BackgroundHuman embryonic stem cells as a source for the development of advanced therapy medicinal products are considered for treatment of Parkinson’s disease. Research has shown promising results and opened an avenue of great importance for patients who currently lack a disease modifying therapy. The use of hESC has given rise to moral concerns and been the focus of often heated debates on the moral status of human embryos. Approval for marketing is still pending.ObjectiveTo Investigate the perspectives and concerns of patients (...) with PD, patients being the directly concerned stakeholders in the ethical discussion.MethodsQualitative semi-structured interviews related to this new therapy in seventeen patients from two Swedish cities.ResultsThe participants expressed various interests related to the use of human embryos for development of medicinal therapies; however, overall, they were positive towards the use of hESC for treatment of PD. It was deemed important that the donating woman or couple made the choice to donate embryos voluntarily. Furthermore, there were concerns that the industry does not always prioritise the patient over profit; thus, transparency was seen as important. (shrink)

BackgroundNew disease-modifying ways to treat Parkinson’s disease (PD) may soon become a reality with intracerebral transplantation of cell products produced from human embryonic stem cells (hESCs). The aim of this study was to assess what factors influence preferences of patients with PD regarding stem-cell based therapies to treat PD in the future.MethodsPatients with PD were invited to complete a web-based discrete choice experiment to assess the importance of the following attributes: (i) type of treatment, (ii) aim of treatment, (iii) available (...) knowledge of the different types of treatments, (iv) effect on symptoms, and (v) risk for severe side effects. Latent class conditional logistic regression models were used to determine preference estimates and heterogeneity in respondents’ preferences.ResultsA substantial difference in respondents’ preferences was observed in three latent preference patterns (classes). “Effect on symptoms” was the most important attribute in class 1, closely followed by “type of treatment,” with medications as preferred to other treatment alternatives. Effect on symptoms was also the most important attribute in class 2, with treatment with hESCs preferred over other treatment alternatives. Likewise for class 3, that mainly focused on “type of treatment” in the decision-making. Respondents’ class membership was influenced by their experience in treatment, side effects, and advanced treatment therapy as well as religious beliefs.ConclusionsMost of the respondents would accept a treatment with products emanating from hESCs, regardless of views on the moral status of embryos. Preferences of patients with PD may provide guidance in clinical decision-making regarding treatments deriving from stem cells. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss practical reasons and value, assuming a coexistence thesis according to which reasons and value always go together. I start by doing some taxonomy, distinguishing among three different ways of accounting for the relation between practical reasons and the good. I argue that, of these views, the most plausible one is that according to which something’s being good just consists in how certain facts about the thing in question – other than that of how it is (...) good – give us reasons to want it. It has been argued that this reasons-based account of goodness is open to various counter-examples. I consider a few, and argue that they misfire. (shrink)

Writers like Christine Korsgaard and Allen Wood understand Kant's idea of rational nature as an end in itself as a commitment to a substantive value. This makes it hard for them to explain the supposed equivalence between the universal law and humanity formulations of the categorical imperative, since the former does not appear to assert any substantive value. Nor is it easy for defenders of value-based readings to explain Kant's claim that the law-giving nature of practical reason makes all beings (...) with practical reason regard the idea of a rational nature as an end in itself. This article seeks to replace these value-based readings with a reading of the idea of rational nature as an end that fits better with the overall argument of the Groundwork. (shrink)

