Wide content and individualist approaches to the individuation of thoughts appear to be incompatible; I think they are not. I propose a criterion for the classification of thoughts which captures both. Thoughts, I claim, should be individuated by their teleological functions. Where teleological function is construed in the standard way - according to the aetiological theory - individuating thoughts by their function cannot produce a classification which is both individualistic and consistent with the principle that sameness of wide content is (...) sufficient for sameness of psychological state. There is, however, an alternative approach to function, the relational theory, which is preferable on independent grounds. A taxonomy of thoughts based on these functions reconciles wide content with individualism. One consequence of individuating thoughts in this way is that intentional content is context sensitive. I discuss some of the implications of context sensitive content. (shrink)

In evolutionary biology changes in population structure are explained by citing trait fitness distribution. I distinguish three interpretations of fitness explanations—the Two‐Factor Model, the Single‐Factor Model, and the Statistical Interpretation—and argue for the last of these. These interpretations differ in their degrees of causal commitment. The first two hold that trait fitness distribution causes population change. Trait fitness explanations, according to these interpretations, are causal explanations. The last maintains that trait fitness distribution correlates with population change but does not cause (...) it. My defense of the Statistical Interpretation relies on a distinctive feature of causation. Causes conform to the Sure Thing Principle. Trait fitness distributions, I argue, do not. *Received July 2009; revised October 2009. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy/Institute for the History, Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Toronto, Victoria College, 91 Charles Street West, Toronto, ON M5S 1K7, Canada; e‐mail: denis[email protected]. (shrink)

This paper tackles the issue of the diversity of déjà experiences. According to the standard view in the neuropsychological literature, they should all be defined by means of a psychological criterion, by which they are experiences triggered by a perceived item and consist of a conscious clash between a first-order feeling of familiarity about the item and a second-order evaluation that assesses the first-order feeling as erroneous. This paper dismisses the standard view and contends there are two types of déjà (...) experiences, labeled déjà vu and déjà vécu respectively. But it also takes issue with the rare proponents of a distinct déjà vécu type. Contrary to their achievement view, it argues that recollection is not involved in déjà vécu experiences as an actual mental state or a component thereof. In our ability view, déjà vécu involves the feeling that one could recollect past occurrences of a currently lived episode of experience. (shrink)

Franz Brentano’s impact on the philosophy of his time and on 20th-century philosophy is considerable. The “sharp dialectician” (Freud) and “genial master” (Husserl) influenced philosophers of various allegiances, being acknowledged not only as the “grandfather of phenomenology” (Ryle) but also as an analytic philosopher “in the best sense of this term” (Chisholm). The fourteen new essays gathered together in this volume give an insight in three core issues of Brentano’s philosophy: consciousness (sect.1), intentionality (sect. 2) and ontology and metaphysics (sect. (...) 3). Two further sections of the volume deal with the posterity of his philoso¬phy: in section 4, the legacy of his account of sense perception and feeling is discussed, while the history of Brentano’s unpublished manuscripts is discussed in section 5. This section also presents an edition of a manuscript from 1899 on relations, along with the letters from Brentano to Marty which discuss this manuscript. The last part of section 5 contains the text of a public lecture given by Brentano on the laws of inference. (shrink)

In this study, I will first introduce Husserl’s analysis in Studien zur Struktur des Bewußtseins by emphasizing the reasons that motivate these analyses on descriptive psychology and their status in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology in the late Freiburg period. I will then focus on the structure of acts, with particular emphasis on three aspects stressed by Husserl in Studien: intentionality, the taxonomy of acts, and Brentano’s principle of the Vorstellungsgrundlage. The last three parts of this study outline the characteristic features of (...) three fundamental aspects of affective life in Husserl’s phenomenology: emotions, sense feelings, and moods. I will conclude with some general remarks on the status of affects and values in Husserl’s phenomenology. (shrink)

The Enchantment of Words is a study of Wittgenstein's early masterpiece, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Recent years have seen a great revival of interest in the Tractatus. McManus's study of the work offers novel readings of all its major themes and sheds light on issues in metaphysics, ethics and the philosophies of mind, language, and logic.

