This article explored the role of personality disposition and value preference as predictors of social well-being in the context of ecological setting. Ecological contexts like rural and urban are critical, particularly in a developing country like India, because they represent significant disparities and variations in the lived experiences of the people. The participants ( n = 360) from the age range of 15–65 years (M = 33.50, SD = 11.99) were drawn from two ecological settings, that is, rural (Gorakhpur Region, (...) Eastern Uttar Pradesh, India) and urban (National Capital Region of Delhi, India) and from both the genders. They completed the measures of social well-being, value preference and personality dispositions. The results showed that the different facets of social well-being were differentially related to the aspects of personality and value preference. Ecological setting had significant influence on the measures of personality disposition, value preference and social well-being. Regression analysis showed that except neuroticism, all other factors of personality had consistent positive contribution as the predictors of social well-being. It was also observed that social value and growth factors of value preference had significant contribution, whereas personal value and protection—factors of value preference—had negative contribution as the predictors of social well-being. (shrink)

In the past few decades, there has been a growing literature on relational egalitarianism. Relational egalitarianism is a view on the nature and value of equality. In contrast to the dominant view in recent debates on equality—distributive egalitarianism, on which equality is about ensuring people have or fare the same in some respect—on the relational view, equality is a matter of the terms on which relationships are structured. But what exactly does it mean for people to relate as equals? And (...) why are relations of equality valuable? Relational egalitarians have offered quite different answers to each of these questions. In this article, I draw attention to some key issues that underlie these disagree- ments, and I offer a taxonomy of different viewpoints that have emerged in the recent literature on these matters. (shrink)

Posthumanism is one of the well-known and significant concepts in the present day. It impacted numerous contemporary fields like philosophy, literary theories, art, and culture for the last few decades. The movement has been concentrated around the technological development of present days due to industrial advancement in society and the current proliferated daily usage of technology. Posthumanism indicated a deconstruction of our radical conception of ‘human’, and it further shifts our societal value alignment system to a novel dimension. The majority (...) of our population is getting deeply involved in virtual reality in daily life. Sooner or later, we shall get a different conception of ‘biological human being’ through the advancement of artificial intelligence technology. If an automated artificial system could replace the human brain and repair any physical loss of our biological body, it will certainly become a journey towards immortality for scientists. However, we must analyze whether posthumanism will consider ‘hybrid human beings’ as moral agents, similar to biological humans. This is why, in the future, the relation between biological human beings and posthumans will play an active role in designing artificial moral agents. Whether the future posthumans would overpower biological humanity or both of them would work as peers to form a digital utopian society and create new dimensions of rationality is still a case of anticipation. Our aim in this paper is to critically analyze the authenticity of the posthuman cyborg as an agent, their relations with humans and the emergence of ‘AI ethics’. (shrink)

Although the connectionist approach has lead to elegant solutions to a number of problems in cognitive science and artificial intelligence, its suitability for dealing with problems in knowledge representation and inference has often been questioned. This paper partly answers this criticism by demonstrating that effective solutions to certain problems in knowledge representation and limited inference can be found by adopting a connectionist approach. The paper presents a connectionist realization of semantic networks, that is, it describes how knowledge about concepts, their (...) properties, and the hierarchical relationship between them may be encoded as an interpreter‐free massively parallel network of simple processing elements that can solve an interesting class of inheritance and recognition problems extremely fast—in time proportional to the depth of the conceptual hierarchy. The connectionist realization is based on an evidential formulation that leads to principled solutions to the problems of exceptions and conflicting multiple inheritance situations during inheritance, and the best‐match or partial‐match computation during recognition. The paper also identifies constraints that must be satisfied by the conceptual structure in order to arrive at an efficient parallel realization. (shrink)

Festschrift in honor of Damodhar Mahapatra Shastri, 1890-1975, Sanskritist; comprises research articles on Vedic literature, religion, and Sanskrit grammar.

