This essay explores three issues in respect for autonomy that pose unfinished business for the concept. By this, I mean that the dialogue over them is ongoing and essentially unresolved. These are: whether we ought to respect persons or their autonomous choices; the role of relational autonomy; and whether nonhuman animals can be autonomous. In attending to this particular set of unfinished business, I highlight some critical moral work left aside by the concept of respect for autonomy as understood in (...) Beauchamp and Childress’ Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Specifically, while significant pragmatic traction is gained by the authors’ focus on autonomous choice, carving such a focus out from the broader questions of moral respect and the autonomy of the person leaves aside a number of questions that we might have thought a view about respect for autonomy in biomedicine ought to answer. These include: How should physicians respond when autonomous patients make decisions that appear nonautonomous? What is the impact of the view that autonomy is “relational” for cross-cultural differences in how autonomy is respected? If chimpanzees can be autonomous, what does that mean for how they should be treated? (shrink)

The Mundane World Hypothesis (mwh) says that we have material bodies, we have brains located inside our bodies, we have sense organs which process visual information, the direct cause of our perceptual judgments is typically macroscopic material objects, and we live in a material world. Skeptics using underdetermination arguments arguemwhhas no more epistemic merit than some skeptical competitor, e.g., that we are in the Matrix. Since such competitor hypotheses are equipollent, we are not justified in believingmwh. This paper takes the (...) underdetermination skeptic’s premises to a more radical conclusion: skeptical dogmatism, which is the view thatmwhis probably false based on the idea that there are many equipollent competitors tomwh. (shrink)

In this paper I seek to clarify the role of narrative in personal unity. Examining the narrative self-constitution view developed by Marya Schechtman, I use a case of radical personal change to identify a tension in the account. The tension arises because a narrative can be regarded either to capture a continuing agent with a loosely coherent, consistent self-conception – or to unify over change and inconsistency. Two possible ways of responding, by distinguishing senses of identity or distinguishing identity and (...) autonomy, are examined, but I argue that neither precisely maps this tension. I then develop a distinction between two ways in which narrative can unify: through “bottom-up” processes related to the connection between agency and self-conception; and “top-down” processes related to self-interpretative activity. The account provides ways to resolve some criticisms of narrative theories of identity, in particular in better accounting for the role of repudiated characteristics in narrative identity. (shrink)

In my professional role as anatomy administrator and bequeathal secretary at a large surgical training centre, I am the first point of contact both for people wishing to donate their body, and for newly bereaved relatives telling us that their registered loved-one has died. I am involved in every stage of the process from that first phone call, through to eventual funeral service, cremation of the body and return of the ashes to the family. I am also a registered body (...) donor myself, as I strongly believe in the value of cadaveric training having seen it first hand. When prospective donors and relatives find out that I am also a registered body donor they find this to be very reassuring to know that having ‘behind the scenes’ access has not put me off, and is a good endorsement for the process, …. (shrink)

Prompted by recent comments on the moral authority of dialogic consensus, we argue that consensus, specifically dialogic consensus, possesses a unique form of moral authority. Given our multicultural era and its plurality of values, we contend that traditional ethical frameworks or principles derived from them cannot be viewed substantively. Both philosophers and clinicians prioritize the need for a decision to be morally justifiable, and also for the decision to be action-guiding. We argue that, especially against the background of our pluralistic (...) society, it is only via unforced dialogue and properly founded argumentation, aiming for consensus, that we can ascribe rightness or wrongness in a normative fashion to dilemmatic situations. We argue that both the process of dialogue, properly constituted, and the consensual outcome itself have moral authority vested within them. Finally, we argue that the consensual decision made is able to withstand moral scrutiny and is action-guiding, without claiming absolute moral authority in other contexts. (shrink)

I have maintained that judgments must be voluntary since, as truth-aimed, they may be represented as responses to practical reasons. Christian Stein has objected that this argument cannot apply to judgments which are not the outcomes of theoretical reasoning. Furthermore, he contends that I have not succeeded in overcoming an argument of H. H. Price's to the effect that judgments which are such outcomes cannot be voluntary. I argue below that neither of these objections can be sustained.

