My aim is to demonstrate the specificities and differences between transcendental deduction of concepts and deduction of the fundamental principles of pure practical reason in Kant’s metaphysics. First of all it is necessary to examine Kant’s attitude to the metaphysics of his time and the problem of its new justification. Kant in his philosophy explicated not only the theoretical world of cognition, but also the practical world of freedom. Accordingly, the fundamental means of proving metaphysics’ claims are (...) the deduction of pure concepts of understanding and the deduction of the principles of pure practical reason. The underlying premises of the Kantian project of reviving metaphysics, “the Copernican Turn”, the critical methods and basic principles of transcendental idealism also provide the methodological basis of transcendental deduction, a new method of proving the claims of metaphysics in various spheres of human being. Proceeding from the above, I analyse the essence, structure and the peculiarities as well as the differences between the deduction of experience and the deduction of freedom. I single out the following features of the two types of deduction. First, theoretical use of reason is aimed at objects while practical reason is aimed at noumena, the foundations of will and freedom. Second, the transcendental deduction of space and time, as well as the deduction of categories, is preceded by transcendental reduction, which is absent in the deduction of freedom. Third, Kant orients the methodological movement of deductions in opposite directions. Theoretical deduction proceeds from pure forms of sensible intuition to concepts of understanding and thence to fundamental principles. Practical deduction proceeds from a priori principles to the concepts of the metaphysics of morals and thence to moral feelings. Fourth, deduction in the theoretical sphere forbids speculative reason to go beyond experience. Practical deduction has pointed to the intelligible world and has proved its “legitimacy”. (shrink)

From Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals and Critique of practical reason, we can deduce Kant's interpretation of the concept of freedom, which has undergone a change from practical freedom to transcendental freedom, and the deduction of freedom has been perfected, the rational facts have been put forward to provide the basis of free deduction. The reason for the change is that freedom as the basis of theoretical practice is assumed and predetermined, how (...) the cause and effect of freedom as will may not be explained, and the nature of freedom is not defined clearly, the legitimacy and authority of the moral law is not established. After the transformation, the problem was solved. Although rigour raises questions about the universality of Kant’s moral law, Onora Sylvia O’Neill and others argue that Kant’s moral law is a product of virtue ethics, not a normative ethic, Kant's moral law still can instruct us in ethical life. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the place of the principles “ought implies can” (OIC) and “you can because you ought” (CBO) in Kant’s moral philosophy. Contrary to an often tacit assumption in the relevant literature, according to which CBO is simply a version of OIC, I argue that it is a separate principle, which has a central role in Kant’s attempt to justify morality and freedom on the basis of the consciousness of the moral law as a “fact of (...) reason”. Crucial to my main argument is the somewhat neglected distinction between actuality and reality of freedom, which leads me to a differentiation within CBO itself. This differentiation is of particular importance for understanding in what the deduction of freedom in the second _Critique_ consists. (shrink)

It is commonly held that Kant ventured to derive morality from freedom in Groundwork III. It is also believed that he reversed this strategy in the second Critique, attempting to derive freedom from morality instead. In this paper, I set out to challenge these familiar assumptions: Kant’s argument in Groundwork III rests on a moral conception of the intelligible world, one that plays a similar role as the ‘fact of reason’ in the second Critique. Accordingly, I argue, there (...) is no reversal in the proof-structure of Kant’s two works. (shrink)

This work offers a new understanding of Kant on the freedom of the will. Voeller looks in detail at the _Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals_ and the _Critique_ _of Practical Reason_ against the background of Kant's critical philosophy as a whole.

This paper deals with the “Table of the Categories of Freedom” in the second main chapter of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. It provides an account of the role these categories are supposed to play and also of their conceptual content. The key to a proper understanding lies in the realisation that they are derived from the so­called table of judgements in the Critique of Pure Reason and the functions of thinking, which it compiles by means of a metaphysical (...) deduction. I therefore interpret the categories of freedom consistently from the table of judgements and reconstruct their conceptual content from the functions of thinking underlying each category. Furthermore, Kant justifies by means of a transcendental deduction the fact that the categories of freedom necessarily relate to all objects of the will. I argue that the categories are concepts constitutive for the object of the will: the role they play is that of the functions of willing an object. Finally, I show that the categories of freedom reach beyond Kant’s foundation of moral philosophy. They point to the later Metaphysics of Morals in that Kant associates an ambitious system­building claim with them. The idea is therefore that the table of the categories organises the system of moral philosophy. (shrink)

It is often assumed that Fichte's aim in Part I of the System of Ethics is to provide a deduction of the moral law, the very thing that Kant – after years of unsuccessful attempts – deemed impossible. On this familiar reading, what Kant eventually viewed as an underivable 'fact' (Factum), the authority of the moral law, is what Fichte traces to its highest ground in what he calls the principle of the 'I'. However, scholars have largely overlooked a (...) passage in the System of Ethics where Fichte explicitly invokes Kant's doctrine of the fact of reason with approval, claiming that consciousness of the moral law grounds our belief in freedom (GA I/5:65). On the reading I defend, Fichte's invocation of the Factum is consistent with the structure of Part I when we distinguish (a) the feeling of moral compulsion from (b) the moral law itself. (shrink)

The essay provides a new interpretation of Fichte’s deduction of the external world that considers the argument to be motivated not by epistemic concerns but by concerns about the possibility of freedom. In defending this view, I critically examine Frederick Beiser’s reconstruction of Fichte’s deduction, which characterizes the argument as refuting external world skepticism, exactly the threat by which Fichte is not troubled. I claim that Fichte is troubled by ethical skepticism, the view that the freedom (...) required for self-consciousness is not possible. Establishing the possibility of the freedom involved in self-consciousness requires an external world suitable for such a form of freedom. An implication of this claim is that the world that Fichte deduces is an intersubjective or social world. (shrink)

