This article examines the efficacy of an ethics discernment process in the organizational context, a practice referred to in the paper as "mission due diligence." This type of ethics discernment is a structured process intended to awaken the ethical concerns that a particular issue raises within moral agents and to give voice, directly and indirectly, to those who will be impacted by, and responsible for, strategic decision making. The efficacy of this particular ethics discernment practice is contingent upon several realities, (...) including, but not limited to 1) the timing in which it is undertaken, 2) the degree of importance and relevance attributed to it, and 3) the skills of the person leading it. This case report examines how this process was used to highlight and address the ethical issues related to a new hiring policy, namely, a mandatory nicotine screening test for prospective employees in the healthcare context. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Health Care Ethics: Theological Foundations, Contemporary Issues, and Controversial Cases, revised edition by Michael R. Panicola, David M. Belde, John Paul Slosar, and Mark F. Repenshek, and: On Moral Medicine: Theological Perspectives in Medical Ethics, third edition ed. by M. Therese Lysaught and Joseph J. Kotva Jr. with Stephen E. Lammers and Allen VerheyLindsey EsbensenReview of Health Care Ethics: Theological Foundations, Contemporary Issues, and Controversial Cases, (...) revised edition MICHAEL R. PANICOLA, DAVID M. BELDE, JOHN PAUL SLOSAR, AND MARK F. REPENSHEK Winona, MN: Anselm Academic, 2011. 438 pp. $37.95Review of On Moral Medicine: Theological Perspectives in Medical Ethics, third edition EDITED BY M. THERESE LYSAUGHT AND JOSEPH J. KOTVA JR. WITH STEPHEN E. LAMMERS AND ALLEN VERHEY Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012. 1180 pp. $61.55Health Care Ethics and On Moral Medicine are excellent resources for those studying and teaching in the field of medical ethics. Each text on its own provides a very good initial evaluation of contemporary conversations in health care ethics. Together they provide a thorough foundation for the study of health care ethics that encourages further exploration of topics in the field. They both provide an excellent overview for undergraduate students as well as anyone interested in the field of medical morality.Health Care Ethics is especially helpful for those entering the field of ethics in general and the more particular realm of medical morality. User-friendly, [End Page 211] the book is accessible to beginners while also being relevant to those already well-versed in medical ethics. The book provides case studies culled from the experiences of the authors throughout their careers in the practice of medical ethics. Perhaps even more useful, however, are the other exercises in which readers are given the opportunity to actively engage the text in order to discover and more fully articulate their own moral stance. Although Health Care Ethics approaches the topic from a theological perspective, using scriptural passages as well as broader religious themes and contexts, the book is accessible to those outside of the religious arena as well.The first three chapters lay the framework for general theological and ethical inquiry while the later chapters discuss more specific topics in applied health care ethics. The opening chapters by Michael Panicola are thought-provoking, especially since they encourage readers to participate in exercises to determine how they would respond to particular scenarios in their personal decision making. For example, after laying out the classic ethical theories, readers are asked to take a “quiz” by responding to multiple-choice questions to determine how they would respond to various ethical situations. The exercise demonstrates that moral discernment that relies on one ethical theory alone or one single approach to ethics is too narrow and confining for authentic dialogue in ethics. Another exercise calls upon readers to examine their fundamental bases for personal decision making by asking them to create a list of what they think are the ten things that constitute human flourishing and then narrow that list down to the top two. In addition to being engaging, these exercises help readers establish their personal moral stance by asking them to appropriate foundational norms in the process of moral discernment to the case studies throughout the book. They also help readers apply these norms to the specific topics in health care ethics presented in the later chapters.The authors of Health Care Ethics clearly identify human flourishing as the center and goal for all ethical inquiry. Demonstrating that “human flourishing” has different connotations for different people, they also argue that certain norms can be agreed upon to establish a framework for all conversations regarding moral decision making in health care. They especially emphasize a concern for the optimization of human flourishing in final chapters of the text. Chapters 4–12 provide detailed examinations of current topics in medical ethics. Each chapter includes case studies that raise questions concerning social ethics as well as health care morality, employing sources from law, sociology, philosophy, and theology. Each case underscores the complexity of moral decision making in health care ethics as well as the point that there is no one, pure approach to medical ethics that... (shrink)

Here the philosopher and physicist David Z Albert argues, among other things, that the difference between past and future can be understood as a mechanical phenomenon of nature and that quantum mechanics makes it impossible to present the entirety of what can be said about the world as a narrative of “befores” and “afters.”.

