Leveraging a massive dataset of over 400 million potential matches between single heterosexuals on a leading mobile dating application we were able to identify numerous characteristics of effective matching. Effective matching is defined as the exchange of contact information with the intent to meet in person. The characteristics of effective match include alignment of psychological traits (i.e. extroversion), physical traits (i.e. height), personal choices (i.e., the relationship type they desired), and shared experiences. For nearly all characteristics, the more similar the (...) individuals were the higher the likelihood of them finding each other desirable and opting to meet in person. The only exception was introversion, where introverts rarely had an effective match with other introverts. Additionally, we investigated the preliminary stages of the choice process. We looked at the consistency between the choice of men/women, the time it took users to make these binary choices and the tendency of yes/no decisions. We used a biologically-inspired choice model to estimate the time allotted to a decision and could predict the decision and response time with nearly 60% accuracy. Given that people make their initial selection within no more than 11 seconds and ultimately converge to a partner who shares numerous attributes with them, we suggest that users are less selective in their early preferences and gradually converge to clusters with high degree of similarity in characteristics during their conversation. (shrink)

Contemporary metaphysics has undergone a change of perspective due to the irruption of Grounding in discussions of metaphysical dependence. Proponents argue that Grounding is the primitive relationship of determination underlying many of the traditionally posited idioms of metaphysical dependence. In a recent line of scepticism Jessica Wilson has argued that the inability of the notion to be informatively effective regarding substantial matters of metaphysical determination renders it useless in the face of theoretical work. To supply this lack of informativeness proponents (...) must resort to the already available set of specific ‘small-g’ relations, which renders the formulation of ‘big-G’ Grounding pre-theoretically unmotivated. In response two motivations are said to remain: The priority and unity arguments. Wilson insists that neither of these motivations succeeds in establishing ‘big-G’ Grounding as theoretically useful. I argue that none of Wilson’s critiques succeeds in establishing eliminative scepticism. (shrink)

The focus of this paper is Aristotle's solution to the problem inherited from Socrates: How could a man fail to restrain himself when he believes that what he desires is wrong? In NE 7 Aristotle attempts to reconcile the Socratic denial of akrasia with the commonly held opinion that people act in ways they know to be bad, even when it is in their power to act otherwise. This project turns out to be largely successful, for what Aristotle shows us (...) is that if we distinguish between two ways of having knowledge (potentially and actually), the Socratic thesis can effectively account for a wide range of cases (collectively referred to here as drunk-akrasia) in which an agent acts contrary to his general knowledge of the Good, yet can still be said to know in the qualified sense that his actions are wrong. However, Book 7 also shows that the Socratic account of akrasia cannot take us any farther than drunk-akrasia, for unlike drunk-akrasia, genuine akrasia cannot be reduced to a failure of knowledge. This agent knows in the unqualified sense that his actions are wrong. The starting-point of my argument is that Aristotle's explanation of genuine akrasia requires a different solution than the one found in NE 7 which relies on the distinction between qualified and unqualified knowing: genuinely akratic behaviour is due to the absence of an internal conflict that a desire for the proper pleasures of temperance would create if he could experience them. (shrink)

In this article, I explore how researchers’ metaphysical commitments can be conducive—or unconducive—to progress in animal cognition research. The methodological dictum known as Morgan's Canon exhorts comparative psychologists to countenance the least mentalistic fair interpretation of animal actions. This exhortation has frequently been misread as a blanket condemnation of mentalistic interpretations of animal behaviors that could be interpreted behavioristically. But Morgan meant to demand only that researchers refrain from accepting default interpretations of (apparent) actions until other fair interpretations have been (...) duly considered. The Canon backfired largely because of Morgan's background metaphysical commitment to a univocal, hierarchical, and anthropocentric account of cognitive architecture. I make the case that, going forward, comparative psychologists would do well to pair judicious use of Morgan's Canon with an openness to the existence of non-humanlike animal minds comprising phenomena belonging to distinct cognitive and folk psychological ontologies. And I argue that this case gives us pragmatic reason to reconcile deep—e.g., psychofunctionalist—and superficial—e.g., dispositionalist—approaches to the metaphysics of belief. (shrink)

