En el libro V de la República Platón intenta distinguir a los verdaderos filósofos de un grupo de personajes que son solo parecidos a los filósofos, pero que en realidad no lo son. Platón utiliza diferentes términos para referirse a estos pseudo-filósofos pero el más recurrente es el de philotheámones (φιλοθεάμονες). Los estudiosos de Platón han tenido muy diversas interpretaciones sobre la identidad de estos personajes. En este trabajo defiendo que dentro del grupo en cuestión están los sofistas, una interpretación (...) cuya intuición principal fue defendida por Vegetti (2000) pero criticada recientemente por Meinwald (2017). Aquí ofrezco tanto razones textuales como filosóficas y contextuales a favor de esta interpretación. (shrink)

En este artículo examino el tratamiento escéptico que Quine hace de la necesidad proposicional (de dicto) y no-proposicional (de re) a través de su teoría de tres grados de compromiso modal. Argumento que, a pesar de poseer diversos aspectos valiosos, sufre de varias limitaciones importantes que lo ..

Some philosophers think that anti-realism about de re necessity entails anti-realism about the individuation and identity of objects. In this paper I address one argument for this view, due to Sidelle, according to which the only way in which a de re modal conventionalist can avoid being refuted by a well-known argument based on the contingency of conventions is by also accepting conventionalism about objects. I show that Sidelle’s argument is not successful and, in this way, I also show that (...) the combination of de re modal anti-realism and realism about objects is at least not threatened from this direction. (shrink)

Hacia el final del Protágoras, Sócrates y Protágoras disputan sobre si la valentía y el conocimiento (o sabiduría) son lo mismo. El primer argumento que Sócrates emplea para mostrarlo, y la respuesta de Protágoras, han sido objeto de mucha discusión y desacuerdo entre los especialistas (349e1-351b2). Me parece que ninguna de las interpretaciones disponibles de este debate es completamente satisfactoria, pues éstas tienden a favorecer exclusivamente a Sócrates o a Protágoras. En este trabajo presento una interpretación nueva, más equilibrada y (...) completa, según la cual, tanto el argumento de Sócrates como la respuesta de Protágoras son razonables y válidos en el contexto del diálogo, y ambos consiguen, hasta cierto punto, su objetivo. (shrink)

En Metafísica M.2 Aristóteles desarrolla diversas objeciones en contra de la introducción platónica de objetos matemáticos como substancias no-sensibles, separadas de las sensibles. Su primera objeción es de carácter doble. En primer lugar, Aristóteles argumenta que la postulación de objetos geométricos separados produce una acumulación absurda. En segundo lugar, sugiere que este argumento geométrico se puede extender al caso de las unidades y los números. En este trabajo me ocupo de explicar esta extensión aritmética. Los especialistas han interpretado esta extensión (...) de una manera que denomino “maximalista”. Aquí defiendo una interpretación distinta, “minimalista”. (shrink)

I discuss Aristotle’s opening argument against Platonic Forms in _Metaphysics_ A.9, ‘the Razor’, which criticizes the introduction of Forms on the basis of an analogy with a hypothetical case of counting things. I argue for a new interpretation of this argument, and show that it involves two interesting objections against the introduction of Forms as formal causes: one concerns the completeness and the other the adequacy of such an explanatory project.

The argument from thinking in Aristotle’s On Ideas deals with the problem of ‘presence in absence’. It argues that, to solve it, one must posit Forms. Scholars claim that Aristotle takes the argument as valid either for Forms or for his own universals. I argue against both alternatives, for Aristotle thinks that the problem that motivates the argument does not require a metaphysical solution, but only a psychological solution.

En este trabajo realizo un examen crítico del reciente libro de Silvana Gabriela Di Camillo sobre la crítica de Aristóteles a la teoría platónica de las Ideas. El libro de Di Camillo es un trabajo muy serio cuya lectura recomiendo ampliamente. Sin embargo, considero que cuatro de las principales tesis que la autora defiende tienen varias dificultades y mi objetivo aquí es presentar argumentos detallados en contra de ellas: la interpretación de la distinción entre argumentos más y menos rigurosos del (...) tratado Sobre las Ideas; la tesis de que la separación es el blanco esencial de las críticas aristotélicas a las Ideas; la interpretación de las opciones que Platón tiene para responder al argumento del tercer hombre, y la tesis de que la separación de las Ideas debe entenderse como homonimia. In this paper I examine Silvana Gabriela Di Camillo's recent book on Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's theory of Ideas. Di Camillo's book is a very serious work that I highly recommend. Nevertheless, I consider that four of the main theses that the author defends face several difficulties and my aim here is to offer detailed arguments against them: the interpretation of the distinction between more and less accurate arguments of the treatise On Ideas; the thesis that separation is the essential target of Aristotle's criticisms against Plato's Ideas; the interpretation of the options available to Plato to reply to the third man argument; and the thesis that the separation of Ideas should be understood as homonymy. (shrink)

