This first anthology of the most important writings by Danny Siegel, spanning and modernizing fifty years of his insights, Radiance intersperses soulful Jewish texts with innovative Mitzvah ideas to rouse individuals and communities to transform our lives, communities, and world.

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We present an argument for revising the theory of alternatives for Scalar Implicatures and for Association with Focus. We argue that in both cases the alternatives are determined in the same way, as a contextual restriction of the focus value of the sentence, which, in turn, is defined in structure-sensitive terms. We provide evidence that contextual restriction is subject to a constraint that prevents it from discriminating between alternatives when they stand in a particular logical relationship with the assertion or (...) the prejacent, a relationship that we refer to as symmetry. Due to this constraint on contextual restriction, discriminating between alternatives in cases of symmetry becomes the task of focus values. This conclusion is incompatible with standard type-theoretic definitions of focus values, motivating our structure-sensitive definition instead. (shrink)

Siegel defends "Limited Intentionism", a theory of what secures the semantic reference of uses of bare demonstratives ("this", "that" and their plurals). According to Limited Intentionism, demonstrative reference is fixed by perceptually anchored intentions on the part of the speaker.

This is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the contents of perception.

I am most grateful to the editors of Informal Logic for their willingness to publish my absurdly long paper (Siegel 2023a) in its entirety, and for organizing the four commentaries published along with it. I am grateful as well to Bart Garssen, Andrew Aberdein, Paula Olmos and Christoph Lumer for their insightful and challenging discussions. In what follows I respond to their criticisms and suggestions in the order in which they appear in the journal. Résumé: Je suis très reconnaissant (...) aux éditeurs d’Informal Logic pour leur volonté de publier mon article absurdement long (Siegel 2023a) dans son intégralité et pour avoir organisé les quatre commentaires publiés avec lui. Je suis également reconnaissant à Bart Garssen, Andrew Aberdein, Paula Olmos et Christoph Lumer pour leurs discussions perspicaces et stimulantes. Dans ce qui suit, je réponds à leurs critiques et suggestions dans l’ordre dans lequel elles apparaissent dans la revue. (shrink)

There is ample discussion of MBA self-serving values in the corporate social responsibility literature, and yet empirical studies regarding the corporate manifestations and consequences of those values are scant. In a comprehensive study of major US public corporations, we find that MBA CEOs are more apt than their non-MBA counterparts to engage in short-term strategic expedients such as positive earnings management and suppression of R&D, which in turn are followed by compromised firm market valuations.

This paper will be concerned with the conjunctive interpretation of a family of disjunctive constructions. The relevant conjunctive interpretation, sometimes referred to as a “free choice effect,” (FC) is attested when a disjunctive sentence is embedded under an existential modal operator. I will provide evidence that the relevant generalization extends (with some caveats) to all constructions in which a disjunctive sentence appears under the scope of an existential quantifier, as well as to seemingly unrelated constructions in which conjunction appears under (...) the scope of negation and a universal quantifier. (shrink)

Building on previous works which argued that scalar implicatures can be computed in embedded positions, this paper proposes a constraint on exhaustification which restricts the conditions under which an exhaustivity operator can be licensed. We show that this economy condition allows us to derive a number of generalizations, such as, in particular, the ‘Implicature Focus Generalization’: scalar implicatures can be embedded under a downward-entailing operator only if the scalar term bears pitch accent. Our economy condition also derives specific predictions regarding (...) the licensing of so-called Hurford disjunctions. (shrink)

The foundations of analysis offered by Cauchy and Riemann were not immediately welcomed by the mathematical community. Before 1870 the foundations of mathematics were considered more or less a national affair. In this paper, Dutch ideas of rigour in analysis between 1840 and 1870 will be discussed. These ideas show that Dutch mathematicians were aware of developments abroad but preferred the concept of infinitesimals as a foundation of mathematics.

What do we see? We are visually conscious of colors and shapes, but are we also visually conscious of complex properties such as being John Malkovich? In this book, Susanna Siegel develops a framework for understanding the contents of visual experience, and argues that these contents involve all sorts of complex properties. Siegel starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. She then (...) introduces a method for discovering the contents of experience: the method of phenomenal contrast. This method relies only minimally on introspection, and allows rigorous support for claims about experience. She then applies the method to make the case that we are conscious of many kinds of properties, of all sorts of causal properties, and of many other complex properties. She goes on to use the method to help analyze difficult questions about our consciousness of objects and their role in the contents of experience, and to reconceptualize the distinction between perception and sensation. Siegel's results are important for many areas of philosophy, including the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. They are also important for the psychology and cognitive neuroscience of vision. (shrink)