It is a question of ascertaining, at first, the difficulties that prevented Reinhold from carrying out the long-sought deduction of a free and absolute cause for freedom of will within the framework of elementary philosophy, or in the plan of the faculty of representation in general. In a second moment, I briefly analyze the author's new strategy when trying to carrying out, or at least to deepen, his foundational approach through practical philosophy. These two movements have Kantian philosophy (...) as a background. In fact, Reinhold takes this starting point after analyzing Kant’s work and considering it problematic in some points, mainly the foundation of the effectiveness of freedom in the fact of reason. Keywords: Reinhold, Kant, freedom, representation, foundation. (shrink)

In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant presents the moral law as the sole ‘fact of pure reason’ that neither needs nor admits of a deduction to establish its authority. This claim may come as a surprise to many readers of his earlier Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In the last section of the Groundwork, Kant seemed to offer a sketch of just such a ‘deduction of the supreme principle of morality’ . Although notoriously obscure, this sketch (...) shows that Kant hoped to base the moral law in the freedom that rational agents can claim as members of the ‘intelligible world’ that transcendental idealism makes available to us. In contrast, the second Critique abandons all aspirations of deriving morality from more basic notions of freedom and practical rationality. (shrink)

Henry Allison is one of the foremost interpreters of the philosophy of Kant. This new volume collects all his recent essays on Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy. All the essays postdate Allison's two major books on Kant, and together they constitute an attempt to respond to critics and to clarify, develop and apply some of the central theses of those books. Two are published here for the first time. Special features of the collection are: a detailed defence of the author's (...) interpretation of transcendental idealism; a consideration of the Transcendental Deduction and some other recent interpretations thereof; further elaborations of the tensions between various aspects of Kant's conception of freedom and of the complex role of this conception within Kant's moral philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hegel's Concept of Life: Self-Consciousness, Freedom, Logic by Karen NgMarina F. BykovaKaren Ng. Hegel's Concept of Life: Self-Consciousness, Freedom, Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. iii + 319. Hardback, $85.00.In her insightful book, Karen Ng defends the fundamental significance of Hegel's concept of life, which she considers "constitutive" not merely of his dynamic account of reason but also of his "idealist program" itself (3–4), the (...) very core structure that grounds his idealism (151, 291). Integrating this concept into his philosophy allows Hegel to resolve three systematic problems indicated in the subtitle of the book: self-consciousness, freedom or self-determination, and logical form.The book offers a systematic account of the logical concept of life by defending three interconnected claims, helpfully summarized in chapter 1. The first, rather general claim clarifies Ng's interpretive point of departure. She maintains that the "core tenets" of Hegel's philosophy can be understood through the "purposiveness theme" inherited from Kant's a priori principle of purposiveness in his Critique of Judgment (5, 43). Ng advances this claim in chapter 2, where she argues that it is working through Kant's concept of inner purposiveness of natural ends from the teleological power of judgment that leads Hegel to develop his own account of Concept, which is foundational for his entire philosophical system (61–64).Chapter 3 continues the examination of Hegel's immediate predecessors in relation to the interpretation of his "speculative identity thesis" (8), which constitutes the second claim. According to Ng, Hegel first introduces this thesis—which remains central to all his works—in the Differenzschift. In this work, Hegel, siding with Schelling, criticizes Fichte's subjective version of idealism, more specifically for his explanation of the relation between subject and object as constructed and facilitated by subjective consciousness itself, thus rendering "nature lifeless and dead" (88). Opposing this approach, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel interprets the identity of object and subject as facilitated by the relation and opposition between self-consciousness and life. Thus, the speculative identity thesis assumes a fundamental significance of life for self-consciousness. Unfolding this thesis is at the core of Hegel's absolute method in the Science of Logic as well. On Ng's reading, Hegel's speculative thesis along with his account of self-consciousness also have their roots in the purposiveness theme inherited from Kant. What is at work here is Kant's claim that the principle of purposiveness is a necessary condition for judgment, which Hegel develops into a claim about the concept of life as being constitutive for self-consciousness.In the rest of the book (chapters 4–8), devoted to a close analysis of Hegel's Science of Logic, Ng advances her third and perhaps most original claim: understanding Hegel's [End Page 527] Subjective Logic "as his own version of a 'critique of judgment'" (18). She demonstrates that this part of the Logic offers a positive account of the concept of life that Hegel develops in his critical interaction with Kant. The most illustrative in this respect is the "Subjectivity" section of the Logic, in which the form of life is presented as the ground and presupposition of Hegel's theory of concepts and judgments. According to Ng, such a reading makes evident that "life opens up the space of reasons" (234, 281).Chapter 4 takes up Hegel's immanent deduction of the Concept argument, revealing that the key to understanding it is the concept of reciprocity (Wechselwirkung) (127), most fully recognizable as an internal purposiveness of the Concept itself.Ng traces the purposiveness theme through the entirety of the Subjective Logic, establishing its significance for understanding the deduction of the Concept and for the transition to the Idea. In her analysis, she closely follows Hegel's division of the Subjective Logic and addresses Subjectivity, Objectivity, and the Idea in chapters 5–8, respectively. With chapter 5, Ng moves to a discussion of how Hegel finds judgment to arise from the "original judgement of life," the initial unity and division of subject and object within life (172). Chapter 6 extends this discussion by elucidating the tension Hegel... (shrink)

