This article examines and assesses Pierre Manent’s critique of the European political project and his concomitant endorsement of the nation-state. It first presents Manent’s basic arguments against the European Union, focusing on his Aristotelian understanding of political forms and his notion of the body politic. Subsequently, it argues that Manent’s position, in part due to its Aristotelian underpinnings, is deeply problematic, in that it disregards the contingency and the element of representation that are necessarily inherent in the foundation of every (...) body politic. As a result, Manent’s critique tends to downplay the contingency of the nation-state and to overplay the contingency of the European Union. (shrink)

Examines the early works of German-Jewish philosopher Leo Strauss (1899-1973).

However, even if Strauss’s critique of Spinoza may be said to take its cue from Jacobi, it is not clear whether the latter’s influence reaches beyond this initial impulse, nor is it clear to what extent. Recently it has been suggested not only that Spinoza’s Critique of Religion is “by its own account, ‘Jacobian’ in orientation,” but also that “the Jacobian dilemma and the critique of rationalism [remained] fundamental for Strauss’s perspective” throughout his career. Moreover, these assumptions carry an implicit (...) criticism, to the extent that Strauss may be said to be heir to the irrationalism, conservatism, and authoritarianism attributed to the anti-Enlightenment with which Jacobi is commonly associated. This paper will attempt to show that such assessments are in need of qualification. It will be argued that even if a certain affinity between Strauss and Jacobi can be shown to exist, this affinity is far more complex than it seems. (shrink)

Leo Strauss, de vader van het Amerikaanse neoconservatisme, stamde uit een Duits orthodox-joods gezin. Hij was reeds een bekende filosoof en politicoloog, toen hij in 1973 naar de Verenigde Staten uitweek. Hier ging hij verder met zijn onderzoek naar de tegenstelling tussen rationaliteit en emotionaliteit, tussen weten en geloven. Strauss is hierover niet tot een duidelijke eindconclusie gekomen.

Waldenfels’ reception of the Platonic dialogues is markedly ambivalent. On the one hand, Plato recurrently appears as a major philosophical antagonist. Like Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida, Waldenfels charges Plato with having fettered Socrates’ boundless questioning to a closed meta- physical system in which there is no place for the strange. On the other hand, he occasionally hints at an “other,” more Socratic Plato whose thought he seems to view as much more akin to his own. This “other” Plato, however, plays (...) only a marginal role in the order of Waldenfels’ phenomenology.This paper argues that the suggestion of an “other” Plato can be fruitfully explored, precisely by viewing him as a Socratic, i.e., by reading his work as an attempt, not to contain and defer Socrates’s strangeness, but to confront the reader with it. The dialogues, it will be argued, are designed to guide the reader to the non-place, the atopos, from which Socrates raises his questions. As a privileged example, the paper discusses Plato’s Socratic exploration of the aporias involved in the foundation of a legal order. (shrink)