This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This paper addresses a number of issues concerning both the status of phenomenology in the work of one of its classical expositors, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and the general relation between theoretical models and evidence in phenomenological accounts. In so doing, I will attempt to explain Merleau-Ponty's departure from classical transcendental accounts in Husserl's thought and why Merleau-Ponty increasingly elaborated on them through aesthetic rationality. The result is a phenomenology that no longer understands itself as foundational and no longer understands itself in (...) the strict opposition of intuition and concept. Rather both emerge from an operative experience generated in the exchange between situated embodied knowing and historical knowledge. (shrink)

We respond to Autumn Fiester’s critique that our proposed bioethical consensus project amounts to “ethical hegemony,” and evaluate her claim that ethicists should restrict themselves to “mere process” recommendations. We argue that content recommendations are an inescapable aspect of clinical ethics consultation, and our primary concern is that, without standardization of bioethical consensus, our field will vacillate among appeals to the disparate claims in the 22 “Core References,” unsustainable efforts to defend value-neutral process recommendations, or become a practice of Lone (...) Ranger clinical ethicists. We contend that a consensus document that captures the basic moral commitments of patients and careproviders is the next step in the professional evolution of our field. (shrink)

Medical decision making on behalf of unrepresented patients is one of the most challenging ethical issues faced in clinical practice. The legal environment surrounding these patients is equally complex. This article describes the efforts of a small coalition of interested healthcare professionals to address the issue in Colorado. A brief history of the effort is presented, along with discussion of the legal, ethical, practical, and political dimensions that arose in Colorado’s effort to address decision making for unrepresented patients through an (...) extension of the existing Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act (CRS 15-18). A discussion of lessons learned in the process is included. (shrink)

This paper has two major goals: First, I argue that Catharine MacKinnon’s and Andrea Dworkin’s anti-pornography activism was an act of public reason and their arguments public reasons arguments. Thus, MacKinnon’s argument that pornography is best understood as a practice of sex discrimination is a public reason argument—and so can be defended as grounded in liberal political principles. Political liberalism, as I defend it, can support MacKinnon’s approach to pornography as embodied in a civil rights ordinance. By way of contrast, (...) I will take up another feminist position on pornography, Drucilla Cornell’s, that differs from, and in fact is quite critical of, the MacKinnon/Dworkin anti-pornography position. My primary aim here is to show that Cornell’s arguments fail—as they stand—as public reason arguments, and thus further highlight the crucial aspects of MacKinnon’s feminist approach that are compatible with public reason, and so with liberal political principles. This is not to say that one could not provide a public reason argument for a position like Cornell’s. However, as she offers it, her position is not compatible with the norms of public reason. Second, I show why the obscenity route to the regulation of pornographic material—the traditional liberal approach—is actually antithetical to the version of political liberalism I am interested in defending. The conclusion of these arguments is that contrary to the mainstream view, liberalism is hospitable to the arguments of MacKinnon and Dworkin, and so as liberals we have not only good reason to take their arguments very seriously, but even stronger their arguments flow from fundamental liberal political values. (shrink)

E. L. Grant Watson, an English field naturalist, zoologist, and one of England's best-loved nature writers, spent a lifetime trying to bring nature and...

E. L. Grant Watson, an English field naturalist, zoologist, and one of England's best-loved nature writers, spent a lifetime trying to bring nature and consciousness into a unified, holistic vision that would establish meaning in the world without losing wonder. The questions raised by facts of nature inexplicable in terms of conventional theories, together with insights gained from a reading of Jung--as well as by a study of early Christian gnostic literature and the anthroposophy of Rudolf Steiner--brought him to (...) an imaginative perception of living things based on the conviction of the presence in all things of a spiritual reality. "Love is of man, but wisdom is of nature, and there are times when it almost seems that the author's secret--as perhaps it will one day be the secret of a reformed scientific method--is to stand aside and let the wisdom of nature herself speak through him. "-Owen Barfield. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:UnbefriendedJean Watson“Can you be a friend to someone who needs one right now?”That probably wasn’t the question that our hospital clinical ethicist asked, though that is what I recall. It sounded like something my mother would encourage me to do. It sounded like something I would like to do. It sounded easy. It was none of that and so much more.Two weeks earlier, a man was found down (...) in his apartment, unresponsive. He had had a stroke. He was hospitalized in our ICU on a ventilator. He had no family or friends to speak on his behalf. Decisions needed to be made. Should he undergo surgery to place a tracheostomy and feeding tube to continue his life?The hospital hired a private investigator who performed yeoman’s work, trying to find someone who knew this man, someone who might be able to share information about his values so that we could act in accord with them. Remarkably, no one was found. The patient had been retired from work for more than a decade. Though he rented an apartment, his landlord did not know him. No family was discovered. No friends came forward nor were identified. No medical records were uncovered. He had not seen a doctor or visited a clinic or hospital in the area until now. He was a solitary person, a human being without close relationships. His apartment was unkempt; beer bottles were strewn about the place.The clinical team requested an ethics consultation. Though the hospital does not have a formal policy for decision making at moments like these, our ethicist is well-versed in a variety of ways these circumstances are handled. Sometimes a treating physician functions as both the attending and a surrogate. This can be fraught with potential conflicts of interest. Unconscious bias could influence one’s thoughts about the value of a life and the cost to sustain it. Sometimes the attending provider presses on with therapies regardless of the likelihood of successful treatment. This choice fails to acknowledge individual autonomy. It fails to weigh the suffering required to live another day. It sidesteps the thorny issues that are discussed everyday between providers, patients, and loved ones.The ethicist gathered a group to serve as informal surrogates for this patient. Three of us agreed to act as friends and decision makers for this man, helping the treatment team determine next steps. The ethicist provided a few rules and much oversight.We met for a family conference. The intensivist and neurologist shared the diagnosis and treatment that the patient had received. They detailed information about the decisions that needed to be made. The patient’s nurse, the social worker, and the spiritual care intern attended the meeting to watch the proceedings and contribute to the discussion. We three, the patient’s friend group, were invited to ask questions. We had some.I am a hospitalist, an internist working in a hospital caring for patients. I have done this work for 25 years. I know the intensivist and the neurologist well. We have worked together, caring for many people over the years. My two surrogate partners were a nurse and a chaplain. The nurse had decades of professional experience, including in the intensive care unit. The chaplain was experienced in her work and comfortable with the challenges that arise in a hospital.The three of us had a robust discussion. I shared what most patients tell me when I ask about resuscitation status. “I don’t want to be kept alive on machines,” or “I don’t want to be a burden.” The ethicist gently reminded us that we were tasked with making a decision on behalf of this person, irrespective of what others would decide for themselves. It was challenging to tease out clues [End Page 10] that could guide us to what this man might choose for himself.Because of the location of his stroke, the patient was not expected to regain consciousness. He had been off sedation for more than a day and had not woken up. For the rest of his life, he would be institutionalized, ventilator dependent, and sustained with nutrition administered via a... (shrink)