This essay raises some questions concerning the method and conceptual structure of Sartre's Being and Nothingness. Three substantially different types of interpretation of this text have been put forward. One of the main issues separating the three interpretative strategies is the relationship that they each establish between Sartre's three fundamental concepts: consciousness, nothingness and freedom—each of which can be seen to play the fundamental role in the argument. It therefore seems crucial for any interpretation of Being and Nothingness to (...) determine the exact relationship between these terms. However, Being and Nothingness presents a hybrid argument that interweaves metaphysical deduction, phenomenological description and moral-existential argument in a way that makes it almost impossible to decide which of the strands of the argument should be seen to dominate the others. It is therefore perhaps equally difficult to ascertain which of its principal concepts has the most central place in the system. One could therefore argue that a reading of Being and Nothingness should aim to account for (rather than dismiss) the hybridity of the argument and then seek to assign relative functions to its different strands. The following remarks are intended as a step in that direction. (shrink)

In this paper I present an interpretation of J. G. Fichte's transcendental argument for the necessity of mutual recognition in Foundations of Natural Right. Fichte's argument purports to show that, as a condition of the possibility of self-consciousness, we must take ourselves to stand in relations of mutual recognition with other agents like ourselves. After reconstructing the steps of Fichte's argument, I present what I call the ‘modal dilemma’, which highlights a serious ambiguity in Fichte's deduction. According to the (...) modal dilemma, the conclusion to Fichte's transcendental argument—that as a condition of the possibility of our self-consciousness, we must recognize and be recognized by others—expresses either metaphysical or normative necessity. However, no normative conclusion follows from Fichte's premises, and the metaphysical claim that does follow from his argument appears to be implausibly strong. Thus the argument looks like a failure on either interpretation of the conclusion's modality. In the penultimate section of the paper, I propose a new interpretation of the argument that avoids the modal dilemma and provides a normative grounding of Fichte's concept of right. (shrink)

This article argues that many (often Anglophone) interpreters of the Deduction have mistakenly identified Kant's aim as vindicating ordinary knowledge of objects and as refuting Hume's (alleged) skepticism about such knowledge. Instead, the article contends that Kant's aims were primarily negative. His primary mission (in the Deduction) was not to justify application of the categories to experience, but to show that any use beyond the domain of experience could not be justified. To do this, he needed to show (...) that their proper use in attaining metaphysical knowledge was restricted to (actual and possible) experience. The central theoretical claims of previous metaphysics were thus rendered void. Kant was not out to save ordinary knowledge from the skeptic, at least not originally, since he did not think such knowledge was in danger. Rather, he wanted to sustain the skeptical claim that we cannot justify metaphysical claims about things in themselves, hence that we cannot gain metaphysical knowledge about the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the beginning of time, and the least parts of matter. He wanted to achieve this result in a more theoretically satisfying manner than had skeptical authors. Doing so would also allow him to curb certain forms of skeptical empiricism, by showing that we cannot disprove, or rule out as unintelligible, human freedom, an afterlife, or divine providence. The article ends by considering the retrospective rereadings of the Deduction by Hermann Cohen and P. F. Strawson, concluding that these rereadings force Kant's text into an alien mold, thereby diminishing its philosophical value as a work with its own distinctive aims and methods. (shrink)

While Kant’s claim that the moral law discloses our freedom to us has been extensively discussed in recent decades, the reactions to this claim among Kant’s immediate successors have gone largely overlooked by scholars. Reinhold, Creuzer, and Maimon were among three prominent thinkers of the era unwilling to follow Kant in making the moral law the condition for knowing our freedom. Maimon went so far as to reject Kant’s method of appealing to our everyday awareness of duty on (...) the grounds that common human understanding is susceptible to error and illusion. In this paper I shall examine how these skeptical reactions to Kant’s position shaped the background for Fichte’s method of moral justification, leading up to his own deduction of the moral law in the System of Ethics. By way of conclusion, I shall propose a new interpretation of how consciousness of the moral law serves as an entry-point to Fichte’s form of idealism. (shrink)

Kant, having identified the formulas of the supreme principle of morality, offers a succinct explanation of their interrelation. What Kant says is, “The above three ways of representing the principle of morality are at bottom only so many formulae of the very same law, and any one of them of itself unites the other two in it.”1 This claim – hereafter the “Unity Claim” – plays the role of the eccentric cousin in the family of Kant’s ethics: although glaringly present, (...) it is little spoken of, but seldom disowned. Most commentators, at any rate, focus their attention on more important matters, such as the content of the individual formulas, the moral psychology, or the deduction of freedom. Such matters are sufficiently absorbing to leave the Unity Claim often passed over without remark. But the Unity Claim should not be ignored. Kant does assert it, which compels us to attempt to find a place for it in his moral theory. It would seem to constrain the interpretation of the other, more momentous issues. How one interprets the content of the categorical imperative, in particular, would seem to be significantly restricted by the Unity Claim; one could not, given the Unity Claim, offer a complete interpretation of any single formula without also at least referring to the other formulas. And, as I shall argue in Part III below, the Unity Claim is no accident. Kant is committed to the Unity Claim by virtue of some basic features of his moral theory. This paper will thus offer what amounts to an extended commentary on the Unity Claim. I shall review the various suggestions of what it might mean, and how it might, or might not, be accommodated within Kant’s moral theory. The structure of this paper will be as such. Part II will examine the two main strategies for including the Unity Claim within Kant’s moral theory, and explain why they are both inadequate. Part III will examine the other main approach to the 2 Unity Claim: giving up on it.. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 108 Heft: 1 Seiten: 55-88.

