This volume contains the invited lectures and a selection of the contributed papers and posters of the workshop on "Fluctuations and Sensitivity in Nonequil ibrium Systems", held at the Joe C. Thompson Conference Center, Un i vers ity of Texas at Austin, March 12-16, 1984. The workshop dealt with stochastic phenomena and sensi­ tivity in nonequilibrium systems from a macroscopic point of view. Durin9 the last few years it has been realized that the role of fluctuations is far less trivial (...) in systems far from equilibrium than in systems under thermodynamic equilibrium condi­ tions. It was found that random fluctuations often are a determining factor for the state adopted by macroscopic systems and cannot be regarded as secondary effects of minor importance. Further, nonequilibrium systems are also very sensitive to small systematic changes in their environment. The main aims of the workshop were: i) to provide scientists with an occasion to acquaint themselves with the state of the art in fluctuation theory and sensitivity analysis; ii) to provide a forum for the presentation of recent advances in theory and experiment; iii) to bring toge­ ther theoreticians and experimentalists in order to delineate the major open problems and to formulate strategies to tackle these problems. The organizing committee of the workshop consisted of W. Horsthemke, O. K. Konde­ pudi, G. Dewel, G. Nicolis, I. Prigogine and L. Reichl. (shrink)

This essay introduces a puzzle about the interaction between quantifiers and epistemic modals. The puzzle motivates the idea that whether an object satisfies an epistemically modalized predicate depends on the mode of presentation of the domain of quantification. I compare two ways of implementing this idea, one using counterpart theory, the other using Aloni's 'conceptual covers' theory, and then provides some evidence in favor of the former.

This essay argues for a 'relationist' treatment of intentional identity sentences like (1) "Hob believes that a witch blighted Bob's mare and Nob believes that she killed Cob's sow" (Geach 1967). According to relationism, facts of the form "a believes that p and b believes that q" are not in general reducible to facts of the form "c believes that r". We first argue that extant, non-relationist treatments of intentional identity are unsatisfactory, and then go on to motivate and explore (...) a relationist alternative in some detail. We show that the general thesis of relationism can be directly motivated via cases already discussed in the literature, and then develop a particular version of relationism couched in the possible worlds framework. The resulting theory avoids the problems facing its non-relationist rivals, and yields a natural account of the truth-conditions of (1), truth-conditions which can be generated in a compositional manner by a version of dynamic semantics. The theory also helps us to cleanly separate semantic questions about intentional identity from metasemantic ones. (shrink)

Williams's famous thought experiment in "The Self and the Future" supports the Simple View of personal identity over time.

Each of the three phrases-the revival of rhetoric, the new rhetoric, and the rhetorical turn-points to a rediscovery of rhetoric in contemporary thought. However, the scholarly work, motivation and commitments associated with each phrase invokes and puts into playa different notion of rhetoric. In this paper, I explore those differences with a view to showing how the "rhetorical turn," unlike the "revival of rhetoric" and the "new rhetoric," repositions rhetoric as a "metadiscipline." Thus, it signifies a radical shift in the (...) self-understanding of rhetoric. (shrink)

It is conventional to try to arrive at the Boltzmann principle and the Second Law starting with the laws of dynamics at the microscopic level. In this article the opposite view is presented: Starting with the Second Law, microscopic properties are derived. A classical result of Wien is developed into a general theorem, and the possibility of deriving the Boltzmann principle as a consequence of Carnot's theorem is discussed.

