In this paper we study intermediate logics between the logic G≤∼, the degree preserving companion of Gödel fuzzy logic with involution G∼ and classical propositional logic CPL, as well as the intermediate logics of their finite-valued counterparts G≤n∼. Although G≤∼ and G≤ are explosive w.r.t. Gödel negation ¬, they are paraconsistent w.r.t. the involutive negation ∼. We introduce the notion of saturated paraconsistency, a weaker notion than ideal paraconsistency, and we fully characterize the ideal and (...) the saturated paraconsistent logics between G≤n∼ and CPL. We also identify a large family of saturated paraconsistent logics in the family of intermediate logics for degree-preserving finite-valued Łukasiewicz logics. (shrink)

This article proposes the meeting of fuzzy logic with paraconsistency in a very precise and foundational way. Specifically, in this article we introduce expansions of the fuzzy logic MTL by means of primitive operators for consistency and inconsistency in the style of the so-called Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs). The main novelty of the present approach is the definition of postulates for this type of operators over MTL-algebras, leading to the definition and axiomatization of a family of (...) logics, expansions of MTL, whose degree-preserving counterpart are paraconsistent and moreover LFIs. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to explore the class of intermediate logics between the truth-preserving Lukasiewicz logic L and its degree-preserving companion L<⁠. From a syntactical point of view, we introduce some families of inference rules (that generalize the explosion rule) that are admissible in L< and derivable in L and we characterize the corresponding intermediate logics. From a semantical point of view, we first consider the family of logics characterized by matrices defined (...) by lattice filters in ⁠[0,1], but we show there are intermediate logics falling outside this family. Finally, we study the case of finite-valued Lukasiewicz logics where we axiomatize a large family of intermediate logics defined by families of matrices (A,F) such that A is a finite MV-algebra and F is a lattice filter. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to the development of model theory of fuzzy logic in narrow sense. We consider a formal system EvŁ of fuzzy logic that has evaluated syntax, i. e. axioms need not be fully convincing and so, they form a fuzzy set only. Consequently, formulas are provable in some general degree. A generalization of Gödel's completeness theorem does hold in EvŁ. The truth values form an MV-algebra that is either finite or Łukasiewicz algebra (...) on [0, 1].The classical omitting types theorem states that given a formal theory T and a set Σ of formulas with the same free variables, we can construct a model of T which omits Σ, i. e. there is always a formula from Σ not true in it. In this paper, we generalize this theorem for EvŁ, that is, we prove that if T is a fuzzy theory and Σ forms a fuzzy set , then a model omitting Σ also exists. We will prove this theorem for two essential cases of EvŁ: either EvŁ has logical constants for all truth values, or it has these constants for truth values from [0, 1] ∩ ℚ only. (shrink)

The term "fuzzy logic," as it is understood in this book, stands for all aspects of representing and manipulating knowledge based on the rejection of the most fundamental principle of classical logic---the principle of bivalence. According to this principle, each declarative sentence is required to be either true or false. In fuzzy logic, these classical truth values are not abandoned. However, additional, intermediate truth values between true and false are allowed, which are interpreted as degrees of truth. This (...) opens a new way of thinking---thinking in terms of degrees rather than absolutes. For example, it leads to the definition of a new kind of sets, referred to as fuzzy sets, in which membership is a matter of degree. The book examines the genesis and development of fuzzy logic. It surveys the prehistory of fuzzy logic and inspects circumstances that eventually lead to the emergence of fuzzy logic. The book explores in detail the development of propositional, predicate, and other calculi that admit degrees of truth, which are known as fuzzy logic in the narrow sense. Fuzzy logic in the broad sense, whose primary aim is to utilize degrees of truth for emulating common-sense human reasoning in natural language, is scrutinized as well. The book also examines principles for developing mathematics based on fuzzy logic and provides overviews of areas in which this has been done most effectively. It also presents a detailed survey of established and prospective applications of fuzzy logic in various areas of human affairs, and provides an assessment of the significance of fuzzy logic as a new paradigm. (shrink)