This paper explores two models using which we might understand Heidegger's notion of ‘Eigentlichkeit’. Although typically translated as ‘authenticity’, a more literal construal of this term would be ‘ownness’ or ‘ownedness’; and in addition to the paper's exegetical value, it also develops two interestingly different understandings of what it is to have a judgment of one's own. The first model understands Heideggerian authenticity as the owning of what I call a ‘standpoint’. Although this model provides an understanding of a number (...) of key features of authenticity, it also invites an important objection—which I call ‘the closure objection’—that can be found in, for example, the work of Steven Galt Crowell and Tony Fisher. Although I argue that this objection can be met, the response for which it calls reveals that the feat of authenticity as understood through the standpoint model rests upon a further feat, and one which may itself have a stronger claim to be identified with Heideggerian authenticity. I develop this thought, introducing what I call the ‘all-things-considered judgment model’ of authenticity, the basis of which lies in, among other sources, Heidegger's appropriation of themes from Aristotle's discussion of phronesis. I explain the exegetical benefits of adopting this model and consider some objections that it invites, before closing with a discussion of how the two models understand the notion of ‘a judgment of one's own’. (shrink)

Spinoza discovered and studied Descartes's philosophy at the school of Van den Enden and then at the University of Leiden. Spinoza is seen as providing metaphysical views of unparalleled audacity, which remain highly exciting and offer a source of inspiration and a source of theoretical models in a wide variety of fields, including neurobiology. The most general of Spinoza's intentions is to expound in accordance with “the prolix Geometric order” what Descartes had left in a more informal one. Spinoza's original (...) distance from Cartesian conceptions, before becoming obvious in the metaphysical views of the Ethics, is already noticeable in the TIE. In metaphysics, the Spinoza‐Descartes relationship is complex, but cannot be said to take the form of an implicit dialogue or a community of inspiration. Descartes's emphasis on the use of free will, the gap between the two authors in matters of moral anthropology is therefore quite limited. (shrink)

This study is about Brentano’s criticism of a version of phenomenalism that he calls “mental monism” and which he attributes to positivist philosophers such as Ernst Mach and John Stuart Mill. I am interested in Brentano’s criticism of Mill’s version of mental monism based on the idea of “permanent possibilities of sensation.” Brentano claims that this form of monism is characterized by the identification of the class of physical phenomena with that of mental phenomena, and it commits itself to a (...) form of idealism. Brentano argues instead for a form of indirect or hypothetical realism based on intentional correlations. (shrink)

Conscious Agency is a major driver of evolution. Artificial Selection (i.e. Conscious Selection by human breeders) was the foil against which Charles Darwin defined Natural Selection. In later work, he extended Artificial Selection to other species. That ability for social (e.g. sexual) selection must have evolved. Jablonka and Ginsburg identify markers of conscious agency, such as Unlimited Associative Learning (UAL), and show that it must have existed at the time of the Cambrian Explosion. To their insights, my commentary argues that (...) the harnessing of stochasticity was also involved in the evolution of the faculty of choice in organisms. (shrink)

The concept of the environment appears to be indispensably involved in adaptive explanation. Quite what its role is, however, is a matter of some dispute. The environment is customarily viewed as the dual of the organism; a wholly external, discrete, autonomous cause of evolution. On this view, the external environment is the principal cause of the adaptedness of form, and the determinant of what it is to be an adaptation. I argue that this conception of the environment neither adequately explains (...) nor individuates evolutionary adaptations. Instead, adaptation, properly construed, is an evolutionary response to affordances. The environment, traditionally construed, underdetermines an organism’s affordances. Instead, I argue that the environment takes its place in evolutionary models not as a discrete causal entity, but as an abstraction. (shrink)

The extensive range and depth of the twenty commentaries on my target article confirms that something has gone deeply wrong in biology. A wide range of biologists has more than met my invitation for “others to pitch in and develop or counter my arguments.” The commentaries greatly develop those arguments. Also remarkably, none raise issues I would seriously disagree with. I will focus first on the more critical comments, summarise the other comments, and then point the way forward on what (...) I view as a necessary and long-overdue transition in the foundations of biology. (shrink)