Presents a guide to the basics of quantum mechanics and measurement.

“What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, Practical Reflection develops philosophical accounts of intention, free will, and the (...) foundation of morals. This new edition of Practical Reflection contains the original 1989 text along with a new introduction and is the latest entry in The David Hume Series of Philosophy and Cognitive Science Reissues, which keeps in print previously published indispensable works in the area of cognitive science. (shrink)

`Quantum theory' is not a single physical theory but a framework in which many different concrete theories fit. As such, a solution to the quantum measurement problem ought to provide a recipe to interpret each such concrete theory, in a mutually consistent way. But with the exception of the Everett interpretation, the mainextant solutions either try to make sense of the abstract framework as if it were concrete, or else interpret one particular quantum theory under the fiction that it is (...) fundamental and exact. In either case, these approaches are unable to help themselves to the very theory-laden, level-relative ways in which quantum theory makes contact with experiment in mainstream physics, and so are committed to major revisionary projects which have not been carried out even in outline. As such, only the Everett interpretation is currently suited to make sense of quantum physics as we find it. (shrink)

I give an introduction to the conceptual structure of quantum field theory as it is used in mainstream theoretical physics today, aimed at non-specialists. My main focuses in the article are the common structure of quantum field theory as it is applied in solid-state physics and as it is applied in high-energy physics; the modern theory of renormalisation.

In discussions of the foundations of statistical mechanics, it is widely held that the Gibbsian and Boltzmannian approaches are incompatible but empirically equivalent; the Gibbsian approach may be calculationally preferable but only the Boltzmannian approach is conceptually satisfactory. I argue against both assumptions. Gibbsian statistical mechanics is applicable to a wide variety of problems and systems, such as the calculation of transport coefficients and the statistical mechanics and thermodynamics of mesoscopic systems, in which the Boltzmannian approach is inapplicable. And the (...) supposed conceptual problems with the Gibbsian approach are either misconceived, or apply only to certain versions of the Gibbsian approach, or apply with equal force to both approaches. I conclude that Boltzmannian statistical mechanics is best seen as a special case of, and not an alternatve to, Gibbsian statistical mechanics. (shrink)

I develop an account of naturalness in physics which demonstrates that naturalness assumptions are not restricted to narrow cases in high-energy physics but are a ubiquitous part of how interlevel relations are derived in physics. After exploring how and to what extent we might justify such assumptions on methodological grounds or through appeal to speculative future physics, I consider the apparent failure of naturalness in cosmology and in the Standard Model. I argue that any such naturalness failure threatens to undermine (...) the entire structure of our understanding of intertheoretic reduction, and so risks a much larger crisis in physics than is sometimes suggested; I briefly review some currently-popular strategies that might avoid that crisis. (shrink)

I argue that wavefunction realism --- the view that quantum mechanics reveals the fundamental ontology of the world to be a field on a high-dimensional spacetime, must be rejected as relying on artefacts of too-simple versions of quantum mechanics, and not conceptually well-motivated even were those too-simple versions exactly correct. I end with some brief comments on the role of spacetime in any satisfactory account of the metaphysics of extant quantum theories.