In the literature on vagueness one finds two very different kinds of degree theory. The dominant kind of account of gradable adjectives in formal semantics and linguistics is built on an underlying framework involving bivalence and classical logic: its degrees are not degrees of truth. On the other hand, fuzzy logic based theories of vagueness—largely absent from the formal semantics literature but playing a significant role in both the philosophical literature on vagueness and in the contemporary logic literature—are (...) logically nonclassical and give a central role to the idea of degrees of truth. Each kind of degree theory has a strength: the classical kind allows for rich and subtle analyses of the comparative form of gradable adjectives and of various types of gradable precise adjectives, while the fuzzy kind yields a compelling solution to the sorites paradox. This paper argues that the fuzzy kind of theory can match the benefits of the classical kind and hence that the burden is on the latter to match the advantages of the former. In particular, we develop a new version of the fuzzy logic approach that—unlike existing fuzzy theories—yields a compelling analysis of the comparative as well as an adequate account of gradable precise predicates, while still retaining the advantage of genuinely solving the sorites paradox. (shrink)

We consider the equationally orderable quasivarieties and associate with them deductive systems defined using the order. The method of definition of these deductive systems encompasses the definition of logics preserving degrees of truth we find in the research areas of substructural logics and mathematical fuzzy logic. We prove several general results, for example that the deductive systems so defined are finitary and that the ones associated with equationally orderable varieties are congruential.

In this paper we first give a variant of a theorem of Jockusch–Lewis– Remmel on existence of a computable, degree-preserving homeomorphism between a bounded strong ${\Pi^0_2}$ class and a bounded ${\Pi^0_1}$ class in 2 ω . Namely, we show that for mathematically common and interesting topological spaces, such as computably presented ${\mathbb{R}^n}$ , we can obtain a similar result where the homeomorphism is in fact the identity mapping. Second, we apply this finding to give a new, priority-free proof (...) of existence of a tree of shadow points computable in 0′. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to graded model theory, in the context of mathematical fuzzy logic. We study characterizations of classes of graded structures in terms of the syntactic form of their first-order axiomatization. We focus on classes given by universal and universal-existential sentences. In particular, we prove two amalgamation results using the technique of diagrams in the setting of structures valued on a finite MTL-algebra, from which analogues of the Łoś–Tarski and the Chang–Łoś–Suszko preservation theorems follow.

The paper presents generalizations of results on so-called Horn logic, well-known in universal algebra, to the setting of fuzzy logic. The theories we consider consist of formulas which are implications between identities (equations) with premises weighted by truth degrees. We adopt Pavelka style: theories are fuzzy sets of formulas and we consider degrees of provability of formulas from theories. Our basic structure of truth degrees is a complete residuated lattice. We derive a Pavelka-style completeness theorem (degree of (...) provability equals degree of truth) from which we get some particular cases by imposing restrictions on the formulas under consideration. As a particular case, we obtain completeness of fuzzy equational logic. (shrink)

The paper introduces a concept of logic applied to a formalization of the so-called inferences preserving degrees of truth. Semantical and syntactical characterizations of three kinds of logics preserving degrees of truth are provided. The other approach than in [3] and [9] to the problem of expressing that a sentence is less true than a sentence is presented.

We present a necessary and sufficient condition for the embeddability of a finite principally decomposable lattice into the computably enumerable degrees preserving greatest element.

The paper studies closure properties of classes of fuzzy structures defined by fuzzy implicational theories, i.e. theories whose formulas are implications between fuzzy identities. We present generalizations of results from the bivalent case. Namely, we characterize model classes of general implicational theories, finitary implicational theories, and Horn theories by means of closedness under suitable algebraic constructions.

Justification logics provide a framework for reasoning about justifications and evidence. In this article, we study a fuzzy variant of justification logics in which an agent’s justification for a belief has certainty degree between 0 and 1. We replace the classical base of justification logics with Hájek’s rational Pavelka logic. We introduce fuzzy possible world semantics with crisp accessibility relation and also single world models for our logics. We establish soundness and graded-style completeness (...) for both kinds of semantics. We also introduce extensions with product conjunction. Finally, we offer a solution to a variant of the sorites paradox in our fuzzy justification logics. (shrink)

Nilpotent Minimum logic (NML) is a substructural algebraizable logic that is a distinguished member of the family of systems of Mathematical Fuzzy logic, and at the same time it is the axiomatic extension with the prelinearity axiom of Nelson and Markov’s Constructive logic with strong negation. In this paper our main aim is to characterize and axiomatize paraconsistent variants of NML and its extensions defined by (sets of) logical matrices over linearly ordered NM-algebra with lattice filters as designated values, (...) with special emphasis on those that only exclude the falsum truth-value, called non-falsity preserving logics. We also consider turning these non-falsity preserving logics into Logics of Formal Inconsistency by expanding them with a consistency operator, and we axiomatize them as well. Finally, we provide a full description of the logics defined by finite products of matrices over finite NM-chains. (shrink)