Wittgenstein is arguably the greatest philosopher of the last hundred years and scepticism is one of the central problems that modern philosophy faces. This collection is the first to be devoted to an examination of how that great philosopher's work bears on this fundamental philosophical problem. Wittgenstein's reaction to scepticism is complex, articulating both a sense that sceptical problems are ultimately unreal and a sense that scepticism teaches us something about the fundamental character of the human predicament. The essays, specially (...) written for this collection by distinguished philosophers and commentators on Wittgenstein, explore that reaction, addressing, in particular, scepticism about the existence of the external world and of other minds. In doing so, it explores issues not only in theory of knowledge but also in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, language, perception and literature, as well as raising questions about the nature of philosophy itself. Several of the papers address the work of Stanley Cavell, perhaps the most influential commentator on the work of Wittgenstein, and Cavell replies in the final pieces to four of those papers. This collection is essential reading for students and scholars of Wittgenstein and anyone interested in the debate surrounding scepticism. (shrink)

Cholak, Goncharov, Khoussainov, and Shore [1] showed that for each k > 0 there is a computably categorical structure whose expansion by a constant has computable dimension k. We show that the same is true with k replaced by ω. Our proof uses a version of Goncharov's method of left and right operations.

According to a prominent view of evolutionary theory, natural selection and the processes of development compete for explanatory relevance. Natural selection theory explains the evolution of biological form insofar as it is adaptive. Development is relevant to the explanation of form only insofar as it constrains the adaptation-promoting effects of selection. I argue that this view of evolutionary theory is erroneous. I outline an alternative, according to which natural selection explains adaptive evolution by appeal to the statistical structure of populations, (...) and development explains the causes of adaptive evolution at the level of individuals. Only together can a statistical theory of selection and a mechanical theory of development explain why populations of organisms comprise individuals that are adapted to their conditions of existence. (shrink)

This paper comprises a case study illustrating ethical and practical challenges for a Ugandan hospital-based social worker early in the COVID-19 pandemic, followed by a commentary. The hospital was under-resourced, with staff and patients experiencing lack of information and panic. The social worker, Denis Adia, recounts his responses to new and ethically challenging situations, including persuading Muslim patients to stop fasting for the good of their health; deciding to keep a baby in hospital with parents although this was against (...) the rules; and supporting a stigmatised former patient in the face of intimidation by colleagues. He reflects on the importance of recognising each person’s unique needs and circumstances, seeing this as a vital role for social workers. The case is followed by a commentary from a UK academic (Sarah Banks), who notes the cognitive and emotional effort (‘ethics work’) undertaken by the social worker to: see the ethical aspects of particular situations; take account of patients’ specific needs; ensure they are treated with respect; promote their well-being; and perform as a good social worker. Banks draws attention to the key role of the virtue of courage in pandemic conditions, which involves working with new risks and facing fears with confidence. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 54, Issue 1, pp 46 - 107 The present paper discusses the question of Marsilio Ficino’s lost translations of Proclus’ _Elements of Physics_ and _Elements of Theology_. It reviews all known evidence for Ficino’s work on the _Elements of Physics_ and _Elements of Theology_, examines new references and fragments of these texts in Ficino’s manuscripts, especially in his personal manuscript of Plotinus’ _Enneads_, and studies how they fit within the Florentine’s philosophical oeuvre. The present case studies of (...) manuscript evidence demonstrate how Proclus accompanied Ficino from his early ‘scholastic background’ through to his mastery of the Platonic tradition late in his career, especially, as is shown, in his study of Pseudo-Dionysius and Plotinus. Despite the fact that scholarship at times pits scholasticism and Renaissance Platonism against each other, in this sense Proclus—largely due to the _Elements_—bridges the two cultures. (shrink)

Dès sa parution en 1953, le Descartes de Martial Gueroult a suscité de vives discussions, toutes liées à une conception singulière, à la fois stricte et peu explicite, de l’« ordre des raisons » d’où les Méditations métaphysiques seraient issues. La présente étude s’intéresse moins aux problèmes les plus classiques soulevés par l’interprétation de Gueroult qu’aux chapitres finaux de l’ouvrage, qui concernent la médecine et surtout la morale. Quelle relation entre la morale cartésienne et l’ordre des raisons? Cette morale a-t-elle (...) ou non statut de science? Qu’elle soit science ou « succédané » de science, comment la caractériser dans son objet? Les limites des réponses apportées à de telles questions marquent celles d’une entreprise critique dont la puissance et le prestige ne peuvent masquer les apories. (shrink)

After sketching some aspects of truthmaker doctrines and "truthmaker projects", and canvassing some prima facie objections to the latter, I turn to an issue which might seem to involve confusion about the nature of character of truthmakers if such there be, viz for statements of identity and (specially) distinctness. The real issue here is versions of the Identity of Indiscernibles. I discuss ways of discriminating versions, which are almost certainly true but trivial, which almost certainly substantive but false, and explore (...) an interesting intermediate possibility which might if developed yield a plausibly true yet not-entirely-trivial version of the doctrine: it is equivalent to what I call "the Denial of Bare Distinctness". (shrink)