In the first study to examine F. W. J. Schelling's political thought, Velimir Stojkovski not only unearths a neglected dimension of the influential thinker's philosophy but further shows what it can teach us about our ethical and political responsibilities today. Unlike Hegel or Fichte, Schelling never wrote a political treatise. Yet by reconstructing the portions of such works as The New Deductions of Natural Right that deal explicitly with the political and by thematically rethinking parts of his writings that have (...) a clear repercussion on politics - in particular those on nature, freedom and religion - this book reveals the centrality of politics to his oeuvre. Revisiting his corpus in this way, Stojkovski uncovers a number of ways we can learn from Schelling and his reception. He examines how Schelling's views on nature can clarify our moral and political obligations to the non-human world and further demonstrates how the separation of ontology as first philosophy from the ethico-political has resulted in a fragmented view of the status of the political subject and thus the body politic. Forcefully renouncing this fragmentation, Stojkovski explores how the same divide has contributed to the ongoing political turmoil in Europe and America. Combining an exploration of German Idealism with contemporary concerns, this is an essential study that will introduce readers to a new Schelling: a political thinker for the 21st century. (shrink)

Why are Kant and Hegel so notoriously hard to understand? It has hitherto gone unnoticed that Kant and Hegel account for philosophy's necessary obscurity by recasting what they think is an ancient tradition of philosophical esotericism. Reconstructing these accounts generates new interpretations of Kant's deduction of freedom and Hegel's deduction of the concept of science . Both deductions aim to make philosophy universally accessible. Each raises, but fails to settle, the question of philosophy's exclusions. ;Following a procedure (...) of Cavell's, I offer a thematics of esotericism, permitting a wide variety of esotericisms. Recent discussion knows only one: elitist obfuscation. I trace several eighteenth century controversies, showing that elitist obfuscation was rejected by Kant and others, but that other esotericisms remained available. I argue against the interpretation of Kant as a secret obfuscatory elitist. ;I then characterize the shift in Kant's thinking leading to his deduction of freedom and his account of esotericism. Building upon work by Allison and Henrich, I interpret the fact of reason as a practical deduction, consisting in an actualization of the capacity for freedom. The first-personal character of the deduction underlies Kant's explicit recasting of esotericism in his response to Schlosser's Seventh Letter esotericism . Kant's metaphysics of morals is esoteric because it is accessible only through the fact of reason: the first-personal actualization of the capacity for freedom shared by all human beings. Kant locates philosophy's "true secret", which Plato grasped only obscurely, in this esoteric, yet universally accessible, practical metaphysics. ;Finally, I interpret Hegel's Phenomenology as a practical deduction whose first-personal character is expressed by the Hegelian "we". This avoids the circularity problem facing interpretations based upon Kant's theoretical deduction of the categories, and enables the reconstruction of Hegel's account of the esotericism of determinate negation. I argue that Fichte's and Schelling's accounts of esotericism endanger Kant's commitment to universal accessibility and that Hegel seeks to preserve Kant's commitment without abandoning their insights. However, neither Kant nor Hegel accounts sufficiently for the resistance their work encounters. (shrink)

The article justifies the need to involve philosophy in specific scientific research due to the ineffectiveness of verbal-and-figurative models and the inadequacy of character education. Indeed, philosophy can increase their theoretical and applied effectiveness in the long-term methodological perspective. The article shows the wrong side of limitations in specific scientific research imposed by an interdisciplinary methodology. It points out to the disadvantages of applying interdisciplinary methods in psycholinguistics, such as analysis synthesis, induction and deduction. The article expands the range (...) of their understanding to achieve a higher level of reliability. Besides, it proves the inadequacy of conclusions obtained mainly from superficial empirical studies without revealing and analyzing their main causes, it being a violation of the determinism principle. It substantiates the need to comply with methodological principles of objectivity and systematicity while analyzing the concepts of the humanities block. If one ignores these principles, it can lead to eсlecticity and, hence, the inefficiency of specific scientific research. The effectiveness of methodological principles in psycholinguistics is shown through a consistent analysis of freedom as a philosophical category, as well as a gradual analysis of the links between such concepts as freedom - responsibility, freedom - arbitrariness - responsibility, freedom - interest - arbitrariness. (shrink)

