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This book presents in translation writings by six medieval philosophers which bear on the subject of conscience. Conscience, which can be considered both as a topic in the philosophy of mind and a topic in ethics, has been unduly neglected in modern philosophy, where a prevailing belief in the autonomy of ethics leaves it no natural place. It was, however, a standard subject for a treatise in medieval philosophy. Three introductory translations here, from Jerome, Augustine and Peter Lombard, (...) present the loci classici on which subsequent discussions drew; there follows the first complete treatise on conscience, by Philip the Chancellor, while the two remaining translations, from Bonaventure and Aquinas, have been chosen as outstanding examples of the two main approaches which crystallised during the thirteenth century. (shrink)

La recherche actuelle se trouve dans l'incapacité d'expliquer l'émergence de la conscience à partir du cerveau, ainsi que son efficience sur celui-ci et, par son intermédiaire, sur le corps. La faute en incombe au dualisme des substances qui constitue encore l'horizon de la science actuelle, lequel dualisme ouvre un abîme infranchissable entre la matière et l'esprit. Il convient donc de repenser les rapports de la conscience et du corps, et ce à partir de la vie qui les conjoint. (...) Cet ouvrage défend l'idée qu'une entité matérielle organisée afin de se conserver elle-même est inévitablement intéressée à sa propre conservation: pas de vie sans désir de vivre, par suite sans un sentiment de vivre qui est la vie même. La vie ne se réduit pas à sa dimension matérielle, 'machinique'. Il n'est évidemment pas question de recevoir un tel énoncé comme un dogme. L'objectif de ce livre est de l'établir rationnellement, en essayant par ailleurs de montrer comment la conscience peut surgir de la subjectivité primitive, inconsciente, qu'il faut reconnaître à tout être vivant."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

L’épistémologie de Cavaillès est connue pour une critique abrupte des notions de conscience et de sujet. Cette critique ne vise pas à éliminer de la philosophie la notion de conscience mais seulement à la destituer de sa place de notion primitive. Dès lors, il s’agit de rendre compte de la conscience. Nous soutenons que la conscience est définie et constituée à partir de la réflexivité du devenir mathématique. Pour établir ce point, nous discutons de quelques textes. (...) Nous sommes amené à distinguer deux problématiques, celle des thèses de 1938, qui restent marquées par la philosophie de Brunschvicg, et celle des écrits posthumes. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Kant's claims about conscience in his moral writings of the 1790s reveal a fundamental instability in his moral philosophy. The central issue is the relationship between the moral law as the form of universality and the judgment of individuals about specific cases. Against Thomas Hill's claim that Kant has only a limited role for conscience, I argue that conscience has a comprehensive role in Kantian deliberation. I unpack the claims about (...) class='Hi'>conscience in the Metaphysics of Morals to show that they describe conscience as both a basic act of self-consciousness and as an all-things-considered judgment. I outline the role of conscience in moral motivation, and argue that taken together Kant's writings about conscience reveal a way to rethink Kant's conception of the Fact of Reason. (shrink)

Richard Sorabji here presents a selection of his previously-published papers on four topics in ancient philosophy: two on the mind-body relation, nine on sense perception, and one each on moral conscience and on the will. The substantial introduction updates and interconnects the papers and fills out the picture by reference to other writings by himself and others, and to further thoughts. The picture of the four main topics shows that each continued to develop throughout the 1200 year course of (...) Ancient Greek Philosophy up to 600 CE. (shrink)

out a visitation and a thorough assessment of his diocese. His predecessor (or rather his friend Benson, the bishop of Gloucester, who during Edward Chandler's decline had managed Durham's affairs) had kept the deanery records in good ...

L’idéalisme critique de Brunschvicg ne cherche pas à construire un système, mais à dégager le sens de la confrontation de l’invention spirituelle et du caractère imprévisible des événements provoqués par l’expérience. Cette orientation qui caractérise sa philosophie des sciences trouve son moment réflexif dans une philosophie de l’esprit dont le champ ne se limite pas aux formes et aux étapes de la conscience scientifique, mais s’étend aux formes de la conscience religieuse. On dévoile ainsi le sens pratique ultime (...) de l’idéalisme brunschvicgien, qui va au-delà de l’examen critique des formes historiques et institutionnelles de conscience religieuse. Il ne craint pas de proclamer l’identité de sens du progrès de l’esprit scientifique et de l’idée d’une religion pure, affranchie des mirages du réalisme. (shrink)

Marqués par Descartes et Locke, les philosophes de ce siècle se sont notamment intéressés à l'épistémologie devenue alors discipline philosophique fondamentale.

The concept of consciousness in ancient Greek philosophy, concerns the internal autonomy and philosophical freedom from the condemnation of ignorance of both the foreign and the domestic world. The ancient Greek philosophers pointed out the value of the dialectic with the inner self to the problem of moral conscience and handed us a legacy of values and the primacy of reason. The concept of moral consciousness in ancient Greek philosophy. The article examines the concept of moral consciousness in ancient (...) Greek philosophy. The purpose of the article is to investigate the moral question related to whether moral concepts have a subjective or an objective basis. In addition, the article demonstrates the unaffected by time significance of the concept of moral consciousness, as well as its connection with the reality of moral concepts, moral propositions, moral judgments, moral man, moral law, moral idealism, moral naturalism and moral relativism. Moral consciousness is the mirror of our self-knowledge. (shrink)