Ground is all the rage in contemporary metaphysics. But what is its nature? Some metaphysicians defend what we could call, following Skiles and Trogdon (2021), the inheritance view: it is because constitutive forms of metaphysical explanation are such-and-such that we should believe that ground is so-and-so. However, many putative instances of inheritance are not primarily motivated by scientific considerations. This limitation is harmless if one thinks that ground and science are best kept apart. Contrary to this view, we believe that (...) ground is a highly serviceable tool for investigating metaphysical areas of science. In this paper, we defend a naturalistic version of the inheritance view which takes constitutive scientific explanation as a better guide to ground. After illustrating the approach and its merits, we discuss some implications of the emerging scientific conception for the theory of ground at large. (shrink)

In an era of heightened concern about injustice in relations of identity and difference, political theorists often prescribe equal recognition as a remedy for the ills of subordination. Drawing on the philosophy of Hegel, they envision a system of reciprocal knowledge and esteem, in which the affirming glance of others lets everyone be who they really are. This book challenges the equation of recognition with justice. Patchen Markell mines neglected strands of the concept's genealogy and reconstructs an unorthodox interpretation (...) of Hegel, who, in the unexpected company of Sophocles, Aristotle, Arendt, and others, reveals why recognition's promised satisfactions are bound to disappoint, and even to stifle.Written with exceptional clarity, the book develops an alternative account of the nature and sources of identity-based injustice in which the pursuit of recognition is part of the problem rather than the solution. And it articulates an alternative conception of justice rooted not in the recognition of identity of the other but in the acknowledgment of our own finitude in the face of a future thick with surprise. Moving deftly among contemporary political philosophers, the close interpretation of ancient and modern texts, and the exploration of rich case studies drawn from literature, history, and modern politics, Bound by Recognition is at once a sustained treatment of the problem of recognition and a sequence of virtuoso studies. (shrink)

This article engages in discussion on the concepts of recognition and redistribution in contemporary politic theory. It discusses the debate on the problem of identity-based injustice and the problem of economic injustice and charts the surprisingly diverse range of uses of the term recognition in recent political thought. It evaluates whether recognition is a discrete good or a general medium of social life and discusses the object of recognition and its relation to the idea of justice. It also analyses American (...) critical theorist Nancy Fraser's views about the conflicts that arise between the politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution. (shrink)

Specifically tailored industrial control systems attacks are becoming increasingly sophisticated, accentuating the need of ICS cyber security. The nature of these systems makes traditional IT security measures not suitable, requiring expressly developed security countermeasures. Within the past decades, research has been focused in network-based intrusion detection systems. With the appearance of software-defined networks, new opportunities and challenges have shown up in the research community. This paper describes the potential benefits of using SDNs in industrial networks with security purposes and presents (...) the set up and results of a pilot experiment carried out in a scaled physical implementation. The experimental set up consists in the detection of ICMP flood and packet payload alteration based on signature comparison. Results point to the potential viability of the technology for intrusion detection and the need of researching in architectural scalability. (shrink)

This article argues that one of the main arguments against metaphysical infinitism—the argument from vicious infinite regress—is unsuccessful. I suggest that a proper interpretation of the argument takes the charge against infinitism to be one of metaphysical insufficiency: without the fundamental facts fully grounding the rest of reality, derivative facts lack the necessary grounding base for their obtaining. I disambiguate the insufficiency claim by examining it from two different perspectives on the regress: the local perspective, which focuses on the obtaining (...) of the individual derivative facts, and the global perspective, which focuses on the obtaining of the entire collection of derivative facts. For each perspective, I argue that the reasons for believing that infinitism cannot provide sufficient grounds are problematic. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the Parts of Animals [PA] should be seen as continuing in the tradition of those earlier natural scientists who “investigated the material principle of things and that s...

Until recently, torture was regarded as an unthinkable act. But in the dark years following September 11, 2001, many people have defended it openly as they have many other kinds of action previously considered taboo. And the underlying issues are complicated. Yet at least a virtually absolute prohibition on interrogational torture can be rationally defended.

