Michael Morris: Factory Farming and Animal Liberation in New Zealand Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-2 DOI 10.1007/s10806-011-9327-1 Authors Dennis Keeney, Emeritus Professor, Iowa State University, Ames, IA, USA Journal Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Online ISSN 1573-322X Print ISSN 1187-7863.

A 37,641-word exegesis for thesis "sur travaux". Includes: Research methodology; "Expositions des textes"; Paralogisms for scholars; Conference, exhibition, and research tour details and itineraries. -/- PhD (Doctor of Philosophy) – Deakin University – 2011-2014 – Thesis by Publication (“sur travaux”): “Visual Agency in Art and Architecture” – Two monographs: Dossier Chris Marker: The Suffering Image (2012); and Not-I/Thou: The Other Subject of Art and Architecture (2014) – Two curated, multimedia group exhibitions: “‘Shadow-lands’: The Suffering Image” (2012), Dennys Lascelles Gallery, Alfred (...) Deakin Prime Ministerial Library, Deakin University; and “‘Shadow-lands’ II: Not-I/Thou” (2014), Dennys Lascelles Gallery, Alfred Deakin Prime Ministerial Library, Deakin University – Two archival submissions: “DCM Bequest” (2012), research dossier, Australian Film Institute/RMIT; “Shadow-lands”: The Suffering Image (2012), limited-edition, hand-made folio (exhibition dossier), Alfred Deakin Prime Ministerial Library, Deakin University, and St. Paschal Library, Yarra Theological Union – Supervision: David Jones, John Rollo, and Flavia Marcello – External examination: Tom Conley, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA; Suzana Milevska, Academy of Fine Arts, Vienna, Austria; and Anonymous, Australia – Research conducted in Australia, England, France, Croatia, and Slovenia – Seven conferences attended in Australia (3), England (2), Italy (1), and Greece (1). (shrink)

A fascinating recent turn in epistemology focuses on inquiring attitudes like wondering and being curious. Many have argued that these attitudes are governed by norms similar to those that govern our doxastic attitudes. Yet, to date, this work has only considered norms that might prohibit having certain inquiring attitudes (“norms of restriction”), while ignoring those that might require having them (“norms of expansion”). We aim to address that omission by offering a framework that generates norms of expansion for inquiring attitudes. (...) The framework draws on inferential erotetic logic, which we explain and augment with some theorems. We explore several of the norms that it yields—some sympathetically, others unsympathetically. (shrink)

When a person commits a testimonial injustice, the unjust thing they do consists in their reaction to an assertion (theorists diverge on the details; paradigmatically the relevant unjust thing consists in prejudicially refraining from believing the assertion). Whatever reactions to questions are analogous to these reactions to assertions, those things are "interrogative injustices". I explore some models of those things and apply them to some non-ideal cases. One of the models appeals to mental states like curiosity and wonder, telling us (...) that interrogative injustice occurs when hearers prejudicially refrain from adopting those mental states. Other models appeal to common conversational goals – these goals including the answering of questions. On these models, interrogative injustice occurs when a person asks a question, and another person prejudicially blocks the answering of that question from joining the common goals. Or, if they don’t block said answering, perhaps they believe that it should be thus blocked. Or perhaps they merely resist the question, not fully blocking its answering from joining the common goals but instead pushing back against it in some other way. Or perhaps they merely believe that they should resist the question. I endorse a pluralism on which each of these things can be an interrogative injustice. (shrink)

This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II. Six new chapters have been added, and several chapters from the previous edition have been extensively revised. The discussion of empirical work in public choice has been greatly expanded. As in the previous editions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the (...) size of government, voter participation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choice are also examined including a normative analysis of the simple majority rule, Bergson–Samuelson social welfare functions, the Arrow and Sen impossibility theorems, Rawls's social contract theory and the constitutional political economy of Buchanan and Tullock. (shrink)