The purpose of this dissertation is to establish an interpretive framework for the study of Kant's Critique of Judgment. The central themes of the text are presented in the first chapter in terms of two different problems. The first is referred to as the prima facie problem. This problem concerns the search for a transcendental principle for the faculty of judgment corresponding to the principles established for understanding and reason in the first two critiques. The second is referred to as (...) the systematic problem. This problem concerns the search for a transcendental principle which can mediate between the domains of understanding and reason and provide for a "unity of transition" between nature and freedom. ;The value of this interpretation is demonstrated in the second chapter through a criticism of Paul Guyer's work on the third critique, Kant and the Claims of Taste . This criticism focuses on Guyer's interpretive method and scholarship. ;The interpretation is developed further in the third and fourth chapters in which specific problems that have not been dealt with adequately in the recent literature in English are addressed. The systematic argument of the two introductions that Kant prepared for the text is presented in the third chapter. Finally, the fourth chapter focuses on the deduction of pure aesthetical judgments and advances an account of this argument that is shown to be preferable to the account of Guyer as well as that developed by Donald Crawford in his study Kant's Aesthetic Theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.2 (2001) 305-306 [Access article in PDF] Fichte, J. G. Foundations of Natural Right according to the Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre. Edited by Frederick Neuhouser. Translated by Michael Baur. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xxxv + 338. Cloth, $64.95; Paper, $22.95. Though best known for his immensely influential effort to "systematize" Kant's Critical philosophy (...) and to ground the same upon a transcendental analysis of the structure of self-consciousness, Fichte also made seminal contributions to social and political philosophy. Of these contributions, the most original is surely his effort to demonstrate that mutual recognition of free subjects is a condition for the possibility of individual self-consciousness. This transcendental deduction of the essentially social or intersubjective character of human beings provides the theoretical underpinnings for a pure theory of Naturrecht ("natural law" or "natural right"), in which the principles of political philosophy are established without any reference to the purely practical principles of morality. Unlike moral laws, the principles of right are only hypothetically or conditionally valid, inasmuch as they are dependent upon one's free decision to live in a community of free beings and to limit one's own freedom accordingly.Justice and law are thereby grounded upon a new, distinctly political conception of [End Page 305] human freedom, which is itself grounded in a new account of the intersubjective dimension of self-consciousness. Following his deduction of the pure concept of right, Fichte proceeds to deduce the conditions for applyingthe same, among the most significant of which is embodiment. Here again, Fichte was a pioneer in arguing for the necessary connection between self-consciousness and the human body. The next step is to demonstrate in detail how social relations between embodied free agents must be organized if such agents are to co-exist in a community. This hypothetical application of the pure concept of right establishes both the "right of coercion" and the basic outlines of the "right of the state," and hence the general form of any legitimate state constitution.Though it appears that Fichte is working with the social contract tradition, his deductive strategy requires a fundamental revision of the same and allows him to construct a theory of the just state that is both recognizably "liberal" and extraordinarily open to considerations of economic justice and social welfare. It is for this reason that some European philosophers (notably, Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut) have in recent decades employed Fichte's political thought as a major resource in their effort to defend a rights-based political theory against attacks from both the right and the left.The primary source of Fichte's political philosophy is his 1796/97 Grundlage des Naturrecht, a work that exercised a decisive influence upon Hegel (whose Phenomenology of Spirit is often and incorrectly described as the first effort, within the context of post-Kantian Idealism, to demonstrate that intersubjectivity is a condition for the possibility of self-consciousness). Directly and indirectly (that is, through Hegel) Fichte's social and political philosophy exercised a strong influence upon Marx and other nineteenth- and twentieth-century socialists.For all of the above reasons, the appearance of a new and reliable English translation of Fichte's Grundlage des Naturrechts is a cause for celebration. Let it be said at once that Michael Baur's translation is simply marvelous. It is accurate and readable, as well as faithful to the style of this, one of Fichte's best-written works. Frederick Neuhouser's Introduction to this translation is equally fine. In it, Neuhouser not only outlines Fichte's main arguments and conclusions, but also offers a brief but trenchant critical appraisal of the historical significance of Fichte's achievement and of the potential relevance of his ideas to contemporary debates and discussions. The Introduction also includes a provocative and well-balanced discussion of some of the unresolved problems implicit in Fichte's arguments. Readers will also appreciate the useful "Guide to Further Reading," and index... (shrink)

Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right was one of the most influential books in nineteenth-century philosophy. It was read carefully by Schelling, Hegel, and Marx, and initiated a tradition in German philosophy that considers human subjectivity to be relational and intersubjective, thus requiring relations of recognition between subjects. The essays in this volume highlight this little-understood book's most important ideas and innovations. They offer discussions of Fichte's conception of freedom, self-consciousness, coercion, the summons, the body, and human rights, together with (...) new analyses of his deduction of right, his views on the social contract, and his arguments for the separation of right from morality. The essays expand and deepen ongoing debates in the scholarship and chart new avenues of thought about Fichte's most enduring work of political philosophy. They will be essential reading for students and scholars of German Idealism, nineteenth-century philosophy, and the history of political thought. (shrink)

In my original confrontation with Kant’s first Critique, although essentially sympathetic with its import, I found myself deploring his use of certain expressions such as “things in themselves,” “noumena,” “intuitive understanding,” “supersensible,” etc. It seemed to me that he could have made his basically positivistic point without calling up vestiges of absolute realities or eternal verities. When I turned to his second critical enterprise, it sometimes seemed as if he were letting God, freedom, and immortality step in the philosophical (...) back door, warranted by the rather vague argument of the transcendental deduction of the moral law which supposedly provided “practical reality” for the transcendental ideas of pure reason. My puzzlement was compounded by his need for a practical “typik” and the notion that practical reason somehow required the realization of unconditional moral ideals in the conditioned sensible world. Perhaps somewhat like Kant himself, I felt that something was missing. There was a kind of gap or void which needed filling in by something which would not only dispel any reservations about some of the language of the first two Critiques, but would also interrelate the two independent realms of nature and freedom in some intelligible way such that any suspicions of a philosophically irreducible dualism could be erased, while still recognizing theory and practice as autonomous functions of the single faculty of intelligence. But what kind of “unity” could we expect? Although the two analyses were logically compatible, each seemed to stand on its own and there was no mutual implication between them. It was as if each went wrong not in respect to its own foundation but in respect to what it said about the other. Kant presents a defensible theory of knowledge which says some very strange things about logically possible, nonempirical entities; and then this is followed by a systematic ethical theory which occasionally makes odd assertions about empirical nature. (shrink)