This short paper argues that interreligious and intra-religious harmony is a necessary condition for social harmony, peace and progress. It is an attempt to develop arguments in favour of the above thesis with special reference to the teachings of Buddha and Vivekananda. Buddha taught human beings to be rational, analytical and moral in way of life. Buddha, therefore, taught openness, interdependence and middle path. Vivekananda also argues for universal religion which is based on scientific, rational and compassionate human relations. He (...) considers that the service of human beings is the service of God. It seems to be a direct impact of the compassionate teachings of Buddha upon Vivekananda. Both of them have indirectly contributed to what is called today the philosophical doctrine of Religious Pluralism which rests on the principle of ‘live and let live’. Both of them were against all kinds of ‘dogmatism, fanaticism and bigotry’. The proposed form of religious harmony is one of the golden ways or middle paths today for addressing many global issues for social harmony, peace and progress. Philosophy and Progress, Vol#67-68; No#1-2; Jan-Dec 2020 P 1-14. (shrink)

Simple taste predications come with an acquaintance requirement: they require the speaker to have had a certain kind of first-hand experience with the object of predication. For example, if I tell you that the creme caramel is delicious, you would ordinarily assume that I have actually tasted the creme caramel and am not simply relying on the testimony of others. The present essay argues in favor of a 'lightweight' expressivist account of the acquaintance requirement. This account consists of a recursive (...) semantics and an account of assertion; it is compatible with a number of different accounts of truth and content, including contextualism, relativism, and purer forms of expressivism. The principal argument in favor of this account is that it correctly predicts a wide range of data concerning how the acquaintance requirement interacts with Boolean connectives, generalized quantifiers, epistemic modals, and attitude verbs. (shrink)

This essay uses a puzzle about assertion and time to explore the pragmatics, semantics, and epistemology of future discourse. The puzzle concerns cases in which a subject is in a position to say, at an initial time t, that it will be that ϕ, but is not in a position to say, at a later time t′, that it is or was that ϕ, despite not losing or gaining any relevant evidence between t and t′. We consider a number of (...) approaches to the puzzle and defend the view that subjects in these cases lose knowledge simply by moving through time. (shrink)

This paper concerns two points of intersection between de se attitudes and the study of natural language: attitude ascription and communication. I first survey some recent work on the semantics of de se attitude ascriptions, with particular attention to ascriptions that are true only if the subject of the ascription has the appropriate de se attitude. I then examine – and attempt to solve – some problems concerning the role of de se attitudes in linguistic communication.

This paper is about the relationship between two questions: the question of what the objects of assertion are and the question of how best to theorise about ‘shifty’ phenomena like modality and tense. I argue that the relationship between these two questions is less direct than is often supposed. I then explore the consequences of this for a number of debates in the philosophy of language.

I argue that de se attitudes pose a special problem for philosophical theories of attitudes. Attitude contents are supposed to play a role in characterizing agreement and are also supposed to play a role in the explanation of action. De se attitudes reveal that no single type of object can play both roles.

Counterfactual attitudes like imagining, dreaming, and wishing create a problem for the standard formal semantic theory of de re attitude ascriptions. I show how the problem can be avoided if we represent an agent's attitudinal possibilities using "multi-centered worlds", possible worlds with multiple distinguished individuals, each of which represents an individual with whom the agent is acquainted. I then present a compositional semantics for de re ascriptions according to which singular terms are "assignment-sensitive" expressions and attitude verbs are "assignment shifters".

This essay surveys some of the literature on "imagining oneself to be another," and offers a theory of the content of such imaginings.

This essay examines the case for relativism about future contingents in light of a distinction between two ways of interpreting the ‘branching time’ framework. Focussing on MacFarlane (2014), we break the argument for relativism down into two steps. The first step is an argument for something MacFarlane calls the "Non-Determination Thesis", which is essentially the view that there is no unique actual future. The second step is an argument from the Non-Determination Thesis to relativism. I first argue that first step (...) of this argument fails. But despite that result, the second step is still of interest, since many philosophers have maintained something like the Non-Determination Thesis on alternative grounds. I then argue that whether the second step of the argument suc- ceeds depends on how the Non-Determination Thesis is motivated, and how the ‘branching time’ framework is interpreted in light of that moti- vation. If the branches in an intended branching time model are ersatz possible worlds, then the argument for relativism might go through; but if, instead, the branches are concrete parts of a ‘branching multiverse’, then the argument for relativism turns out to make implausible assumptions about the nature of personal identity over time. That argument can thus be rejected by rejecting those assumptions. One upshot of this is that the case for relativism about future contingents is much weaker than has been appreciated; a broader lesson is that philosophers who invoke the branching time framework need to pay close attention to different ways of interpreting it. (shrink)