Social science employs teleological explanations which depend upon the rationality principle, according to which people exhibit instrumental rationality. Popper points out that people also exhibit critical rationality, the tendency to stand back from, and to question or criticise, their views. I explain how our critical rationality impugns the explanatory value of the rationality principle and thereby threatens the very possibility of social science. I discuss the relationship between instrumental and critical rationality and show how we can reconcile our critical rationality (...) with the possibility of social science if we invoke Popper’s conception of limited rationality and his indeterminism. (shrink)

In Biro and Siegel we argued that a theory of argumentation mustfully engage the normativity of judgments about arguments, and we developedsuch a theory. In this paper we further develop and defend our theory.

The notion of measurement plays a central role in human cognition. We measure people’s height, the weight of physical objects, the length of stretches of time, or the size of various collections of individuals. Measurements of height, weight, and the like are commonly thought of as mappings between objects and dense scales, while measurements of collections of individuals, as implemented for instance in counting, are assumed to involve discrete scales. It is also commonly assumed that natural language makes use of (...) both types of scales and subsequently distinguishes between two types of measurements. This paper argues against the latter assumption. It argues that natural language semantics treats all measurements uniformly as mappings from objects (individuals or collections of individuals) to dense scales, hence the Universal Density of Measurement (UDM). If the arguments are successful, there are a variety of consequences for semantics and pragmatics, and more generally for the place of the linguistic system within an overall architecture of cognition. (shrink)

This paper makes the case that when wishful thinking ill-founds belief, the belief depends on the desire in ways can be recapitulated at the level of perceptual experience. The relevant kinds of desires include motivations, hopes, preferences, and goals. I distinguish between two modes of dependence of belief on desire in wishful thinking: selective or inquiry-related, and responsive or evidence-related. I offers a theory of basing on which beliefs are badly-based on desires, due to patterns of dependence that can found (...) in the relationship between experiences and desires as well. This conclusion brings us a large part of the way to the conclusion that like beliefs, experiences can be ill-founded by depending on a desire. (shrink)

I argue that, because of scarcity, the right to life cannot imply an obligation on others to save the life of the right-holder, and that collectivising resources for health care not only ensures that resources are used inefficiently and inappropriately but also removes from people the authority to make decisions for themselves about matters of health, life and death.

We motivate the desire for self-driving and explain its potential and limitations, and explore the need for—and potential implementation of—morals, ethics, and other value systems as complementary “capabilities” to the Deep Technologies behind self-driving. We consider how the incorporation of such systems may drive or slow adoption of high automation within vehicles. First, we explore the role for morals, ethics, and other value systems in self-driving through a representative hypothetical dilemma faced by a self-driving car. Through the lens of engineering, (...) we explain in simple terms common moral and ethical frameworks including utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics before characterizing their relationship to the fundamental algorithms enabling self-driving. The concepts of behavior cloning, state-based modeling, and reinforcement learning are introduced, with some algorithms being more suitable for the implementation of value systems than others. We touch upon the contemporary cross-disciplinary landscape of morals and ethics in self-driving systems from a joint philosophical and technical perspective, and close with considerations for practitioners and the public, particularly as individuals may not appreciate the nuance and complexity of using imperfect information to navigate diverse scenarios and tough-to-quantify value systems, while “typical” software development reduces complex problems to black and white decision-making. (shrink)

There is an important division in the human mind between perception and reasoning. We reason from information that we have already, but perception is a means of taking in new information. Susanna Siegel argues that these two aspects of the mind become deeply intertwined when beliefs, fears, desires, or prejudice influence what we perceive.

On 12 October 2019, Kenyan runner Eliud Kipchoge became the first person to run a ‘marathon’, known as the INEOS 1:59 Challenge, in less than 2 hours in a time of 1:59:40.2. However, his time was n...

Life is fundamentally unequal, shaped by the arbitrary circumstances of birth and fate. The chapter critically explores the role of intellectual property (IP) law within the framework of meritocracy, arguing that meritocratic IP can provide effective incentives to fostering creativity, commerce, and innovation, to move up one’s position in society and change the culture in the process. However, meritocratic IP should not be used to justify or perpetuate inequality. IP rights, copyright, patents, trademarks, geographical indications (GIs), cultural heritage rights (CHR), (...) and trade secrets, are analyzed for their meritocratic value and their potential to either exacerbate or mitigate inequality. The digital transformation and the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) present new challenges, where creative destruction may widen income inequality while also lowering resource inequality by increasing access to goods and services. Additionally, the spatial and cultural dimensions of IP, particularly in the context of GIs and CHRs, are examined for how they can entrench existing disparities. The chapter advocates for a recalibration of IP law that better aligns with true meritocratic principles while ensuring that it does not reinforce inequality. It calls for a more flexible and inclusive IP system that respects both the heritage of the past and the innovation of the future, ultimately aiming to create a society where meritocracy drives inclusive progress and shared prosperity rather than entrenched inequities. (shrink)

