Although the mental time travel (MTT) hypothesis provides a rich, conceptual framework, the absence of clear, empirically tractable, behavioural criteria for determining the capacity for MTT restricts its usefulness in comparative research. Examples of empirical criteria for evaluating MTT in animals are given. We also question the authors' evaluation of semantic foresight and their even-handedness in assessing human and nonhuman behaviour.

Assessing children's episodic future thinking by having them select items for future use may be assessing their functional reasoning about the future rather than their future episodic thinking. In an attempt to circumvent this problem, we capitalised on the fact that episodic cognition necessarily has a spatial format (Clayton & Russell, 2009; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007). Accordingly, we asked children of 3, 4, and 5 to chose items they would need to play a game (blow football) from the opposite side (...) of the table on which they had never before played. The crucial item was the box that was needed by children to reach the table from the other side. Over four experiments, we demonstrated that, while children of 3 perform poorly on future questions and children of 5 generally perform quite well, children of 4 years find a question about what they themselves will need to play in the future harder to answer than a similar question posed about another child. We suggest that this result is due to the 'growth error' of over-applying newly-developed Level 2 perspective-taking skills (Flavell et al., 1981), which encourages the selection of non-functional items. The data are discussed in terms of perspective-taking abilities in children and of the neural correlates of episodic cognition, navigation, and theory of mind. (shrink)

Uncorrected Proof; please cite published version.

1. Οντολογία του Παιγνίου Μία από τις πιο σημαντικές συνεισφορές του Αξελού είναι η θεωρία του περί του «κοσμικού παιγνίου». Σύμφωνα με αυτήν, ο κόσμος δεν είναι ούτε ένα αυστηρό σύστημα καθορισμένων νόμων, ούτε ένα χαοτικό σύνολο τυχαίων γεγονότων, αλλά ένα δυναμικό παίγνιο που εμπλέκει τη δημιουργία, την καταστροφή και τη μεταμόρφωση. Η έννοια του παιγνίου επιτρέπει μια ανοιχτή, μη δογματική προσέγγιση του Κόσμου, όπου το είναι και το γίγνεσθαι αλληλοδιαπλέκονται. Με αυτόν τον τρόπο, απορρίπτει την παραδοσιακή δυϊστική διάκριση μεταξύ (...) υποκειμένου και αντικειμένου, προτείνοντας μια πιο ολιστική/αποσπασματική και ρευστή προσέγγιση στην κατανόηση της ύπαρξης. -/- 2. Η Επιρροή του Ηράκλειτου και του Χέγκελ Η σκέψη του Αξελού αντλεί σημαντική έμπνευση από τον Ηράκλειτο και τον Χέγκελ. Ο Ηράκλειτος με την έννοια του γίγνεσθαι και της διαρκούς μεταβολής, καθώς και ο Χέγκελ με τη διαλεκτική του μεθοδολογία, αποτελούν βασικά σημεία αναφοράς στο έργο του. Ωστόσο, ο Αξελός διαφοροποιείται, προτείνοντας μια μη τελεολογική διαλεκτική, η οποία απορρίπτει την τελική σύνθεση και αφήνει ανοιχτό το ενδεχόμενο της αέναης κίνησης και του συνεχούς μετασχηματισμού. Η ανοιχτή σκέψη προϋποθέτει την αποδοχή της αβεβαιότητας και της ρευστότητας της ύπαρξης, απορρίπτοντας κάθε είδους απόλυτο σύστημα γνώσης. Αυτή η προσέγγιση οδηγεί σε μια νέα φιλοσοφική στάση, όπου η σκέψη δεν επιδιώκει να επιβάλει σταθερούς κανόνες, αλλά να βρίσκεται σε διαρκή διάλογο με το άγνωστο και το ανοίκειο. -/- 3. Το Τεχνικό Φαινόμενο και η Μοντέρνα Εποχή Ο Αξελός αναγνωρίζει την τεχνική ως μια από τις πλέον κυρίαρχες δυνάμεις της σύγχρονης εποχής. Στο έργο του "Το Τεχνικό Φαινόμενο" εξετάζει τον τρόπο με τον οποίο η τεχνική δεν αποτελεί απλώς ένα εργαλείο στα χέρια του ανθρώπου, αλλά μια κοσμοϊστορική διαδικασία που διαμορφώνει το ίδιο το είναι του κόσμου. Η τεχνική δεν περιορίζεται στη χρήση μηχανών ή στην τεχνολογική πρόοδο, αλλά αποτελεί μια συνολική δυναμική που καθορίζει τις σχέσεις του ανθρώπου με τον κόσμο και τον ίδιο του τον εαυτό. Μέσω της τεχνικής, η ανθρωπότητα προσπαθεί να ελέγξει τον κόσμο, αλλά ταυτόχρονα χάνει την επαφή με την κοσμική διάσταση της ύπαρξής της. Αυτό οδηγεί σε μια κρίση της νεωτερικότητας, όπου η τεχνολογία γίνεται κυρίαρχη αλλά και ανεξέλεγκτη. Η τεχνική δεν λειτουργεί απλώς ως ένα μέσο που εξυπηρετεί τον άνθρωπο, αλλά γίνεται μια αυτόνομη δύναμη που αποξενώνει το άτομο από τη φυσική του ύπαρξη. Ο Αξελός, επηρεασμένος από τη Χεγκελιανή και Μαρξιστική παράδοση, αλλά και από τον Χάιντεγκερ, θεωρεί ότι η τεχνική μεταβάλλει τον άνθρωπο σε απλό χρήστη και διαχειριστή, περιορίζοντας τη δυνατότητά του για ουσιαστική φιλοσοφική σκέψη και ελεύθερη δημιουργία. Αυτή η αποξένωση εκδηλώνεται στην αποκοπή του ανθρώπου από το κοσμικό παιχνίδι της ύπαρξης, καθώς εγκλωβίζεται σε έναν μηχανιστικό και λειτουργικό τρόπο σκέψης. Παρότι ο Αξελός ασκεί κριτική στη μονόπλευρη κυριαρχία της τεχνικής, δεν την απορρίπτει εξολοκλήρου. Αντίθετα, τη θεωρεί μέρος του παιχνιδιού του κόσμου, μιας αέναης κίνησης που δεν μπορεί να εγκλωβιστεί σε αυστηρά οριοθετημένες κατηγορίες. Το πρόβλημα δεν βρίσκεται στην τεχνική αυτή καθαυτή, αλλά στην άκριτη αποδοχή της ως μοναδικού τρόπου σχέσης με τον Κόσμο. Η τεχνική, ενώ αποτελεί αναπόφευκτο στοιχείο της εξέλιξης, εγκυμονεί τον κίνδυνο της αποξένωσης όταν λειτουργεί ανεξέλεγκτα και χωρίς στοχαστική και ποιητική θεώρηση. Η φιλοσοφία του Αξελού προτείνει μια πιο ανοιχτή προσέγγιση, όπου η τεχνική δεν θα αντιμετωπίζεται ως υπέρτατη δύναμη, αλλά ως μία από τις πολλές διαστάσεις της ανθρώπινης ύπαρξης. Ο Αξελός προτείνει μια ανοιχτή στάση απέναντι στην τεχνική, όπου ο άνθρωπος θα παραμείνει συνειδητός συμμέτοχος στο παιχνίδι του κόσμου, αντί να μετατραπεί σε απλό εκτελεστή μιας τεχνολογικής αναγκαιότητας. (shrink)