The concept of "recognition" lies at the intersection between contemporary identity politics and the philosophy of Hegel. While Hegel's philosophy is often invoked to provide normative grounding for political projects devoted to overcoming misrecognition, Hegel's analysis of recognition actually supports an immanent critique of such politics. It provides us with diagnostic tools that show how the pursuit of recognition, especially in the context of modern, state-centered politics, works both for and against the values of agency and plurality it is supposed (...) to serve. I develop this argument through readings of Hegel's Phenomenology and Philosophy of Right; Sophocles' Antigone; the history Jewish emancipation in nineteenth-century Prussia; and contemporary theorists of multiculturalism, including Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka. ;In chapter one, establishing connections between Taylor's work on Herder and language and his work on multiculturalism, I show that demands for recognition have a self-obscuring character: recognition constructs identities by seeming only to cognize them. To understand the temptations and risks of political strategies that constitutively involve misunderstanding our own activity in this way, chapters two and three turn to important recognition scenes in Sophocles' Antigone and Hegel's Phenomenology. Read through the lens of tragedy, Hegel illuminates how the pursuit of recognition, blind to its own participation in the workings of power through which identities are constructed, enacts new forms of subjection in the name of an attractive yet impossible vision of masterful agency. Chapters four and five show that, pace the later Hegel, the mediating institution of the modern state cannot salvage the ideal of recognition, because the state itself participates in struggles for recognition, demanding confirmation of its sovereignty. I trace the consequences of the state's involvement in the politics of recognition through the case of Jewish emancipation, and by analyzing contemporary debates over the supposedly divisive effects of multiculturalism as struggles for recognition in which the sovereign imperatives of multicultural states help generate essentialist articulations of identity, foreclosing democratic agency. The conclusion suggests modes of political practice and institution that might enable us to loosen our tenacious attachment to recognition, thereby negotiating its double binds more gracefully. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt’s political theory is often understood to rest on a celebration of action, the memorable words and deeds of named individuals, over against the anonymous processes constitutive of ‘labor’ and ‘society’. Yet at key moments in _The Human Condition_ and _The Origins of Totalitarianism_, Arendt seems to signal a different relationship between political action and anonymity; and she does so in part via citations of the novels of William Faulkner. Using the apparently contradictory notion of ‘anonymous glory’ as a (...) heuristic, this essay reconsiders Arendt’s political thought through readings of the novels she cites, _A Fable_ and _Intruder in the Dust_. The essay argues that, for Arendt, a conception of action adequate to the scale of modern social power must somehow be both indelibly tied to individual deeds and immersed in a processual field that is indifferent to the needs for meaning or purpose or satisfaction that individuals bring to what they do; and that Arendt’s engagement with this problem both complicates the relation of action to its supposed opposites, and makes it more difficult to conceive of action’s recovery as a reliable source of theoretical or political redemption. (shrink)

This essay argues that the neo-Roman republican principle of "non-domination," as developed in the recent work of Philip Pettit, cannot serve as a single overarching political ideal, because it responds to only one of two important dimensions of concern about human agency. Through critical engagements with several aspects of Pettit's work, ranging from his philosophical account of freedom as "discursive control" to his appropriation of the distinction between dominium and imperium, the essay argues that the idea of domination, which responds (...) to concerns about "control," needs to be supplemented by the idea of usurpation, which responds to questions about "involvement"; and it shows how attention to both domination and usurpation (and to the interaction between them) can shed light on such phenomena as imperialism, slavery, and democracy. (shrink)

There is a crisis of leadership in sport. Leadership as an athletic excellence is under threat from the deepening influence of coaches on in-game decision- making. To appreciate what is being lost in this shift of responsibility, it is necessary to understand the challenge of athlete leadership. Captaincy is the quintessential on-field leadership role. However, the role of captain, and athlete leadership more widely, remains philosophically untheorized. This paper initiates a discussion of leadership in sport by providing the first normative (...) account of captaincy. Rugby union is used as a case study, as this sport preserves an especially demanding and complex form of captaincy that may provide a rough template for the revival of athlete leadership in other sports. A virtue theoretical analysis of the role is developed based on a functionalist conception of virtue. It is argued that discharging the responsibilities of such captaincy requires two key virtues: ‘sporting judgement’ and ‘responsibility’. (shrink)

In Go Set a Watchman, Harper Lee reveals that American man of integrity Atticus Finch harbors deep-seated racist beliefs. Bob Ewell, Finch's nemesis in To Kill a Mockingbird, harbors the same beliefs. But the two men live out their shared racist beliefs in dramatically different fashions. This article argues that extant dispositionalist accounts of belief lack the tools to accommodate Finch and Ewell's divergent styles of believing. It then draws on literary and philosophical character studies to construct the required tools.