Republic 596a introduces a One over Many principle that has traditionally been considered as an argument for the existence of Forms, according to which, one Form should be posited for each like-named plurality. This interpretation was challenged by (Smith, J. A. 1917. “General Relative Clauses in Greek.” Classical Review 31: 69–71.), who interpreted it rather as a statement that each Form is unique and correlated to a plurality of things that have the same name as it. (Sedley, D. 2013. “Plato (...) and the One-over-Many Principle”, in Chiaradonna & Galluzzo 2013, 113–37.) has offered a forceful defence of Smith’s interpretation. I argue that Sedley’s defence fails and that the traditional interpretation should be preferred. (shrink)

In the first argument of Metaphysics Μ.2 against the Platonist introduction of separate mathematical objects, Aristotle purports to show that positing separate geometrical objects to explain geometrical facts generates an ‘absurd accumulation’ of geometrical objects. Interpretations of the argument have varied widely. I distinguish between two types of interpretation, corrective and non-corrective interpretations. Here I defend a new, and more systematic, non-corrective interpretation that takes the argument as a serious and very interesting challenge to the Platonist.

Aristotle formulates in _Metaphysics_ M.9 an aporia about Forms, according to which, those who introduce Forms make them universal substances and, at the same time, separate entities and, hence, particulars. But, he claims, it is not possible that both attributes, being a universal and being a particular, inhere in the same thing. The interpretation that scholars have offered of this objection is external, in that they hold that it derives from Aristotle’s own conception of separation: only what is particular is (...) separate. Here I defend an internal interpretation which claims that the objection derives from an assumption about the explanatory role of Forms that Aristotle attributes to the Platonists. (shrink)

En este trabajo examino la “elección imposible” que Sócrates le plantea a Teeteto y que parece consistir en elegir entre: aceptar (a) que el juicio falso es imposible, o (b) que es posible conocer y no conocer el mismo objeto (Teeteto 196c7-d2). De acuerdo con la interpretación tradicional de esta elección, Sócrates afirma que es necesario aceptar una de las dos opciones: (b). En consecuencia, Sócrates desarrollaría el Aviario como un modelo de explicación del error en el que es posible (...) conocer y no conocer lo mismo. Aquí argumento en contra de esta lectura. Según mi interpretación, lo que dice Sócrates es que se deben rechazar los dos términos de la “elección imposible”, (a) y (b), y, por ende, el Aviario presenta un modelo en el que el juicio falso es posible sin tener que aceptar que es posible conocer y no conocer lo mismo. (shrink)

Aristóteles parece negar el estatuto ontológico de los artefactos que no serían sustancias. Se analizan los textos básicos al respecto y sus principales interpretaciones. Se discute la opinión de R. Katayama, para mostrar que acierta en remarcar la importancia de la separabilidad de los compuestos, pero se equivoca en la noción de separación. Se sostiene que las formas no son separables de sus compuestos tanto naturales como artefactos, pero los primeros poseen un tipo de separación de otras formas o especies (...) que no poseen los segundos y, por ello, son substancias. Aristotle seems to deny the ontological status of artifacts which are not substances. In this paper I discuss the basic regarding this topic and its main intepretations. I discuss R. Katayama's opinion to show that he is right to underline the importance of the trait of separation, but he is wrong regarding the the notion of separation. My thesis is that neither the forms of natural things nor those of artifacts are separable from the composites, but the former possess a different kind of separation from other forms or species, which the latter do not possess. Hence, the former are substances. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Crispin Wright's modal anti-realism as based on the availability of a certain attitude of Caution towards judgements of necessity. I think that Wright's account should be attractive in several ways for modal theorists with an anti-realist bend. However, the attitude of Caution to which it appeals has attracted some controversy. Wright himself has later come to doubt whether Caution is ultimately coherent. Here I first address Wright's worries concerning the coherence of Caution and show that (...) they are unfounded. But then I argue that although the attitude of Caution is coherent, it cannot provide a suitable basis for a non-eliminativist account of necessity. I offer two different objections against Caution. I argue that Wright's appeal to Caution, if successful, would show not only that modal judgement is non-objective but also that it is dispensable. Thus, I claim that appeal to Caution would seem to serve more as a threat against a non-eliminativist account of necessity, rather than as a potential adequate basis for it. However, I argue that Wright's appeal to Caution is unsuccessful, for there is no genuine Caution: Caution is a mere verbal attitude. (shrink)