The advent of the intelligent robot has occupied a significant position in society over the past decades and has given rise to new issues in society. As we know, the primary aim of artificial intelligence or robotic research is not only to develop advanced programs to solve our problems but also to reproduce mental qualities in machines. The critical claim of artificial intelligence advocates is that there is no distinction between mind and machines and thus they argue that there are (...) possibilities for machine ethics, just as human ethics. Unlike computer ethics, which has traditionally focused on ethical issues surrounding human use of machines, AI or machine ethics is concerned with the behaviour of machines towards human users and perhaps other machines as well, and the ethicality of these interactions. The ultimate goal of machine ethics, according to the AI scientists, is to create a machine that itself follows an ideal ethical principle or a set of principles; that is to say, it is guided by this principle or these principles in decisions it makes about possible courses of action it could takea. Thus, machine ethics task of ensuring ethical behaviour of an artificial agent. Although, there are many philosophical issues related to artificial intelligence, but our attempt in this paper is to discuss, first, whether ethics is the sort of thing that can be computed. Second, if we are ascribing mind to machines, it gives rise to ethical issues regarding machines. And if we are not drawing the difference between mind and machines, we are not only redefining specifically human mind but also the society as a whole. Having a mind is, among other things, having the capacity to make voluntary decisions and actions. The notion of mind is central to our ethical thinking, and this is because the human mind is self-conscious, and this is a property that machines lack, as yet. (shrink)

Fat stigma is pervasive. Being fat is widely regarded a bad thing, and fat persons suffer numerous social and material disadvantages in virtue of their weight being regarded that way. Despite the seriousness of this problem, it has received relatively little attention from analytic philosophers. In this paper, I set out to explore whether there is a reasoned basis for stigmatizing fatness, and, if so, what forms of stigmatization could be justified. I consider two lines of reasoning that might be (...) advanced to defend fat stigma. The first is broadly consequentialist. It seeks to justify stigmatizing fatness based on the public health benefits that might be produced by doing so. The second argument takes stigmatizing fatness to be a warranted response to the morally blameworthy failure to slim down exhibited by fat persons. Clarifying and assessing each of these two lines of reasoning is the main task of this paper. I argue that, upon careful examination, both these attempts to justify the stigmatization of fatness fail. (shrink)

Human agents draw a variety of inferences effortlessly, spontaneously, and with remarkable efficiency – as though these inferences were a reflexive response of their cognitive apparatus. Furthermore, these inferences are drawn with reference to a large body of background knowledge. This remarkable human ability seems paradoxical given the complexity of reasoning reported by researchers in artificial intelligence. It also poses a challenge for cognitive science and computational neuroscience: How can a system of simple and slow neuronlike elements represent a large (...) body of systemic knowledge and perform a range of inferences with such speed? We describe a computational model that takes a step toward addressing the cognitive science challenge and resolving the artificial intelligence paradox. We show how a connectionist network can encode millions of facts and rules involving n-ary predicates and variables and perform a class of inferences in a few hundred milliseconds. Efficient reasoning requires the rapid representation and propagation of dynamic bindings. Our model (which we refer to as SHRUTI) achieves this by representing (1) dynamic bindings as the synchronous firing of appropriate nodes, (2) rules as interconnection patterns that direct the propagation of rhythmic activity, and (3) long-term facts as temporal pattern-matching subnetworks. The model is consistent with recent neurophysiological evidence that synchronous activity occurs in the brain and may play a representational role in neural information processing. The model also makes specific psychologically significant predictions about the nature of reflexive reasoning. It identifies constraints on the form of rules that may participate in such reasoning and relates the capacity of the working memory underlying reflexive reasoning to biological parameters such as the lowest frequency at which nodes can sustain synchronous oscillations and the coarseness of synchronization. (shrink)

On the problems of epistemology as depicted in the Jaina canonical literature; a study.

In this paper, I would like to examine Nāgārjuna’s idea of the self and its contemporaneity interpretations in philosophy. As we know, Nāgārjuna examines the emptiness of various things in which the emptiness of the self occupies an important position in the Buddhist philosophical tradition. The main aim of this paper is to understand the meaning of emptiness to explain the nature of the self and to show how it is different from the substantial notion of self. However, Nāgārjuna’s idea (...) of the self is not identical with the contemporary materialistic notion of self. The paper is divided into five sections. In the first section, I would like to explain the nature of emptiness in relation to self and how it is different from the substantial self. The second section will focus on the constituents of the self. The third section will bring out the nature of self. In the fourth section and last section, I would like to bring out Nāgārjuna’s idea of the emptiness of the self with respect to the contemporary debates on the nature of self. (shrink)

