Edna Ullmann-Margalit provides an original account of the emergence of norms. Her main thesis is that certain types of norms are possible solutions to problems posed by certain types of social interaction situations. She presents illuminating discussions of Prisoners' Dilemma, co-ordination, and inequality situations.

Normal Rationality is a selection of the most important work of Edna Ullmann-Margalit, presenting some influential and widely admired essays alongside some that are not well known. She was an unorthodox and deeply original philosopher whose work illuminated the largest mysteries of human life. Much of her writing focuses on two fundamental questions. (1) How do people proceed when they cannot act on the basis of reasons, or project likely consequences? (2) How is social order possible? Ullmann-Margalit's answers, emphasizing (...) what might be called biased rationality, are important not only for philosophy, but also for political science, psychology, sociology, cognitive science, economics (including behavioral economics), law, and even public policy. Ullmann-Margalit demonstrates that people have identifiable strategies for making difficult decisions, whether the question is small (what to buy at a supermarket) or big (whether to transform one's life in some large-scale way). She also shows that social dilemmas are solved by norms; that invisible-hand explanations take two identifiable (and dramatically different) forms; that trust can emerge in seemingly unpromising situations; and that considerateness is the foundation on which our relationships are organized in both the thin context of the public space and the intimate context of the family. One of the distinguishing features of Ullmann-Margalit's work is its close attention to the details of human experience, and its use of those details to offer fresh understandings of social phenomena. Her essays cast new light on a diverse assortment of problems in philosophy, social science, and individual lives. (shrink)

I want to focus on some of the limits of decision theory that are of interest to the philosophical concern with practical reasoning and rational choice. These limits should also be of interest to the social-scientists’ concern with Rational Choice.

This collection is the first proceedings volume of the lectures delivered within the framework of the Israel Colloquium for the History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science, in its year of inauguration 1981-82. It thus marks the beginning of a new venture. Rather than attempting to express an ideology of the l}nity of science, this collection in fact aims at presenting a kaleidoscopic picture of the variety of views about science and within science. Three main disciplines come together in this volume. (...) The first of scientists, the second of historians and sociologists of science, the third of philosophers interested in science. The scientists try to present the scientific body of knowledge in areas where the scientific adventure kindles the imagination of the culture of our time. At the same of course, they register their own reflections on the nature of this body time, of knowledge and on its likely course of future development. For the historians and sociologists, in contrast, science is there to be studied diachronically, as a process, on the one hand, and synchronically, as a social institution, on the other. As for the phil9sophers, finally, their contribution to this series is not meant to remain within the confines of what is usually seen as the philosophy of science proper, or to be limited to the analysis of the scientific mode of reasoning and thinking: it is allowed, indeed encouraged, to encompass alter native, and on occasion even competing, modes of thought. (shrink)

Given a descriptive word, what is the nature of the relation between it and the features of the object to which it is supposed to apply? What is it that entitles one to assert ‘this is a horse’?A traditional answer has been in terms of ‘Merkmal’: a collection of features, or properties, severally necessary and Jointly sufficient for the application of the word in question. This relation - call it the Merkmal relation - between word and features is common to (...) a variety of theories of meaning that may otherwise be in disagreement about the status of the features themselves in their relation to the object: whether they be actual or believed, perceptual or ‘essential,’ phenomenal or ‘real,’ etc. (shrink)

The volume before us is the fourth in the series of proceedings of what used to be the Israel Colloquium for the History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science. This Colloquium has in the meantime been renamed. It now bears the name of Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (1915-1975). Bar-Hillel was an eminent philosopher of science, language, and cognition, as well as a fearless fighter for enlightenment and a passionate teacher who had a durable influence on Israeli philosophical life. The essays collected in this (...) volume have of course this much in common, that they are all in, of, and pertaining to science. They also share the property of having all been delivered before live, and often lively, audiences in Jerusalem and in Tel Aviv, in the years 1984-1986. As is customary in the volumes of this series, the essays and commentaries presented here are intended to strike a rather special balance between the disciplines to which the Colloquium is dedicated. The historical and sociological vantage point is addressed in Kramnick's and Mali's treatment of Priestley, in Vickers' and Feldhay's studies of the Renaissance occult, and in Warnke's and Barasch's work on the imagination. From a philosophical angle several concepts, all material to the methodology of science, are taken up: rule following, by Smart and Margalit; analysis, by Ackerman; explanation, by Taylor; and the role of mathematics in physics, by Levy-Leblond and Pitowsky. (shrink)