Though Heidegger’s Being and Time is often cited as one of the most important philosophical works of the last hundred years, its Division Two has received relatively little attention. This outstanding collection corrects that, examining some of the central themes of Division Two and their wide-ranging and challenging implications. An international team of leading philosophers explore the crucial notions that articulate Heidegger’s concept of authenticity, including death, anxiety, conscience, guilt, resolution and temporality. In doing so, they clarify the bearing of (...) Division Two’s reflections on our understanding of intentionality, normativity, responsibility, autonomy and selfhood. These discussions raise important questions about how we may need to rethink the morals of Division One of Being and Time , the broader project to which that book was devoted, the shaping influence of figures such as Aristotle and Kierkegaard, as well as Heidegger’s relationship with his contemporaries and successors. Essential reading for students and scholars of Heidegger’s thought, and anyone interested in key debates in phenomenology, ethics, metaphilosophy and philosophy of mind. Contributors: William Blattner, Clare Carlisle, Taylor Carman, Steven Galt Crowell, Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Sophia Dandelet, Hubert Dreyfus, Charles Guignon, Jeffrey Haynes, Stephan Käufer, Denis McManus, Stephen Mulhall, George Pattison, Peter Poellner, Katherine Withy, Mark A. Wrathall. (shrink)

Cet article traite de la question méta-sémantique de ce qui permet au souvenir épisodique d’avoir le contenu sémantique qui est le sien. Il adopte une position singulariste quant au contenu du souvenir et critique la justification méta-sémantique relationnaliste de cette position. Selon celle-ci, le contenu du souvenir est singulier parce que le souvenir consiste en une relation d’accointance avec l’événement passé. L’article oppose un argument causal et un argument sémantique à cette analyse puis montre que les deux traits du souvenir (...) que l’idée d’accointance est censée expliquer – la phénoménologie et la singularité du souvenir – peuvent l’être au moyen de modèles singularistes non fondés sur l’accointance. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide a psychologically-informed philosophical account of the phenomenology of episodic remembering. The literature on epistemic or metacognitive feelings has grown considerably in recent years, and there are persuasive reasons, both conceptual and empirical, in favour of the view that the phenomenology of remembering—autonoetic consciousness, as Tulving influentially referred to it, or the feeling of pastness, as we will refer to it here—is an epistemic feeling, but few philosophical treatments of this phenomenology as an epistemic feeling have (...) so far been proposed. Building on insights from the psychological literature, we argue that a form of feeling-based metacognition is involved in episodic remembering and develop an integrated metacognitive feeling-based view that addresses several key aspects of the feeling of pastness, namely, its status as a feeling, its content, and its relationship to the first-order memories the phenomenology of which it provides. (shrink)

RésuméContrairement à ce que pourrait donner à penser la these de E. Mayr sur ľimportance actuelle des explications évolutives en biologie, par opposition aux explications fonctionnelles, ľauteur soutient que, pour ľépistémologie de la causalité, le second type ?on;explication reste plus significatif que le premier. II tente de le montrer en reprenant brièvement son analyse des travaux de P.E. Pilet sur les inhibiteurs de croissance , telle qu'elle a ete présentée dans quatre articles antérieurs.SummaryStarting from E. Mayr's distinction between functional and (...) evolutionary explanation, the author suggests that, as far as the epistemological analysis of causality is concerned, the former type of explanation remains of more interest than the latter. He illustrates this claim by briefly taking up his philosophical and logico‐linguistic study of P.E. Pilet's work on growth inhibitors in the field of plant growth regulation, which was presented in a series of four previous papers.ZusammenfassungVon E. Mayrs Unterscheidung zwischen funktionaler und evolutiver Erklärung ausgehend, weist der Autor nach, dass die erste Art der Erklärung in bezug auf die erkenntnistheoretische Analyse der Kansalität mehr Bedeutung hat. Er versucht aufgrund seiner früheren Analysen von P.E. Pilets Schriften über Wachstumsinhibitoren auf dem Gebiet der Wachstumsregulation von Pflanzen diese Auffassung zu erhärten. (shrink)