Proposals for allocating scarce lifesaving resources in the face of the Covid-19 pandemic have aligned in some ways and conflicted in others. This paper attempts a kind of priority setting in addressing these conflicts. In the first part, we identify points on which we do not believe that reasonable people should differ—even if they do. These are (i) the inadequacy of traditional clinical ethics to address priority-setting in a pandemic; (ii) the relevance of saving lives; (iii) the flaws of first-come, (...) first-served allocation; (iv) the relevance of post-episode survival; (v) the difference between age and other factors that affect life-expectancy; and (vi) the need to avoid quality-of-life judgments. In the second part, we lay out some positions on which reasonable people can and do differ. These include (i) conflicts between maximizing benefits and priority to the worst off; (ii) role-based priority; and (iii) whether patients’ existing lifesaving resources should be subject to redistribution. (shrink)

Quantum theory plays an increasingly significant role in contemporary early-universe cosmology, most notably in the inflationary origins of the fluctuation spectrum of the microwave background radiation. I consider the two main strategies for interpreting standard quantum mechanics in the light of cosmology. I argue that the conceptual difficulties of the approaches based around an irreducible role for measurement - already very severe - become intolerable in a cosmological context, whereas the approach based around Everett's original idea of treating quantum systems (...) as closed systems handles cosmological quantum theory satisfactorily. Contemporary cosmology, which indeed applies standard quantum theory without supplementation or modification, is thus committed - tacitly or explictly - to the Everett interpretation. (shrink)

We discuss two recent attempts two solve Schrodinger's cat paradox. One is the modal interpretation developed by Kochen, Healey, Dieks, and van Fraassen. It allows for an observable which pertains to a system to possess a value even when the system is not in an eigenstate of that observable. The other is a recent theory of the collapse of the wave function due to Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber. It posits a dynamics which has the effect of collapsing the state of (...) macroscopic systems. We argue that the modal interpretation cannot account for non-accurate measurements and that both accounts have the consequence that in ordinary measurement situations the observables that ends up well defined are not quite the ones that we want to be well defined. (shrink)

The standard account of denying the antecedent (DA) is that it is a deductively invalid form of argument, and that, in a conditional argument, to argue from the falsity of the antecedent to the falsity of the consequent is always fallacious. In this paper, we argue that DA is not always a fallacious argumentative strategy. Instead, there is a legitimate usage of DA according to which it is a defeasible argument against the acceptability of a claim. The dialectical effect of (...) denying the antecedent is to shift the burden of proof back to the original proponent of a claim. We provide a model of this non-fallacious usage which is built upon pragmatic models of argumentation. (shrink)

On one possible view of practical reason, that capacity is subject to a standard of correctness determined by independently obtaining facts. This view has recently come under attack, notably in Jeremy Fix’s ‘Intellectual Isolation’. The relevant view, he claims, treats practical reason as a species of theoretical reason and is unable to account for the role that practical reason plays in rational agency. His case relies, however, on a certain conception of theoretical reason: a contemplative conception according to which theoretical (...) reason is practically inert. By embracing that conception, he is led to suppose that exercises of a capacity with an external standard of correctness could not, by themselves, move a subject to act. But the contemplative conception is hardly compulsory. A view according to which practical reason is subject to an external standard need not take the shape, nor involve the corollaries, that Fix, and others, assume it must. Or so I argue. (shrink)

The model of clinical ethics consultation (CEC) defended in the ASBH Core Competencies report has gained significant traction among scholars and healthcare providers. On this model, the aim of CEC is to facilitate deliberative reflection and thereby resolve conflicts and clarify value uncertainty by invoking and pursuing a process of consensus building. It is central to the model that the facilitated consensus falls within a range of allowable options, defined by societal values: prevailing legal requirements, widely endorsed organizational policies, and (...) professional standards of practice and codes of conduct. Moreover, the model stipulates that ethics consultants must refrain from giving substantive recommendations regarding how parties to a moral disagreement in the clinic should evaluate their options. We argue that this model of CEC is incomplete, because it wrongly assumes that what counts as the proper set of allowable options among which the parties are to deliberate will itself always be clearly discernible. We illustrate this problem with a recent case on which one of us consulted—a neonate born with trisomy 18 (T18). We try to show that law, policy, and standards of practice reveal no clear answer to the question posed by the case: namely, whether forgoing gastrostomy tube feedings for a baby with T18 is allowable. We suggest there may be other kinds of cases in which it may simply be unsettled whether a given choice falls within the set of allowable options within which consensus is to be facilitated. What should an ethicist do when confronting such unsettled cases? We agree with the facilitation model that an ethicist should remain neutral among the allowable options, when it is clear what the allowable options are. But, in unsettled cases, the role of a consultant should be expanded to include a process of moral inquiry into what the allowable options should be. We end by raising the issue of whether this means an ethicist should share his or her own conclusions or views about the allowability of a given clinical option. (shrink)