Attempts to illuminate the nature of “blame” have shaped recent philosophical discussion of free will and moral responsibility. In this paper I show how, in at least one context, this search for a theory of blame has led us astray. Specifically, I focus on the contemporary debate about the “standing” to blame and argue, first, that theorizing about blame-in-general in this context has assumed an impoverished moral psychology that fails to reflect the range of blaming emotions and that conflates these (...) emotions’ distinctive logics; and, second, that such theorizing has encouraged the propagation of misleading theories of blame’s “norms.” Rather than searching for the nature of blame, I employ and defend an alternative methodological approach that focuses on the psychology and ethics of specific reactive emotions. I then show how an agent’s own bad behavior can alter the appropriateness of these various attitudes in distinctive ways. Marking these distinctions leads to some surprising conclusions. For example, it allows us to move beyond the assumption that the wrongness of standingless blame is fundamentally a matter of hypocrisy. (shrink)

Saunders has recently claimed that “identical quantum particles” with an anti-symmetric state (fermions) are weakly discernible objects, just like irreflexively related ordinary objects in situations with perfect symmetry (Black’s spheres, for example). Weakly discernible objects have all their qualitative properties in common but nevertheless differ from each other by virtue of (a generalized version of) Leibniz’s principle, since they stand in relations an entity cannot have to itself. This notion of weak discernibility has been criticized as question begging, but we (...) defend and accept it for classical cases likes Black’s spheres. We argue, however, that the quantum mechanical case is different. Here the application of the notion of weak discernibility indeed is question begging and in conflict with standard interpretational ideas. We conclude that the introduction of the conceptual resource of weak discernibility does not change the interpretational status quo in quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Deontology has fallen out of favor among bioethicists. According to Pierson and colleagues’ (2024) “Bioethicists Today”, deontology is now the least accepted major approach to normative theory, tra...

In some sense, bioethics was built on conflicts. Abortion, physician‐assisted suicide, patients’ demand for autonomy all are staple and contentious issues. And the controversies continue to proliferate. What forum best serves such debates? A look at political theories of democracy can help answer that question. The most promising for bioethics debates are theories that ask citizens and officials to justify any demands for collective action by giving reasons that can be accepted by those who are bound by the action. This (...) conception has come to be known as deliberative democracy. (shrink)

blurb from publisher: "In Apperception and Self-Consciousness in Kant and German Idealism, Dennis Schulting examines the themes of reflexivity, self-consciousness, representation and apperception in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and German Idealism more widely. Central to Schulting’s argument is the claim that all of human experience is inherently self-referential and that this is part of a self-reflexivity of thought, or what is called transcendental apperception, a Kantian insight that was first apparent in the work of Christian Wolff and came (...) to inform all of German Idealism. In a rigorous text suitable for students of German philosophy and upper-level students of metaphysics, epistemology, moral and political philosophy, and aesthetics courses, the author establishes the historical roots of Kant’s thought and traces it through to his immediate successors Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. He specifically examines the cognitive role of self-consciousness and its relation to idealism and places it in a clear and coherent history of rationalist philosophy." . (shrink)

Abstract: Contemporary analytic philosophers of the “reactive attitudes” tend to share a simple conception of guilt as “self-directed blame”—roughly, an “unpleasant affect” felt in combination with, or in response to, the thought that one has violated a moral requirement, evinced substandard “quality of will,” or is blameworthy. I believe that this simple conception is inadequate. As an alternative, I offer my own theory of guilt’s logic and its connection to morality. In doing so, I attempt to articulate guilt’s defining thought (...) or proposition through an extended investigation and analysis of guilt’s many competing metaphors, which I trace from the Hebrew Bible to the New Testament to Shakespeare to contemporary vernacular. My interpretation of this literary genealogy offers a way to understand guilt’s seemingly disparate metaphors in terms of a single master-image that illuminates our self-conceptions and our relationship to morality. I conclude by making a very brief start toward a moral vindication of guilt against the backdrop of Nietzschean and Freudian analyses that explicitly call guilt’s place in a healthy social and personal life into question. I suggest that once guilt’s logic is made explicit, we can see that it makes sense of, honors, and addresses some of our deepest aspirations and needs. (shrink)

Existing ethical guidelines that aim to guide the development of mental health apps tend to overemphasize the role of Western conceptual frameworks. While such frameworks have proved to be a useful first step in introducing ethics to a previously unregulated industry, the rapid global uptake of mental health apps requires thinking more deeply about the diverse populations these apps seek to serve. One way to do this is to introduce more intercultural ethical perspectives into app design and the guidelines that (...) aim to encourage best practices. In addition to this, existing ethical guidelines can also benefit from the ethical scholarship from the feminist and disability traditions, both of which highlight specific ethical considerations for vulnerable users. Rethinking the ethical responsibilities of mental health app designers through the prisms of feminism, disability studies, and intercultural philosophy leads us to a more global and inclusive set of ethical considerations in app design. This white paper explores what existing guidelines for the regulation of mental health apps are missing. It also explores how these guidelines could be improved for users who inhabit an increasingly diverse and globalized world. (shrink)

