In this book, Daniel K. Miller articulates a new vision of human and animal relationships based on the foundational love ethic within Christianity. Framed around Jesus' parable of the Good Samaritan, Animal Ethics and Theologythoughtfully examines the shortcomings of utilitarian and rights-based approaches to animal ethics. By considering the question of animals within the Christian concept of neighbourly love, Miller provides an alternative narrative for understanding the complex relationships that humans have with other animals. This book addresses significant theological (...) questions such as: Does being created in the image of God present a meaningful distinction between humans and other animals? What does it mean for humans to have dominion over animals? Is meat eating a moral problem for Christians? In addition to drawing out the significance of Christian theology for field of animal ethics this book also engages environmental and feminist ethics. Miller brings a theological perspective to such questions as: Should care for animals be distinguished from care for the environment, and what role should human emotions play in our ethical dealings with other animals? As the title suggests, this book provides fresh insight into the theological significance of human relationships with other animals. mental and feminist ethics. Miller brings a theological perspective to such questions as: Should care for animals be distinguished from care for the environment, and what role should human emotions play in our ethical dealings with other animals? As the title suggests, this book provides fresh insight into the theological significance of human relationships with other animals. (shrink)

Provides an overview of the anonymous work of sophistic rhetoric known as Dissoi Logoi or Double Arguments.

The late Daniel Albright was one of the preeminent scholars of musical and literary modernism, leaving behind a rich body of work before his untimely passing. In the essays contained in Music's Monisms, he shows how musical phenomena, like literary ones, can be fruitfully investigated through the lens of monism, the philosophical belief that things that appear to be two are actually one. Albright shows how, in music, despite its many binaries-diatonic vs. chromatic, staccato vs. legato, major vs. minor, (...) tonal vs. atonal-there is always a larger system at work that aims to reconcile all tension and resolve all conflict. Albright identifies a "radical monism" in the work of modernist poets such as T. S. Eliot and musical works by Wagner, Debussy, Britten, Schoenberg, and Stravinsky, and also delves into figures such as Maeterlinck, Rimbaud, and Yeats along the way. Through a series of close readings of musical and literary works, Albright advances powerful philosophical arguments that not only shed light on these specific figures but also aesthetic experience in general. (shrink)

RESUMEN: El presente artículo trata de lo transindividual, un concepto fundamental en la teoría de la individuación elaborada por Gilbert Simondon, y de su vinculación con ciertas proposiciones de Karl Marx que tratan del individuo y la sociedad. Entre ambos autores existe una relación directa, evidenciada en cada uno de los textos donde Simondon hace mención a Marx y al marxismo en general. Pero también existe una relación indirecta, para nada evidente, que surge menos de lo que Simondon dice acerca (...) de Marx que de lo que ciertos pensadores contemporáneos dicen sobre uno y otro. Aquí intento dar cuenta de ambos tipos de relaciones. Asimismo, me propongo introducir y comentar algunos pasajes de Marx que compiten en radicalidad y audacia con los que escribiera Simondon un siglo más tarde, y en los cuales quiero apoyar mi hipótesis de lectura, a saber, que Marx es un pensador de lo transindividual avant la lettre. ABSTRACT: The present article is about the transindividual, a fundamental concept in the theory of the individuation produced by Gilbert Simondon, and about its entailment with certain propositions of Karl Marx, that deal with the individual and the society. Between both authors there is a direct relationship, evidenced in each of the texts where Simondon makes mention to Marx and the Marxism in general. But it also exists an indirect relationship, at all evident, that arises less from what Simondon says about Marx than from what certain contemporary thinkers claim about one and the other. Here I attempt to give account of both types of relationships. In addition, I propose to introduce and comment some passages of the work of Marx, which compete in both radicalness and audacity with those that Simondon wrote a century after. And in which I want to sustain my reading hypothesis, namely, that Marx is a thinker of the transindividual avant la lettre. (shrink)