It has been acknowledged that education includes ‘a love of what one teaches and a love of those whom one teaches’ (Hogan 2010: 81), but two traditions of writing in philosophy of education—concerning love for student and love for subject—have rarely been brought together. This paper considers the extent to which the ‘triangular’ relationship of teacher, student and subject matter runs the risk of the rivalry, jealousy and strife that are characteristic of ‘tragic’ love triangles, or entails undesirable consequences such (...) as transference from one intended object of love to another. It argues that this faultline in the literature of educational love corresponds to education's ‘divided heart’. The implication of this exploration of education's triangular relationship is that we cannot ignore the ‘dark of love’, nor can we address it simply by asserting that educational love must be of a more honourable sort than romantic love. These tensions can be reconciled through the loving recourse of ‘ceasing to strive’ and the possibility of sublimating the two originary loves into a higher ‘love of truth’. (shrink)

The Nobel Prize in Literature laureate Mario Vargas Llosa (2020) praises the legal protection of bullfighting by a Peruvian law that prohibits the torture of animals except in case of cultural traditions, such as bullfighting and cockfighting. He claims that his defense of bullfighting follows from his liberal point of view, and advances three reasons in favor of its preservation: It is a tradition, it is a fine art, and the individuals should be constitutionally free to choose what to see (...) and where to go. I argue that his arguments are morally irrelevant and logically unsound. (shrink)

Tomasello’s view of comparative primatology and human evolution is part of an emerging paradigm and his main empirical contribution has been the comparative study of great apes and human children. He has also contributed to the overall theoretical framework, but his rendering of the major theories of social evolution – such as kin selection, reciprocity, and levels of selection – is problematic. To correct this problem, I briefly review the concept of equivalence (theories that invoke the same causal processes from (...) different perspectives) and provide a “translation manual” so that the thesis of Tomasello’s book can be seen more clearly and better related to the work of others who are helping to develop the same paradigm. (shrink)

There are many people who think that deconstruction has run its course, has had its day, and that it is now time to return to the important business of philosophy, or perhaps to serious ethical, social and political questions. Derrida's work, it is said, leads nowhere but a sterile philosophy of difference that in its de-politicized, de-historicized abstractness is a form of conservatism little better than the kinds of identity thinking to which it seems to be so radically opposed. In (...) short, we must go ‘beyond’ deconstruction. (shrink)

In The Varieties of Reference, Evans makes two parallel claims about thought and perception. He argues that both our capacity to self-ascribe thought and our capacity to self-ascribe perception are fallible. The essay focuses on his claim about perception and examines its relation to Evans's project of rejecting a Cartesian conception of the mind. In his theory of perception, I argue, Evans embraces a conception of first-person authority that he seeks to reject in his account of thought. He is thus (...) not able to extend to perception the critique of Cartesianism that he develops in the context of his analysis of thought. My intent is not exclusively critical. By working through the difficulties that Evans's argument raises, I seek to shed light on whether and, if so, how criticisms of a Cartesian conception of thought may be extended to the philosophy of perception. (shrink)

The essay explores Richard Moran’s conception of the self-relation that certain social interactions involve. My focus is on the following question: how much room is there for being deceived about h...