In his general theory of relativity (GR) Einstein sought to generalize the special-relativistic equivalence of inertial frames to a principle according to which all frames of reference are equivalent. He claimed to have achieved this aim through the general covariance of the equations of GR. There is broad consensus among philosophers of relativity that Einstein was mistaken in this. That equations can be made to look the same in different frames certainly does not imply in general that such frames are (...) physically equivalent. We shall argue, however, that Einstein's position is tenable. The equivalence of arbitrary frames in GR should not be equated with relativity of arbitrary motion, though. There certainly are observable differences between reference frames in GR (differences in the way particles move and fields evolve). The core of our defense of Einstein's position will be to argue that such differences should be seen as fact-like rather than law-like in GR. By contrast, in classical mechanics and in special relativity (SR) the differences between inertial systems and accelerated systems have a law-like status. The fact-like character of the differences between frames in GR justifies regarding them as equivalent in the same sense as inertial frames in SR. (shrink)

In this paper, I reflect on the idea, hinted at by Kant in a footnote to §16 of the B- Deduction that is not often discussed (KrV B 134n.), that transcendental logic is the ground of logic as a whole. This has important repercussions for the way we should see the role of transcendental logic with respect to the question of truth as well as the nature and scope of transcendental logic in relation to cognition, and in relation to general (...) or formal logic as such. To illustrate one of the ways in which transcendental logic is fundamental to our way of thinking, I address an issue that is brought up by Kant’’s counterfactual claim at B 132 that if a representation is not accompanied by an ‘‘I’’ thought, it is ‘‘either impossible’’ or at least ‘‘nothing for me’’, suggesting to some recent commentators that by the former Kant means the impossibility of thinking contradictory thoughts. Unlike these commentators, I do not think Kant is saying here that we cannot think contradictory thoughts. To believe he is betrays a misunderstanding of the metaphysical nature of transcendental logic, or so I shall argue. It is because transcen- dental logic is a metaphysical logic that Kant can claim that transcendental logic grounds even the whole of logic, including the possibility of thinking contradictory thoughts. (shrink)

Although rational choice theory has enjoyed only modest predictive success, it provides a powerful explanatory mechanism for social processes involving strategic interaction among individuals and it stimulates interesting empirical inquiries. Rather than present competing theories to compare against rational choice, Don Green and Ian Shapiro have merely alluded to alternative explanatory variables such as culture, institutions, and social norms, without showing either how these factors can be incorporated into a more powerful theory, or how they are inconsistent with rational choice (...) theory. It is likely that any eventual theory of the origin and maintenance of social institutions, norms, and values will have to reserve a central place for rational action. (shrink)

Sometimes we make decisions which affect our lives at times when we will hold values that are different from our values at the time the decision is made. What is the reasonable way to make such a choice? Some think we should accept a requirement of temporal neutrality and take both sets of values into account, others think we should decide on the strength of our present values, yet others think that in evaluating what will happen at that other time (...) we should use the values that we will endorse at that time instead of our present values. These views see the problem as one about finding some attitude towards time itself that is distinctively rational. This article argues that these views are subject to serious objections. It suggests that instead we should think in terms of well-being. If a person approves of, or positively responds to, the way their life is going they will experience more well-being than if there is no positive response. The article explores the implications of a positive response condition on well-being for deciding what it is rational to do in cases involving changing goals. (shrink)

The paradox of analysis has been a problem for analytic philosophers at least since Moore’s time, and it is especially significant for those who seek an account of analysis along classical lines. The present paper offers a new solution to the paradox, where a theory of analysis is given where (1) analysandum and analysans are distinct concepts, due to their failing to share the same conceptual form, yet (2) they are related in virtue of satisfying various semantic constraints on the (...) analysis relation. Rather than distinguish between analysandum and analysans by appeal to epistemic considerations, the paper appeals to semantic considerations in giving a candidate account of the identity conditions for concepts. The distinctness of analysandum and analysans then serves to block the paradox in a straightforward way. (shrink)