The Israel Colloquium for the History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science presents before you its third volume of proceedings. The philosophy section of the volume has three main foci: the scientific explanation (Hempel and Ben-Menachem, Elster and Dascal); realism in science (Cohen and Zemach) and its implications for the problem of universals (Armstrong and Bar-Elli); and the question of demarcation: the dividing line between science and philosophy (KrUger), as well as the cognitive limits of science (Stent). There is no neat (...) separation in this volume between essays on the history of science and those on the sociology of science, and perhaps properly so. Thus, Lenoir's contribution is a clear example of the way the two disciplines combine and interrelate. Joseph Ben-David's comment on this lecture was among the last things he wrote, knowing full well that his days were numbered. Reading his contribution imparts a strong sense of loss, the loss of a great sociologist and a wise man. Not only history, however, but also historiography is a subject for reflection in this volume (Freudenthal and Kerszberg). And, finally, a couple of articles convey the sense of fascination with science as a story (Heilbron, Hughes). We have by now come to expect from the investigations reported in the Israel Colloquium series not surface unity of theme and method, but rather an underlying common commitment and zest for the scientific enterprise at its best. The third volume hopes to join the first two in footing this bill. (shrink)

This is the second volume of Proceedings of the Israel Colloquium for the History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science. At the time that this preface is being written, the fourth annual series of lectures within the framework of the Israel Colloquium is already behind us and the fifth is underway. The Israel Colloquium thus has now not only a future to look forward to but also a past which is a source, of pride and pleasure for those who take part (...) in this venture. The Israel Colloquium has, I believe, struck roots in the Israeli scientific and intellectual life, while drawing on the ever-increasing readiness of the international scientific and intellectual community for continuous support. As in the first volume, here too the papers presented, taken together, attempt a threefold representation of science and of the scientific activity: the historical, the social, and the systematic. A novel focal point in this volume is the treatment of some case studies illuminating historical, social, and philosophical aspects of medicine. Another center of gravity here is the Eddington Centennial Symposium which was a main event in the ColloƯ quium activity of the 1982-83 series. This is a fitting place for me to report with sorrow the untimely death in the summer of 1984 of Solly G. Cohen, one of Israel's leading scientists, who is among the contributors to this volume. (shrink)

In this paper I take up the notion of family fairness and contrast it with justice. In particular I take issue with Susan Okin's notion of the just family and develop, instead, the notion of the not-unjust fair family. Driving a wedge between justice and fairness, I propose that family fairness is partial and sympathetic rather than impartial and empathic, and that it is particular and internal rather than universalizable. Furthermore, I claim that family fairness is based on ongoing comparisons (...) of preferences among family members. I finally characterize the good family as a not-unjust family that is considerate and fair. (shrink)

Looking at the Essene connection, the archaeology of Qumran, and the sectarian nature of the scrolls community, this work explores the different arenas, and ways, in which contesting theories of the scrolls do battle. In this context, it finds examples that exercise philosophers of science as well as the general public.

What makes a choice difficult, beyond being complex or difficult to calculate? Characterizing difficult choices as posing a special challenge to the agent, and as typically involving consequences of significant moment as well as clashes of values, the article proceeds to compare the way difficult choices are handled by rational choice theory and by the theory that preceded it, Kurt Lewin's "conflict theory." The argument is put forward that within rational choice theory no choice is in principle difficult: if the (...) object is to maximize some value, the difficulty can be at most computational. Several prototypes of choices that challenge this argument are surveyed and discussed ; special attention is given to difficult choices faced by doctors and layers. The last section discusses a number of devices people employ in their attempt to cope with difficult choices: escape, "reduction" to non-difficult choices, and second-order strategies. (shrink)

Reasoning Practically deals with a classical philosophical topic, the link between thought and action--how we think about what we do or ought to do, and how we move from thinking to doing. The essays by such renowned contributors as Donald Davidson, Barry Stroud, Cass R. Sunstein, Seyla Benhabib, and Gerald Dworkin, cover a range of issues raised when we link reason and practice. This collection connects state-of-the-art philosophical work with concrete issues in social life and political practice, making it of (...) interest not only to philosophers, but to political theorists, legal scholars, and any researcher interested in the practical application of reason. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper is concerned with the question of whether an individual has a moral obligation to sign a protest petition which has been initiated on moral grounds. It is argued that there is such an obligation when the petition represents a viewpoint with which one broadly agrees. This is a general dury which may lapse with changed circumstances or which may be redeemed by some alternative action. It is argued that the duty to initiate a protest petition is, on (...) the other hand, supererogatory as far as an individual is concerned, but may be a duty for a community or group. Finally it is argued that protest petitions are essentially protests, not against evil deeds as such, but against evil deeds done in one's own name, and are therefore a vital aspect of democracy. (shrink)