Prototypes and fuzziness are regarded in this paper as fundamental phenomena in the inherent logic of concepts whose relationship, however, has not been sufficiently clarified. Therefore, modifications are proposed in the definition of both. Prototypes are defined as the elements possessing maximal degree of membership in the given category such thatthis membership has maximal cognitive efficiency in representing theelement. A modified fuzzy set (m-fuzzy set) is defined on aclass (possibly self-contradictory collection) such that its core (the collection (...) of elements with full membership) is aset (self-consistent collection) comprising the finite set of the prototypes. In this scheme of recursive representation the possibility of contradictions, which has been proven to be inevitable in the logic of concepts, islocalized. Finally a related model of the brain''s pattern recognition mechanism is briefly summarized. (shrink)

Involutive Stone algebras were introduced by R. Cignoli and M. Sagastume in connection to the theory of $n$-valued Łukasiewicz–Moisil algebras. In this work we focus on the logic that preserves degrees of truth associated to S-algebras named Six. This follows a very general pattern that can be considered for any class of truth structure endowed with an ordering relation, and which intends to exploit many-valuedness focusing on the notion of inference that results from preserving lower bounds of truth values, (...) and hence not only preserving the value $1$. Among other things, we prove that Six is a many-valued logic that can be determined by a finite number of matrices. Besides, we show that Six is a paraconsistent logic. Moreover, we prove that it is a genuine Logic of Formal Inconsistency with a consistency operator that can be defined in terms of the original set of connectives. Finally, we study the proof theory of Six providing a Gentzen calculus for it, which is sound and complete with respect to the logic. (shrink)

A common objection to theories of vagueness based on fuzzy logics centres on the idea that assigning a single numerical degree of truth -- a real number between 0 and 1 -- to each vague statement is excessively precise. A common objection to Bayesian epistemology centres on the idea that assigning a single numerical degree of belief -- a real number between 0 and 1 -- to each proposition is excessively precise. In this paper I explore (...) possible parallels between these objections. In particular I argue that the only good objection along these lines to fuzzy theories of vagueness does not translate into a good objection to Bayesian epistemology. An important part of my argument consists in drawing a distinction between two different notions of degree of belief, which I call dispositional degree of belief and epistemic degree of belief. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to define the logical system Sm4 characterised by the degree of truth-preserving consequence relation defined on the ordered set of values of Smiley’s four-element matrix MSm4. The matrix MSm4 has been of considerable importance in the development of relevant logics and it is at the origin of bilattice logics. It will be shown that Sm4 is a most interesting paraconsistent logic which encloses a sound theory of logical necessity similar to (...) that of Anderson and Belnap’s logic of entailment E. Intuitively, Sm4 can be described as a four-valued expansion of the positive fragment of Lewis’ S5 or, alternatively, as a four-valued version of S5. (shrink)

Łukasiewicz’s infinite-valued logic is commonly defined as the set of formulas that take the value 1 under all evaluations in the Łukasiewicz algebra on the unit real interval. In the literature a deductive system axiomatized in a Hilbert style was associated to it, and was later shown to be semantically defined from Łukasiewicz algebra by using a “truth-preserving” scheme. This deductive system is algebraizable, non-selfextensional and does not satisfy the deduction theorem. In addition, there exists no Gentzen calculus fully (...) adequate for it. Another presentation of the same deductive system can be obtained from a substructural Gentzen calculus. In this paper we use the framework of abstract algebraic logic to study a different deductive system which uses the aforementioned algebra under a scheme of “preservation of degrees of truth”. We characterize the resulting deductive system in a natural way by using the lattice filters of Wajsberg algebras, and also by using a structural Gentzen calculus, which is shown to be fully adequate for it. This logic is an interesting example for the general theory: it is selfextensional, non-protoalgebraic, and satisfies a “graded” deduction theorem. Moreover, the Gentzen system is algebraizable. The first deductive system mentioned turns out to be the extension of the second by the rule of Modus Ponens. (shrink)