A cardinal rule of academic research with human participants is to protect their confidentiality. While there are limits to confidentiality, universities and researchers will make strenuous efforts...

In Plato’s Symposium, the mysterious Apollodorus recounts to an unnamed comrade, and to us, Aristodemus’ story of just what happened at Agathon’s drinking party. Since Apollodorus did not attend the party, however, it is unclear what relevance he could have to our understanding of Socrates’ speech, or to the Alcibiadean “satyr and silenic drama” (222d) that follows. The strangeness of Apollodorus is accentuated by his recession into the background after only two Stephanus pages. What difference—if any—does Apollodorus make to the (...) Symposium? Does his inclusion call the dramatic and philosophical unity of the work into question? I argue that despite initial appearances, Plato has important philosophical reasons for including Apollodorus as a character. Far from being an odd appendage to an otherwise complete narrative, the figure of Apollodorus is useful for our understanding of Socrates’s conception of eros later in the work. (shrink)

The author argues that uploading does preserve personal identity, at least identity of a certain sort. The fact that we are assuming that computers are capable of embodying all the same type of properties necessary for personal identity means that we can make use of the equivalency thesis. There are two reasons for invoking the equivalency thesis. The first is so that we are not misled by a new form of racism: substratism. The second is that it makes directly relevant (...) an enormous amount of philosophical effort that has gone into exploring the possibility of carbonto‐ carbon transfers. He examines an alternative explanation to somaticism for why people might be reluctant to use Parfit's Teletransporter, namely, fear of the unknown. Finally, the author talks about the type/token (TT) account of personal identity and then see whether the no‐branching argument has any traction against it. (shrink)

The notion of Socratic Note Taking is introduced to enhance students’ learning from assigned readings. SNT features students asking questions and answering their own questions while doing the readings. To test the effectiveness of SNT, half the students from two sections of a philosophy course were assigned SNT on alternating weeks. Quizzes each week alternated between the two classes as either high or low stakes in a counterbalanced format. The design was a 2 x 2 x 2 within-participants factorial. On (...) ten-point quizzes, SNT made an average difference of 1.22 points. Furthermore, the results indicate that SNT is particularly effective with weaker students, e.g., we found a nearly three-point increase on ten-point quizzes for the weakest students. (shrink)

In fragments from the Protrepticus, Aristotle offers three linked arguments for the view that philosophy is easy. According to an obvious normative worry, however, Aristotle also seems to think that the easiness of many activities has little to do with their choiceworthiness. Hence, if the Protrepticus seeks to exhort its audience to philosophize on the basis of philosophy’s easiness, then perhaps the Protrepticus provides the wrong sort of hortatory appeal. In response, I briefly situate Aristotle’s arguments in their dialectical context. (...) On this basis, I elucidate what sort of easiness Aristotle attributes to philosophy, and what difference Aristotle thinks philosophy’s easiness makes to its choiceworthiness. (shrink)

None is so poor that he need sit on a pumpkin.Henry Thoreau, Walden.

_ Source: _Page Count 29 Underdetermination arguments for skepticism maintain that our common sense view of the external world is no better, evidentially speaking, than some skeptical competitors. An important and well-known response by dogmatists, those who believe our commonsense view is justified, appeals to abduction or inference to the best explanation. The predominant version of this strategy, going back at least to Locke, invokes Occam’s razor: dogmatists claim the common sense view is simpler than any of its skeptical alternatives (...) and so has more to recommend it, evidentially speaking. This dispute has overshadowed another possible view: skeptical dogmatism. Skeptical dogmatists hold that we are justified in believing that the common sense view is probably false. I argue that skeptical dogmatism presents some interesting complications to the dialectic between the dogmatist and the skeptic. On the one hand, even if the dogmatist’s use of Occam’s razor is sufficient to rebut skepticism, in itself it is not sufficient to refute skeptical dogmatism. On the other hand, skeptics themselves, ironically, must, given the assumptions of the paper, appeal to something like Occam’s razor in order to avoid capitulating to skeptical dogmatism. (shrink)