Traditional social worlds enable plural modes of self‐expression and communication across both public and private realms. Our identity involves a variety of aspects of self. Moreover, plural and conflicting aspects of self are often presented within the context of one relationship, role, or encounter. The presentation of less chosen aspects of our selves often also provides the object for the expression of certain relational aspects of respect for one another's privacy. Self‐presentation and shared activity in many online social worlds can (...) also enable autonomy and privacy. The online revolutions in access to information and to one another have provided unprecedented opportunities to expand our knowledge, to pursue our social and working lives, and to carry on all sorts of interests and activities. One specific example of how some of our fears about online evils have been claimed to be exaggerated and misguided concerns fears of risks to our children from online sexual predators. (shrink)

Shows that the very same asymmetries that arise for intentionally also arise from deciding, desiring, in favor of, opposed to, and advocating. It seems that the phenomenon is not due to anything about the concept of intentional action in particular. Rather, the effects observed for the concept of intentional action should be regarded as just one manifestation of the pervasive impact of moral judgment.

Selective scientific realists disagree on which theoretical posits should be regarded as essential to the empirical success of a scientific theory. A satisfactory account of essentialness will show that the (approximate) truth of the selected posits adequately explains the success of the theory. Therefore, (a) the essential elements must be discernible prospectively; (b) there cannot be a priori criteria regarding which type of posit is essential; and (c) the overall success of a theory, or ‘cluster’ of propositions, not only individual (...) derivations, should be explicable. Given these desiderata, I propose a “unification criterion” for identifying essential elements. (shrink)

Όλα τα έργα του Hesse θεμελιώνονται σε μια μεταφυσική αρχή, την αρχή της ενότητας ολόκληρου του σύμπαντος που διατρέχει όλα τα έργα του, τα οποία είναι αφιερωμένα στην αναζήτηση του ιερού «εγώ» που βρίσκεται σε κάθε άτομο από τη γέννηση, με άλλα λόγια διερευνά την ανθρώπινη συμμετοχή στην Υπερβατικότητα του Θείου. Τα μονοπάτια των ηρώων του οδηγούν στον Θεό, που για αυτόν είναι υπερβατική και Αόρατη Αρχή και οποίος ζει σε όλα, το Θείο συστατικό είναι τα πάντα και το τίποτα. (...) Ο καθένας στον κόσμο μας αποκαλύπτει τη Θεία ενότητα μέσω της ποικιλομορφίας της ζωής Ο Θεός, σύμφωνα με τον Hesse, είναι η Θεία ουσία μέσα μας, που σήμαινε για τον Hesse το μέτρο της ανάμειξης ενός ατόμου στο ιερό «εγώ», που είναι κρυμμένο στην ψυχή του καθενός. Αυτό είναι το υψηλότερο, υπερ-προσωπικό «εγώ», στραμμένο προς τον Θεό, την Ενότητα του Παντός, γιατί η σωτηρία του «εγώ» του ατόμου βρίσκεται στη μεταφυσική επανένωση, την ενοποίηση με τον Θεό, που είναι η ουσία όλων των μυστικιστικών θρησκειών, τόσο της Ανατολής όσο και της Δύσης. (shrink)