Razão e Devoção no Advaita Vedānta: Madhusūdana Sarasvatī e o Bhagavad Gītā 1 Resumo: O artigo tem por objetivo empreender a análise dos princípios constitutivos da práxis devocional proposta pelo Bhagavad Gītā, segundo a interpretação do filósofo Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Excelso representante do Advaita Vedānta, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī buscou incorporar as práticas devocionais à epistemologia tradicional da escola, centrada num exercício radical de reflexão racional, em sintonia com os ensinamentos do filósofo fundador Śaṅkarācārya. Devoto inarredável de Kṛṣṇa, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī cumpriu sua tarefa (...) filosófica em meio a uma interlocução fascinante com a escola Acintyabhedābheda Vedānta, fundada por Caitanya Mahāprabhu, de orientação predominantemente devocionalista vaiṣṇava.Palavras-chave: Devoção. Bhakti. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Bhagavad Gītā. Vedānta. Reason and Devotion in Advaita Vedānta: Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and the Bhagavad Gītā: The article aims to undertake the analysis of the constitutive principles of devotional praxis proposed by the Bhagavad Gītā, in accordance with philosopher Madhusūdana Sarasvatī’s interpretation. A great representative of Advaita Vedānta, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī sought to incorporate devotional practices into the school’s traditional epistemology, centered around a radical exercise of rational reflection, in line with the teachings of philosopher and founder Śaṅkarācārya. A great devotee of Kṛṣṇa, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī fulfilled his philosophical task in the midst of a fascinating dialogue with the school Acintyabhedābheda Vedānta, founded by Caitanya Mahāprabhu, of a predominant vaiṣṇava devotionalist orientation. Key-words: Devotion. Bhakti. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Bhagavad Gītā. Vedānta. Raison et Dévotion dans Advaita Vedānta: Madhusūdana Sarasvatī et la Bhagavad Gītā Résumé: L'article vise à entreprendre l'analyse des principes constitutifs de la praxis dévotionnelle proposée par le Bhagavad Gītā, selon l'interprétation du philosophe Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Représentant notable d'Advaita Vedānta, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī a cherché à incorporer les pratiques de dévotion dans l'épistémologie traditionnelle de son école, centrée sur un exercice radical de réflexion rationnelle, conformément aux enseignements du philosophe fondateur Śaṅkarācārya. Un ardent dévot de Kṛṣṇa, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī a accompli sa tâche philosophique au milieu d'un dialogue fascinant avec l'école Acintyabhedābheda Vedānta, fondée par Caitanya Mahāprabhu, et dont l’ orientation est principalement dévotionnelle vaiṣṇava. Mots clés: Dévotion. Bhakti. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Bhagavad Gītā. Vedānta. Data de registro: 30/07/2020 Data de aceite: 21/10/2020 1 As palavras transliteradas do sânscrito seguem as normas do International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration. Todas as traduções de originais em sânscritos foram feitas pelo autor. (shrink)

We present a survey of some results and problems concerning constructions which require a diagonalization of length continuum to be carried out, particularly constructions of almost disjoint families of various sorts. We emphasize the role of cardinal invariants of the continuum and their combinatorial characterizations in such constructions.

We answer a question of Cummings and Magidor by proving that the P-ideal dichotomy of Todorčević refutes ${\square}_{\kappa, \omega}$ for any uncountable $\kappa$. We also show that the P-ideal dichotomy implies the failure of ${\square}_{\kappa, < \mathfrak{b}}$ provided that $cf(\kappa) > {\omega}_{1}$.