This paper first investigates logical characterizations of different structures of opposition that extend the square of opposition in a way or in another. Blanché’s hexagon of opposition is based on three disjoint sets. There are at least two meaningful cubes of opposition, proposed respectively by two of the authors and by Moretti, and pioneered by philosophers such as J. N. Keynes, W. E. Johnson, for the former, and H. Reichenbach for the latter. These cubes exhibit four and six squares of (...) opposition respectively. We clarify the differences between these two cubes, and discuss their gradual extensions, as well as the one of the hexagon when vertices are no longer two-valued. The second part of the paper is dedicated to the use of these structures of opposition for discussing the comparison of two items. Comparing two items usually involves a set of relevant attributes whose values are compared, and may be expressed in terms of different modalities such as identity, similarity, difference, opposition, analogy. Recently, J.-Y. Béziau has proposed an “analogical hexagon” that organizes the relations linking these modalities. Elementary comparisons may be a matter of degree, attributes may not have the same importance. The paper studies in which ways the structure of the hexagon may be preserved in such gradual extensions. As another illustration of the graded hexagon, we start with the hexagon of equality and inequality due to R. Blanché and extend it with fuzzy equality and fuzzy inequality. Besides, the cube induced by a tetra-partition can account for the comparison of two items in terms of preference, reversed preference, indifference and non-comparability even if these notions are a matter of degree. The other cube, which organizes the relations between the different weighted qualitative aggregation modes, is more relevant for the attribute-based comparison of items in terms of similarity. (shrink)

When considering m-sequents, it is always possible to obtain an m-sequent calculus VL for every m-valued logic (defined from an arbitrary finite algebra L of cardinality m) following for instance the works of the Vienna Group for Multiple-valued Logics. The Gentzen relations associated with the calculi VL are always finitely equivalential but might not be algebraizable. In this paper we associate an algebraizable 2-Gentzen relation with every sequent calculus VL in a uniform way, provided the original algebra L has (...) a reduct that is a distributive lattice or a pseudocomplemented distributive lattice. We also show that the sentential logic naturally associated with the provable sequents of this algebraizable Gentzen relation is the logic that preserves degrees of truth with respect to the original algebra (in contrast with the more common logic that merely preserves truth). Finally, for some particular logics we obtain 2-sequent calculi that axiomatize the algebraizable Gentzen relations obtained so far. (shrink)

Shared conceptualization, in the sense we take it here, is as recent a notion as the Semantic Web, but its relevance for a large variety of fields requires efficient methods of extraction and representation for both quantitative and qualitative data. This notion is particularly relevant for the investigation into, and construction of, semantic structures such as knowledge bases and taxonomies, but given the required large, often inaccurate, corpora available for search we can get only approximations. We see fuzzy description (...) logic as an adequate medium for the representation of human semantic knowledge and propose a means to couple it with fuzzy semantic networks via the propositional Łukasiewicz fuzzy logic such that these suffice for decidability for queries over a semantic-knowledge base such as “to what degree of sharedness does it entail the instantiation C(a) for some concept C” or “what are the roles R that connect the individuals a and b to degree of sharedness ε.” . (shrink)

Presented is a completeness theorem for fuzzy equational logic with truth values in a complete residuated lattice: Given a fuzzy set Σ of identities and an identity p≈q, the degree to which p≈q syntactically follows (is provable) from Σ equals the degree to which p≈q semantically follows from Σ. Pavelka style generalization of well-known Birkhoff's theorem is therefore established.

In the realm of computational intelligence, the age-old adage, "not everything is black and white," has never been more pertinent. Through the lens of fuzzy logic and neutrosophic systems, Applications of Fuzzy Theory in Applied Sciences and Computer Applications, unravels the complex tapestry of uncertainty, imprecision, and subjectivity in real-world scenarios. This book stands as a testament to the power of fuzzy systems in bridging the gap between theoretical concepts and their pragmatic applications. Chapter one introduces readers (...) to the ever-evolving realm of biometrics, specifically focusing on face recognition. The complexities of human features demand a system that can navigate the nuances, and fuzzy pattern recognition presents a promising solution. Diving deeper into the world of health and demography in Chapter two, the authors explore the potential of fuzzy inference systems in mortality studies. By incorporating a degree of uncertainty, these systems offer a more holistic view of mortality trends and predictions. From biometrics and health, we shift our focus to the mathematical underpinnings of neutrosophic logic in chapter three. Here, the application of neutrosophy over digraphs is meticulously dissected, offering readers an intricate understanding of this unique conjunction. The subsequent chapters delve into various other fields, from reliability analysis and higher education to fisheries and supply chain management, demonstrating the pervasive influence of fuzzy and neutrosophic systems in diverse domains. Chapter t2welve concludes this enlightening journey with a life-altering application - the utilization of fuzzy logic in the detection and classification of brain tumors. Through this chapter, the profound impact of fuzzy systems on healthcare and diagnostics is underscored. This promises a transformative journey, ensuring that by the end, readers will look at uncertainty not as a challenge, but as an opportunity to explore, innovate, and excel. Whether you're a seasoned researcher, a professional seeking innovative solutions, or a curious student, this book has insights to offer to everyone. Welcome to a world where the lines are blurred, but the visions are clear. (shrink)