The theme of this issue of Ethical Perspectives is the French tradition in liberal thought, and the unique contribution that this tradition can make to debates in contemporary liberalism. It is inspired by a colloquium held at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in December of 2008 entitled “In Search of a Lost Liberalism: Constant, Tocqueville, and the singularity of French Liberalism.” This colloquium was held in conjunction with the retirement of Leuven professor and former Dean of the Institute of Philosophy, (...) André Van de Putte, who found much inspiration in this tradition. A revised version of his valedictory lecture from the conference serves as the final contribution to this issue. Much contemporary liberal political philosophy is currently done in conversation with a line of liberal thinkers starting with John Locke, running through Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, and culminating in the work of John Rawls and his followers. The reasons for the enormous appeal of this philosophical tradition are, among other things, the combination of the central role of the intuitively appealing value of individual liberty with a strong rationalistic, universalistic, and normative character. The thread running through most of these liberal theories is a commitment to what the French liberal Benjamin Constant referred to as “the liberty of the moderns,” that is, liberty in a negative sense, as a lack of interference in one’s activity from others and from government. This focus has expanded over time to include a richer body of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights, for instance, in the work of liberal thinkers who have tried to integrate the insights of communitarian thought and discourse ethics in their work. However, the emphasis on individual liberty in the negative sense continues to be the normative and theoretical touchstone and default position for many contemporary liberal theories. The limitation of the canon of liberal thought to the aforementioned authors and themes deprives the contemporary debate of a rich source of ideas: the French liberal tradition. Montesquieu, considered to be the father of this tradition, provides a good example of how it can enrich current debates in liberal theory. Montesquieu’s work evinces a keen eye for the dynamics of power relations and the limitations of the power of the better rational argument. His insight that power can sometimes only be checked by an equal and opposing power, so that a system of separation and balance of powers is necessary in order to preserve liberty, is reflected in the foundations of most modern democracies. Montesquieu also argues that contingent environmental, historical, social and economic conditions play a dramatic role in determining what kind of government is appropriate for a particular society. On his view, ignoring these facts when framing a government can inadvertently end in despotism. Montesquieu’s observations challenge us to reexamine some of contemporary liberalism’s universalist and rationalist claims. Benjamin Constant is most famous for his distinction between two kinds of liberty: the liberty of the ancients and the liberty of the moderns. The ancient form of liberty manifested itself in the active political participation of citizens in the ancient republic. While this form of government and decision-making was suitable for small, homogeneous city-states, Constant argues that it is impracticable for large modern nation-states. Hence, the concept of modern liberty shifts to an emphasis on the rule of law and the non-interference of the state in private matters. This form of liberty is familiar to us from contemporary liberalism – and Constant cherishes this form of freedom as much as any liberal does today. However, his position is complex: he also argues that the liberty of the ancients should not be neglected. Active political participation is needed to ensure that the government is executing its duty of preserving the modern form of liberty by publicly pointing out violations. The contemporary relevance of Constant’s work is clear when we consider the alleged “democratic deficit” that plagues the EU and international institutions such as the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank. Not only does this democratic deficit threaten the modern form of liberty by placing decision-making processes out of sight of the people, it also threatens citizens’ sense of self-respect derived from self-governance. Constant’s argument for the necessity of combining the liberty of the ancients with that of the moderns provides a fruitful resource for confronting these contemporary issues. Tocqueville’s work on liberalism benefits from his opportunity to observe a society founded on liberal democratic principles – the United States of America – in action. In his Democracy in America, he examines the social consequences, both intended and unintended, of building a society on ‘the equality of conditions’, as he defines ‘democracy’. Tocqueville sees a tension between the democratic value of equality and the aristocratic value of the rule of the best. He observes that democratic societies do not necessarily choose the best leaders and instead promote mediocrity instead of virtue, talent, and excellence. Democracy also confronts citizens with the threat of ‘soft despotism’, where a government that preserves the outer signs of the liberty of the moderns nevertheless controls the behavior of its citizens in minute detail through a system of detailed rules ostensibly aimed at their welfare. This paternalism is an even more insidious threat to liberal values than the hard variety of despotism, since it is so difficult to detect and done in the name of liberal values themselves. Taking Tocqueville’s observations seriously would add complexity to attempts to theorize about the modern social-democratic welfare state. The contributions to this issue supplement and critique mainstream