A person of good character treats other sentient beings with care and compassion. Yet virtue ethics apparently has trouble accounting for the moral status of nonhuman animals because of its focus on excellent character traits, rather than the moral “patient,” and because of its non-codifiability, at least in some forms. The task of this article is to answer the question: How can virtue ethics account for the moral value of nonhuman animals in the context of biomedical research? I argue that (...) it can do so through attention to animal good lives, human-animal bonds, and the virtues themselves. The virtue ethics resources I draw on to support nonhuman animal value are not the same as those typically brought to bear in moral status discussions, but I suggest that moral status as usually conceived has its own problems as a tool for use in practical contexts like animal research. (shrink)

There are often said to be five main 'theories of truth': correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, redundancy, and semantic theories. The coherence theory of truth equates the truth of a judgment with its coherence with other beliefs. Different versions of the theory give different accounts of coherence, but in all its forms the point is to exhibit truth as an internal relation between beliefs. The pragmatic theory of truth is akin to a coherence theory of this Kantian kind. No coherence theorist need (...) deny the uncontentious claim that for a judgment to be true is for it to stand in a certain relationship, which can be called correspondence, with some state of affairs in the world. The conflict with the redundancy theory may be more apparent than real. For the redundancy theory is not a theory of what truth consists in, but a theory about the meaning of the words 'is true'. (shrink)

Gregory Bateson’s career from anthropologist, through his development of cybernetics and systems theory, to developing ideas around ‘the sacred’, has parallels with Roy Bhaskar’s intellectual journey. This paper proposes that as well as Bateson’s theory of cybernetics and systemic thought making a contribution to basic and dialectic critical realism, his final and posthumously published Angels Fear: Towards and Epistemology of the Sacred adds to our understanding of Bhaskar’s metaReality. Similarities between the development of Bateson’s work from 1936 to 1987 and (...) Bhaskar’s work from 1975 to 2016 enable the development of theory that adds to both of their respective appreciations of metaReality and the sacred. Thus, by starting a conversation between Bateson and Bhaskar, we can develop a higher order understanding of the world than proposed by Bhaskar’s metaReality alone. (shrink)

This paper presents a longue durée account of the discursive emergence of ‘the market'. It seeks to develop understanding of the ‘crisis system' by showing that the crises of the present have their origins earlier than some critical realist scholars have suggested and can be better understood by the theorization of the generative mechanisms that emerged from the economic and political chaos of the early 1600s. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is employed to show that in the context of the emergence (...) of capitalism in England, these generative mechanisms resulted in the meaning of the word ‘market’ slipping loose of the geo-spatial semiotic bounds by which it had commonly been delineated – i.e. as a physical space in a town or city where goods were bartered or sold – and being re-semioticised to refer to abstract space where all acts of capitalist economic exchange, including those impacting upon the natural world, take place. (shrink)

The use of sound to systematically communicate data has been with us for a long time, and has received considerable research, albeit in a broad range of distinct fields of inquiry. Sonification is uniquely capable of conveying series and patterns, trends and outliers…and effortlessly carries affect and emotion related to those data. And sound-either by itself or in conjunction with visual, tactile, or even olfactory representations-can make data exploration more compelling and more accessible to a broader range of individuals. Nevertheless, (...) sonification and auditory displays still occupy only a sliver of popular mindshare: most people have never thought about using non-speech sound in this manner, even though they are certainly very familiar with other intentional uses of sound to convey status, notifications, and warnings. This article provides a brief history of sonification, introduces terms, quickly surveys a range of examples, and discusses the past, present, and as-yet unrealized future promise of using sound to expand the way we can communicate about data, broaden the use of auditory displays in society, and make science more engaging and more accessible. (shrink)