In a legal expert system based on CBR (Case-Based Reasoning), legal statute rules are interpreted on the basis of precedents. This interpretation, because of its vagueness and uncertainty of the interpretation cannot be handled with the means used for crisp cases. In our legal expert system, on the basis of the facts of precedents, the statute rule is interpreted as a form of case rule, the application of which involves the concepts of membership and vagueness. The case rule is stored (...) in a data base by means of fuzzy frames. The inference based on a case rule is made by fuzzy YES and fuzzy NO, and the degree of similarity of cases. The system proposed here will be used for legal education; its main area of application is contract, especially in relation to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). (shrink)

The dissertation has two parts, each dealing with a problem, namely: 1) What is the most adequate account of fuzziness -the so-called phenomenon of vagueness?, and 2) what is the most plausible solution to the sorites, or heap paradox? I will try to show that fuzzy properties are those which are gradual, amenable to be possessed in a greater or smaller extent. Acknowledgement of degrees in the instantiation of a property allows for a gradual transition from one opposite to (...) the other, each intermediate stage constituting an overlap in certain proportion of both contraries. Hence, degrees in the possession of a property give rise to simple contradictions. The reason why I have chosen those two questions is that they provide the main philosophical motivation for a particular brand of an infinite valued and paraconsistent logic. I will claim that Classical logic (CL) is not adequate to handle fuzzy situations, and, being deficient, is in need of being expanded to make room for degrees of truth and weak contradictions. One can hardly deny the importance of the debate, since what is ultimately at stake is what the limits of truth, rationality, intelligibility and possibility are. The main disciplines within which the research moves are the philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and ontology. (shrink)

Formalization of reasoning which accepts rules of inference leading to conclusions whose logical values are not smaller than the logical value of the “weakest” premise leads to the concept of consequence operation preserving degrees of truth. Several examples of such consequence operation have already been considered . In the present paper we give a general notion of the consequence operation preserving degrees of truth and its characterization in terms of projective generation and selfextensionality.

We consider the class of pointed varieties of algebras having a lattice term reduct and we show that each such variety gives rise in a natural way, and according to a regular pattern, to at least three interesting logics. Although the mentioned class includes several logically and algebraically significant examples (e.g. Boolean algebras, MV algebras, Boolean algebras with operators, residuated lattices and their subvarieties, algebras from quantum logic or from depth relevant logic), we consider here in greater detail Abelian (...) ℓ-groups, where such logics respectively correspond to: i) Meyer and Slaney’s Abelian logic [31]; ii) Galli et al.’s logic of equilibrium [21]; iii) a new logic of “preservation of truth degrees”. (shrink)

In VAGUENESS AND DEGREES OF TRUTH, Nicholas Smith develops a new theory of vagueness: fuzzy plurivaluationism. -/- A predicate is said to be VAGUE if there is no sharply defined boundary between the things to which it applies and the things to which it does not apply. For example, 'heavy' is vague in a way that 'weighs over 20 kilograms' is not. A great many predicates -- both in everyday talk, and in a wide array of theoretical vocabularies, from (...) law to psychology to engineering -- are vague. -/- Smith argues, based on a detailed account of the defining features of vagueness, that an accurate theory of vagueness must involve the idea that truth comes in degrees. The core idea of degrees of truth is that while some sentences are true and some are false, others possess intermediate truth values: they are truer than the false sentences, but not as true as the true ones. Degree-theoretic treatments of vagueness have been proposed in the past, but all have encountered significant objections. In light of these, Smith develops a new type of degree theory. Its innovations include a definition of logical consequence that allows the derivation of a classical consequence relation from the degree-theoretic semantics, a unified account of degrees of belief and their relationships with degrees of truth and subjective probabilities, and the incorporation of semantic indeterminacy -- the view that vague statements need not have unique meanings -- into the degree-theoretic framework. -/- As well as being essential reading for those working on vagueness, Smith's book provides an excellent entry-point for newcomers to the area -- both from elsewhere in philosophy, and from computer science, logic and engineering. It contains a thorough introduction to existing theories of vagueness and to the requisite logical background. (shrink)