This article is a response to Nancy Bauer's How To Do Things with Pornography. The main argument of the book is presented and evaluated. In particular, Bauer's criticisms of Catharine MacKinnon's work on pornography are considered and a defense of MacKinnon's views offered.

The mother discipline of organisational behaviour has deep roots in psychology, particularly industrial and organisational psychology. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that new and theoretically incommensurate findings involving human moral behaviour have been met with calls for a more psychologically informed investigation of ethical behaviour in organisational contexts (DeCremer and Tenbrunsel, 2012; Reynolds and Ceranic, 2009). This project, aimed at a fuller understanding of the psychology of ethical behaviour, typically falls under the label of Organisational Ethical Behavior (OEB).

The late Gregor Sebba was fond of describing his monumental _Bibliographia Cartesiana: A Critical Guide to the Descartes Literature, 1800–1960 _as a by-product of his research begun in 1949 for an article he had in mind titled _The Dream of Descartes._ The bibliography has been indispensable to Descartes scholars since its appearance in 1964. When Sebba died in 1985, his manuscript for _The Dream of Descartes _was still unfinished. Here, with materials provided by Aníbal A. Bueño, Richard H. Popkin, and (...) Helen Sebba, Richard A. Watson presents the completed work based on a 1973 draft, letters, outlines, and other manuscript material. The result is a fascinating analysis of Descartes’ dreams as seminal in the creative process of genius. (shrink)

As John Henry Newman reflected on 'The Idea of a University' more than a century and a half ago, Bradley C. S. Watson brings together some of the nation's most eminent thinkers on higher education to reflect on the nature and purposes of the American university today. Their mordant reflections paint a picture of the American university in crisis. This book is essential reading for thoughtful citizens, scholars, and educational policymakers.

This paper presents an implemented computational model of word acquisition which learns directly from raw multimodal sensory input. Set in an information theoretic framework, the model acquires a lexicon by finding and statistically modeling consistent cross‐modal structure. The model has been implemented in a system using novel speech processing, computer vision, and machine learning algorithms. In evaluations the model successfully performed speech segmentation, word discovery and visual categorization from spontaneous infant‐directed speech paired with video images of single objects. These results (...) demonstrate the possibility of using state‐of‐the‐art techniques from sensory pattern recognition and machine learning to implement cognitive models which can process raw sensor data without the need for human transcription or labeling. (shrink)

Most observers agree that modern physical theory attempts to provide objective representations of reality. However, the claim that these representations are based on conventional choices is viewed by many as a denial of their objectivity. As a result, objectivity and conventionality in representation are often framed as polar opposites. Offering a new appraisal of symmetry in modern physics, employing detailed case studies from relativity theory and quantum mechanics, Objectivity, Invariance, and Convention contends that the physical sciences, though dependent on convention, (...) may produce objective representations of reality. Talal Debs and Michael Redhead show that both realists and constructivists have recognized important elements of an understanding of science that may not be contradictory. The position--"perspectival invariantism"-- introduced in this book highlights the shortcomings of existing approaches to symmetry in physics, and, for the constructivist, demonstrates that a dependence on conventions in representation reaches into the domain of the most technical sciences. For the realist, it stands as evidence against the claim that conventionality must undermine objectivity. We can be committed to the existence of a single real ontology while maintaining a cultural view of science. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.3 (2003) 407 [Access article in PDF] Reply By Margaret J. Osler and Richard A. Watson In his comments on our historiographical Notes in the October 2002 issue of JHP, A. P. Martinich misrepresents our position by erroneously claiming that we presume a sharp dichotomy between the analytic history of philosophy and the historical history of philosophy. Neither of us accepts such (...) a premise. Once that misreading is eliminated there are few disagreements between each of us and Martinich.We agree that any meaningful history of philosophy must be both philosophically sophisticated and historically grounded. History without philosophy would be nothing but chronicle; history of philosophy without historical context would describe a series of moves, but explain nothing. A desideratum of both history and philosophy is careful reading, exposition, and analysis of texts.... (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Historical‐Dialectical Thought in Hegel and Marx Marx's Onto‐formative View of Human Nature Capitalism As a Counter‐ontological, Fetishizing Force Gramsci's Historical and Dialectical Campaign against Capitalism Conclusion Notes References.