Eligibility to compete in sport is organised principally around two binary distinctions: ‘clean/doped’ and ‘male/female’. These distinctions are challenged both by steroid users who wish to...

Schelling is often thought to be a protean thinker whose work is difficult to approach or interpret. Devin Zane Shaw shows that the philosophy of art is the guiding thread to understanding Schelling's philosophical development from his early works in 1795-1796 through his theological turn in 1809-1810. -/- Schelling's philosophy of art is the 'keystone' of the system; it unifies his idea of freedom and his philosophy of nature. Schelling's idea of freedom is developed through a critique of the (...) formalism of Kant's and Fichte's practical philosophies, and his nature-philosophy is developed to show how subjectivity and objectivity emerge from a common source in nature. The philosophy of art plays a dual role in the system. First, Schelling argues that artistic activity produces through the artwork a sensible realization of the ideas of philosophy. Second, he argues that artistic production creates the possibility of a new mythology that can overcome the socio-political divisions that structure the relationships between individuals and society. Shaw's careful analysis shows how art, for Schelling, is the highest expression of human freedom. (shrink)

In this first book-length examination of the Cartesian theory of visual perception, Celia Wolf-Devine explores the many philosophical implications of Descartes’ theory, concluding that he ultimately failed to provide a completely mechanistic theory of visual perception. Wolf-Devine traces the development of Descartes’ thought about visual perception against the backdrop of the transition from Aristotelianism to the new mechanistic science—the major scientific paradigm shift taking place in the seventeenth century. She considers the philosopher’s work in terms of its background in Aristotelian (...) and later scholastic thought rather than looking at it "backwards" through the later work of the British empiricists and Kant. Wolf-Devine begins with Descartes’ ideas about perception in the _Rules _and continues through the later scientific writings in which he develops his own mechanistic theory of light, color, and visual spatial perception. Throughout her discussion, she demonstrates both Descartes’ continuity with and break from the Aristotelian tradition. Wolf-Devine critically examines Cartesian theory by focusing on the problems that arise from his use of three different models to explain the behavior of light as well as on the ways in which modern science has not confirmed some of Descartes’ central hypotheses about vision. She shows that the changes Descartes made in the Aristotelian framework created a new set of problems in the philosophy of perception. While such successors to Descartes as Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume accepted the core of his theory of vision, they struggled to clarify the ontological status of colors, to separate what is strictly speaking "given" to the sense of sight from what is the result of judgments by the mind, and to confront a "veil of perception" skepticism that would have been unthinkable within the Aristotelian framework. Wolf-Devine concludes that Descartes was not ultimately successful in providing a completely mechanistic theory of visual perception, and because of this, she suggests both that changes in the conceptual framework of Descartes are in order and that a partial return to some features of the Aristotelian tradition may be necessary. (shrink)

John Roemer's comment succinctly summarizes the logical structure of his own theory of capitalist exploitation, but misunderstands the main points of our critique. He reduces his argument to two propositions. The first is an “empirical proposition”about the “root causes of exploitation”: X + Y → Z, where X is the existence of differential ownership of means of production, Y is coercion in the labor process, and Z is the capitalist class structure and exploitation. The second is the strictly theoretical proposition (...) X + not- Y -” Z, the truth of which he demonstrates, given most of the assumptions of a Walrasian economic model. He concludes that these two propositions, taken together, demonstrate the primacy of DOPA in explaining capitalist class relations. This much is true – subject to the various limitations we have indicated in our article – but only within the restricted confines of a Walrasian framework. This purely theoretical conclusion has no force as an empirical conclusion: this is the point at which Roemer's interpretation goes awry. For obviously, DOPA is a crucial element of empirical reality. But because Roemer's Walrasian framework precludes other equally crucial elements of empirical reality, an irreducible distance remains therein between the theoretical and the empirical. (shrink)