We outline a theory of the cognitive role of belief in absolute necessity that is normative and intended to be metaphysically neutral. We take this theory to be unique in scope since it addresses simultaneously the questions of how such belief is (properly) acquired and of how it is (properly) manifest. The acquisition and manifestation conditions for belief in absolute necessity are given univocally, in terms of complex higher-order attitudes involving two distinct kinds of supposition (A-supposing and C-supposing). It is (...) subsequently argued that the proposed acquisition and manifestation conditions are rationally interdependent, and that such harmony affords explanations of connections between different facets of belief in necessity that otherwise remain mysterious. (shrink)

Under what conditions would it be paradoxical to consider the possibility of false judgment? Here we claim that in the initial puzzle of Theaetetus 187e5–188c9, where Plato investigates the question of what could psychologically cause a false judgment, the paradoxical nature of this question derives from certain constraints and restrictions about causal explanation, in particular, from the metaphysical principle that opposites cannot cause opposites. Contrary to all previous interpretations, this metaphysical approach does not attribute to Plato any controversial epistemological assumptions (...) and fits better with the text and its role within the dialectic of the dialogue. (shrink)

El consumo de energía y el crecimiento económico han llevado a la degradación del medio ambiente. Las centrales eléctricas son una de las principales fuentes de contaminación. Existe una necesidad de utilizar energías renovables para reducir el impacto ambiental. Sin embargo, en los países en desarrollo, la falta de recursos económicos limita la adopción de energías limpias. Las energías limpias, como la solar, eólica, hidroeléctrica y geotérmica, son fuentes sostenibles de energía. La energía hidroeléctrica puede ser controvertida debido a sus (...) impactos ambientales y sociales. La biomasa y el biogás también son fuentes de energía renovable. La eficiencia energética es otra área importante para reducir la dependencia de los recursos no renovables. El artículo discute la importancia de las energías limpias y el desarrollo sostenible en el Perú. Se menciona el potencial de la energía de las olas marinas, el bioetanol y el biodiesel como fuentes de energía renovable. También se abordan los impactos ambientales de los "negocios sucios" y las implicaciones socioeconómicas de las energías limpias. Se discuten los conflictos de interés y la regulación normativa en el país, así como las perspectivas futuras y la necesidad de un desarrollo energético estable y sostenible. Palabras clave: Energías limpias, negocios sucios, impacto ambiental, sostenibilidad. (shrink)

La educación tradicional concebida en compartimientos estancos que coquetean en torno al árbol de la ciencia, ha formado a un individuo descontextualizado, sin capacidad de respuesta para enfrentar la complejidad del mundo actual. La Multiversidad Mundo Real “Edgar Morin” asume la misión de una enseñanza educativa basada en los postulados del Pensamiento Complejo de Edgar Morin; pero aún quedan pendientes nuevas definiciones que rompan con los esquemas de la educación basada en el paradigma simplificador. La meta es emprender (...) el gran viraje que haga posible que la reforma paradigmática implique también una reforma de las mentes y del lenguaje, porque nombrar lo nuevo con la palabra vieja dificulta a nivel inconsciente detonar el cambio. Superar los bloqueos propios y los adquiridos por la educación que nos ha conducido a ser individuos desarticulados del contexto, ese es el gran reto de la Multiversidad. (shrink)

This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature on normative cognition by providing a lineage explanation of human social norm psychology. This approach builds upon theories of goal-directed behavioral control in the reinforcement learning and control literature, arguing that this form of control defines an important class of intentional normative mental states that are instrumental in nature. I defend the view that great ape capacities for instrumental reasoning and our capacity (or family of capacities) for shared intentionality coadapted to (...) each other and argue that the evolution of this capacity has allowed the representation of social norms and the emergence of our capacity for normative guidance. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 1, Page 148-168, March 2022.