In the Technology Age, innovations in medical, communications, and weapons technologies have given rise to many new ethical questions: Are technologies always value-neutral tools? Are human values and human prejudices sometimes embedded in technologies? Should we merge with the technologies we use? Is it ethical to use autonomous weapons systems in warfare? What should a self-driving car do if it detects an unavoidable crash? Can robots have morally relevant properties? -/- This is Technology Ethics: An Introduction provides an accessible overview (...) of the sub-field of philosophy that focuses on the ethical implications of new technologies. Requiring no previous background in the subject, this reader-friendly volume explores ethical questions concerning artificial intelligence, robots, self-driving cars, brain implants, social media and communication technologies, and more. Throughout the book, clear and engaging chapters describe and discuss key discussions, issues, and themes while inviting readers to develop their own perspectives on a wide range of moral and ethical questions. -/- * Discusses how various technologies influence and shape individuals and society both positively and negatively * Illustrates how emerging technologies affect traditional ideas about ethics and human self-understanding * Addresses the ethical complications of creating technologies that may lead to morally problematic consequences * Considers if the benefits of new technologies outweigh potential drawbacks, such as how people interact online through social media * Explores how established moral and ethical theories relate to new questions concerning advanced technologies -/- Part of the popular This is Philosophy series published by Wiley-Blackwell, This is Technology Ethics: An Introduction is a must-read for undergraduate students taking a Technology Ethics course, researchers in the field, engineers, technology professionals, and general readers looking to learn more about the topic. (shrink)

This volume examines the notion of an analytic proof as a natural deduction, suggesting that the proof's value may be understood as its normal form--a concept with significant implications to proof-theoretic semantics.

One of the topics that often comes up in ethical discussions of deep brain stimulation (DBS) is the question of what impact DBS has, or might have, on the patient’s self. This is often understood as a question of whether DBS poses a “threat” to personal identity, which is typically understood as having to do with psychological and/or narrative continuity over time. In this article, we argue that the discussion of whether DBS is a “threat” to continuity over time is (...) too narrow. There are other questions concerning DBS and the self that are overlooked in discussions exclusively focusing on psychological and/or narrative continuity. For example, it is also important to investigate whether DBS might sometimes have a positive (e.g. a rehabilitating) effect on the patient’s self. To widen the discussion of DBS, so as to make it encompass a broader range of considerations that bear on DBS’s impact on the self, we identify six features of the commonly used concept of a person’s “true self”. We apply these six features to the relation between DBS and the self. And we end with a brief discussion of the role DBS might play in treating otherwise treatment-refractory anorexia nervosa. This further highlights the importance of discussing both continuity over time and the notion of the true self. (shrink)

Drawing on insights from robotics, psychology, and human-computer interaction, developers of sex robots are currently aiming to create emotional bonds of attachment and even love between human users and their products. This is done by creating robots that can exhibit a range of facial expressions, that are made with human-like artificial skin, and that possess a rich vocabulary with many conversational possibilities. In light of the human tendency to anthropomorphize artefacts, we can expect that designers will have some success and (...) that this will lead to the attribution of mental states to the robot that the robot does not actually have, as well as the inducement of significant emotional responses in the user. This raises the question of whether it might be ethically problematic to try to develop robots that appear to love their users. We discuss three possible ethical concerns about this aim: first, that designers may be taking advantage of users’ emotional vulnerability; second, that users may be deceived; and, third, that relationships with robots may block off the possibility of more meaningful relationships with other humans. We argue that developers should attend to the ethical constraints suggested by these concerns in their development of increasingly humanoid sex robots. We discuss two different ways in which they might do so. (shrink)

Hübner and White argue that we should not administer DBS to psychopathic prisoners. While we are sympathetic to their conclusion, we argue that the authors’ two central arguments for this conclusion are problematic. Their first argument appeals to an overly restrictive conception of individual medical benefit: namely, that an individual medical benefit must alleviate subjective suffering. We highlight cases that clearly constitute individual medical benefits although there is no relief of subjective suffering. The second argument depends on an overly restrictive (...) conception of the sort of motivation needed to ground consent to a medical procedure. It is also too quick to treat it as unproblematic to consider psychopaths as fully competent. We argue that this view overlooks certain kinds of internal motivation. It also overlooks the possibility that after successful activation of underactive brain-regions, a former psychopath might become a better representative of his or her “true self.” -/- . (shrink)