Molecular and developmental studies of limb pattern formation have recently gained widespread attention. The fact that vertebrate limbs are amenable to both genetic and embryological manipulations has established this model system as a valuable paradigm for studying vertebrate development. Limb buds are polarised along all three major axes and the establishment of the dorso‐ventral (DV) polarity is dependent upon cues localised in the trunk, where a DV ectodermal interface is produced by confrontation of dorsal and ventral identities. By analogy to (...) Drosophila imaginal disc development, this interface has been proposed to determine and position an ectodermal organising centre, the Apical Ectodermal Ridge (AER), controlling limb bud outgrowth. Recent fate mapping studies(1) and studies of genes regulating DV limb polarity(2‐6), AER formation(7,8) and differentiation(9) suggest, however, that DV patterning and AER induction, though coordinately regulated during limb bud outgrowth, may early on be more dissociated than expected. (shrink)

This paper is the general introduction to a collection of essays entitled Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy (forthcoming). In this substantial introduction, I comment several aspects of the recent reception of Brentano’s philosophical programme in contemporary philosophy, and the actual debates on topics such as emotions, values, and intentionality, for example. It is divided in four parts corresponding to the four sections of the book. The first three sections contain 11 original contributions on Brentano’s philosophy and its place in the (...) history of philosophy in Austria, and the last section contains three unpublished manuscripts from Alfred Kastil et Moritz Schlick. I. Descriptive psychology and phenomenology: Brentano and Husserl II. Brentano and the Vienna Circle III. Brentano and the history of philosophy IV. Documentation: Alfred Kastil and the Vienna Circle . (shrink)

" Des six méditations, la première est la plus brève, mais aussi, selon l'auteur, celle qui exigera la plus longue application d'esprit. Vivante comme peut-être aucun texte de pure philosophie ne l'avait été depuis les dialogues de Platon, elle " parlera " au lecteur le moins averti. Mais on a pas eu tort d'y voir le " cheval de Troie " d'où les démonstrations cartésiennes"s'élancent pour enlever d'assaut toutes espèce de défense " : elle offre en tout cas -ou oppose- (...) à l'analyse de singulières difficultés, qui se meurent au caractère inouï de son projet. " Publiées en latin en 1641 et en français en 1647, avec plusieurs séries d'Objections et Réponses, les Méditations métaphysiques de Descartes constituent, sous une forme littéraire fascinante, une des œuvres phares de toute l'histoire de la philosophie. L'ouvrage dont voici le premier volume soumet chacun des moments du texte cartésien à une étude nouvellement méthodique, tout en s'attachant à définir sur chaque point les acquis de la tradition critique et les problèmes restés ouverts. A la fois guide, somme et essai, il offre ainsi un instrument de travail sans équivalent, doublé d'une réflexion persévérante sur la manière dont le " sujet cartésien " a su s'installer dans son propre monde. (shrink)

Brentano clearly asserts, in his Vienna lectures of 1887–1888, that his descriptive psychology is an a priori or “exact” science. Since he rejects Kant's idea of a synthetic a priori, this means that the descriptive psychologist's laws are analytic. My aim in this paper is to clarify and discuss this view. I examine Brentano's epistemology in the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and then its later developments. I conclude with a difficulty inherent in Brentano's psychological approach to a priori knowledge.

It is well known that classical logics are able to represent only some aspects of ordinary reasoning. In particular, by accepting the law of obversion, they remove the possibility of defining any but a propositional negation; certain natural uses of negation thus elude them. Logical theories do exist, however, that are exempt from such limitations. Among these theories are those of S. Leśniewski, which differ profoundly from classical formal systems. Unlike the latter, they do not have a determined list of (...) functors of syntactical-semantical categories. Due to formalized directives for definitions, the logics of Leśniewski are constructed progressively, making new theses and consequently functors of new syntactical-semantical categories accessible. In this article we use some of these theses-definitions to define a principle of appropriateness. With this principle it is possible to represent certain logical subtleties that are used quite naturally but are neglected due to the law of obversion. (shrink)

We show that there are models and such that elementarily embeds into but their ultrafilter extensions and are not elementarily equivalent.