Isaiah Berlin: A Celebration gathers tributes, reflections, and commentaries on the great thinker and his philosophy, politics, and life-including contributions from Michael Ignatieff, Leon Wieseltier, Ronald Dworkin, Stephen Spender, and many others. "Some [essays], like Joseph Brodsky's tribute, are touchingly personal. Others, like G. A. Cohen's 'Isaiah's Marx, and Mine,' mingle personal reminiscences with a more theoretical look at Berlin's ideas. . . . The volume is a fitting tribute to a thinker famed for his erudition, eclecticism, and clarity of (...) style."--Merle Rubin, The Christian Science Monitor "One of the many merits of this rich and rewarding collection is the sense-very imperfectly conveyed here-it transmits of the tone of Berlin's writings and conversation, of the multiplicity of his interests and the variety of his achievements. . . . The essays testify to the character of Berlin's mind as a luminous prism, in which the cultural traditions of Russia, England and Judaism are marvelously refracted."--John Gray, Times Literary Supplement "[T]he collection testifies to the learning and profundity of Berlin's thought and, by way both of reminiscence and influence, to the charm and gaity of its expression."--Anthony Quinton, The Times of London. (shrink)

This is a selection of the most important work of Edna Ullmann-Margalit, an unorthodox and deeply original philosopher whose work illuminated the largest mysteries of human life. It centres on two questions: How do people proceed when they cannot act on the basis of reasons, or project likely consequences? How is social order possible?

Edna Ullmann-Margalit provides an original account of the emergence of norms. Her main thesis is that certain types of norms are possible solutions to problems posed by certain types of social interaction situations. She presents illuminating discussions of Prisoners' Dilemma, co-ordination, and inequality situations.

This volume brings together philosophers and psychologists to investigate the phenomenon of transformative change and a host of fascinating questions it prompts. Taking their departure from seminal work on transformative choice and experience by L. A. Paul and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, the authors pursue fundamental questions concerning the nature of rationality, the limits of the imagination, and the metaphysics of the self. They also strike out into new areas, including value theory, aesthetics, moral and political philosophy. Several chapters present the (...) results of experimental investigation into the psychology of transformation, self-concept, and moral learning. (shrink)

In this study, I juxtapose the views of Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Menachem Fisch on radical changes of mind. I note in particular the common aspects of their proposal that typically, radical change is not, indeed, cannot be justified by reasons. Their responses to and arguments for this threat to rationality are critically examined. Hili Razinsky’s analysis of ambivalence is shown to contribute to the understanding of change by providing a broader perspective on the rationality of belief. Her work thus (...) provides a promising alternative to the above positions and the impasse they confront. (shrink)

In this paper I start by briefly presenting an analysis of token cause and of token causal relevance that I developed elsewhere, and then apply it to the famous thirsty traveler riddle. One general outcome of the analysis of causal relevance employed here is that in preemption cases (early or late) the preempted cause is not a cause since it is causally irrelevant to the effect. I consider several variations of the thirsty traveler riddle. In the first variation the first (...) enemy emptied the canteen and the second enemy threw it away. On this variation, the act of neither enemy comes out, on the analysis employed here, as causally relevant to, and thus not as a cause of, the fact that the traveler died, but the conjunction of the two acts is a cause of it. This version is a case of mutual preemption. I argue that it has the same structure as the voting paradox, which thus has an analogous solution. In the standard version, in which the first enemy added poison to the water in the traveler's canteen, the act of the second enemy (who threw the canteen away) comes out, on the analysis used here, as causally relevant to and as a cause of the fact that the traveler died, but the act of the first enemy comes out as neither. I also make a comparison with Lewis' accounts, and discuss alternative treatments of the puzzle such as those of Hart and Honore and of Gavison, Margalit, and Ullmann-Margalit. (shrink)

When is it legitimate for a government to ‘nudge’ its citizens, in the sense described by Thaler and Sunstein (2008)? In their original work on the topic, Thaler and Sunstein developed the _‘as judged by themselves’ (or AJBT) test_ to answer this question (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 5). In a recent paper, Paul and Sunstein (2019) raised a concern about this test: it often seems to give the wrong answer in cases in which we are nudged to make a (...) decision that leads to what Paul calls a _personally transformative experience_, that is, one that results in our values changing (Paul 2014). In those cases, the nudgee will judge the nudge to be legitimate after it has taken place, but only because their values have changed as a result of the nudge. In this paper, I take up the challenge of finding an alternative test. I draw on my _aggregate utility account_ of how to choose in the face of what Ullmann-Margalit (2006) calls _big decisions_, that is, decisions that lead to these personally transformative experiences (Pettigrew 2019, Chapters 6 and 7). (shrink)

The paper considers contemporary models of presumption in terms of their ability to contribute to a working theory of presumption for argumentation. Beginning with the Whatelian model, we consider its contemporary developments and alternatives, as proposed by Sidgwick, Kauffeld, Cronkhite, Rescher, Walton, Freeman, Ullmann-Margalit, and Hansen. Based on these accounts, we present a picture of presumptions characterized by their nature, function, foundation and force. On our account, presumption is a modal status that is attached to a claim and has the (...) effect of shifting, in a dialogue, a burden of proof set at a local level. Presumptions can be analysed and evaluated inferentially as components of rule-based structures. Presumptions are defeasible, and the force of a presumption is a function of its normative foundation. This picture seeks to provide a framework to guide the development of specific theories of presumption. (shrink)