liberal thought and its relation to contemporary issues through a serious engagement with the French liberal tradition. Annelien De Dijn’s contribution discusses Bertrand de Jouvenel, a lesser-known 20th Century representative of the French political tradition she terms ‘aristocratic liberalism’. This tradition has its roots in the work of Montesquieu, and emphasizes the importance of intermediary bodies, most importantly the aristocracy, in providing a check to the top-down power of despotic state authorities and the bottom-up power of revolutionary leveling tendencies, both of which threaten liberty. De Dijn situates Jouvenel in this tradition, but then indicates an important difference between his thought and that of his predecessors: his most significant work, On Power, is not only on French history, but on European history. Pointing to the enthusiastic reception of this work in the Anglophone world, she suggests that the rise of totalitarianism in Europe gave the anti-totalitarian features of aristocratic liberalism a broader appeal. Valentino Lumowa’s paper concerns Constant’s classic text, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns. Lumowa argues that in order to understand Constant’s piece, we must be aware that its two parts were written under different historical circumstances and decipher the argumentative thrust inherent in the text. Following Stephen Holmes, he argues that to understand the shift Constant made in the second part of the text, we should read it within the context of the increasing influence of the ultra-Royalists in the legislature during the Bourbon Restoration. However, in contrast to Holmes, he contends that the spirit of both civic and individual freedom, which enlivens representative system, is the backbone of the text in its unity. Demin Duan’s essay investigates an apparent ambivalence between liberal and imperialist tendencies in the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, which has already drawn some attention from Tocquevillian scholars. These interpretations of Tocqueville and his writings on empire generally agree that Tocqueville stands in a recognized tradition of liberalism, which is characterized by respect for human rights, individual freedom and a sense of universal humanism. On this standard view, Tocqueville’s support of imperialism represents nothing but an unfortunate breach of his own otherwise consistent liberal thinking. Duan’s article questions this standard position. By questioning the assumption of Tocqueville’s liberalism in the first place, he tries to gauge the influence of both the old republican tradition and the new liberal perspective on his thinking. In conclusion, he argues that Tocqueville’s overall thought, especially his notion of freedom, is very much informed by an old republican tradition. His support of French imperialism could be better understood from this perspective rather than be rendered simply as a deviation from liberal norms. Pawel Marczewski’s contribution is an attempt to show that Tocqueville’s conception of liberty transcends the divisions between negative and positive aspects of freedom. He begins by juxtaposing this conception with the opposition drawn by Constant between liberty of the ancients and liberty of the moderns. While Tocqueville and Constant shared a concern for the preservation of individual rights, Tocqueville was much more reluctant to accept the modern loss of the communal dimension of liberty. He did not accept the view that jouissances privées, private pleasures, are the main compensation that the modern world has to offer for the lost ancient treasure of political participation. The essay then looks into the relevance of Tocqueville’s standpoint for current debates between liberal defenders of negative freedom and republican advocates of freedom as non-domination. Participants on both sides of the debate seem to be so devoted to showing that their particular approach provides the best guarantees against actual and possible threats to liberty that they overlook the fact that their definitions of freedom remain significantly similar. By arguing that ‘to be free is to be guided by one’s own will’, contemporary republicans, as well as their liberal counterparts, move along the lines drawn by Constant towards private pleasures. By questioning the inevitability of this turn, Tocqueville provides us with a valuable contribution to these discussions in contemporary political philosophy. Finally, André Van de Putte’s contribution, an adaptation of his emeritus speech that closed the conference on French Liberalism, appeals to Tocqueville in order to draw attention to the importance of intermediary, dialogical bodies in mitigating the implicit despotic tendencies of the democratic drive to equality. In Tocqueville’s view, the transition from the feudal corporate inequality to democratic individual equality was not a clean break. Rather, this transition is a continual process of democratization that is driven by a desire for equality, or egalité des conditions. This dissolution of distinctions of estate, class and status has the unintended consequence of concentrating the diffuse power of these entities into a centralized state, which is responsible for ensuring the equality of all under the law. This process leaves increasingly isolated and atomized individuals to face the power of a monolithic state in defense of their freedom, and moves toward a soft, paternalistic despotism. Constant’s freedom of the moderns is not sufficient to protect individuals from this centralized power. Democracy also requires the political freedom of the ancients. Van de Putte argues for a system in which atomized individuals organize themselves into intermediary bodies that, in a Montesquieuian balance of powers, can enter into dialogue with each other and the state on more equitable terms. Van de Putte’s contribution closes with a plea for a conception of democracy as a regime of dialogue. (shrink)