This is a contribution to the discussion on the role of truth degrees in manyvalued logics from the perspective of abstract algebraic logic. It starts with some thoughts on the so-called Suszko’s Thesis (that every logic is two-valued) and on the conception of semantics that underlies it, which includes the truth-preserving notion of consequence. The alternative usage of truth values in order to define logics that preserve degrees of truth is presented and discussed. Some recent works studying (...) these in the particular cases of Łukasiewicz’s many-valued logics and of logics associated with varieties of residuated lattices are also presented. Finally the extension of this paradigm to other, more general situations is discussed, highlighting the need for philosophical or applied motivations in the selection of the truth degrees, due both to the interpretation of the idea of truth degree and to some mathematical difficulties. (shrink)

Many theorists think nowadays that vagueness is a widespread phenomenon that affects and infects almost all terms and concepts of our thought and language, and for some philosophers degree of truth theories are the best way to cope with vagueness and sorites susceptible concepts. In this paper I argue that many of the allegedly vague concepts are not vague in the last analysis the philosopher or scientist could offer if compelled to, and that much of the vagueness of the (...) properly vague ones comes from its contextual dependence alone. I also argue that degree of truth approaches -- particularly the infinitist ones -- and fuzzy logics do not solve practically any of the puzzles brought about by vagueness and sorites arguments, and conversely they have many additional problems of their own. Concerning recalcitrant cases of vagueness, I would tentatively commend the epistemic theory of vagueness, from an inference to the best explanation. (shrink)

We look at the problem of revising fuzzy belief bases, i.e., belief base revision in which both formulas in the base as well as revision-input formulas can come attached with varying degrees. Working within a very general framework for fuzzy logic which is able to capture certain types of uncertainty calculi as well as truth-functional fuzzy logics, we show how the idea of rational change from “crisp” base revision, as embodied by the idea of partial meet (...) (base) revision, can be faithfully extended to revising fuzzy belief bases. We present and axiomatise an operation of partial meet fuzzy base revision and illustrate how the operation works in several important special instances of the framework. We also axiomatise the related operation of partial meet fuzzy base contraction. (shrink)

Kripke’s work on modal logic has been immensely influential. It hardly needs remarking that this is not his only work. Here we address his pioneering applications of fixpoint constructions to the theory of truth, and related work by others. In his fundamental paper on this he explicitly described a modal version, applying a fixpoint construction world by world within a modal frame. This can certainly be carried out, and doubtless has been somewhere. Others have suggested a variety of other extensions (...) such as using the unit interval as the underlying space of truth values, or using a four valued logic instead of three, or various combinations of these. When many similar formal constructions have been proposed, one naturally asks what is the common core. Is there some setting in which things can be proved once and for all, with the various specific proposals seen as applications of this common core. In fact this is the case, with bilattices providing the desired structure. Much of such a development has already appeared in some form or other. It is the purpose of this article to bring everything together, and also add a few things. We present general results that, more or less, have everything currently in the fixpoint literature as special cases. Fortunately this does not make things more complicated, since the underlying proofs are essentially the same as they have always been. It is just that they are being carried out in generality rather than in specificity. (shrink)

This commentary on Sadegh-Zadeh's article 'Fuzzy health, illness and disease,' has its focus on the philosophical background for applying fuzzy logic to medical theory. I concentrate on four issues. First, I contest some of Sadegh-Zadeh's statements on the present state of the theory of medicine, in particular with regard to assumptions ascribed to contemporary theorists. Second, I consider Sadegh-Zadeh's interesting idea that a person can have a disease to varying degrees, from not having it at all to having (...) it completely. I argue that there are difficulties pertaining to the definition of particular diseases, which obstruct the application of this idea. The following two points concern medical semantics and principles for definition in general. I take issue with Sadegh-Zadeh's description of the correct procedure for definition. I also contest his unconditional proposal for a social definition of health, illness and disease. (shrink)

Power structures are obtained by lifting some mathematical structure (operations, relations, etc.) from an universe X to its power set ${\mathcal{P}(X)}$ . A similar construction provides fuzzy power structures: operations and fuzzy relations on X are extended to operations and fuzzy relations on the set ${\mathcal{F}(X)}$ of fuzzy subsets of X. In this paper we study how this construction preserves some properties of fuzzy sets and fuzzy relations (similarity, congruence, etc.). We define the notions (...) of good, very good, Hoare good and Smith good fuzzy relation and establish some connections between them, generalizing some results of Brink, Bošnjak and Madarász on power structures. (shrink)