Background: While sustainability is a key concept in many different domains today, it has not yet been sufficiently emphasized in the healthcare sector. Earlier research shows that ethical values and evidence-based care models create sustainability in care practice. Objective: The aim of this study was to gain further understanding of the ethical values central to the realization of sustainability in care and to create an ethical practice model whereby these basic values can be made perceptible and active in care practice. (...) Research design: Part of the ongoing “Ethical Sustainable Caring Cultures” research project, a hermeneutical application research design was employed in this study. Participants: Dialogues were used, where scientific researchers and co-researchers were given the opportunity to reflect on ethical values in relation to sustainability in care. Findings: An ethical practice model with ethos as its core was created from the results of the dialogues. In the model, ethos is encircled by the ethical values central to sustainability: dignity, responsibility, respect, invitation, and vows. Discussion: The model can be used as a starting point for ethical conversations that support carers’ reflections on the ethical issues seen in day-to-day care work and the work community, allowing ethical values to become visible throughout the entire care culture. Conclusion: It is intended as a tool whereby carers can more deeply understand an organization’s common basic values and what they entail in regard to sustainability in care. (shrink)

Dag Prawitz The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Volume 19, Issue 1, Page 119-122, March 2013.

This book argues that we need to explore how human beings can best coordinate and collaborate with robots in responsible ways. It investigates ethically important differences between human agency and robot agency to work towards an ethics of responsible human-robot interaction.

Many ethicists writing about automated systems attribute agency to these systems. Not only that; they seemingly attribute an autonomous or independent form of agency to these machines. This leads some ethicists to worry about responsibility-gaps and retribution-gaps in cases where automated systems harm or kill human beings. In this paper, I consider what sorts of agency it makes sense to attribute to most current forms of automated systems, in particular automated cars and military robots. I argue that whereas it indeed (...) makes sense to attribute different forms of fairly sophisticated agency to these machines, we ought not to regard them as acting on their own, independently of any human beings. Rather, the right way to understand the agency exercised by these machines is in terms of human–robot collaborations, where the humans involved initiate, supervise, and manage the agency of their robotic collaborators. This means, I argue, that there is much less room for justified worries about responsibility-gaps and retribution-gaps than many ethicists think. (shrink)

The development of highly humanoid sex robots is on the technological horizon. If sex robots are integrated into the legal community as “electronic persons”, the issue of sexual consent arises, which is essential for legally and morally permissible sexual relations between human persons. This paper explores whether it is conceivable, possible, and desirable that humanoid robots should be designed such that they are capable of consenting to sex. We consider reasons for giving both “no” and “yes” answers to these three (...) questions by examining the concept of consent in general, as well as critiques of its adequacy in the domain of sexual ethics; the relationship between consent and free will; and the relationship between consent and consciousness. Additionally we canvass the most influential existing literature on the ethics of sex with robots. (shrink)

Justice is an important concept in philosophy since ancient times and a key phenomenon in human life (in societies). First a judge at a court, two sides, their witnesses, Lawyer-A and Lawyer-B are considered in this quasi-essay inquiry. Then pointed out that, which lawyer better develops his/her arguments, his/her side will be advantageous. Reality conceals on the one side, truth (and rightness) stands on the other. However this will be risky in social life; it may be understood by an ordinary (...) man (or someone who doesn’t have a proper philosophical insight) as “who - obeying the rules- better diverts reality and shows that (s)he is right, his/her side wins.” Not only knowledge, but also philosophy itself loses prestige in such a tableau. Stemming from ‘Gettier-pictures,’ a “murderingevent” is presented thereafter. By help of pseudo-philosophers Prof. Truth, Prof. Reality and E.G. (“eyeglasser”) some perspectives related to “knowledge” and “knowing” are discussed while trying to analyze the mentioned event. At the end, (reflecting in the place of me) E.G. states some features (which are important for him) concerning knowledge. In this paper, ‘subject-dependency’ and internalizability (or better, interiorizability) of knowledge will be traced somehow; in addition to a search towards ‘relevant’, ‘valuable’, ‘illicit’, and ‘proper’ kinds. (shrink)