This paper offers a contrast between “content-first” course design, and “skills-first” course design. The traditional lecture format is a paradigmatic example of the former, by the later I mean courses that emphasize the sustained practice of skills integral to the discipline. Two arguments are offered for adopting, other things being equal, the skills-first design. One is the “content-plus” argument that the skills-first course design does a better job of promoting content acquisition than a content-first class. The second argument, the “skills-plus” (...) argument, claims that a skills-first course design has the added value of better promoting philosophical skills as compared with a content-first course. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Theory in the “Post” Era: A Vocabulary for the 21st-Century Conceptual Commons ed. by Alexandru Matei, Christian Moraru and Andrei TerianLaura Elena Savu WalkerMatei, Alexandru, Christian Moraru, and Andrei Terian, editors. Theory in the “Post” Era: A Vocabulary for the 21st-Century Conceptual Commons. Bloomsbury, 2021. 376pp.Far from “mourning” the demise of theory, this timely and thoughtfully curated essay collection testifies to its “renewed vitality,” its compelling presence “across (...) fields, domains of life, and geocultural boundaries,” and its power to build an ever-expanding world community of practioners who are forming what has come to be known as a “theory commons” (ix). As the collection’s editors point out, theory’s new lease on life hinges on ensuring both the democratic workings of this “world discourse formation” (1) and on the responsible theorizing of the very notion of community in “a world threatened by all kinds of anti-communal actions and reactions, from runaway globalization to exacerbated tribalism and tunnel-vision politics” (x). Working on the margins, specifically, out of a Romanian “lab” called The Critical Theory Institute (CTI), which opened its doors in early 2000, the contributors seek to revise the “standard history of theory,” one whose “Western origins, authority, and cultural compass ” strike them as “exceedingly reductive” (3). This project of geotheoretical repositioning and recalibration aims to recast theory as a “quintessentially cross-linguistic, cross-cultural, trans- and intercontinental undertaking” (4). As such, it carries on the project, launched in a previous volume, Romanian Literature as World Literature (2018), of fashioning an alternative to the nation-state paradigm that has long shaped literary and intellectual histories. In both of these works, Romanian critics and theorists have tuned into a wide range of voices, and tapped into a shared conceptual and methodological apparatus—itself the product of “an ethno-linguistic medley of traditions” (8). This approach informs what editors see as the “epoch-making” (17) discursive paradigm that has taken shape in globally networked post-Cold War societies (17), a viral model of cultural influence that fosters an ontology of “contact, contagion, of infection, dissemination, and horizontal accumulation” (15).To give us a sense of theory’s complex genealogy and evolution, the editors reference the Bulgarian critic Galin Tihanov, who has attributed [End Page 122] important developments in contemporary theory to the achievements of theorists (Nikolai Trubetskoi, Roman Jakobson, Vladimir Propp, and Georg Lukács) and schools of thought (Russian Formalism and the Prague Linguistic Circle). In “Traveling Theory” (1983) and “Traveling Theory Reconsidered” (2000), Edward Said called attention to the migratory nature of contributions made, for instance, by Georg Lukács, whose theories moved across different European locales in this period. Since then, contemporary theory has branched out to integrate the travels and travails of scholars affiliated with theory labs located in Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, and last, but not least, Romania (10).Theory in the “Post” Era highlights five characteristics that distinguish theory in the “post” era from earlier forms: 1) It has a “reluctantly epoch-alist” thrust (19; original italics), which assumes that the “post” lexicon entails “rupture, discontinuity, and opposition” (19), radical departures, tentative claims, provisional conclusions, and ex-centric perspectives; 2) it adopts a “self-reflexive and experimental” (20; original italics) stance in which theorists invoke inherited approaches or invent new ones; 3) it introduces a “transdisciplinary” (21; original italics) scope that allows authors to interrogate the foundations, aims, and methods of theoretical discourse and practice across several knowledge domains, from which they “borrow whole vocabularies and toolkits” (21); 4) it is “nationally, transnationally, and ecologically affiliative” (20) in ways that allow theorists to “think with others at a distance” (21) about global issues; and 5) it is programmatic, placing critical and theoretical concerns in the service of “the ethical, the political, and the communal” (22). Organized around three main themes (“Aesthetics,” “Temporalities,” and “Critical Modes”), the essays juxtapose discussions of pivotal historical events and cultural phenomena with literary analyses of Romantic era “classics,” modernist experiments, and postmodern works of the post-Communist era, a corpus that includes, but is not limited to, landmark works of national culture that are now part of a fast-expanding planetary... (shrink)