Ziel des Beitrages ist, die Bedeutung der Mysterien für das Denken des jungen Nietzsche, der unauffällig, aber dezidiert die Kernbegriffe seines Philosophierens - das Apollinische und das Dionysische, die Tragödie, die ästhetische Rechtfertigung der Welt - mit einer 'Geheimlehre' vervindet, auszuloten. Eine textnah Interpretation seiner Aussagen zur apollinischen bzw. dionysischen Mysterienordung zeigt, dass die tragische griechische Kultur im Mysterienvorgang als kultischem un institutionellem Geschehen begründet ist. Aus Nietzsches Analyse dieser die Metaphysik des Willens exemplarisch zum Ausdruck bringenden Kultur geht hervor, (...) dass ohne Mysterien der Wille sich nicht optimal entfalten kann. Diese Einsicht überträgt Nietzsche auch in die Sprache seines Philosophierens.The aim of the article is to fathom the meaning of mystery cults in Nietzsche's early thinking. in a discreet manner, he associates the key concepts of his philosophy - the Apollonian and the Dionysian, the tragedy, the aesthetic justification of the world - with a 'secret doctrine'. A close reading of his writings on the Apollonian and Dionysian 'mystery order' shows that the tragic Greek culture is founded on the mysteris as cultic and institutional happenings. Nietzsche's analysis of this culture, which gives expression to the metaphysics of the will in an exemplary fashion, reveals that without mystery cults the will cannot unfold itself optimally . Nietzsche translates this insight also into the language of his philosophy. (shrink)

The Iran depicted in the headlines is a rogue state ruled by ever-more-defiant Islamic fundamentalists. Yet inside the borders, an unheralded transformation of a wholly different political bent is occurring. A “liberal renaissance,” as one Iranian thinker terms it, is emerging in Iran, and in this pamphlet, Danny Postel charts the contours of the intellectual upheaval. _Reading "Legitimation Crisis" in Tehran_ examines the conflicted positions of the Left toward Iran since 1979, and, in particular, critically reconsiders Foucault’s connection to (...) the Iranian Revolution. Postel explores the various elements of the subtle liberal revolution and proposes a host of potential implications of this transformation for Western liberalism. He examines the appeal of Jürgen Habermas, Hannah Arendt, and Isaiah Berlin among Iranian intellectuals and ponders how their ideas appear back to us when refracted through a Persian prism. Postel closes with a thought-provoking conversation with eminent Iranian philosopher Ramin Jahanbegloo. A provocative and incisive polemic highly relevant to our times, _Reading "Legitimation Crisis" in Tehran_ will be of interest to anyone who wants to get beyond alarmist rhetoric and truly understand contemporary Iran. (shrink)

This paper argues in favor of two claims: (a) that Scope Shifting Operations (Quantifier Raising and Quantifier Lowering) are restricted by economy considerations, and (b) that the relevant economy considerations compare syntactic derivations that end up interpretively identical. These ideas are shown to solve several puzzles having to do with the interaction of scope with VP ellipsis, coordination, and the interpretation of bare plurals. Further, the paper suggests a way of dealing with the otherwise puzzling clause-boundedness of Quantifier Raising.

How should we think about the interrelationships that obtain among Philosophy, Education, and Culture? In this paper I explore the contours of one such interrelationship: namely, the way in which educational and (other) philosophical ideals transcend individual cultures. I do so by considering the contemporary educational and philosophical commitment to multiculturalism. Consideration of multiculturalism, I argue, reveals important aspects of the character of both educational and philosophical ideals. Specifically, I advance the following claims: i) We are obliged to embrace the (...) moral and political directives of multiculturalism. ii) This obligation is a moral one: that is, multiculturalism is justified on moral grounds. iii) Far from entailing any philosophically problematic form of cultural relativism, multiculturalism is itself a ‘universal’ or ‘transcultural’ ideal. iv) Moreover, the advocacy of multiculturalism presupposes another kind of universality, dubbed below ‘transcultural normative reach.’ v) Consequently, multiculturalism should not be understood as entailing the demise of ‘universalistic’ dimensions of either philosophy or education. (shrink)