Of all the German idealists, Sartre refers the least to Fichte-so little in fact that there have been long-standing suspicions that he was not even familiar with Fichte's writings. It is perhaps ironic, then, that Fichte's writings are as helpful as they are for clarifying Sartre's views, especially his views on subjectivity and inter-subjectivity. Here I want to look closely at a key concept in Fichte's mature writings: the concept of the Anstoss, a concept which Dan Breazeale has called "Fichte's (...) original insight." Fichte introduces the Anstoss, or "check," to explain why the I posits the world as it does. In effect, the Anstoss is the occasion of the facticity of the I. I will show that his concept can be uniquely helpful in understanding the role the body plays in Sartre's theory of inter-subjectivity. The importance of Sartre's account of the body for his theory of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity has been chronically underappreciated by his interpreters; this comparison is the beginning of an attempt to rectify that. In turn the concept of the Anstoss provides a means for analyzing the necessary differences between any Sartrean and Fichtean ethics based on their respective accounts of inter-subjectivity. (shrink)

The thesis discusses the justice of state punishment in response to criminal wrongs. The introductory chapter explores the logic of the concept of justice itself, proposing that we understand justice as the function of remedying injustice. This negative approach – studying justice through injustice – allows us to critically evaluate theories of retributive justice via the conceptions of the wrong in crime that they entail, and for which punishment is perceived as a remedy. Examples of the conceptions of the wrong (...) in crime considered in the first part of the thesis are: ‘infringement of mutual freedom’, ‘freeloading’, ‘undermining the mutual benefits of law’, ‘undeserved profit’, ‘harm to the victim’ and ‘material imbalance’. Punishment, upon each of these conceptions, is just to the extent that it remedies the particular wrong of the crime, for instance by cancelling its undeserved profits or by alleviating the harm of the victim. The first part of the thesis culminates in a prolonged discussion of what is deemed the most suitable theory of punishment in a modern democratic state, the ‘Freedom Perspective’ based on a Kantian-Hegelian framework, whereupon crime is wrong because it infringes upon mutual freedom. The second part discusses the possible injustice of punishing severely socially deprived offenders. Specifically, it considers four reasons for the justice of lowering or abstaining from punishment of this group of offenders. These reasons relate to the material, cultural and psychological factors which increase this group’s likelihood of committing crimes and of being punished. These factors are to some extent the result of unjust social structures in society. Hence, this part discusses the links between social justice and criminal justice. Finally, the thesis examines the justice of an alternative way of remedying the wrong in crime: restorative justice processes between victim, offender and other parties to the crime. The concluding remarks are devoted to the meta-issue of how to conceive of justice when facing competing, yet plausible claims of justice. (shrink)

In this paper I propose to answer the age-old reductio against vegetarianism, which is usually presented in the form of a sarcastic question. Addressing the question takes on special significance in the light of arguments which seem to show that even nonsentient life is intrinsically valuable. Thus, I suggest that we rephrase the question in the following manner: When beings evolve into societies of moral agents are they entitled merely to assume that they retain their license to destroy other life (...) in order to sustain their own? I answer in the negative. I argue that such societies must continually earn that right by engaging in activity that makes up for and augments the values that they destroy. Unlike other biological beings, humans have complete control over what they eat, whether they eat, and whether they reproduce. Hence, the appeals to necessity that are ubiquitous in justifications of both vegetarian and non-vegetarian diets are inauthentic and must be accordingly forsaken. We will have to appeal instead to the value of particular human activities that are fueled by our consumption of other lives. (shrink)

Spiritual depression is a term originally employed by Dr. Martyn Lloyd-Jones to describe the phenomenon of Christians experiencing a state of the soul that is marked by an unusually potent and longstanding sense of pessimism, inadequacy, despondency, and lack of activity within one's relationship with God for what appears to be no discernable cause. Although St. John of the Cross’ The Dark Night of the Soul is arguably the most historically influential work on the subject, the English Puritans also developed (...) a robust perspective of their own–-one built upon the principles of the Reformation and a solidly Protestant perspective of the spiritual life. The Puritan concept of spiritual desertion is most lucidly articulated in a lesser-known work by Joseph Symonds titled, The Case and Cure of a Deserted Soul–-a rich and invaluable resource for contemporary pastoral care. (shrink)