The dissertation has two parts, each dealing with a problem, namely: 1) What is the most adequate account of fuzziness -the so-called phenomenon of vagueness?, and 2) what is the most plausible solution to the sorites, or heap paradox? I will try to show that fuzzy properties are those which are gradual, amenable to be possessed in a greater or smaller extent. Acknowledgement of degrees in the instantiation of a property allows for a gradual transition from one opposite to (...) the other, each intermediate stage constituting an overlap in certain proportion of both contraries. Hence, degrees in the possession of a property give rise to simple contradictions. The reason why I have chosen those two questions is that they provide the main philosophical motivation for a particular brand of an infinite valued and paraconsistent logic. I will claim that Classical logic (CL) is not adequate to handle fuzzy situations, and, being deficient, is in need of being expanded to make room for degrees of truth and weak contradictions. One can hardly deny the importance of the debate, since what is ultimately at stake is what the limits of truth, rationality, intelligibility and possibility are. The main disciplines within which the research moves are the philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and ontology. (shrink)

The need for a ‘many-valued logic’ in linguistics has been evident since the 1970s, but there was lack of clarity as to whether it should come from the family of fuzzy logics or from the family of probabilistic logics. In this regard, Fine [14] and Kamp [26] pointed out undesirable effects of fuzzy logic (the failure of idempotency and coherence) which kept two generations of linguists and philosophers at arm’s length. (Another unwanted feature of fuzzy (...) logic is the property of truth functionality.) While probabilistic logic is not fraught by the same problems, its lack of constructiveness, i.e. its inability to compose complex truth degrees from atomic truth degrees, did not make it more attractive to linguists either. In the absence of a clear perspective in ‘many-valued logic’, scholars chose to proliferate ontologies grafted atop the classical bivalent logic: ontologies for truth, individuals, events, situations, possible worlds and degrees. The result has been a collection of incompatible classical logics. In this paper, I present sample logic, in particular its semantics (not its axiomatization). Sample logics is a member of the family of probabilistic logics, which is constructive without being truth functional. More specifically, I integrate all the important linguistic data on which the classical logics are predicated. The concepts of (in)dependency and conditional (in)dependency are the cornerstones of sample logic. (shrink)

For each continuous t-norm &, a class of fuzzy topological spaces, called &-topological spaces, is introduced. The motivation stems from the idea that to each many-valued logic there may correspond a theory of many-valued topology, in particular, each continuous t-norm may lead to a theory of fuzzy topology. It is shown that for each continuous t-norm &, the subcategory consisting of &-topological spaces is simultaneously reflective and coreflective in the category of fuzzy topological spaces, hence gives rise (...) to an autonomous theory of fuzzy topology. Topologizing a fuzzy pre-ordered set with the fuzzy Scott topology yields a functor from the category of fuzzy pre-ordered sets and maps that preserve suprema of flat ideals to the category of &-topological spaces. It is proved that this functor is a full one if and only if the t-norm & is Archimedean. (shrink)

We study degree-theoretic properties of reals that are not random with respect to any continuous probability measure (NCR). To this end, we introduce a family of generalized Hausdorff measures based on the iterates of the “dissipation” function of a continuous measure and study the effective nullsets given by the corresponding Solovay tests. We introduce two constructions that preserve non-randomness with respect to a given continuous measure. This enables us to prove the existence of NCR reals in a number of (...) Turing degrees. In particular, we show that every \(\Delta ^0_2\) -degree contains an NCR element. (shrink)

It is taken for granted in much of the literature on vagueness that semantic and epistemic approaches to vagueness are fundamentally at odds. If we can analyze borderline cases and the sorites paradox in terms of degrees of truth, then we don’t need an epistemic explanation. Conversely, if an epistemic explanation suffices, then there is no reason to depart from the familiar simplicity of classical bivalent semantics. I question this assumption, showing that there is an intelligible motivation for adopting a (...) many-valued semantics even if one accepts a form of epistemicism. The resulting hybrid view has advantages over both classical epistemicism and traditional many-valued approaches. (shrink)

We give a partial answer to an important open problem in descriptive set theory, the Decomposability Conjecture for Borel functions on an analytic subset of a Polish space to a separable metrizable space. Our techniques employ deep results from effective descriptive set theory and recursion theory. In fact it is essential to extend several prominent results in recursion theory (e.g. the Shore-Slaman Join Theorem) to the setting of Polish spaces. As a by-product we give both positive and negative results on (...) the Martin Conjecture on the degree preserving Borel functions between Polish spaces. Additionally we prove results about the transfinite version as well as the computable version of the Decomposability Conjecture. (shrink)

