Medical ethicists debate whether or not the moral assessment of cases of euthanasia should depend on whether the patient is 'killed' or 'allowed to die'. The usual presupposition is that a clear distinction between killing and letting die can be drawn so that this substantive question is not begged. I contend that the categorisation of cases of instances of killing rather than as instances of letting die depends in part on a prior moral assessment of the case. Hence is it (...) trivially rather than substantively true that the distinction has moral significance. But even if a morally neutral (ie non-question begging) distinction could be drawn, its application to the euthanasia controversy is problematic. I illustrate the difficulties of employing this distinction to reach moral conclusions by critically discussing Philippa Foot's recent treatment of euthanasia. I conclude that even if an act of euthanasia is an instance of killing, and there exists a prima facie moral duty not to kill, and no more stringent duty overrides this duty, one still cannot determine such an act to be morally impermissible. (shrink)

Aristotle's well-known divisions of friendship, those based on utility, pleasure and virtue, are based on the kind of good each provides. It is fairly easy to see what is contributed by utility- and pleasure-friendships, but virtue-friendship presents a special difficulty. Aristotle writes that virtue-friendship occurs between good (virtuous) persons, each of whom is happy because of that goodness. Aristotle also asserts, however, that the good (happy) person, especially the philosopher, is largely self-sufficient, needing little in the way of external goods (...) for his happiness. Such a person is virtuous not only in the moral sense but intellectually, having developed the capacities of the mind to make effective moral decisions and, in the case of the philosopher, to contemplate the most divine of subjects. If that is the case, it is not difficult to see why such a person would not need many utility- or pleasure-friends, but why would he need virtue-friends? What does virtue-friendship contribute to the happiness of one who is already happy? Possible answers to those questions have been provided by a number of commentators, whose views will be considered below. I believe their answers can be classified into three general types of argument: the �opportunity argument�, the �reassurance argument� and the �pleasure argument�. Although all of these have their merits, each has pitfalls. There is another possible answer, an �essentialist argument�, which more accurately describes Aristotle's view. I will argue that virtue-friends come to understand each other's true selves, and each, through the awareness and contemplation of the other, becomes a better human being and, consequently, happier. (shrink)

ḥeleḳ 1. Musar ʻatsot ṿe-hanhagot -- ḥeleḳ 2. Musre haśkel ba-Torah -- ḥeleḳ 3. Ḥidushim u-veʼurim ba-Shas.

D. N. MacCormick; XI*—The Obligation of Reparation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 78, Issue 1, 1 June 1978, Pages 175–194, https://doi.org/10.

Equity was first established as a terminus technicus by Aristotle, but the word was initially shaped by Plato in his Statesman. Aristotle considers equity as a necessary criterion of the interpretation of human action, i.e., the ultimate, the particular moral situation, given that law is general, and every moral agent makes different moral choices, since man exhibits a multiplicity of purposes as a being and every person acts on the basis of a variety of moral perspectives and values. Therefore, the (...) task of every judge is to trace the moral choice made by a moral agent, as well as to interpret the law and attribute justice, since, as it is attested, law may be deficient, whereas this does not necessarily apply to justice itself. (shrink)

T. 1. Metodologicheskie osnovanii︠a︡ i modeli, Bogopoznanie i nauchnoe znanie -- t. 2. Chislo. Garmonii︠a︡. Metafizika Sveta -- t. 3. Svet bogoslovskie osnovanii︠a︡ kreatologi.

D N Aspin; Church Schools, Religious Education and the Multi-ethnic Community, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 17, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 229–24.

A minor modification of the arguments of Press and Lightman leads to an estimate of the height of the tallest running, breathing organism on a habitable planet as the Bohr radius multiplied by the three-tenths power of the ratio of the electrical to gravitational forces between two protons (rather than the one-quarter power that Press got for the largest animal that would not break in falling over, after making an assumption of unreasonable brittleness). My new estimate gives a height of (...) about 3.6 meters rather than Press’s original estimate of about 2.6 cm. It also implies that the number of atoms in the tallest runner is very roughly of the order of the nine-tenths power of the ratio of the electrical to gravitational forces between two protons, which is about 3×1032. (shrink)

This paper looks into the known evidence on the origins of the type of argument called the circumstantial ad hominemargument in modern logic textbooks, and introduces some new evidence. This new evidence comes primarily from recent historical work by Jaap Mansfeld and Jonathan Barnes citing many cases where philosophers in the ancient world were attacked on the grounds that their personal actions failed to be consistent with their philosophical teachings. On the total body of evidence, two hypotheses about the roots (...) of the circumstantial ad hominem are considered. One is that it came from Aristotle through Locke. The other is that it may have had separate roots in these ancient philosophical writings that criticized philosophers for not practicing what they preached. (shrink)

There are two views of the ad hominem argument found in the textbooks and other traditional treatments of this argument, the Lockean or ex concessis view and the view of ad hominem as personal attack. This article addresses problems posed by this ambiguity. In particular, it discusses the problem of whether Aristotle's description of the ex concessis type of argument should count as evidence that he had identified the circumstantial ad hominem argument. Argumentation schemes are used as the basis for (...) drawing a distinction between this latter form of argument and another called argument from commitment, corresponding to the ex concessis argument. (shrink)