The ‘Other’ can be near to us, or far from us. We are in-relation with both. Given that, we explore whether, from a moral philosophical perspective, the ‘near-other’ is in tension with the ‘far-other’. We argue that we find our relationship with the near-other through a transcendent metaphysical empathy derived from the noumenon, which is manifest in the phenomenon as compassion and justice. We then argue that perceived differences in the phenomenon mean that we do not reliably transfer this empathy (...) for the near-other, to the far-other. Further, empathic and constructive dialogue is made more difficult because of our proclivity to actively engage in ‘othering’ those not-like-us. Properly, moral decision-making is positioned in a space cognizant of the other. Near-otherness makes consensus in the decision-making process easier, while far-otherness makes consensus more difficult. In our post-modern, multicultural and multifaith era, we need to be alert to the other’s perspective, to find a way to have a meaningful dialogue and thus achieve consensus in our moral decision-making. (shrink)

The chapter aims to provide at least a partial analysis of the word ‘happiness’ as it is used in everyday language. The author tries to make clear exactly what we are looking for in a theory of happiness and then goes on to argue for a particular theory. The theory that the author endorses is a composite of affective and cognitive elements. The chapter looks at four monistic theories of happiness before showing why each is insufficient. It considers two affective (...) accounts of happiness: sensory hedonism and emotional state theory. The chapter then discusses two cognitive accounts. It shows that whole life satisfaction is not a constituent of superlative happiness, though whole life satisfaction is perhaps the most common understanding of happiness in both social science and philosophical literature. The author argues for a composite view of happiness that includes sensory pleasure, positive emotional states, and positive propositional attitudes. (shrink)

Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, EarlyView.

In seeking an account of the good life we are looking for what philosophers sometimes term a theory of wellbeing, welfare or prudential good. Philosophical theories of prudential value are often parsed according to a tripartite distinction: hedonism, desire satisfactionism, and objective list theories. This chapter defends the objective list theory. The author argues that repeated application of the method of difference results in a very big objective list of prudential values. The resulting theory termed the “big objective list” theory (...) of wellbeing includes the two main contemporary competitors to objective list theories — hedonism and desire satisfactionism — as well as athleticism, autonomy, beauty, creativity, friendship, happiness, health, knowledge, love, truth, and wealth. The author considers objections to the big objective list as well as objections to the method of difference. (shrink)

The study of emotional intelligence and its relationship with the dark triad has emerged as a popular research area. However, the complex nature of the dark triad and EI, including multiple me...

We are living through a demographic transition from a world in which there were lots of young people and very few older adults to one in which the numbers in these age groups are becoming more evenly balanced. One reason for this is that more of us are living into our seventies, eighties, nineties, and beyond. That is the good news. Unfortunately, the chance of developing chronic illnesses (including diabetes, arthritis, and dementia) is typically higher for people in these older (...) age groups than for those who are younger. Because we do not know how to cure these illnesses, many of us will spend at least some of this extra time with one or more chronic illness. While we are more likely than in the past to live into older age, we are likely to be living with illness when we get there. That raises a challenge: how should we respond to this change? (shrink)

In ‘The autonomy of the affect’ Brian Massumi wrote of the gap between affective and cognitive registering of the traumatic experience. Affect theorists and neuroscientists have long shared the notion of a gap between the somatic response to a traumatic event and the appraisal of the affective situation. This article develops theories on dissociation or nothingness, where nothingness is a measurement of the space between the affective and the cognitive registering of a traumatic event. It explores the concept of two (...) different systems, one a ‘conscious automatic’ system and the other an ‘intensity system’ that exists outside of normal physiological sequencing, beyond narration, and therefore incapable of integrating into memory systems. (shrink)

pt. 1. The need for a philosophy of pain and suffering. The circle of life on the earth. The misuse of fear. Pain. The problems of old age. Rejuvenation. Death and dying. The hereafter. The circle of recurrence.--pt. 2. Doctors and doctoring. Surgery. Psycho-therapy. The two worlds.

Knowledge may be defined in terms of four necessary conditions: belief, justification, truth and gettier. I argue that a form of philosophical skepticism may be raised with respect to each.