Le déficit d’explicabilité des techniques d’apprentissage machine (AM) pose des problèmes opérationnels, juridiques et éthiques. Un des principaux objectifs de notre projet est de fournir des explications éthiques des sorties générées par une application fondée sur de l’AM, considérée comme une boîte noire. La première étape de ce projet, présentée dans cet article, consiste à montrer que la validation de ces boîtes noires diffère épistémologiquement de celle mise en place dans le cadre d’une modélisation mathématique et causale d’un phénomène physique. (...) La différence majeure est qu’une méthode d’AM ne prétend pas représenter une causalité entre les paramètres d’entrées, qui peuvent être de plus de haute dimensionnalité, et ceux de sortie. Nous montrons dans cet article l’intérêt de mettre en œuvre les distinctions épistémologiques entre les différentes fonctions épistémiques d’un modèle, d’une part, et entre la fonction épistémique et l’usage d’un modèle, d’autre part. Enfin, la dernière partie de cet article présente nos travaux en cours sur l’évaluation d’une explication, qui peut être plus persuasive qu’informative, ce qui peut ainsi causer des problèmes d’ordre éthique. (shrink)

Judgments based on episodic memory are often thought to be immune to errors of misidentification (IEM). Yet there is a certain category of episodic memories, viz. observer memories, that seems to threaten IEM. In the resulting debate, some say that observer memories are a threat to the IEM enjoyed by episodic memory (Michaelian, 2021); others say that they pose no such threat (Fernández, 2021; Lin, 2020). In this paper, we argue for a middle way. First, we frame the debate, claiming (...) that the existing literature lacks a satisfying definition both of observer memories and of the precise issue of errors of identification in such memories. Then, we contribute to the debate by challenging an anti-separatist view about the relation between phenomenal and intentional features of observer memories that looms behind this debate. On this view, if the rememberer's self is a phenomenal feature of the memory, by implication it is also built into the intentional content. We reject this view and offer a moderate separatist account. Distinguishing between empirically-grounded species of observer memories, we say that the phenomenal self sometimes is, and sometimes is not built into the intentional content of the memory, and this results in different implications for IEM. (shrink)

La théorie étiologique définit les fonctions biologiques en faisant référence à l'action passée de la sélection naturelle. Elle peut ainsi permettre de définir les pathologies comme des dysfonctionnements : il y a pathologie lorsqu'un composant x de l'organisme ne fait plus ce qu'il est censé faire et qui a conduit à le retenir dans le passé de l'histoire évolutive. On peut distinguer trois problèmes qui attendent les partisans de cette solution. Le premier est celui de la conciliation entre deux visées (...) différentes : la théorie de l'évolution peut-elle à la fois contribuer à l'explication du fait récurrent de la maladie (ce que vise une « médecine darwinienne ») et permettre une démarcation entre normal et pathologique ? Le second problème est celui des exceptions : en certains cas, une incapacité acquise a bien valeur de pathologie, mais la présence de la capacité correspondante ne s'explique pas par la sélection, ce qui ôte à la proposition initiale son caractère de nécessité conceptuelle. Enfin, la réalisation d'un trait peut être à la fois atypique et adaptative, ce qui fragilise la notion de normalité biologique impliquée par la théorie étiologique. Ces problèmes sont sérieux et l'article examine pour conclure si un autre concept de fonction, le concept systémique, ne pourrait pas mieux convenir moyennant quelques ajustements, à la philosophie de la médecine. Etiological theory defines biological functions in reference to the past action of natural selection. Accordingly, it may define pathological states as dysfunctional states : component x being in a pathological state would mean x no longer does what it is still supposed to do, that is, what it has been designed to do in past evolutionary history. There are three problems with this solution. First, it may prove difficult to reconcile the evolutionary explanation of the recurring fact of disease (the purpose of a « Darwinian medicine ») and the suggested demarcation between the normal and the pathological. Second, we may think of cases where a certain capacity is impaired, this impairment being clearly a pathology, and where, nonetheless, the explanation of why the corresponding capacity is there is by no means selective. This weakens the initial proposition because it thereby loses its alleged conceptual necessity. Thirdly, a biological feature may be expressed in a way that is both atypical and adaptive, i.e. a challenge to the idea of biological normality involved in etiological theory. These seem to be quite serious problems and one may ask if another concept of function, the systemic concept with a number of adjustments, would not be better suited to the ends of the philosophy of medicine. (shrink)