Excerpt from The Idea of Personality Not since the French Revolution have the masses of men had such a passionate trust in the power of ideas as they have today. Such ideas as society, state, person, are no longer the exclusive concern of the few favored experts in philosophy and political theory. Such other ideas as authority, responsibility, conscience, right, and freedom, have become more than the mere blunted foils of friendly, academic discussion. This democratization of ideas has been, (...) on the whole, a healthy stimulant. No one who recalls the riotous confusion of thought in the nineteenth century will regret a situation that seems to promise a period of redefinition. One does not have to be an obscurantist to regret the uncontrolled and, often uncritical way, in which the findings of physical science were applied in the fields of ethics, religion, politics, sociology, economics, and history. We should have been warned that speculation was moving too rapidly. The careful scientist rarely makes a sweeping and definite conclusion. More rarely still does he make a universal application of deductions, reached in his own sphere of investigation, to all branches of knowledge. If the philosophy of life, built upon the recent biological and sociological premises, has been unsatisfactory, this has been due to an apparent unwillingness to take the time required to distinguish what is of permanent value from what is simply the exaggeration of controversy, in the anxiety to establish a theory. It is conceivable that men should wish, under the impulse of fresh evidence, to re-examine their notions of God, the nature of human progress, society, and free-will; but it is not conceivable that conclusions, reached so rapidly and with so little discrimination between fact and hypothesis, should he always accurate and should really reflect life's problems and complexities. We need to be redeemed from our own overweening confidence. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Developing an instrument with the capability approach can be challenging, since the capability concept of Sen is ambiguous concerning the burdens that people experience whilst achieving their capabilities. A solution is to develop instruments with a comprehensive concept of capability, such as the concept of ‘option-freedom’. This study aims to develop a theoretical framework for instrument development with the concept of option-freedom. A best-fit framework synthesis was conducted with seven qualitative papers by one researcher. Two researchers supported the (...) synthesis by discussing interim results during the synthesis. A priori concepts of option-freedom were used to deductively code against. Themes and subthemes were developed inductively when data did not match a priori themes. Seven paper were identified that fulfilled the eligibility criteria. Four themes emerged from the synthesis. (1) Option Wellbeing represents a range of options that need to be satisfied for individuals to experience wellbeing. (2) Self-Realization represents that there are experiences in an individual’s life that have value beyond realizing options. (3) Perceived Access to Options represents the perceived ability of individuals to realize freedoms. (4) Perceived Control represents the experience of having control. Developing an instrument with the proposed framework has two benefits. First, it acknowledges the importance of assessing impediments in realizing capabilities for wellbeing assessment. Secondly, the themes form a broad informational base by including themes related to subjective wellbeing. Future research should study the feasibility of implementing the framework for instrument development. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: What Is ‘High’ and What Is ‘Low’ in the Significance of Reason The Standpoint of Reason: or When Certainty Is Not Yet Truth Philosophical Issues: Standard Views and Reappraisals References Further Reading.

In his critical writings before 1786 Kant argues that trans¬cendental freedom is a problem for speculative philosophy – and that this problem was solved satisfyingly in 1781 by his own Transcendental Idealism. In the Groundwork, 1785, after having linked the moral law inseparably to transcendental freedom by his discovery of autonomy, Kant claimed that the moral law can be deduced from freedom thus established. But in May 1786 he was persuaded by a review-article that his 1781/85-deduction (...) of freedom was incompatible with his critical philosophy. Hence Kant had to shift the epistemic priority from freedom to the moral law. He thus replaced the deduction of freedom and morality given in the Third Part of the Groundwork by his Doctrine of the “fact of pure practical reason” in the 2nd Critique. By this move Kant established an entirely new and dominant role for practical reason in metaphysics, a role which already shows up in the second edition of the 1st Critique – and which leads to Kant′s unprecedented conception of a “praktisch-dogmatische Metaphyik” in the 1790ties. (shrink)

Kant’s coining of «reflective judgment» in the third Critique by a conceptual clarification of the third higher cognitive faculty has long been criticized as redundant for his philosophical system and deemed a typical Kantian architectonic failure. Zhu Xi’s vital development of the doctrine «gewu» in his commentary on The Great Learning has been attacked for centuries for committing a hermeneutic fallacy. I argue that a comparative study shows that both conceptions steered a metaphysical transition towards «the supersensible» in each philosophy, (...) leading to a similar construction of moral teleology. Zhu Xi’s «li» is comparable to Kant’s «purpose» as a moral teleological property. The Neo-Confucian li-qi dichotomy provides a counterpart of the Kantian double causality. Nevertheless, Neo-Confucian moral teleology does not rely on a Kantian-type rationalistic deduction concerning the idea of highest good (as final purpose) nor on the so-called intellectual intuition. Gewu looks outwards for the moral coherence between humans and things, while Kant ultimately rejects the natural world for the sake of moral certainty in terms of freedom and identifies what is unique within us. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that Aristotle, a universal philosopher who analysed both natural and social worlds, suggested a groundwork for a theory of justice, which is a fertile soil for a broader social perspective. Such categories as the social order, free will, law, policy choices, and the state are naturally flowing from his brief passage on justice in his Nichomachean Ethics. I assert that all of them are phenomena of turbulent social mechanics. Therefore, in this paper I introduce Aristotle’s (...) contribution to the mainstream theory of justice and then, loosely relying on the works of Aristotle and Newton, I develop a theory of justice in the context of social mechanics. I conclude that the concept of justice is essentially the same as Newton’s third law of mechanics. For this purpose, I employ interdisciplinary and functional approaches, textual and conceptual analysis,and the method of deduction. (shrink)

The paper in general investigates Kant’s transcendental theory of moral psychology in its relation to Sellarsian characterization of origin of normativity with respect to the preconditions of a complete conception of humans and their actions. The complete conception of humans and their actions is a conception in which we are able to account for free human in general and for his free will in particular in accordance with the natural law. I argue that Sellars’ manifest and scientific images of a (...) person on the one hand and Kant’s empirical and intelligible character on the other hand has similar accounts for acquiring the knowledge of the source of our normative assessments. In both it is considered that manifest or empirical conception of a person within nature in general fails to provide a deductive procedure from which one can derive the complete conception of a person as a free being in itself. I further argue that any set of procedure for identifying the source of normativity and of our normative assessments cannot be provided from an ontologically oriented perspective in which we aim at establishing a naturalistic model of normativity- a model where accurate descriptions and true explanations of causal relations in the world of appearances can allow us to make sense the blameworthiness of the moral agent as the normative force applied on his actions. (shrink)