Simple sentences containing predicates like "tasty" and "beautiful" typically suggest that the speaker has first-hand knowledge of the item being evaluated. I consider two explanations of this acquaintance inference: a presuppositional approach and a pragmatic-epistemic approach. The presuppositional approach has a number of virtues, but runs into trouble because the acquaintance inference has a very different projection pattern from that of standard presuppositions. The pragmatic-epistemic approach accounts for the main data discussed in the paper, but faces challenges of its own.

Utterances of simple sentences containing taste predicates (e.g. "delicious", "fun", "frightening") typically imply that the speaker has had a particular sort of first-hand experience with the object of predication. For example, an utterance of "The carrot cake is delicious" would typically imply that the speaker had actually tasted the cake in question, and is not, for example, merely basing her judgment on the testimony of others. According to one approach, this acquaintance inference is essentially an implicature, one generated by the (...) Maxim of Quality together with a certain principle concerning the epistemology of taste (Ninan 2014). We first discuss some problems for this approach that arise in connection with disjunction and generalized quantifiers. Then, after stating a conjecture concerning which operators ‘obviate’ the acquaintance inference and which do not, we build on Anand & Korotkova (2018) and Willer & Kennedy (Forthcoming) by developing a theory that treats the acquaintance requirement as a presupposition, albeit one that can be obviated by certain operators. (shrink)

According to one tradition in the philosophy of language and mind, the content of a psychological attitude can be characterized by a set of possibilities. On the classic version of this account, advocated by Hintikka (1962) and Stalnaker (1984) among others, the possibilities in question are possible worlds, ways the universe might be. Lewis (1979, 1983a) proposed an alternative to this account, according to which the possibilities in question are possible individuals or centered worlds, ways an individual might be. The (...) motivation for the centered worlds theory has primarily to do with self-locating – or de se – attitudes. The focus of this paper is on the less-discussed question of how other-locating – or de re – attitudes ought to be treated within this framework. Most advocates of what we might call the modal approach to attitudes, Stalnaker and Lewis included, offer some kind of descriptivist solution to the well-known problems that other-locating attitudes raise. There are intramural differences between Stalnaker, Lewis, and other modal theorists (e.g. two-dimensionalists) on a number of issues: on the precise nature of the descriptivism involved, how attitude content relates to the asserted content of the sentences we utter, and on the proper semantic treatment of attitude reports. I pass over these differences to focus on a problem common to these various approaches: all face a problem when it comes to characterizing the contents of counterfactual attitudes like imagining, dreaming, and wishing. (shrink)

The standard account of modal expressions in natural language analyzes them as quantifiers over a set of possible worlds determined by the evaluation world and an accessibility relation. A number of authors have recently argued for an alternative account according to which modals are analyzed as quantifying over a domain of possible worlds that is specified directly in the points of evaluation. But the new approach only handles the data motivating it if it is supplemented with a non-standard account of (...) attitude verbs and conditionals. It can be shown the the relational account handles the same data equally well if it too is supplemented with a non-standard account of such expressions. (shrink)

A discussion of Imogen Dickie's book "Fixing Reference.".

The deontic modal must has two surprising properties: an assertion of must p does not permit a denial of p, and must does not take past tense complements. I first consider an explanation of these phenomena that stays within Angelika Kratzer’s semantic framework for modals, and then offer some reasons for rejecting that explanation. I then propose an alternative account, according to which simple must sentences have the force of an imperative.