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Let us say that an extended object is “composed wholly of simples” just in case it is an aggregate of absolutely unextended parts spread throughout an extended region—that is, just in case there is a set S such that: every member is a point-sized part of the object, and for every x, x is part of the object if and only if it has a part in common with some member of S. Could a truly extended substance be composed entirely (...) of unextended parts? Reflection upon the fact that it must be at least possible for extended objects to touch one another suggests that the answer to this question is: No. (shrink)

Proof-theoretic reflection principles are schemas which attempt to express the soundness of arithmetical theories within their own language, e.g., ${\mathtt{{Prov}_{\mathsf {PA}} \rightarrow \varphi }}$ can be understood to assert that any statement provable in Peano arithmetic is true. It has been repeatedly suggested that justification for such principles follows directly from acceptance of an arithmetical theory $\mathsf {T}$ or indirectly in virtue of their derivability in certain truth-theoretic extensions thereof. This paper challenges this consensus by exploring relationships between reflection principles (...) and principles of mathematical and transfinite induction as well as the status of the latter with respect to various foundational characterizations of number theory. (shrink)

Countering claims of its impossibility, this paper argues for economic theology as an intelligible figure of contemporary political rationality and organization, and a distinctive analytical strategy in relation to forms of liberal and neoliberal governmentality and the contemporary management of social life. As an analytical strategy, it has two arms: an institutional one, drawing upon Michel Foucault’s work on the pastorate; and a conceptual one, following from Giorgio Agamben on oikonomia, order and providence. Economic theology was the arcana of 20th-century (...) debates on both political theology and governmentality and a condition for their emergence. It formed the horizon of Carl Schmitt’s intervention of a political theology in response to Max Weber, and, as the pastorate, it was for Foucault the historical background of the emergence of the liberal arts of government. While appearing as a new paradigm, it thus has a measure of priority over our more established ones. Furthermore, to the extent that economic theology comes to occupy the place of political rationality in contemporary liberal-democratic societies, the political becomes less a rational public sphere and more a form of public liturgy. (shrink)

Preface -- Which risk society, and for whom? -- The sociology of risk and the ineliminability of realism -- Risk society and systematic social theory -- Thinking with Bourdieu, Marx, and Weber to analyse contemporary inequalities and class -- Risk society and the distribution of bads -- Risk illusion and organized irresponsibility in contemporary finance -- Conclusion: beyond the quiet politics of risk.

‘Molinism’, in contemporary usage, is the name for a theory about the workings of divine providence. Its defenders include some of the most prominent contemporary Protestant and Catholic philosophical theologians.¹ Molinism is often said to be the only way to steer a middle..

It is a natural thought that understanding language consists in possessing knowledge—to understand a word is to know what it means. It is also natural to suppose that this knowledge is propositional knowledge—to know what a word means is to know that it means such-and-such. Thus it is prima facie plausible to suppose that understanding a bit of language consists in possessing propositional knowledge of its meaning. I refer to this as the epistemic view of understanding language. The theoretical appeal (...) of this view for the philosophy of language is that it provides for an attractive account of the project of the theory of meaning. If understanding language consists in possessing propositional knowledge of the meanings of expressions, then a meaning theory amounts to a theory of what speakers know in virtue of understanding language. In this paper I argue that, despite its intuitive and theoretical appeal, the epistemic view is false. Propositional knowledge is not necessary for understanding language, not even tacit knowledge. Unlike knowledge, I argue, linguistic understanding does not fail in Gettier cases, does not require epistemic warrant and does not even require belief. The intuitions about knowledge that have been central to epistemology do not seem to hold for linguistic understanding. So unless epistemologists have been radically mistaken about what knowledge requires, knowledge is unnecessary for understanding language. (shrink)

Recent critics have called attention to the alienation of contemporary academics from broad currents of intellectual activity in public culture. The general complaint is that intellectuals are finding a professional home in institutions of higher learning, insulated from the concerns and interests of a wider reading audience. The demands of professional expertise do not encourage academics to work as public intellectuals or to take up social, literary, or political matters in imaginative and perspicuous ways. More problematic is the relative absence (...) of religion in the writings of those who aspire to work as public intellectuals. This essay reviews recent attempts by William Dean, Cornel West, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Stephen Carter, and Robin Lovin to remedy the problem of academic alienation and to address the place of religion in American life. (shrink)

The study of digital economies and the sociology of risk have, with few exceptions, a relationship of benign mutual neglect despite possible important connections between the two. This article aims to bridge the gap between these two fields using Beck’s theory of risk society to explore how the digital economy’s momentum of innovation is generating risks and limiting the scope of existing democratic decision-making via the power of the digital economy to create social faits accomplis outside of democratic control. Three (...) specific risks emerging from the dynamics of innovation of digital economies are discussed as vignettes to illustrate these developments: (1) the remaking of interpersonal co-presence and solitary life; (2) the growing threats of AI to intensify unemployment and inequality; and (3) the impact on the environment of an ‘always on’ and ‘always upgrading’ digital communication ecosystem. With the gap between the potential and the actual use value of the digitalization of the infrastructure of life continuing to grow, this article argues that a different relationship between digital innovation and private and public spheres needs to be established to protect the effectiveness of contemporary democracy. (shrink)

Although risky decision-making has been posited to contribute to the maladaptive behavior of individuals with psychopathic tendencies, the performance of psychopathic groups on a common task of risky decision-making, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994), has been equivocal. Different aspects of psychopathy (personality traits, antisocial deviance) and/or moderating variables may help to explain these inconsistent findings. In a sample of college students (N = 129, age 18–27), we examined the relationship between primary and secondary psychopathic (...) features and IGT performance. A measure of impulsivity was included to investigate its potential as a moderator. In a joint model including main effects and interactions between primary psychopathy, secondary psychopathy and impulsivity, only secondary psychopathy was significantly related to risky IGT performance, and this effect was not moderated by the other variables. This finding supports the growing literature suggesting that secondary psychopathy is a better predictor of decision-making problems than the primary psychopathic personality traits of lack of empathy and remorselessness. (shrink)