The attempt to find usable diagrams fornterms of the sort devised by John Venn seems to have originated with Venn himself, who published diagrams for up to five classes (the fifth class, however, was shaped like a doughnut, and contained an area outside itself — like the hole in the doughnut). Venn then suggested that “if we wanted to use a diagram forsixterms (x, y, z, w, v, u) the best plan would probably be to taketwofive-term figures, one for theupart (...) and one for the non-upart of all the other combinations …” Such a method would, as Venn admits, be somewhat confusing to the eye, and thus fail to fulfil one of the major purposes of the diagram; nevertheless, it is a method which could be extended to covernclasses.Venn also suggests (but without illustration) another method for drawing diagrams fornterms: “… the rule of formation would be very simple. We should merely have to begin by drawing any closed figure, and then proceed to draw others subject to the one condition that each intersect once, and once only, all the existing subdivisions produced by those which had gone before.” Then, in a rather surprising footnote, he adds: “It will be found that when we adhere to continuous figures, instead of the discontinuous five-term figure given above, there is a tendency for the resultant outlines thus successively drawn to assume a comb-like shape after the first four or five. If we begin by circles or other rounded figures the teeth are curved, if by parallelograms then they are straight. (shrink)

Moral theology: tradition and prospects -- Purpose, reason and action -- The process of practical reasoning -- How to evaluate good and bad actions -- Actions, dispositions and character -- The reality of sin -- Conversion to Christ -- God's will and God's law -- Virtues: moral dispositions for acting well -- Wisdom in action -- Justice -- Fortitude -- Self-control -- Faith -- Love -- Hope.

This article examines life assurance and the politics of ‘big data’ in mid-19th-century Britain. The datasets generated by life assurance companies were vast archives of information about human longevity. Actuaries distilled these archives into mortality tables – immensely valuable tools for predicting mortality and so pricing risk. The status of the mortality table was ambiguous, being both a public and a private object: often computed from company records they could also be extrapolated from public projects such as the census, or (...) clerical records. Life assurance more generally straddled the line between private enterprise and collective endeavour, though its advocates stressed the public interest in its success. Reforming actuaries such as Thomas Rowe Edmonds wanted the data on which mortality tables were based to be made publicly available, but faced resistance. Such resistance undermined insurers’ claims to be scientific in spirit and hindered Edmonds’s personal quest for a law of mortality. Edmonds pushed instead for an open actuarial science alongside fellow travellers at the Statistical Society of London, which was populated by statisticians such as William Farr as well as by radical mathematicians such as Charles Babbage. The article explores Babbage’s little-known foray into the world of insurance, both as a budding actuary but also as a fierce critic of the industry. These debates over the construction, ownership, and accessibility of insurance datasets show that concern about the politics of big data did not begin in the 21st century. (shrink)

The topic of my dissertation is satire. This seems to excite many people, and over the past four years I have heard many variations of a similar refrain: “Oh, wow. You’re studying satire? That’s very topical. You must have a lot of material to work with.” There is a way in which this is true, though I suspect in a way that diverges from the way that most of my interlocutors believed. I suspect that the material they imagined me to (...) be working with was the output of Donald Trump, first a candidate for and now holder of the office of President of the United States. That is not the material I find interesting. More interesting to me is their statement. It evinces a number of beliefs that I find interesting, chief among them that Trump makes the current period particularly apt for satire, as if a doddery and incompetent ruling class is somehow a recent phenomenon. And I suspect that underneath this belief in the aptness of satire is a belief in the power of satire. Satire is somehow how people are going to strike back at the vice-governed fools who rule us. Those beliefs are the material I want to work with. This is my interest in satire, then: not so much what it is about satire that makes it powerful, but what is it about satire that makes people think it is powerful? And what is it about satire that makes people think it is powerful when there is pretty powerful evidence that it is not? Unfortunately, here is where I run into the problem that in a very important way I do not have a lot of material to work with. There is not an awful lot on satire within the analytic tradition: outside of a few references to satire, analytic discussions of satire are limited to two short articles. Accordingly, I have taken the task of my dissertation to be to create an account of satire that helps to bring forward why satire is a thing that people can imagine to be powerful, that they can imagine to be politically effective. My dissertation will effectively have two halves, one where I build my account and one where I begin to apply it. The purpose of applying my account, which will comprise the final two chapters, will not be to show its implications so much as how it can be used. My goal will not so much be to give definitive answers about the nature of satire, but rather to give a demonstration of how my account facilitates engaging questions about the role of satire in social and political context. (shrink)

This book shows that the breakoff of narrative causal explanation in physics, although remarkable, is no basis for the negative view of scientific knowledge.