In this essay I explore the relationship of sport to art. I do not intend to argue that sport is one of the arts. I will rather argue that sport and art have a commonality, in that both are alienated philosophy. This is to propose – in an argument that has its roots in Hegel's aesthetics – that sport and art may both be interpreted as a way of reflecting upon metaphysical and normative issues, albeit in media that are alien (...) to philosophy's conceptual language. The medium of art is the manipulation of sensuous materials, such as stone, paint, or sound. The medium of sport is the pursuit of a physical challenge, at which the athlete may fail. I will develop this argument by borrowing from the philosophy of art of Arthur C. Danto. In particular, I will suggest that a parallel to his concept of ‘artworld’ can be seen in a ‘sportworld’. As the artworld is an ‘atmosphere of theory’ and a ‘knowledge of history’ through which an event is interpreted and thereby constituted as art, so a sportworld is the atmosphere of theory through which an event is constituted as sport. I will argue that much of the existing discussion of the relationship between sport and art is grounded in an ill-conceived aesthetics. In order to be appreciated and appropriately interpreted, sport must be understood within a modernist aesthetics and hermeneutics. As such, the core issue of an aesthetics of sport is not that of beauty, but rather of the meaning of the sport, and what I shall call the capacity of sport to ‘speak as a world’ – to bring to consciousness through play the taken-for-granted cultural conditions through which our social lives are constituted, and within which metaphysical and normative problems are articulated. I will propose that the hermeneutics of music provides a useful model for the interpretation of sport. (shrink)

Imaginary worlds are extremely successful. The most popular fictions produced in the last few decades contain such a fictional world. They can be found in all fictional media, from novels (e.g., Lord of The Rings and Harry Potter) to films (e.g., Star Wars and Avatar), video games (e.g., The Legend of Zelda and Final Fantasy), graphic novels (e.g., One Piece and Naruto), and TV series (e.g., Star Trek and Game of Thrones), and they date as far back as ancient literature (...) (e.g., the Cyclops Islands in The Odyssey, 850 BCE). Why such a success? Why so much attention devoted to non-existent worlds? In this paper, we propose that imaginary worlds co-opt our preferences for exploration, which have evolved in humans and nonhuman animals alike, to propel individuals toward new environments and new sources of reward. Humans would find imaginary worlds very attractive for the very same reasons, and under the same circumstances, as they are lured by unfamiliar environments in real life. After reviewing research on exploratory preferences in behavioral ecology, environmental esthetics, neuroscience, and evolutionary and developmental psychology, we focus on the sources of their variability across time and space, which we argue can account for the variability of the cultural preference for imaginary worlds. This hypothesis can, therefore, explain the way imaginary worlds evolved culturally, their shape and content, their recent striking success, and their distribution across time and populations. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza ciertas interpretaciones del célebre comentario de Wittgenstein a Drury, sin duda relevantes para comprender el sentido de la filosofía del pensador vienés en su último periodo, según el cual él mismo, sin ser una persona religiosa, no podía evitar contemplar todas las cuestiones desde una perspectiva religiosa. Los pasos para identificar la razón por la que se puede afirmar que la inmunización de la forma de vida religiosa constituye el sentido último de la filosofía concebida como análisis (...) de los juegos de lenguaje serán, en primer lugar, poner en relación el valor supremo de la claridad con la crítica de la actitud explicativa característica de la filosofía convencional y, en segundo término, considerar el análisis del discurso religioso y la peculiar religiosidad del propio Wittgenstein. This paper explores some of the issues related to Wittgenstein's famous comment to Drury -that he himself, while not a religious person, could not avoid contemplating all questions from a religious perspective- that might contribute to an understanding of the final meaning of the philosophical practice distinctive of Wittgenstein's last period. This paper aims at showing that final meaning is the immunization of the religious form of the life. In order to reach this conclusion we will first recall the importance of clarity as an absolute goal of Wittgenstein's philosophy, and see how it is connected to a specific attitude toward the explanatory claims of conventional philosophy. Then we will summarize the essence of Wittgenstein's philosophical analysis of religious discourse and review some crucial texts that highlight the peculiar religiosity unique to Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Resumen El objetivo de este trabajo es determinar la relevancia de la teoría informacional del conocimiento para el problema de la suerte epistémica. Argumento que el clásico enfoque de Dretske es equivalente a la condición de seguridad de Pritchard. Sin embargo, considero que esta manera de eludir la suerte epistémica exige lidiar con el llamado "problema de la generalidad". Argumento que una respuesta a este problema requiere una noción de seguridad diferente y propongo un enfoque informacional equivalente a esta versión (...) del requisito. Concluyo que este enfoque es preferible a la condición de seguridad propuesta porque desvela relaciones conceptuales entre los elementos que constituyen el conocimiento.The aim of this paper is to determine the relevance of an informational theory of knowledge to address recently discussed epistemic problems. I argue that Dretske's classical approach is equivalent to the safety condition proposed by Pritchard to avoid epistemic luck. However, I claim that Pritchard's condition has to be modified to avoid the so-called "generality problem" for reliabilism. I propose an alternative version of the requirement to deal with these problems and provide an equivalent informational condition. I conclude that this informational version is preferable since it reveals conceptual relationships between the constituents of knowledge. (shrink)