Even though Kant, because of his modus operandi, has been saluted as the renewer of dialectic method (after mature Plato), nonetheless his ars exponiendi, as apparent, for example, in the subjective deduction of categories, has always been characteristically dual (noumenon/phenomenon, understanding/sensibility, theory/praxis, etc.) or fourfold (as in the antinomies, eventually liable to be reduced to two pairs in conflict). However, in the second Critique a notable contradiction arises in a judgment that is pretendedly analytic and also the consequence of (...) the categorical imperative commanding that every man be treated as an end in himself (as representing humanity in his person). There, it is said that such consideration occurs at the same time and in the same regard as the use of man as a means. Far from treating this contradiction as a mere mistake, this article tries to unfold the fruitfulness of that contradictory judgment in order to reconcile the world of politics, based on the spheres of work and private property (characteristic of the realm of means), with the world of morality (beyond mere ethics).With the purpose of elucidating this point, we will resort to the ‘useful fiction’ of a ‘stepmother Nature’ (in the mundane) and to the heterogony of ends, which transform the external freedom (first and most important of passions) into a reflexive and Law-bounded freedom, open to condolence and sacrifice. (shrink)

Kant's Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten is popular as an introduction into his philosophy and into fundamental ethics in general. Its third chapter is, nevertheless, a notoriously difficult text. According to many interpreters, it raises questions rather than answering them. This article tries to answer some questions which often remain unclear even in the secondary literature: how is the logical structure of the chapter; what exactly is the synthetic character of the categorical imperative; how does freedom function as the (...) third, connecting term in this synthesis; what is the relationship between questions concerning the possibility and the validity of the categorical imperative? In his own words, Kant wants to give here 'a deduction of the principle of morality' but also of the concept of freedom. The double use of the term 'deduction' needs an accurate interpretation. One thesis of the article is that the deduction of freedom must not be identified with the problematic deduction of the categorical imperative. The deduction of the concept of freedom has a more modest function within the proof of the possibility of the categorical imperative. This means that the question concerning the proof of its validity is still open; but the very idea that such a proof is neither possible nor necessary evokes already the notion of the factum der Vernunft. (shrink)

The article by the Swiss author, published in translation, vividly and expressively reveals the nature of the personality and work of Charles Secretan (1815–1895), an outstanding philosopher of Switzerland of the 19th century, in the historical context in which they developed. The author of the article convincingly shows the difficulty of unambiguous historical and philosophical characteristics of Secretan’s philosophy, which is based on the religious-metaphysical doctrine of freedom and moral obligation. Maurer approaches the coverage of Secretan’s philosophy, trying to (...) understand it not only as a result of certain philosophical and religious influences, but also as a reflection of “his time and his country”. The author of the article presents the evolution of Secretan's work as a departure from the speculative-deductive method of German idealists-systematists, characteristic of its first period, which is manifested in the Swiss philosopher’s appeal to the actual moral and socio-political problems of his time. Maurer’s article can be useful not only to specialists in the history of philosophy, but also to a wider circle of readers interested in the thought of the 19th century, without knowledge of which it is impossible to understand modern Western philosophy. (shrink)

This paper explores the charge by Bruce Aune and Allen Wood that a gap exists in Kant's derivation of the Categorical Imperative. I show that properly understood, no such gap exists, and that the deduction of the Categorical Imperative is successful as it stands.

The relationship between 20th-century phenomenology and the transcendental program launched by Immanuel Kant is crucial, but delicate. First there is Husserl, who seemed both attracted to and seriously critical of Kant's first Critique. Then there is Heidegger's ambition to scour the entire field of the three Critiques. Most important in this context, is probably his reading of the Critique of Pure Reason in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics . Faithful to his notion of a salvaging “destruction” of the philosophical (...) tradition, Heidegger argues that the earliest version of Kant's work, the so-called A-deduction, is radically different from the philosophy promoted by the neo-Kantians. Kant, he claims, was not really interested in epistemology in the narrow meaning of the term. He was, rather, a philosopher verging upon a genuine ontology of Being, but who, for reasons that remain unknown, felt forced to leave these tracks behind in order to pursue the transcendental conditions of knowledge. Then there is the second Critique, which Heidegger approaches through a discussion of the Kantian notions of freedom and causality. And, finally, there are his remarks about the Critique of Judgment, scattered all over his writing on art from the early 1930s onwards. However, Heidegger never produces a proper, systematic account of the relevance of the third Critique. Such an account, I argue in this essay, is provided by Hans-Georg Gadamer. (shrink)

As the interesting title of this work indicates, its author is concerned less with Kant’s theory of morality, with its account of freedom, the possibility of pure reason being practical, and the deduction of the moral law, than he is with Kant’s Sittenlehre, or the account of the moral law as applied, moral judgment, and the substantive, derived duties of justice and virtue. Accordingly, he concentrates almost exclusively on two texts. The first four chapters are a commentary on (...) and assessment of the three chapters of the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, and his last two chapters deal with the two main sections of the Metaphysics of Morals. Other important texts of Kant’s moral theory are dealt with, as he says, en passant, and some are not dealt with at all. This approach has the virtue of focusing attention on perhaps the central Kantian moral problem: the nature of the transition from pure moral principles to "morals." It has the defect of being bound in too restrictive a way to the Groundwork as an expression of Kant’s general moral theory. There is no discussion of the synthetic or "regressive" methodology of that work, an approach which Kant realized aided its popular appeal, but greatly limited its theoretical adequacy, nor of the well known revisions Kant made in his moral theory, especially his account of freedom, by 1788. However, the author admits that he did not intend to write a book "directed specifically to Kant scholars." Instead, he tries to keep his discussion of textual interpretation minimal, always tries to present Kant’s arguments in a "contemporary idiom," refers only to English translations, infrequently to the Kant literature, and then only to English language literature. (shrink)