This article aims to contribute to counteracting the negative perception of Descartes’ philosophical legacy. The article addresses a specific aspect of the supposed human dominance over nature, that of the animal question. Against the accusation of “speciesism,” a hierarchy that considers humans superior and justifies their domination and cruelty towards animals, it is argued that Descartes did not regard animals as completely insensible, that his position was not as categorical as often presented, and that he can be interpreted not as (...) a speciesist but as an environmental advocate. (shrink)

The aim of Ethics and Self-Cultivation is to establish and explore a new 'cultivation of the self' strand within contemporary moral philosophy. Although the revival of virtue ethics has helped reintroduce the eudaimonic tradition into mainstream philosophical debates, it has by and large been a revival of Aristotelian ethics combined with a modern preoccupation with standards for the moral rightness of actions. The essays comprising this volume offer a fresh approach to the eudaimonic tradition: instead of conditions for rightness of (...) actions, it focuses on conceptions of human life that are best for the one living it. The first section of essays looks at the Hellenistic schools and the way they influenced modern thinkers like Spinoza, Kant, Nietzsche, Hadot, and Foucault in their thinking about self-cultivation. The second section offers contemporary perspectives on ethical self-cultivation by drawing on work in moral psychology, epistemology of self-knowledge, philosophy of mind, and meta-ethics. (shrink)

Continuing on the value of givenness, Dennis Vanden Auweele argues that a modern project for absolutized autonomy cannot do but dread silence, which signals a hiccup or momentary lapse in the project of logos. And yet, Vanden Auweele shows that silence can be a convalescence that renders human beings receptive to something in excess of finite determination, which can in turn inspire self-determination to new heights.

In this paper, we aim to demonstrate that Kiyozawa Manshi’s 1895 Draft for a Skeleton of a Philosophy of Other-Power and two of Nishida Kitarō’s early writings—namely the 1911 An Inquiry into the Good and the 1917 Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness—instantiate the mystical form of absolute dialetheism. Absolute dialetheism is the thesis that the absolute exists and can only be known as a true contradiction. Its mystical form holds that because every conceptual cognition of the absolute leads to contradiction, (...) the absolute transcends all conceptual knowing. By exploring their theoretical and practical differences, we show how Kiyozawa and Nishida represent two varieties of the mystical form of absolute dialetheism. Theoretically, this difference in variety is apparent in the way in which they attempt to prove the existence of the absolute. Kiyozawa employs the Cartesian version of the ontological argument to derive the existence of the absolute from the concept of a maximally perfect being. By contrast, Nishida relies on an experience that is purified of all reflection and in which the collapse of the subject-object distinction implies the omnipresence of the absolute—something we illustrate using the example of music. Practically, while Kiyozawa regards the contradictory absolute as grounding and motivating the transition from philosophy to religion, Nishida points the way to a philosophical practice in which we live into the pure experience of contradiction. We argue that both approaches to the mystical form of absolute dialetheism fail for reasons internal to them. Whereas Kiyozawa cannot employ the Cartesian version of the ontological argument while simultaneously rejecting the principle of non-contradiction, Nishida has trouble accounting for the possibility of difference, without which there can be neither reflection nor philosophical thought. Most of all we aim to demonstrate the productive nature of these failures, for they form the agenda and the problems that would motivate the absolute thinking so characteristic of key members of the Kyoto School. (shrink)

As a Mahāyāna response to Nietzsche's critique of Buddhism, this article will explore Tanabe Hajime's philosophy of metanoetics in a way that addresses the Nietzschean dilemmas. Within his critique of Nietzsche, Tanabe contends that Nietzsche only advances principles of absolute being that lead to an affirmation of life indicative of self-power and thus forecloses any sense of an absolute critique that could awaken a surrendering to Other-power. According to Tanabe, upon letting go of one's clinging to the logic of non-contradiction (...) expressed within self-power is an emerging unshakable faith to Other-power through which the negated self is transformed into an affirmation of life realized as "being as upāya " ( hōben sonzai 方便存在). The transformation of the heart that comes from Tanabe's philosophy of metanoetics therefore converts the hidden inclination to dominate oneself and the other in cycles of ressentiment into a world of love and compassion for the other. The "will-to-power" that lies at the basis of Nietzschean subjectivity is thereby amended by Tanabe's standpoint of metanoetics that is a "philosophy that is not a philosophy.". (shrink)