Whenever a structure with a particularly interesting computability-theoretic property is found, it is natural to ask whether similar examples can be found within well-known classes of algebraic structures, such as groups, rings, lattices, and so forth. One way to give positive answers to this question is to adapt the original proof to the new setting. However, this can be an unnecessary duplication of effort, and lacks generality. Another method is to code the original structure into a structure in the given (...) class in a way that is effective enough to preserve the property in which we are interested. In this paper, we show how to transfer a number of computability-theoretic properties from directed graphs to structures in the following classes: symmetric, irreflexive graphs; partial orderings; lattices; rings ; integral domains of arbitrary characteristic; commutative semigroups; and 2-step nilpotent groups. This allows us to show that several theorems about degree spectra of relations on computable structures, nonpreservation of computable categoricity, and degree spectra of structures remain true when we restrict our attention to structures in any of the classes on this list. The codings we present are general enough to be viewed as establishing that the theories mentioned above are computably complete in the sense that, for a wide range of computability-theoretic nonstructure type properties, if there are any examples of structures with such properties then there are such examples that are models of each of these theories. (shrink)

This paper argues that the doctrines of determinism and supervenience, while logically independent, are importantly linked in physical mechanics—and quite interestingly so. For it is possible to formulate classical mechanics in such a way as to take advantage of the existence of mathematical devices that represent the advance of time—and which are such as to inspire confidence in the truth of determinism—in order to prevent violation of supervenience. It is also possible to formulate classical mechanics-and to do so in an (...) observationally equivalent, and thus equally empirically respectable, way—such that violations of supervenience are (on the one hand) routine, and (on the other hand) necessary for achieving complete descriptions of the motions of mechanical systems—necessary, therefore, for achieving a deterministic mechanical theory. Two such formulations—only one of which preserves supervenience universally—will conceive of mechanical law in quite different ways. What's more, they will not admit of being extended to treat thermodynamical questions in the same way. Thus we will find that supervenience is a contingent matter, in the following rather surprising and philosophically interesting way: we cannot in mechanics separate our decisions to conceive of physical law in certain ways from our decisions to treat macroscopic quantities in certain ways. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I argue that vagueness is a metaphysical phenomenon---that properties and objects can be vague---and propose a trivalent theory of vagueness meant to account for the vagueness in the world. In the first half, I argue against the theories that preserve classical logic. These theories include epistemicism, contextualism, and semantic nihilism. My objections to these theories are independent of considerations of the possibility that vagueness is a metaphysical phenomenon. However, I also argue that these theories are not capable (...) of accommodating metaphysical vagueness. As I move into my positive theory, I first argue for the possibility of metaphysical vagueness and respond to objections that charge that the world cannot be vague. One of these objections is Gareth Evans' much-disputed argument that vague identities are impossible. I then describe what I call the logic of states of affairs. The logic of states of affairs has as its atomic elements states of affairs that can obtain, unobtain, or be indeterminate. Finally, I argue that the logic of states of affairs is a better choice for a theory of vagueness than other logics that could accommodate metaphysical vagueness such as supervaluationism and degree theories. Preference should be given to the logic of states of affairs because it provides a better explanation of higher-order vagueness and does a better job of matching our ordinary understandings of logical operators than supervaluationism does and because it provides a more general account of indeterminacy than the account given by degree theories. Advisor: Reina Hayaki. (shrink)

Rosanna Keefe (`Vagueness by Numbers' MIND 107 1998 565--79) argues that theories of vagueness based upon fuzzy logic and set theory rest on a confusion: once we have assigned a number to an object to represent (for example) its *height*, there is no distinct purpose left to be served by assigning a number to the object to represent its *degree of tallness*; she claims that ``any numbers assigned in an attempt to capture the vagueness of `tall' do no (...) more than serve as another measure of height.'' In this paper I defend fuzzy theories of vagueness against Keefe's attack. I show that the numbers that we assign to objects to measure (for example) heights serve a quite distinct purpose from the numbers that fuzzy theories of vagueness assign to objects to measure degrees of tallness: the two sorts of assignment are both *formally* and *conceptually* distinct; the fuzzy approach to vagueness is well-motivated and free of confusion. (shrink)