Respect is one of the central concepts in contemporary moral thought. It plays a prominent role in everyday, pre-philosophical moral thinking, as well as in recent moral theory and applied ethics. Yet basic questions about the concept and role of respect have received less attention than might be expected. This volume takes up some of these basic questions. The book is not meant to be a comprehensive handbook that covers all aspects of the topic of respect, nor is the focus (...) of the book mainly historical. Rather, the aim is to give leading experts in the field a chance to present their latest ideas and point the research on respect in new directions. Following an introductory historical essay, Part I addresses questions of what respect is, its nature and basis. Part II examines questions in moral theory, for example what exactly ought to be respected, what role respect plays in morality, and which different types of respect are appropriate and morally significant. Part III deals with the practical application of requirements of respect. The essays in this volume will be of interest both to scholars and students working on issues of respect and to anyone interested in this central moral notion. (shrink)

"Introducing the reader to the very latest developments in the philosophical foundations of physics, this book covers advanced material at a level suitable for ...

This chapter contains sections titled: * I Introduction * II A-Theories and B-Theories * III Competing Versions of the A-Theory * IV Presentism a Trivial Truth? * V Open Theism and the A-Theory of Time * VI The “Truthmaker” Argument * VII Conclusion * Notes.

In medical ethics, a large body of work exists on the virtues that enable good medical practice. Medical virtue ethics singles out a number of virtues of the good doctor for attention; among others, these include empathy, care, truthfulness, and justice. According to medical ethicists like Pellegrino and Thomasma, however, phronesis, or “practical wisdom,” occupies a special place among these virtues. For Pellegrino and Thomasma, phronesis is “indispensable” to good medical practice, because it coordinates all the different moral virtues that (...) the doctor must bring to ethical decisions as part of wise moral action.... (shrink)

Η αφήγηση του Οδυσσέα είναι μια σειρά από τυχαίες συναντήσεις. Η ζωή των ηρώων και η συμπεριφορά του έχει σχεδόν ενδεχομενικό χαρακτήρα και λέμε «Σχεδόν» — γιατί το κείμενο πρέπει να γραφτεί. Η ασήμαντη απρόβλεπτη λεπτομέρεια πρέπει να μετατραπεί σε σημάδι, ώστε στη συνέχεια να εγκαταλείψει ένα μέρος της εφήμερης ιδιότητάς της και να κοινοποιηθεί, που γίνεται μέρος του ίδιου του μυθιστορήματος του Joyce. Για να αποφευχθεί ο χαρακτηρισμός σε αποσπάσματα όπως αυτό που αναφέρθηκε παραπάνω από το να παραμείνει καθαρός (...) κατάλογος, προκύπτουν δύο στρατηγικές: (1) η ανάπτυξη μιας ελάχιστης αφηγηματικής δομής. και (2) η ανάπτυξη ενός συγκεκριμένου στυλ. Για τον Joyce, το στυλ κάνει τις λέξεις — ή συγκεκριμένες μονάδες γραφής, όπως φράσεις — να μετρούν από μόνες τους στη σχέση τους με άλλες λέξεις. Η ποίηση είναι η απόλυτη παρουσίαση ενός ύφους με αυτή την έννοια. Εάν ο Όμηρος σχηματίζει ένα δομικό ή αφηγηματικό σκηνικό στον Οδυσσέα, αυτό πρέπει να γίνει κατανοητό ως μια ανοιχτή δομή που μπορεί να φιλοξενήσει μια σχεδόν άπειρη σειρά περιεχομένων. Και λίγοι σχολιαστές απέτυχαν να παρατηρήσουν την ποιητική ποιότητα της γραφής του Joyce — ο μονόλογος της Μόλι Μπλουμ στο τελευταίο κεφάλαιο αναφέρεται ως χαρακτηριστικό παράδειγμα. Λιγότεροι, ωστόσο, μπόρεσαν να συνδέσουν το στυλ του Joyce με το πρόβλημα της γραφής που αντιμετώπιζε. Το στυλ είναι η απάντηση του Joyce στο πρόβλημα του πώς μπορεί να εμφανιστεί το ενδεχόμενο στο μυθιστόρημα. Έτσι, ενώ οι ρεαλιστές συγγραφείς του δέκατου ένατου αιώνα εργάζονταν για να κάνουν τις ενδεχόμενες λεπτομέρειες να φαίνονται απαραίτητες για το σύνολο του αφηγηματικού ιστού του μυθιστορήματος, η στρατηγική του Joyce, αντίθετα, είναι να θέσει σε κίνδυνο την ίδια την πιθανότητα της αφήγησης κάνοντας την ενδεχόμενη λεπτομέρεια σχετικά αυτόνομη, υποταγμένη στο τίποτα. εκτός από τη δική της (ποιητική) ύπαρξη. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to explore the significance of Montague’s paradox—that is, any arithmetical theory $T\supseteq Q$ over a language containing a predicate $P$ satisfying $P\rightarrow \varphi $ and $T\vdash \varphi \,\therefore\,T\vdash P$ is inconsistent—as a limitative result pertaining to the notions of formal, informal, and constructive provability, in their respective historical contexts. To this end, the paradox is reconstructed in a quantified extension $\mathcal {QLP}$ of Artemov’s logic of proofs. $\mathcal {QLP}$ contains both explicit modalities $t:\varphi $ (...) and also proof quantifiers $x:\varphi $. In this system, the basis for the rule NEC is decomposed into a number of distinct principles governing how various modes of reasoning about proofs and provability can be internalized within the system itself. A conceptually motivated resolution to the paradox is proposed in the form of an argument for rejecting the unrestricted rule NEC on the basis of its subsumption of an intuitively invalid principle pertaining to the interaction of proof quantifiers and the proof-theorem relation expressed by explicit modalities. (shrink)