When one considers one's own persistence over time from the first-person perspective, it seems as if facts about one's persistence are "further facts," over and above facts about physical and psychological continuity. But the idea that facts about one's persistence are further facts is objectionable on independent theoretical grounds: it conflicts with physicalism and requires us to posit hidden facts about our persistence. This essay shows how to resolve this conflict using the idea that imagining from the first-person point of (...) view is a guide to centered possibility, a type of possibility analyzed in terms of centered worlds. (shrink)

Kripke (1980) hypothesizes a link between rigidity and scope: a singular term is rigid over a space S of possibilities just in case it is scopeless with respect to modals that quantify over S. Kripke’s hypothesis works well when we consider the interaction of singular terms with metaphysical modals, but runs into trouble when we consider the interaction of singular terms with epistemic modals. After describing the trouble in detail, and considering one non-solution to it, I develop a novel version (...) of dynamic semantics that resolves the problem. (shrink)

Jeffrey King has recently argued: (i) that the semantic value of a sentence at a context is (or determines) a function from possible worlds to truth values, and (ii) that this undermines Jason Stanley's argument against the rigidity thesis, the claim that no rigid term has the same content as a non-rigid term. I show that King's main argument for (i) fails, and that Stanley's argument is consistent with the claim that the semantic value of a sentence at a context (...) is (or determines) a function from worlds to truth values. (shrink)

The distinct function of ātmanepada in Sanskrit language remains a sort of linguist mystery in Sanskrit studies. In this article, I analyze the larger implications and subliminal meaning of ātmanepada by moving beyond the realm of linguistics, which has been the dominant approach, and entering the territory of philosophy and, more specifically, the purportful approach of traditional Indian philosophy of language represented by Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya. Bhartṛhari’s analytical procedure seeks to unveil the ontological interdependence that binds together the constituent elements of (...) linguistic sentences, understood as modal appearances of the ever present foundational ground of the world/word—Brahman as Vāc. This is our referential guide to the semantic reconstruction of ātmanepada’s teleology. (shrink)

In his book Mental Files , Francois Recanati develops a theory of mind and language based on the idea that Fregean senses should be identified with ‘mental files’, mental representations whose primary function is to store information about objects. I discuss three aspects of Recanati’s book. The first concerns his use of acquaintance relations in individuating mental files, and what this means for ‘file dynamics’. The second concerns his comments on a theory that I have elsewhere advocated, the ‘sequenced worlds’ (...) or ‘multi-centered worlds’ theory. The third concerns how the mental file approach handles non-doxastic attitudes like imagining. (shrink)

Contributed research papers chiefly on Indic philosophy.

It is proved to be consistent relative to a measurable cardinal that there is a uniform ultrafilter on the real numbers which is generated by fewer than the maximum possible number of sets. It is also shown to be consistent relative to a supercompact cardinal that there is a uniform ultrafilter on \ which is generated by fewer than \ sets.

We are drowning in information, while starving for wisdom.Are the smartest people also the wisest? Not necessarily. While traditional intellectual reasoning and procedural knowledge have helped build the communities we live in, there is a growing scientific understanding that we need emotionally balanced and better-fitting prosocial frameworks for coping with the uncertainties and complexities of life and addressing new challenges of the modern world. We are now poised on the edge of a new science of wisdom.The concept of wisdom, long (...) considered the “pinnacle of insight into the human condition”, has been that of an intangible, subjective, culturally specific entity—an unscientific... (shrink)

In this paper we describe the nature and problems of business and define one aspect of the business environment. We then propose a framework based on augmented soft systems methodology and object technology that captures both the soft and hard aspects of a business environment within the context of organisational culture. We also briefly discuss cognitive informatics and its relevance to understanding problems and solutions. Pólya's work, which is based around solving mathematical problems, is considered within the context of information (...) systems development. We propose a generic reusable business object model based on general systems theory. We also show how these approaches can be integrated to provide a strategy for understanding business problems and developing integrated solutions. (shrink)

In this paper we shall try to understand what it is to beg the question, and since begging the question is generally believed to be linked with circularity, we shall also explore this relationship. Finally, we shall consider whether certain forms of valid argument can go through smoothly in anepistemio context without begging the question. We shall consider, especially, the claims of the disjunctive syllogism in this regard.