Given the popularity and success of the Hindu-Right in India's electoral politics today, how may one study ostensibly 'Western' concepts and ideas, such as the secular and its family of cognates, like secularism, secularisation and secularity in non-Western societies without assuming them simply as derivative, or colonial legacies or contrast cases of Western societies? While recognizing that the dominant language of political modernity of Western societies is not easily translatable in non-Western societies, The Secular Imaginary elaborates upon an intellectual history (...) of secularity in modern India by focusing on the two most influential political leaders – M.K. Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. It is an intellectual history of both idea(s) and intellectuals, which sheds light on Indian narratives of secularity – the Gandhian sarva dharma samabhava, Nehruvian secularism, and unity in diversity. It revisits this dominant narrative of secularity of the twentieth century that influenced and shaped the imagination of the modern nation-state. (shrink)

Fundamentals of the Lokāyata school in Hindu philosophy.

Concept of rebirth in Indic philosophy; an analytical study.

This book deals with the major philosophical issues in the theoretical framework of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in particular and cognitive science in general.

Using the mainstreaming of socially responsible investing as our empirical context, we show that as the divestment movement in the late twentieth century got institutionalized by being incorporated as a business strategy into more mainstream financial instruments like mutual funds, the prior meanings and categorical definition of ethical investing became ambiguous due to fuzzy boundaries, duality of virtue inherent in the portfolio targets, and exercise of discretion by portfolio managers. We find that increased heterogeneity in standards led to greater ambiguity (...) about who belongs to a category, and fund managers adopted distinct measures-based, values-based and expertise-based approaches to resolve this ambiguity. One consequence of such ambiguity is that individual self-expression, self-consciousness and agency that are central in such movements become appropriated by discretionary and meaning-making work at the institutional level. (shrink)

This chapter examines the case for health care policies aimed at holding obese individuals responsible for their weight and for obesity-related health issues. In particular, it considers the merits of two arguments for policies that would seek to make obese individuals bear some of the higher health care costs associated with being that way. On the fairness argument, it is claimed that such policies would serve the interests of fairness by holding obese individuals to account for irresponsible lifestyle choices that (...) are linked to their higher weight and its associated health risks. On the public health promotion argument, it is claimed that adopting such policies could produce impressive public health benefits: encouraging people to make healthier lifestyle choices, reducing obesity rates, and reducing obesity-related health care spending. Both arguments face serious objections. Contrary to the fairness argument, policies aimed at holding obese individuals responsible for their weight or for related health problems would neither treat people as they deserve to be treated nor make the distribution of health care resources fairer. And contrary to the public health promotion argument, those policies would not produce better health outcomes for society at large. Indeed, they would tend to do just the opposite. Reflection on the shortcomings of those arguments reveals that their conclusion is false: society should not adopt policies aimed at holding obese individuals responsible for their weight or for obesity-related health problems. (shrink)

Anti-fat sentiment is pervasive, and fat people suffer a host of harms as a result: workforce discrimination, inferior medical care, relentless teasing, and internalized shame. A significant proportion of the population endures such harms. Yet, that is not typically regarded as a serious problem. Most of us aren’t quite sure: Is it really OK to be fat? This book argues that it is. In Why It’s OK to Be Fat, Nath debunks popular narratives about weight, health, and lifestyle choices (...) that underlie the dominant cultural aversion to fatness. She argues that we should view fatness through the lens of social equality, examining the wide-ranging ways that fat individuals fail to be treated as equals. According to Nath, we ought to recognize "sizeism"—the systematic ways that our society penalizes fat individuals for their size—as a structural injustice, akin to racism, sexism, and homophobia. (shrink)