L’apôtre Paul a la réputation d’être un théologien performant dans l’argumentation, plus enclin à la rationalité qu’aux envols extatiques. Or, un examen attentif de sa correspondance fait apparaître la présence d’expériences religieuses, que l’apôtre raconte, et que l’on ne peut hésiter à appeler mystiques. Les signes sont discrets, mais indéniables: parler en langues, guérisons charismatiques, extases, visions. L’enquête de Daniel Marguerat fait l’inventaire de ces expériences, mettant en évidence l’interprétation qu’en donne l’apôtre. On ira jusqu’à parler d’une subversion de (...) l’expérience mystique chez Paul. (shrink)

This essay examines the role that fasting played in Newman’s spirituality as an Anglican: [1] the intellectual, spiritual, and historical factors that led Newman toconcentrate on this ascetical practice; [2] his theology of fasting as it appears in his Parochial and Plain Sermons and his Letters and Diaries; and [3] the role of fasting in his personal spiritual journey.

Este trabajo tiene por finalidad analizar la pregunta por el sentido de ser como la tarea o quehacer propio de la filosofía, subrayando el carácter específico que dicha pregunta tiene como articuladora del método y de la estructura argumentativa de Ser y tiempo. Se centra en el análisis de la estructura formal de dicha pregunta, particularmente a partir de su tratamiento en el § 2, con la intención de mostrar la plausibilidad de que la reiteración de la pregunta por el (...) sentido de ser es el método desplegado en Ser y tiempo, a partir de lo cual puede proyectarse la articulación argumentativa de la obra en su conjunto. (shrink)

As a reader of Dionysius the Areopagite’s Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, John Colet encountered a theology, liturgy, and social framework that seemed absent from the rites and doctrines of the Tudor church. Dionysius’s orderly ecclesia embodied a social perfection that Colet idealized as a Christian "republic." He reacted to ecclesiastical lapses from this model by writing with passionate indignation and, in public venues, by pronouncing bold challenges to clerical misbehavior. Writing for a small audience and adhering to an increasingly doubted authority, Colet (...) responds to Dionysius with a sense of tragically changed historical circumstances, and he assumes the role of an admonishing prophet. (shrink)

The empire/servility syndrome -- How to read the Bible -- Reimagining the world -- Justice, Bible-style -- Prophets : the connoisseurs of Tsedaqah -- If you want peace, build it -- Peace : how ideals die-- and can be reborn -- Truth and the tincture of the will -- When freedom is a virtue -- Hope vs. the cringe -- Exploring love -- Song of joy.

My dissertation is a systematic defense of the moral relevance of alternative possibilities. As such, it constitutes an attack on semi-compatibilism. ;To begin, then, I defend alternative possibilities against three related but independent lines of criticism. The most prominent of these is Harry Frankfurt's now famous counterexample strategy in which cases are constructed that purport to show that a person can, in fact, be responsible even when he cannot do otherwise. Another line of criticism is John Fischer's "flicker of freedom" (...) argument, which builds on Frankfurt-type argumentation by challenging the "robustness" of alternative possibilities. Finally, some recent critics of alternative possibilities have developed "reasons-responsiveness" accounts of moral responsibility that seem further to invalidate the importance of the power to do otherwise. By extending traditional concerns and developing new objections, I argue that room remains for the possible relevance of an alternative possibilities condition on moral responsibility. ;I try to make a positive case for the plausibility of relevance by offering reasons to think that the ability to do otherwise plays an important role in our moral life. Alternatives are important, I argue, because giving up a "freedom to do otherwise" condition would put us in an epistemic bind with respect to our responsibility. That is, the kind of confidence we ordinarily have in our own moral responsibility would be unjustified if it turned out that we do not have alternatives. A second consideration in favor of the relevance of alternatives is distinctively moral. I explore and exploit the relationship between the ability to do otherwise and the putatively Kantian idea that "ought" implies "can," concluding that the semi-compatibilist must either reject both alternative possibilities and the Kantian thesis, or accept that people would not be blameworthy for their moral failures under determinism. Neither option is attractive. ;I conclude, then, that there is good reason to believe that alternative possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility and that semi-compatibilism should be rejected. Our intuitions about the importance of being able to do otherwise can still factor into the traditional arguments to the conclusion that moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism. (shrink)

Much of contemporary philosophy of mind is dominated by the intersection of three topics: physicalism, the conceivability argument, and the necessary a posteriori. I will be concerned here to describe the consensus view of these topics; to explain why I think this account is mistaken; and to briefly sketch an alternative.