In this paper I reflect critically on the concept of pragmatism as it is used in Ottoman historiography. Pragmatism has gained increasing currency over the last ten to fifteen years as one of the defining features of the Ottoman polity. I argue that unless it is properly defined from a theoretical-philosophical perspective, and carefully contextualized from a historical perspective, pragmatism cannot be used as an explanatory or comparative category. When used as a framework of explanation for historical change, pragmatism blurs (...) more than it clarifies an essential aspect of the Ottoman polity that it seeks to define, namely, the political. It is essential to reflect on the difference between the political and politics because whereas the political refers to the configuration of the power relations that organize a society as a legitimate entity, politics refers to the strategies, practices, institutions, or discourses whose purpose is to construct and retain hegemony within a polity. Through an analysis of the concept of pragmatism in Ottoman historiography, I show that for most proponents of Ottoman pragmatism, pragmatism pertains to politics rather than to the political. From a perspective rigorously confined to political theory, I argue that much like the discourse of modern tolerance, pragmatism in Ottoman historiography posits a problematic periodization, relegates the political to the background, and depoliticizes essential power relations. (shrink)

Recent research suggests that “smart drugs” don’t make healthy individuals who use them smarter. The main effects are instead on levels of motivation and interest. So the main ethical question here is not whether there is anything wrong or regrettable about healthy individuals’ using these drugs to make themselves smarter. It is rather whether there is anything problematic about their using these drugs to control or modulate their levels of motivation and interest. This question can either be discussed on a (...) wholly general level or be related to the values and goals characteristic of specific domains of human activity. This essay considers the use of motivation-modulators within the academic domain, and suggests two ways in which such enhancements might conflict with the values distinctive of this domain. (shrink)

According to Haidt’s “social intuitionist model”, empirical moral psychology supports the following conclusion: intuition comes first, strategic reasoning second. Critics have responded by arguing that intuitions can depend on non-conscious reasons, that not being able to articulate one’s reasons doesn’t entail not being responsive to reasons, and that the relations between intuitions and reasoning can be truth-tracking and principled in ways overlooked by Haidt. This debate involves a false dichotomy: that either reasoning is truth-tracking, or else our reasoning is purely (...) strategic and manipulative in nature. Reason-giving also, I argue, performs other important functions in moral and social life. A robust willingness to offer reasons in favor of our convictions is itself a virtue we seek and appreciate in others. Others’ willingness to reason with us is itself a good we enjoy at their hands, or that they confer upon us. What we give each other in being willing and determined to reason together is, among other things, respect for, and good-will towards, each other. (shrink)

John Harris discusses the problem of other minds, not as it relates to other human minds, but rather as it relates to artificial intelligences. He also discusses what might be called bilateral mind-reading: humans trying to read the minds of artificial intelligences and artificial intelligences trying to read the minds of humans. Lastly, Harris discusses whether super intelligent AI – if it could be created – should be afforded moral consideration, and also how we might convince super intelligent AI that (...) we ourselves should be treated with moral consideration. In this commentary, I discuss these issues brought up by Harris. I focus specifically on robots (rather than AI in general), and I set aside future super intelligent AI to instead focus on more limited forms of AI. I argue that the human tendency to attribute minds even to robots with very limited AI and whether such robots should be given moral consideration are more pressing issues than those that Harris discusses, even though I certainly agree with Harris that the potential for super intelligent AI is a fascinating topic to speculate about. (shrink)

In this chapter, I use the expression “robotic animism” to refer to the tendency that many people have to interact with robots as if the robots have minds or a personality. I compare the idea of robotic animism with what philosophers and psychologists sometimes refer to as “mind-reading”, as it relates to human interaction with robots. The chapter offers various examples of robotic animism and mind-reading within different forms of human-robot interaction, and it also considers ethical and prudential arguments for (...) and against attributing minds and a personality to robots. In the last section of the chapter, I also consider the intriguing question of whether any robots that exist today could be said to have some sort of minds in some non-trivial sense. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that on Kant’s view of action, ‘everyone always acts on maxims.’ Call this the ‘descriptive reading.’ This reading faces two important problems: first, the idea that people always act on maxims offends against common sense: it clashes with our ordinary ideas about human agency. Second, there are various passages in which Kant says that it is ‘rare’ and ‘admirable’ to firmly adhere to a set of basic principles that we adopt for ourselves. This article offers an (...) alternative: the ‘normative reading.’ On this reading, it is a normative ideal to adopt and act on maxims: it is one of the things Kant thinks we would do if our reason were fully in control of our decision-making. (shrink)