It has been argued that, on Kantian grounds, pedophiles, rapists and murderers are morally obligated to take their own lives prior to committing a violent action that will end their moral agency. That is, to avoid destroying the agent's moral life by performing a morally suicidal action, the agent, while he still is a moral agent, should end his body's life. Although the cases of dementia and the morally reprehensible are vastly different, this Kantian interpretation might be useful in the (...) debate on the permissibility of suicide for those facing dementia's effects. If moral agents have a duty to act as moral agents, then those who will lose their moral identity as moral agents have an obligation to themselves to end their physical lives prior to losing their dignity as persons. (shrink)

Arguably, Caribbean development has evolved through three distinct historical periods in international political economy and currently must find its way in a fourth—the new multipolar world order. The hitherto three periods were characterized by a system of multipolar colonial imperial empires, bipolar cold war with neocolonialism, and unipolar neoliberalism. The purpose here is to unlock the door to critical thinking on Caribbean social, political, and economic policies for the new multipolarity. The region must dial back its blind pursuit of self-regulating (...) market policies and exercise its sovereign right to determine development paths based on its cultural and historical heritage. A descriptive analysis of theorizing about Caribbean development in each of the periods is presented before some specific sets of conditions are identified for policy formation and operationalization in the new multipolarity. (shrink)

The present paper begins with an investigation of Nishida Kitarō’s discussion of love in Zen no Kenkyū. Nishida claims that love is a deep union of subject and object, where the self is casted off and unites with the other. In other words, love is the expression of the self dissolving into the other, in which the self negates itself in order to further the other’s awakening to no-self. This paper then argues that we can carve out an account of (...) forgiveness based on Nishida’s view of love. That if forgiveness is a practice of a higher form of love, then love, as the groundwork of a self-contradictory standpoint, is nothing other than the practice of forgiveness, and forgiveness is nothing other than repeated acts of love. Contemporary human life is one of co-existence, but conflict and divisions seem to be more of the rule of the day, which speaks to the importance of recovering the lost art of forgiveness. This paper seeks to re-assert forgiveness, as drawn from Nishida’s view of love, in the attempt to heal and address the fragmentation that prevents dialogue between warring factions. (shrink)

In this contribution, we use the formalism of Magnetic Resonance to present an argument for the reality of the solution of the Schrodinger Equation appropriate for the existence of Bloch Equation magnetization states. We take as our definition of Reality that the observable used can be measured in the laboratory such as the Cartesian x Component of Magnetization. We relate this real existing observable to the Density Matrix corresponding to the system and then argue the Density Matrix must have Physical (...) Reality if the Magnetization has Physical Reality. Since the Density Matrix for a pure state is simply related to the wave function, we then argue that the corresponding wavefunction must also be Physically Real. (shrink)

We argued in earlier work that South Africa's democratic transition accomplished more than abolishing formal apartheid and replacing it with civil and political democracy. The transition also established a platform for “transformative constitutionalism,” an aspiration and generous constitutional framework for South Africa to embark on a postliberal path toward becoming an egalitarian social and economic democracy. Manifestly, the promised social and economic transformation remains largely unfulfilled. Many South Africans blame the constitutional settlement for this failure of delivery, seeing it as (...) a weak compromise with the old regime that restricts socio-economic transformation. We reject this view and assign blame for the failure of the transformative project squarely on the politics and policies of ANC governments in power over three decades. The transformative project was not blocked by the constitutional settlement; it was never attempted. The ANC brought mostly conventional, liberal democratic goals to the transition negotiations. It embraced neoliberalism before the 1996 Constitution was drafted, indeed before the 1994 elections brought the ANC to power. Ironically, during the Final Constitution drafting process (1994-1996), ANC negotiators moved left under the inspiration of and pressure from the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). The 1996 text is transformative in aspiration and in its toolbox of innovative legal technologies, but the ANC never took it seriously as a guide to policy. If South African politics ever realigns, future activists will find in the 1996 text a storehouse of legal values and tools meant to nourish radical social and economic change. (shrink)

Remembrance and reconciliation envision intentional pathways out of conflict and toward peace.