This paper reexamines the central thesis of Gadamer’s theory of interpretation that objectivity is not a suitable ideal for understanding a text, historical event or cultural phenomenon because there exists no one correct interpretation of such phenomena. Because Gadamer fails to make clear the grounds for this claim, I consider three possible arguments. The first, predominant in the secondary literature, is built on the premise that we cannot surpass our historically situated prejudgments. I reject this argument as insufficient. I also (...) reject a second argument concerning the heuristics of understanding. I then articulate a third argument that the object of understanding changes according to the conditions under which it is grasped. I appeal to the notion of relational properties to make sense of this claim and to defend it against two objections: that it conflates meaning and significance; and that it is saddled with an indefensible relativism. (shrink)

In this issue of the Hastings Center Report, Danielle Wenner looks at a few prominent analyses of the social value requirement for clinical research, claiming that they are all based on what she calls a transactional model of research ethics. She argues that the transactional model fails to provide a secure foundation for the social value requirement, and then, appealing to John Rawls, she argues that a more secure foundation lies in the principles of social justice. Wenner's attempt to locate (...) the source of the social value requirement raises important questions regarding its scope and strength. To determine what the social value requirement requires, we need to know why it's a requirement. Does the social value requirement apply to all trials or only to a subset? Is it a necessary condition on ethical research or an important consideration that can conflict with, and sometimes be defeated by, other considerations? Wenner's attempt to answer these questions is obscured by the fact that she mistakenly regards a minority view of research ethics as the mainstream view. Once we correct for that, her analysis of the foundation of the social value requirement provides a valuable opportunity to consider how the ethics of research as an institution might supplement or alter the ethics of individual clinical trials. (shrink)

Joseph Butler was an Anglican priest and later a bishop who wrote about ethics, religion, and other philosophical themes. He is not well known today. During his lifetime and into the early part of the twentieth century he was better known especially for his major work the Analogy of Religion (1736). Today he is known mostly for his sermons which are interpreted as essays on ethics and for his essay on identity. Butler had a profound effect on J. H. Newman, (...) Matthew Arnold, and W. E. Gladstone and some effect on many other popular, academic, and professional readers. This book is as much about Butler’s sources and his reception as it is about the way he arranged and presented the evidence in the first half of the 18th century. He was a good man and is recognized by the Anglican church as a divine. We have no interest in taking a nostalgic look at a quaint figure in English church history. To those who claim Butler is unknown, that he was “blown out of the water” by John Wesley or Karl Barth, or Cornelius van Til, we can only say Butler is not as well known in the 20th and 21st centuries as in the 19th, but he is certainly not unknown to those who have taken any interest in philosophy, religion, or ethics. Today there has been a revival of interest in Bishop Butler. Our concern is to build and maintain a bridge that will help to keep this momentum. He offers an ethic that is universal and clearly Christian, yet it is based on the nature of man. Kant had a similar project, but in our opinion, Butler makes more compelling arguments. What is of interest to the Christian apologist is Butler’s work in this area. The purpose of this book is to present Butler’s ideas. We believe that his ethics have a universality that is applicable to people of all religious faiths and those that have none. It is common sense way of looking at ethics for everyday interaction. This book is a narrative argument presenting in detail how Butler’s creative arrangement of the evidence served as a bridge between the ancients as known in the Greek, Latin, and Hebrew originals, and the moderns, mostly Anglophone, who constituted Butler’s work environment and his reception in the latter day down to the present. We can hardly expect everyone to agree with Butler on all points, we certainly do not. The point at issue is rather whether he merits a seat at the present-day round table of deliberation on matters pertaining to philosophy, religion, and ethics. (shrink)

Pereboom’s defense of deliberation-compatibilism is the most elaborate and most sophisticated current attempt to defend this position. In this paper, I have provided a careful, and open-minded assessment of that defense. The conclusion that emerged is that it is subject to an important objection that leaves him with no explanation of the relevant difference between a scenario in which it would irrational for an agent to deliberate what to do, and a scenario the deliberation-compatibilist would consider appropriate for rational deliberation. (...) Without a satisfactory response to this objection, Pereboom’s defense of deliberation-compatibilism cannot be deemed successful. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 11, November 2019, Page 67-68.