DOI: 10.5294/PEBI.2015.19.2.11 La Fundación Colombiana de Ética y Bioética FUCEB, agradece a todos los que han hecho posible su participación en esta audiencia y elogia que se haya facilitado una legítima expresión del pueblo sobre el tema de la eutanasia.

Mary Gentile’s Giving Voice to Values presents an approach to ethics training based on the idea that most people would like to provide input in times of ethical conflict using their own values. She maintains that people recognize the lapses in organizational ethical judgment and behavior, but they do not have the courage to step up and voice their values to prevent the misconduct. Gentile has developed a successful initiative and following based on encouraging students and employees to learn how (...) to engage in communication or action to express their values within an organization’s formal and informal value system. The purpose of this analysis is to examine the Giving Voice to Values approach to empowering the individual to take action to deal with lapses in organizational ethics. We examine the role of Giving Voice to Values in business ethics education, considerations for implementing GVV, and recommendations for business educators and corporate ethics officers. We conclude that while GVV is an effective tool, it is not a comprehensive or holistic approach to ethics education and organizational ethics programs. (shrink)

In the Winter semester of 1925/26 Heidegger gave what appears to have been his first seminar on Hegel. Still unpublished in any form, this neglected seminar is of extraordinary importance, and not only for the in-depth and critical reading it pursues of Hegel’s Logic I, a critique that charges Hegel with not knowing how or where to begin. The seminar is also important for its attempt to demonstrate that Hegel’s philosophy was thoroughly Greek. In the class of 25 November 1925, (...) Heidegger is reported to have said: “Therefore am I in the habit of saying that Hegel is the most radical Greek there ever was. With the means that were pre-formed in Greek ontology as if in a seed, the means that lay at the roots of Greek ontology, Hegel mastered something (roughly speaking: spirit, history) that in this form was never experienced by the Greeks. This is only asserted here. Proof of this thesis is naturally very difficult.” Heidegger therefore turns towards the end of the seminar to Aristotle’s account of time in the Physics to show that both this understanding of time and the conception of being it presupposes are also Hegel’s. Yet Heidegger entrusts the initial presentation of Aristotle’s conception of time to a student whose reading is at odds with his own, so much so that Heidegger accuses the student of turning everything on its head. The student’s name is H.-G. Gadamer. (shrink)

La “Navidad Negra” de 1822, en San Juan de Pasto, es un sangriento y oscuro episodio de la historia de la guerra independencia de Colombia que tiñe de deliberada crueldad la mítica figura del _Libertador_, Simón Bolívar, construida como referente moral y político de las nacientes repúblicas andinas durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX. La _intolerable estética_ de la violencia desplegada por el ejército republicano en la Campaña del Sur contra sus propios compatriotas, incompatible con la ética de la (...) guerra defendida públicamente por el Libertador, ha sido negada y omitida por gran parte de la historiografía oficial. Este artículo analiza en profundidad la contradicción entre el juicio ético y el estético sobre la crueldad de la figura épica, cuando ésta aparece como irrefutable voluntad de sufrimiento del enemigo inerme, y el papel de la negación y el olvido como mecanismos de preservación de la función política del mito del héroe. (shrink)

This article analyzes the figure of Omar Khayyam by looking at his famous quatrains or rubayat,focusing on the reception and review of the Arab philosophies of his time, and the defense that he makes of Persian Archaic, Zoroastrian, Mazdean and Manichean culture and philosophy.

Sobre la base de la relación con los conceptos de existencia y realidad, el artículo analiza la teoría de los contenidosde- juicio de Anton Marty en tanto irrealia y truth-makers. Partiendo de su debate con el ‘psicologismo’ y el ‘a-psicologismo’, mostramos la originalidad y la tensión de su posición, que intenta de articular el contenido- de-juicio con la inmanencia del acto intencional y la trascendencia de la objetividad, a partir de los conceptos de co-percepción e intencionalidad.