The literature on the interplay between geographic communities and organizations has largely ignored the role of individual residents. In adopting a meso-perspective, we examine a potentially vital relationship between corporate conduct and pro-social behavior demanding sacrifice from individuals. Drawing on Weber ), we theorize that organizations in a community legitimize personal social conduct in three ways—by serving as role models, imparting norms and values, and routinizing forms of interaction. We study the relationship between corporate social responsibility behavior by local firms (...) and the social distancing of citizens in US counties during the Covid-19 pandemic, a core ethical outcome. We argue and find that the residents of communities in which firms exhibit higher levels of CSR engaged in more SD during the Covid-19 pandemic. This was true when firms were long-established, isomorphic in their CSR, and major employers and vendors. Moreover, CSR relating to the treatment of employees as well as positive and negative extremes in CSR bore especially strong relationships with SD. Implications are drawn for the study of business ethics, as modeled by CSR, as a force for ethical personal behavior and public health in communities. (shrink)

The article examines the compatibility of agonistic democracy and populism as well as their relationship to the idea of constitutionalism. The first part shows that Chantal Mouffe’s recent attempts to reconcile her normative approach of an agonistic pluralism with a populist style of politics are not fully convincing. Although there are undeniable commonalities between an agonistic and a populist understanding of politics – the appreciation of conflict, the rejection of moralistic and juridical modes of conflict resolution etc. – the populist (...) mode of the construction of the people (and the denunciation of political opponents as enemies of the people) risks impeding the transformation of antagonistic into agonistic modes of political contest. The tensions between agonism and populism are especially evident in matters of constitutionalism. This topic is examined in the second part of the article, which provides some ideas for reducing the normative and institutional blind spots of contemporary theories of agonistic democracy. It focuses on elementary principles for an agonistic concept of democratic constitutionalism that differs from the populist view of the relationship between politics and law, especially in respect of its interpretation of the concept of ‘resistibility’ of legal norms. (shrink)

Education's Epistemology extends and defends Siegel's "reasons conception" of critical thinking, developing it in both philosophical and educational directions. Of particular note is its emphasis on epistemic quality and epistemic rationality and its concerted defense of "universal" educational and philosophical ideals in the face of multicultural, postmodern, and other challenges.

Can perceptual experiences be states of uncertainty? We might expect them to be, if the perceptual processes from which they're generated, as well as the behaviors they help produce, take account of probabilistic information. Yet it has long been presumed that perceptual experiences purport to tell us about our environment, without hedging or qualifying. Against this long-standing view, I argue that perceptual experiences may well occasionally be states of uncertainty, but that they are never probabilistically structured. I criticize a powerful (...) line of reasoning that we should expect perceptual experience to be probabilistic, given their interfaces with unconscious probabilistic information, with behavior responsive to it, and with credences. (shrink)

It is with some trepidation that I offer this critical review of Feyerabend's new book. I do not relish the prospect of getting involved in one of the nasty little fights Feyerabend picks with those who criticize his work. Nevertheless, Feyerabend's work cries out for critical attention. Of particular interest is the degree to which this new work deepens or enhances Feyerabend's earlier castigations of Reason. Fans of Feyerabend will be disappointed to learn that Feyerabend's philosophy is not deepened or (...) enhanced in any significant way, and that his responses to his critics are on the whole unconvincing. (shrink)

Siegel and Byrne debate whether perceptual experiences present rich properties or exclusively thin properties.

In discussions of perception and its relation to knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver comes to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content.

It is well-known that constructions involving ellipsis share many properties with constructions that involve phonological reduction. The similarity between ECs and PRCs is semantic: the interpretation of both is constrained by the interpretation of an antecedent. Rooth and Tancredi have pointed out that this similarity follows from an independently needed theory of focus.

This paper considers two philosophical problems and their relation to science education. The first involves the rationality of science; it is argued here that the traditional view, according to which science is rational because of its adherence to (a non-standard conception of) scientific method, successfully answers one central question concerning science''s rationality. The second involves the aims of education; here it is argued that a fundamental educational aim is the fostering of rationality, or its educational cognate, critical thinking. The ramifications (...) of these two philosophical theses for science education are then considered, and a science education which takes reasons in science as its fundamental feature is sketched. (shrink)

I discuss the roles of journalism in aspirational democracies, and argue that they generate set of pressures on attention that apply to people by virtue of the type of society they live in. These pressures, I argue, generate a problem of democratic attention: for journalism to play its roles in democracy, the attentional demands must be met, but there are numerous obstacles to meeting them. I propose a principle of salience to guide the selection and framing of news stories that (...) I argue may help address the puzzle: the public-as-protagonist principle. -/- . (shrink)