L'ergographe d'Angelo Mosso est caractérisé comme objectivation du travail musculaire par la méthode graphique, mais aussi comme indice d'une compréhension du corps comme machine, et comme élément d'un systéme où la connaissance doit déterminer l'usage de la force de travail. Les recherches qui sont issues de l'œuvre de Mosso sont analysées dans cet article comme une reconnaissance des exigences normatives du corps en action — menant à une appréciation nouvelle, en particulier, de la signification de la fatigue — et non (...) comme un projet d'assujettissement de l'homme au travail. Les difficultés propres aujourd'hui à toute mesure du travail soulignent rétrospectivement la portée critique du mouvement ergographique. Mosso's ergograph is defined as a tool which made a tracing of the mechanical work of the muscles available ; as a symptom of a mechanistic conception of the human body, but also as part of a system where knowledge has to determine the social use of labour power. Research going beyond Mosso's pioneering work is analyzed in this paper as an acknowledgement of the normative demands of the body in action — leading, in particular, to a reappraisal of the meaning of physical fatigue, rather than as an attempt to further enslave man to his work. In retrospect, the difficulties currently inherent to any attempt at work measurement underline the critical implications of ergography. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill examine dans le dernier des Trois Essais sur la religion l’argument du Dessein. Ce faisant, il l’évalue selon les normes épistémiques définies dans le Système de logique en dressant un parallèle avec l’hypothèse présentée par Darwin dans L’Origine des espèces. Pour comprendre le verdict nuancé rendu par Mill, il faut faire intervenir trois niveaux d’analyse : la relation entre méthode inductive et méthode hypothétique (théorie de la connaissance), le choix du phénoménalisme qui limite l’engagement naturaliste (métaphysique), la (...) question de l’espoir raisonnable (philosophie morale). La philosophie de la religion engage ainsi l’unité de la philosophie de Mill. (shrink)

A remarkable volume, the Russian avant-garde and radical modernism brings together the most significant movements and figures in Russian experimental art, cinema and literature of the early twentieth century (both pre-Soviet and Soviet) and presents them in commentary by leading scholars in the field" -- p. [4] of cover.

Modern societies are increasingly culturally pluralistic and more and more people are coming into contact with other cultures. These encounters with different cultures do not always lead to mutual understanding and acceptance. In this context, the importance of promoting and developing intercultural sensitivity is recognized as one of the fundamental tasks of (future) teachers in modern schools, which presupposes that they themselves are interculturally sensitive and express this sensitivity. With this in mind, the aim of this study was to investigate (...) the extent to which multicultural experiences and certain socio-demographic characteristics of prospective teachers contribute to explaining their intercultural sensitivity. 630 students from all teacher education programs in the Republic of Croatia participated in the study. The survey consisted of a questionnaire on socio-demographic data, an Intercultural Sensitivity Scale (Chen & Starosta, 2000) and a modified Multicultural Experience Questionnaire (Narvaez et al., 2017). The research findings suggest that certain socio-demographic characteristics and multicultural experiences contribute significantly to the level of intercultural sensitivity of prospective teachers. In addition to considering the role of intercultural sensitivity and multicultural experiences in the affirmation of intercultural education in schools, implications for initial teacher education and recommendations for future research are provided based on the research findings obtained. (shrink)

This volume presents new research on Cartesian psychophysiology that combines historical and textual analysis with a consideration of recent advances in contemporary neuroscience research. It seeks to explain why the theory of the Cartesian brain and its communication with the mind still offers a remarkable model for cognitive studies. New research in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science has reignited interest in the role and the structure of the "Cartesian brain" among scholars of Descartes. This volume rethinks Cartesian psychology (...) from the perspective of physiology, with the aim of redetermining the contributions of the brain and central nervous system to mental phenomena. The first part of the volume concerns the details of Descartes's own physiological account of the brain. The discussion covers his treatment not only of the anatomy of the brain, but also of the mode of interaction between mind and body, in which the pineal gland plays a central role, and of the relation between the brain and the rest of the body. The second part considers the reception and legacy of the Cartesian brain. The focus here is on understanding how Cartesian psychophysiology was received by Descartes's early modern contemporaries and immediate successors, as well as on the relevance of the Cartesian brain for contemporary neurophysiology and cognitive science. The Cartesian Brain is an essential resource for scholars and advanced students interested in Descartes, history of philosophy, history of science, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. (shrink)

(2013). Heidegger, Wittgenstein and St Paul on the Last Judgement: On the Roots and Significance of ‘The Theoretical Attitude’. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 143-164. doi: 10.1080/09608788.2012.686980.