This paper offers a defense of the practice of mindless eating. Popular accounts of the practice suggest that it is non-autonomous and to blame for many of society’s food related problems, including the so-called obesity epidemic and the prevalence of diet related illnesses like diabetes. I use Maureen Sie’s “traffic participation” account of agency to argue that some mindless eating is autonomous, or more specifically, agential. Insofar as we value autonomous eating, then, it should be valued. I also argue that (...) mindless eating can be substantively good: it can help us achieve valuable ends, like creating and maintaining community. Acknowledging the agency and value in mindless eating has both practical and ethical benefits. I contend that it can help us preserve the value in mindless eating while suggesting more effective ways to change it, and, by offering a new narrative about mindless eaters, may be less damaging to agency than popular narratives. (shrink)

How do we know what other speakers say? Perhaps the most natural view is that we hear a speaker's utterance and infer what was said, drawing on our competence in the syntax and semantics of the language. An alternative view that has emerged in the literature is that native speakers have a non-inferential capacity to perceive the content of speech. Call this the perceptual view. The disagreement here is best understood as an epistemological one about whether our knowledge of what (...) speakers say is epistemically mediated by our linguistic competence. The present paper takes up the question of how we should go about settling this issue. Arguments for the perceptual view generally appeal to the phenomenology of speech comprehension. The present paper develops a line of argument for the perceptual view that draws on evidence from empirical psychology. The evidence suggests that a speaker's core syntactic and semantic competence is typically deployed sub-personally. The point is not just that the competence is tacit or unconscious, but that the person is not the locus of the competence. I argue that standing competence can enter into the grounds for knowledge only if it is subject to a certain sort of epistemic assessment, an assessment that is appropriate only if the person is the locus of that competence. If the person is not the locus of a speaker's core linguistic competence, as the psychological evidence suggests, then that competence does not enter into the grounds for our knowledge of what speakers say. If this line of argument is right, it has implications for the epistemology of perception and for our understanding of how empirical psychology bears on epistemology generally. (shrink)

Δύο επίμονα θέματα ζωντανεύουν όλη τη γραφή του Αλμπέρ Καμύ και αποτελούν τη βάση του καλλιτεχνικού του οράματος: Το ένα είναι το αίνιγμα του σύμπαντος, το οποίο είναι εκπληκτικά όμορφο αλλά αδιάφορο για τη ζωή. Το άλλο είναι το αίνιγμα του ανθρώπου, του οποίου η λαχτάρα για ευτυχία και νόημα στη ζωή παραμένει άσβεστη από την πλήρη επίγνωση της δικής του θνητότητας και της κυρίαρχης αδιαφορίας του περιβάλλοντός του. Στη ρίζα κάθε μυθιστορήματος, κάθε θεατρικού έργου, κάθε δοκιμίου, ακόμη και κάθε (...) καταχώρησης στα τετράδιά του βρίσκεται η αδιάκοπη ανάγκη του Καμύ να διερευνήσει και να προβληματιστεί για τον ειρωνικό διπλό δεσμό που αντιλαμβανόταν ότι ήταν η ουσία της ανθρώπινης κατάστασης: Ο άνθρωπος είναι προικισμένος με τη φαντασία να συλλάβει μια ιδανική ύπαρξη, αλλά ούτε οι συνθήκες, ούτε οι δικές του δυνάμεις επιτρέπουν την επίτευξή της. Η αντίληψη αυτού του απελπιστικού διπλού δεσμού έκανε αναπόφευκτη στον Καμύ την υποχρέωση να αντιμετωπίσει ένα κυρίαρχο ηθικό ζήτημα για τον άνθρωπο: Δεδομένης της περιορισμένης κατάστασης του ανθρώπου, υπάρχουν έντιμοι όροι με τους οποίους μπορεί να ζήσει τη ζωή του;. (shrink)

The work of Foucault on liberal government, and that of his followers, is subject to two dangers. The first is to regard the critical character of liberalism (as governing through freedom) as providing safeguards against the despotic potentials of biopower and sovereignty. The second is to regard these heterogenous powers of life and death as somehow simply relocated or reinscribed within the field of liberal governmentality. The latter point is a major methodological error; the former closes the gap between the (...) analytics of government and the normativity of liberalism itself. By working through these dangers, our understanding of the ethos of liberal government is transformed. That ethos today requires us to link governing through freedom to the powers of life and death, the exercise of choice to the sovereign decision, the contract to violence, economic citizenship to moral discipline and obligation, and rights and liberties to enforcement. (shrink)