The Enlightenment is commonly held accountable for the rise of both racial classification and modern scientific racism. Yet this argument sits uneasily alongside the birth of a modern rights language and strong anticolonial perspectives within the same intellectual movement. This article seeks to make sense of this paradox by arguing that one of the contexts in which we can best understand eighteenth-century race concepts is humanity’s place in a transformed history of nature that brought together novel understandings of deep time (...) and a materialist view of reproduction. Analysing the thought of Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon and Denis Diderot, the article demonstrates that the waning of both the authority of biblical genealogies and ancient environmentalist explanations of human physical diversity left a lacuna in the eighteenth-century human sciences. Buffon and Diderot’s “races” of humanity are not fixed entities, but rather exist in the flux of time. New understandings of heredity and reproduction combined with a time revolution led these Enlightenment thinkers to reconceive humanity’s place in the natural world. The article suggests that while “race” is a biologically incoherent concept, two elements of these Enlightenment thinkers’ anthropology – a materialist understanding of reproduction and humanity’s place in deep time – remain central to how we understand human diversity. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with the definition of religion. This definition is developed within a context which recognizes the impossibility of value-neutrality in the definition of words. The definition proposed is applied to three complex borderline cases: Spinozism, Marxism,and economism or free-market ideology.

Organizations pride themselves on their creation of rational structures based primarily on a male perspective of interaction. Workers are expected to set aside interpersonal behaviours that do not directly contribute to task performance. As more women enter management, norms concerning appropriate interpersonal relationships at work are undergoing strain. In addition, the phenomenon of mutual sexual attractions between co-workers is demanding attention. This study systematically describes attitudes, attributions and anticipated consequences of mutual sexual attractions at work. Findings suggest that gender stereotypes (...) are significant factors in people's judgments of persons involved in sexual attractions at work. (shrink)

This book examines an important area of Aristotle's philosophy: the generation of substances. While other changes presuppose the existence of a substance (Socrates grows taller), substantial generation results in something genuinely new that did not exist before (Socrates himself). The central argument of this book is that Aristotle defends a 'hylomorphic' model of substantial generation. In its most complete formulation, this model says that substantial generation involves three principles: (1) matter, which is the subject from which the change proceeds; (2) (...) form, which is the end towards which the process advances; and (3) an efficient cause, which directs the process towards that form. By examining the development of this model across Aristotle's works, Devin Henry seeks to deepen our grasp on how the doctrine of hylomorphism - understood as a blueprint for thinking about the world - informs our understanding of the process by which new substances come into being. (shrink)

Double dissociations between perceivable colors and physical properties of colored objects have led many philosophers to endorse relationalist accounts of color. I argue that there are analogous double dissociations between attitudes of belief—the beliefs that people attribute to each other in everyday life—and intrinsic cognitive states of belief—the beliefs that some cognitive scientists posit as cogs in cognitive systems—pitched at every level of psychological explanation. These dissociations provide good reason to refrain from conflating attitudes of belief with intrinsic cognitive states (...) of belief. I suggest that interpretivism provides an attractive account of the former. Like colors, attitudes of belief evolved to be ecological signifiers, not cogs in cognitive systems. (shrink)

A pluralistic approach to folk psychology must countenance the evaluative, regulatory, predictive, and explanatory roles played by attributions of intelligence in social practices across cultures. Building off of the work of the psychologist Robert Sternberg and the philosophers Gilbert Ryle and Daniel Dennett, I argue that a relativistic interpretivism best accounts for the many varieties of intelligence that emerge from folk discourse. To be intelligent is to be comparatively good at solving intellectual problems that an interpreter deems worth solving.

Este trabajo ofrece un resumen de la doctrina religiosa de taqiyya o disimulación en el islam sunní, recurriendo a comentarios del Qur’ān, compendios de ḥadīṯ, obras de ley islámica y tratados de principios éticos. En las fuentes andaluces antes de la conquista cristiana aparecen discusiones acerca del concepto de taqiyya y del de coerción , ambos exenciones legales, y algunas de ellas continuaron estando a disposición de los moriscos y de los juristas norteafricanos que les aconsejaban. El análisis de estos (...) materiales facilita la interpretación de la fatwā que Ibn Abī Ȳum’a al-Wahrānī envió a los moriscos en el ano 1504 y particularmente la comprensión de su tratamiento de la blasfemia bajo coacción. (shrink)