An important debate in the current philosophy of wisdom is whether knowledge is necessary for wisdom. In this paper I argue that knowledge is necessary to explain wise actions. Towards this, firstly, I individuate two modal properties relevant for wise actions: (i) counterfactual robustness: an action performed in the actual world is wise only if it leads to or is constituted by the goals of living well in all nearby worlds; (ii) rational robustness: an action performed for the sake of (...) living well is wise only if, in all nearby worlds, when an agent has sufficient reasons to perform the action, she performs the action. Secondly, I argue that these two modal properties are best explained in terms of two central features of knowledge: (a) safety: if the agent knows that a certain action will help her successfully reach the relevant goal(s) of living well, or is constituted by those goal(s), then in all the nearby worlds, her belief that the action will help her successfully reach the goal is true; (b) stability: the agent's knowledge that the action will help her successfully reach the goal(s) of living well, or is constituted by those goals, entails that her belief that the action will help her successfully reach the goal(s), or is constituted by those goals, isn’t based on any reason that could easily have been defeated by misleading evidence. (shrink)

We examine whether gender-diverse boards prioritize product market concerns over capital market incentives when proprietary costs are high. We argue that gender-diverse boards protect their firm’s competitive edge and maximize long-term shareholder wealth by ethically and carefully maintaining the confidentiality of proprietary information. Due to the reduced disclosure of proprietary information, firms with gender-diverse boards are likely to face more adverse selection when proprietary costs are high. However, the reduced disclosure of proprietary information enables firms with gender-diverse boards to enhance (...) and maintain their competitive edge and gain higher long-term returns. Using a matched sample of the United States-listed companies, we find that firms with gender-diverse boards, relative to similar firms with all-male boards, (1) are associated with higher adverse selection costs and (2) higher long-run stock returns when the firm faces high product market competition. Collectively, our results suggest that firms with gender-diverse boards, which initially experience higher adverse selection in a competitive environment, are rewarded with a net gain of about 10 percent of their stock price in three years. Our research contributes to the literature by highlighting the importance of board gender diversity in fostering the ethical redaction of proprietary information for proprietary cost-based motives as opposed to agency cost-based motives. Our findings have important implications for regulators, firms, and shareholders by identifying gender-diverse boards as an antecedent for the ethical redaction of proprietary information. (shrink)

This chapter canvasses the debate between John Rawls and his cosmopolitan critics over the demands of economic justice that arise beyond state borders. In particular, it examines the merits of four defenses of the position Rawls advances in The Law of Peoples that justice does not call for a cross-society egalitarian distributive principle: first, that such a principle would fail to hold states responsible for their economic position; second, that because societies do not have a fundamental interest in wealth, they (...) would not favor such a principle; third, that satisfying such a principle would not be feasible; and, fourth, that appeal to Rawls's constructivist methodology can explain why the egalitarian principles he takes to be suited for the state context are not suited for the international context. The chapter concludes that upon careful examination, none of these defenses succeed in plausibly motivating Rawls's rejection of global egalitarianism. (shrink)

According to ‘global institutionalism,’ individuals who do not share a state have duties of justice to one another, and this is explained, in part, by the institutional connections that obtain between them. In this chapter, I defend this view against two challenges. First, I consider challenges raised by ‘non-institutionalists,’ who deny that facts about global institutional interaction bear on the nature of duties of justice that arise between particular individuals. Second, I address challenges posed by ‘domestic institutionalists,’ who accept the (...) claim that facts about institutional interaction bear upon the scope of justice but deny that the right sort of interaction necessary to ground duties of justice is found in the global domain. (shrink)

Research essays on the negative theory of meaning (Apohavāda) in Buddhist logic.

Presents the thesis that Sankaracarya, exponent of the Advaita school in Hindu philosophy flourished in 6th century.

Lange & Dyer misunderstand what is meant by an “entity” and confuse a medium of representation with the content being represented. This leads them to the erroneous conclusion that SHRUTI will run out of phases and that its representation of bindings lacks semantic content. It is argued that the limit on the number of phases suffices, and SHRUTI can be interpreted as using “dynamic signatures” that offer significant advantages over fixed preexisting signatures. Bonatti refers to three levels of commitment to (...) a representational theory of the mind and states that SHRUTI is committed to RTM at levels 1 and 2. He acknowledges that SHRUTI is not committed at level 3, but argues that an extended SHRUTI would have to make such a commitment. We agree that SHRUTI is committed to RTM at level 1 and, in a sense, also at level 2. SHRUTI, however, is not committed to RTM at level 3 and, even though it has been extended in several ways, it has retained its original representational character. (shrink)