)

This article explores the meaning of the task of teaching students to formulate critique in relation to the so-called ‘pedagogical paradox’, according to which the educational ideal of individual autonomy is contradicted by the practice of planning and control, which is particularly pronounced in the influential model of ‘constructive alignment’. Taking Kant’s idea of enlightenment and autonomy as a starting point, I introduce Luc Boltanski’s concept of reflexivity and link it to Jon Elster’s discussion of ‘states that are essentially (...) by-products’. In doing so, I advance the view that genuine critique typically emerges from a shift in perspective, from the pragmatic realization of goals according to institutionalized practices to a metapragmatic reflection on those practices. Since teaching is itself an institutionalized practice, personal reflexivity can only be understood as a by-product of teaching, and, contra the logic of models like constructive alignment, it cannot be set as a direct objective. Emerging from the subject itself, rather than from the influence of an educational technique, personal reflexivity should be recognized as an important aspect of the subject’s transition from youth to maturity. (shrink)