Self-driving cars hold out the promise of being safer than manually driven cars. Yet they cannot be a 100 % safe. Collisions are sometimes unavoidable. So self-driving cars need to be programmed for how they should respond to scenarios where collisions are highly likely or unavoidable. The accident-scenarios self-driving cars might face have recently been likened to the key examples and dilemmas associated with the trolley problem. In this article, we critically examine this tempting analogy. We identify three important ways (...) in which the ethics of accident-algorithms for self-driving cars and the philosophy of the trolley problem differ from each other. These concern: the basic decision-making situation faced by those who decide how self-driving cars should be programmed to deal with accidents; moral and legal responsibility; and decision-making in the face of risks and uncertainty. In discussing these three areas of disanalogy, we isolate and identify a number of basic issues and complexities that arise within the ethics of the programming of self-driving cars. (shrink)

Stephen Campbell, Connie Ulrich, and Christine Grady argue that we need to a broader understanding of moral distress – broader, that is, than the one commonly used within nursing-ethics and, more recently, healthcare ethics in general. On their proposed definition, moral distress is any self-directed negative attitude we might have in response to viewing ourselves as participating in a morally undesirable situation. While being in general agreement with much of what Campbell et al. say, I make two suggestions. First, in (...) order to distinguish moral distress that is specifically related to the roles and responsibilities of healthcare-workers from other kinds of moral distress, it would be useful for the broadened definition to contain an explicit reference to the distinctive situation and challenges faced by healthcare-workers. Second, whereas Campbell et al. write in a manner that suggests that there is very little that is positive or redeeming about moral distress, we should also ask if there is anything morally good about such distress. I suggest that the disposition to respond with moral distress to situations that call for it can plausibly be seen as a virtue on the part of healthcare-workers. The moral value of responses of appropriate moral distress is positive (because it is a display of virtue on the part of the healthcare-worker), whereas the state of affairs that moral distress is called for is bad and regrettable. (shrink)

The traditional picture of logic takes it for granted that "valid arguments have a fundamental epistemic significance", but neither model theory nor traditional proof theory dealing with formal system has been able to give an account of this significance. Since valid arguments as usually understood do not in general have any epistemic significance, the problem is to explain how and why we can nevertheless use them sometimes to acquire knowledge. It is suggested that we should distinguish between arguments and acts (...) of inferences and that we have to reconsider the latter notion to arrive at the desired explanation. More precisely, the notions should be developed so that the following relationship holds: one gets in possession of a ground for a conclusion by inferring it from premisses for which one already has grounds, provided that the inference in question is valid. The paper proposes explications of the concepts of ground and deductively valid inference so that this relationship holds as a conceptual truth. Logical validity of inference is seen as a special case of deductive validity, but does not add anything as far as epistemic significance is concerned—it resides already in the deductively valid inferences. (shrink)

Ethics of Artificial Intelligence This article provides a comprehensive overview of the main ethical issues related to the impact of Artificial Intelligence on human society. AI is the use of machines to do things that would normally require human intelligence. In many areas of human life, AI has rapidly and significantly affected human society … Continue reading Ethics of Artificial Intelligence →.

Ibn al-'Arabī (d. 1240) was one of the towering figures of Islamic intellectual history, and among Sufis still bears the title of al-shaykh al-akbar, or "the greatest master." Ibn al-'Arabī and Islamic Intellectual Culturetraces the history of the concept of "oneness of being" (wahdat al-wujūd) in the school of Ibn al- 'Arabī, in order to explore the relationship between mysticism and philosophy in Islamic intellectual life. It examines how the conceptual language used by early mystical writers became increasingly engaged over (...) time with the broader Islamic intellectual culture, eventually becoming integrated with the latter's common philosophical and theological vocabulary. It focuses on four successive generations of thinkers (Sadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī, Mu'ayyad al-Dīn al-Jandī, 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī, and Dāwūd al-Qaysarī), and examines how these "philosopher-mystics" refined and developed the ideas of Ibn al-'Arabī. Through a close analysis of texts, the book clearly traces the crystallization of an influential school of thought in Islamic history and its place in the broader intellectual culture. Offering an exploration of the development of Sufi expression and thought, this book will be a valuable resource for students and scholars of Islamic thought, philosophy, and mysticism. (shrink)