According to the epistemic account of request normativity, a request gives us reasons by revealing normatively relevant information. The information is normative, not the request itself. I raise a new objection to the epistemic account based on situations where we might try to avoid someone requesting something of us. The best explanation of these situations seems to be that we do not want to acquire a new reason to do something. For example, if you know I am going to ask (...) you to read a draft of my paper, you might avoid running into me so as to avoid acquiring a reason to read a draft of my paper. I then argue that the epistemic account can successfully reply to this objection and that in fact the epistemic account does a better job of accounting for cases like this than competing views of the normativity of requests. (shrink)

In Educating Reason, Harvey Siegel presented the case regarding rationality and critical thinking as fundamental education ideals. In Rationality Redeemed? , a collection of essays written since that time, he develops this view, responds to major criticisms raised against it, and engages those critics in dialogue. In developing his ideas and responding to critics, Siegel addresses main currents in contemporary thought, including feminism, postmodernism and multiculturalism.

Wissen, so lautet die unausgesprochene Maxime der Humanisten und Polyhistoren der Frühen Neuzeit, kann man nie genug erwerben. Riesige Bibliotheken und Kunstkammern sowie voluminöse Abhandlungen, Geschichtswerke und Enzyklopädien geben noch heute eindrucksvoll Rechenschaft von dieser Leidenschaft. Doch wächst mit der Größe jeder Sammlung auch die Notwendigkeit ihrer Ordnung. Es ist daher kein Zufall, dass ›Ordnung‹ zum Schlüsselbegriff des humanistischen Enzyklopädismus aufgestiegen und zum Gegenstand hartnäckiger Auseinandersetzungen unter den Gelehrten geworden ist. In Steffen Siegels Untersuchung werden die vielfältigen philosophischen Versuche, die (...) Fülle des Wissens systematisch zu ordnen, nicht allein anhand der Überlieferung von Texten rekonstruiert. Im Zentrum dieser reich illustrierten Studie, die bei mittelalterlichen Wissenspraktiken ihren Ausgang nimmt, sich insbesondere den vielschichtigen Bildkulturen des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts widmet und einen Ausblick auf moderne Visualisierungstechniken bietet, steht die faszinierende Vielfalt jener Bilder, die Ordnungen des Wissens als sichtbare Figuren vor Augen rückten. Die Bedeutung von Schautafeln und Bildallegorien, von wissenschaftlichen Illustrationen und Karten wird, mit Blick auf die Frage nach möglichen Ordnungen des Wissens, in diesem Buch zum ersten Mal übergreifend analysiert. Ein Akzent der Untersuchungen liegt auf der bislang nur wenig erforschten Geschichte des Diagramms in der Frühen Neuzeit. In der Mitte zwischen den Darstellungsmöglichkeiten von Bildern und Texten, standen insbesondere diagrammatische Schemata im Dienst der Konstruktion und der Beglaubigung von Ordnungen des Wissens. Anhand der reichen Tradition frühneuzeitlicher Diagramme lassen sich in hervorragender Weise die Potentiale, aber auch die Probleme eines Zusammenspiels von Wissens-, Ideen- und Mediengeschichte in der Zeit um 1600 ablesen und profilieren. Mit den im Jahr 1587 in Paris publizierten Tableaux legte Montaignes Zeitgenosse Christophe de Savigny eines der erstaunlichsten und reichsten Zeugnisse frühneuzeitlicher Kunst im Dienst einer solchen Wissensgeschichte vor. Das Tafelwerk steht daher im Mittelpunkt der Untersuchungen zu den Figuren enzyklopädischer Wissensordnungen. Erstmals seit seiner Publikation vor über fünfhundert Jahren wird dieses sehr selten gewordene, für die Gelehrtenkultur des 16. Jahrhunderts äußerst repräsentative Werk hier vollständig und in einer farbigen Reproduktion wieder zum Druck gebracht. Die komplexen Strategien, mit Hilfe von Bildern, Diagrammen und Texten für eine bestimmte Wissensordnung zu argumentieren, lassen sich auf diese Weise an einer bedeutenden Quelle der vormodernen Gelehrtengeschichte minutiös nachvollziehen. Die Fülle des Wissens und die Möglichkeiten seiner Ordnung werden dabei als Herausforderungen sichtbar, die in gleicher Weise das Interesse der Kunstgeschichte und der Kulturwissenschaft, der Wissenschafts- und Pädagogikgeschichte und der Philosophie berühren. (shrink)