Δεν φαίνεται πολύ σοβαρό, εκ πρώτης όψεως, να υποστηρίζουμε ότι η «ανθρωπότητα που θα έρθει» μπορεί να έχει δικαιώματα. Η απλή κοινή λογική θα υποστηρίξει ότι αυτό που δεν υπάρχει – ή αυτό του οποίου η ύπαρξη είναι προβληματική – δεν μπορεί να έχει δικαιώματα. Μόνο φυσικά ή νομικά πρόσωπα ικανά να τα διεκδικήσουν, δηλαδή να τα διεκδικήσουν με υποκείμενα ή φορείς που έχουν τη σχετική υποχρέωση να τα προστατεύσουν, μπορούν να επωφεληθούν από τα «δικαιώματα», με τη στενή έννοια αυτού (...) του όρου. Αυστηρά μιλώντας, επομένως, ούτε τα συλλογικά όντα (ζωικά είδη) ούτε τα πράγματα (δέντρα, βράχοι κ.λπ.) ούτε τα «όντα της λογικής» («ανθρωπότητα») δεν μπορούν να έχουν δικαιώματα: εκτός εάν συγχέονται τα νόμιμα δικαιώματα. (πράγμα που συνεπάγεται νόμο και κύρωση) και ηθικό δικαίωμα που είναι μόνο μια απροσδιόριστη απαίτηση, και επομένως αμετάφραστη σε νομικούς όρους (όπως το δικαίωμα των παιδιών να αγαπιούνται για παράδειγμα...). Ή για να το θέσω διαφορετικά: δεν μπορεί να υπάρξει δικαίωμα χωρίς σύμβαση τουλάχιστον σιωπηρή, τουλάχιστον δυνητική, και χωρίς αμοιβαιότητα συμφωνημένη μεταξύ όλων των συμβαλλόμενων μερών. Για όλους αυτούς τους λόγους, η «ανθρωπότητα που θα έρθει», ή οι επόμενες γενιές, δεν μπορούν να είναι «υποκείμενα» οποιασδήποτε αξίωσης, οποιασδήποτε απαίτησης και δεν μπορούν, αυστηρά μιλώντας, να διεκδικήσουν τίποτα. Ή, για να το θέσω αλλιώς: γιατί να επιβάλλω οποιονδήποτε περιορισμό στις επιθυμίες μου από την έγνοια για τους απογόνους που δεν είναι δική μου ευθύνη και για τους οποίους δεν έχω καμία χρησιμότητα; -/- . (shrink)

Although “you are what you eat” is a well-worn cliché, personal identity does not figure prominently in many debates about the ethics of eating interventions. This paper contributes to a growing philosophical literature theorizing the connection between eating and identity and exploring its implications for eating interventions. I explore how “identity-policing,” a key mechanism for the social constitution and maintenance of identity, applies to eating and trace its ethical implications for eating interventions. I argue that identity policing can be harmful (...) and that eating interventions can subject people to these harms by invoking identity policing qua intervention strategy or by encouraging people to eat in ways that subject them to policing from others. While these harms may be outweighed by the benefits of the intervention being promoted, they should nonetheless be acknowledged and accounted for. To aid in these evaluations, I consider factors that modulate the presence and severity of identity-policing and discuss strategies for developing less harmful eating interventions. I conclude by considering the relationship between identity-policing and identity loss caused by long-term diet change. This paper contributes to the centering of identity in food ethics and to a more comprehensive picture of identity’s ethical importance for eating interventions. (shrink)

New standards adopted by the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business International (AACSB) stress business curriculum-wide learning objectives, of which ethics is a critical part. “Knowledge and skills” in ethical responsibilities are required as part of institutionalaccreditation. An exploratory study offers insight into ethics integration, perceived comfort in teaching ethics, and methods used. The main tension presented balances calls for ethics across business curricula with the assertion that ethics instruction, in the hands of an untrained professor, may do more (...) damage than good. Results suggest that while faculty include ethics in their courses, only slightly more than half have received some kind of ethics training. We also explore ethics pedagogies and found differences between methods respondents used in the classroom and desired learning methods for themselves. We offer insights about and possible explanations for the gaps we found in our study, contextualizing them in new literature. We finish with a brief discussion of how our findings impact accreditation assessment. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In ‘The Pro‐Life Argument from Substantial Identity: A Defence’, Patrick Lee argues that the right to life is an essential property of those that possess it. On his view, the right arises from one's ‘basic’ or ‘natural’ capacity for higher mental functions: since human organisms have this capacity essentially, they have a right to life essentially. Lee criticises an alternative view, on which the right to life arises from one's ‘developed’ capacity for higher mental functions (or development of some (...) other accidental property). I argue that his criticisms of this alternative view are misguided or self‐defeating, and that there are good reasons to hold we have a right to life accidentally rather than essentially. (shrink)

My comments have two parts. I begin by laying out the argument that seems to me to be at the core of Olson’s thinking about human persons; and I suggest a problem with his reasons for accepting one of its premises. The premise is warranted by its platitudinous or commonsensical status; but Olson’s arguments lead him to conclusions that undermine the family of platitudes to which it belongs. Then I’ll raise a question about how Olson should construe the vagueness that (...) would seem to infect the boundaries of human animals. (shrink)