We prove that the Kleene schemes for primitive recursion relative to the μ-operator, relativized to some nondeterministic objects, have the same power to express total functionals when interpreted over the partial continuous functionals and over the Kleene-Kreisel continuous functionals. Relating the former interpretation to Niggl's ℳω we prove Nigg's conjecture that ℳω is strictly weaker than Plotkin's PCF + PA.

We study the logical and computational properties of basic theorems of uncountable mathematics, including the Cousin and Lindelöf lemma published in 1895 and 1903. Historically, these lemmas were among the first formulations of open-cover compactness and the Lindelöf property, respectively. These notions are of great conceptual importance: the former is commonly viewed as a way of treating uncountable sets like e.g. [Formula: see text] as “almost finite”, while the latter allows one to treat uncountable sets like e.g. [Formula: see text] (...) as “almost countable”. This reduction of the uncountable to the finite/countable turns out to have a considerable logical and computational cost: we show that the aforementioned lemmas, and many related theorems, are extremely hard to prove, while the associated sub-covers are extremely hard to compute. Indeed, in terms of the standard scale (based on comprehension axioms), a proof of these lemmas requires at least the full extent of second-order arithmetic, a system originating from Hilbert–Bernays’ Grundlagen der Mathematik. This observation has far-reaching implications for the Grundlagen’s spiritual successor, the program of Reverse Mathematics, and the associated Gödel hierarchy. We also show that the Cousin lemma is essential for the development of the gauge integral, a generalization of the Lebesgue and improper Riemann integrals that also uniquely provides a direct formalization of Feynman’s path integral. (shrink)

Reviewed Works:Gaisi Takeuti, Proof Theory.Georg Kreisel, Proof Theory: Some Personal Recollections.Wolfram Pohlers, Contributions of the Schutte School in Munich to Proof Theory.Stephen G. Simpson, Subsystems of $\mathbf{Z}_2$ and Reverse Mathematics.Solomon Feferman, Proof Theory: A Personal Report.

As in classical Latin philosophical and theological texts, Spinoza did not make any semantic distinction between the concepts of conscientia and conscius, and used one interchangeably. But the concept of conscientia is used as an “inner voice” or “conscience” meaning “moral sensitivity” or “moral awareness” and expresses both rational and irrational processes in traditioanl philosophy. On the other hand, the concept of conscius is used in the sense of “consciousness” and expresses a mental or psychological reflexive activity based on rational (...) processes in the same tradition. Based on Spinoza's use of the two concepts in the same sense, this study claims that “moral sensitivity” is formed as a result of reflexive thinking, which is a mental action. Where consciousness is understood as a reflexive activity based on the relationship between ideas, it is argued that “moral awareness” occurs in the mind as an idea formed as a result of the relationship between ideas. In the study, it is determined that Spinoza developed a kind of “moral consciousness” theory based on the awareness in question, rather than a “conscience theory”. The main focus of the study is that the idea of “good” and “evil”, which are the basic concepts in Spinoza’s ethics, arise from the idea of “joy” and “sadness” that occur as emotions in the mind. Here, “joy” or “sadness” is considered as the primary ideas that occur in the mind as a result of the affection of the body, and “good” or “bad” as secondary ideas formed by the mind as a result of contemplation on these primary ideas. In the article, the theory of “moral consciousness” is based on the “ideas of ideas”, which are the secondary ideas in question. Keywords: Consciousness, Conscience, Awareness, Moral Consciousness, Good-Evil, Joy-Sadness. (shrink)