Two issues are at the core of a seemingly never-ending debate about Groundwork III: First, does Kant in GMS III still think he has to deduce the moral law partly from non-moral presuppositions by making a transition from theoretical to practical freedom, as Schönecker argues? Or does Kant already regard the categorical imperative as grounded in a fact of reason, as Puls argues? It is, secondly, no less unclear what exactly is meant by the “deduction” Kant mentions in (...) three places in GMS III. While Puls claims that Kant is referring to the deduction of the idea of freedom from the unquestionable consciousness of pure practical reason, Schönecker contends that GMS III is ultimately about the deduction of the categorical imperative. Schönecker takes issue with Puls’s position as developed, and Puls replies. (shrink)

B a c k g r o u n d. This scientific investigation conducts a constructive-critical, comprehensive, and systematic analysis of the state, paradigms, and trends in the development of Ukrainian and European fundamental science. It highlights, at a synthetic level, the epistemological and social functions, historical mission, and vision of domestic science in shaping the traditions and values of European culture. The article draws attention to the significant contributions made by domestic scientists to the research of theoretical-methodological, epistemological, and (...) worldview foundations of Ukrainian fundamental science as an intellectual phenomenon. This topic is covered in extensive monographic works, articles, discourses, and scientific investigations by such scientists as B. Paton, A. Zahorodnii, A. Naumovets, D. Zerbino, O. Habovych, V. Kuznietsov, L. Kurylo, N. Semenova, S. Honcharenko, A. Pavko, Z. Partiko, A. Filipenko, and others. Valuable, little-studied, and debatable aspects of this issue have also been highlighted in the works of foreign scientists. Among them, the author of the article includes interdisciplinary publications by J. Barroso, J. Gorgon, V. Humboldt, K. Popper, and other Western thinkers and researchers. At the same time, there are practically no professional generalizing works in domestic socio-humanitarian thought that consider Ukrainian fundamental science from a comprehensive, synthetic perspective as a powerful intellectual factor in shaping the traditions and values of European culture. M e t h o d s. The article uses a set of methods (analysis, synthesis, inductive and deductive methods) as well as general scientific approaches such as dialectical, systematic, and interdisciplinary methods to study this socio-humanitarian problem. This has led to the revelation of the internal contradictory nature of trends in the development of fundamental science, the evaluation of Ukrainian science in the system of European values and culture. Meanwhile, the dialectical method provides the theoretical and methodological foundation for a deep, essential understanding of the intellectual potential of fundamental research. In contrast, the systematic approach used in the article is extrapolated to conduct a correct, comprehensive analysis of the integral components that determine the regularities and features of the development of domestic science in modern conditions. The interdisciplinary approach, creatively applied in the article, made it possible to combine achievements in the field of social humanities, which significantly determine the determinants of the methodological culture of scientific analysis, critical thinking in the process of producing and assimilating scientific knowledge. R e s u l t s. The article identifies the following trends in the development of Ukrainian fundamental science as an institutional factor in shaping the traditions and values of European culture: Powerful, systematic development of fundamental science is a necessary condition for improving the mechanisms of deepening European integration processes in Ukraine. Modern fundamental science is one of the components of the socio-cultural progress of humanity and defines such important characteristics as the differentiation and integration of science, computerization, and humanization of each of them. The historical experience of the development of European civilization shows that science, both in the past and in the present, has been and remains an important intellectual factor, a reliable rational foundation of strong states and nations. C o n c l u s i o n s. The conclusion establishes that the scientific potential of the state is an integral component of European culture and the intellect of the modern Ukrainian nation. It is important to consider that European values should have a profound and irreversible nature for domestic science rather than a temporary one. The preservation and modernization of national intellect, intellectual capital are essential conditions for its integration into the educational, scientific, and cultural space of Europe, and for the preservation and development of Ukraine as a modern, scientifically powerful democratic state with established civilizational traditions. The article emphasizes that the constant pursuit of intellectual and political freedom, patriotism, tireless industriousness, intelligence, education, creativity, intellect, healthy pragmatism, persistence, courage, ingenuity, and a sense of humor are precisely the universal, distinctly defined, characteristic traits of our compatriots that make them resilient and open up a unique intellectual space in Europe, a wonderful European world of existence. (shrink)

Allen W. Wood presents the first book-length systematic exposition in English of Fichte's most important ethical work, the System of Ethics. He places this work in the context of Fichte's life and career, of his philosophical system, and in relation to his philosophy of right or justice and politics. Wood discusses Fichte's defense of freedom of the will, his grounding of the moral principle, theory of moral conscience, transcendental deduction of intersubjectivity, and his conception of free rational communication (...) and the rational society. He develops and emphasizes the social and political radicalism of Fichte's moral and political philosophy, and brings out the philosophical interest of Fichte's positions and arguments for present day philosophy. Fichte's Ethical Thought argues that Fichte is a major thinker in the history of ethics, and the most important figure in the history of modern continental philosophy in the past two centuries. (shrink)

Kant’s argument in § 38 of the *Critique of Judgment* is subject to a dilemma: if the subjective condition of cognition is the sufficient condition of the pleasure of taste, then every object of experience must produce that pleasure; if not, then the universal communicability of cognition does not entail the universal communicability of the pleasure. Kant’s use of an additional premise in § 21 may get him out of this difficulty, but the premises themselves hang in the air and (...) have no independent plausibility. What Kant offers as a proof of our right to make judgments of taste is more charitably construed as an indirect argument for the adequacy of a speculative explanation of a *presumed* right to make judgments of taste. (shrink)

An intriguing work that considers the shared tradition of Canadian political philosophy.