In recent years, commentators have devoted increasing attention to Hegel’s conception of conscience. Prominent interpreters like Frederick Neuhouser have even argued that many points of contact can be found between Hegel’s conceptions of conscience and moral subjectivity and historical and contemporary liberalism. In this paper, I offer an interpretation of an under-examined 1830 addition to the Philosophy of Spirit concerning the relation between religion and the state which proves particularly resistant to the kind of liberal interpretation of (...) class='Hi'>conscience which Neuhouser provides. I assess the significance of Hegel’s argument for the “inseparability” of ethical and religious conscience for liberal interpretations. I conclude by arguing that we can identify a kind of consistency between the Philosophy of Right and the later writings and lectures, but that Hegel’s conception of conscience is incompatible with contemporary political liberalism. (shrink)

For more than fifty years, Sterling M. McMurrin served as one of the preeminent intellectual voices of the LDS community. From his beginnings as an Institute of Religion instructor to U.S. Commissioner of Education, and from a professor of philosophy to U.S. Envoy to Iran, he showed by example how personal and institutional morality can be defended.In a series of candid discussions with Jack Newell, McMurrin reveals his ability to reconcile freedom and conscience. In a spirit of repartee and (...) friendship, writes Boyer Jarvis in the foreword, Newell probes, challenges, and constantly draws McMurrin out as he... reflects upon his wide-ranging ideas and experiences. Rich in insight and humor, this remarkable dialogue captures the sweep and depth of McMurrin's thoughts as Newell engages him in discussing his approaches to philosophy, education, and religion.Among the qualities that characterized McMurrin's life and mind, explains Newell, perhaps the most notable is the freedom with which he has spoken his views on both the sacred and the profane. His intellectual integrity -- coupled as it almost always is with his humane instincts and innate fairness -- has simultaneously confounded and earned the respect of critics. (shrink)

Dans le cadre général de la réception des Principles of Psychology dans les pays germanophones, on examine l’influence de cet ouvrage sur la philosophie de la culture d’Ernst Cassirer. Le concept de flux de conscience a notamment aidé Cassirer à résoudre ce que l’on peut appeler le problème de l’articulation : comment décrire la transition entre le flux continu de sensations et la création de formes culturelles capables de durer dans le temps? Pour répondre à cette question il faut (...) faire face à un problème auquel James n’avait pas donné de réponse définitive, celui de la relation entre les composantes dynamiques ou transitoires du flux de la conscience et ses composantes statiques : concepts, symboles, images. (shrink)

La section des Principes de la philosophie du droit concernant « Le Bien et la conscience-morale » développe la dialectique de la subjectivité morale au sens strict. Il s’agit du procès par lequel le point de vue moral subjectif, dès lors qu’il se porte à l’absolu, conduit à l’impossibilité pour la conscience morale formelle de délivrer un critère réel de l’action, de sorte que Hegel déplace le Mal de son lieu traditionnel (le libre arbitre) pour en faire l’un (...) des possibles de la conscience morale elle-même. Trois points sont en outre à noter : 1. la fécondité maintenue, pour une part, de la moralité subjective, qui ne s’épuise pas dans le subjectivisme moral ; 2. l’originalité de ce passage au sein du corpus hégélien : la contradiction ne travaille pas ici la dualité de la conscience (Phénoménologie de l’esprit) ou de l’idée du bien (Science de la logique) et du monde, mais une opposition interne à la volonté, entre sa subjectivité immédiate et son essence abstraite; 3. le rapport Hegel-Kant qui se joue ici, car si la réception du kantisme par Fichte peut faire office de confirmation historique de la dialectique de la conscience morale, c’est au prix de deux déplacements décisifs, l’un opéré par Fichte, l’autre par Hegel lui-même. (shrink)

Hegel presents significant accounts of “conscience” (Gewissen) at decisive moments both in the early Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Right. In spite of some important similarities between these accounts, they present deeply different, perhaps even inconsistent, understandings of the nature and value of individual conscience. Roughly, on the Philosophy of Right account, conscience is fundamentally something inward and individualizing, requiring transformation if it is to be integrated into the social institutions and practices that constitute modern (...) “ethical life.” By contrast, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, conscience is always already fundamentally social, entailing demands that individuals both realize their convictions in actions that are, in principle at least, available to others, and that they be able discursively to articulate, justify, and, in some cases, modify their convictions in relation to others. Drawing on this contrast between two understandings of the nature and value of conscience, I consider two models of the liberty of conscience. On the first model, the liberty of conscience fundamentally entails the need for the protection of an inward sphere over which institutions ought not to attempt to exercise coercive influence. On the second, the liberty of conscience entails acknowledging the discursive and social character of conscience, so that, while individuals should be entitled to a sort of moral autonomy, that autonomy entails an equal demand to be able to justify their convictions to others, and to respond reasonably to the claims that others make on them. I argue that Hegel’s concept of “spirit,” which suggests that selfhood is fundamentally a product of concrete relations among individuals, provides stronger support for the second model of the liberty of conscience. (shrink)

Peu de philosophes ont autant insisté sur la différence entre la lettre et l’esprit d’une philosophie que Fichte. Breazeale prend Fichte au mot concernant cette distinction et tente de reconstituer ce qu’il appelle l’esprit de la philosophie d’Iéna, soit la première version de la philosophie que Fichte construisit entre 1793 et 1799. L’auteur montre combien Fichte est loin de la caricature de l’idéalisme débridé, interprétation qui prévalut chez les commentateurs classiques comme dans une certaine philosophie analytique. Il montre aussi comment (...) une vulgate plus contemporaine qui tend à surinvestir l’aspect religieux (en valorisant notamment ce qu’on appelle la dernière philosophie) manque le sens et l’esprit de la philosophie d’Iéna et renoue ainsi avec l’interprétation traditionnelle d’un Fichte dogmatique et métaphysicien. (shrink)

John Searle : Le courant analytique, dans lequel je me situe, est pour une large part un ensemble de réactions à l’oeuvre de Gottlob Frege. Nous ne faisons que commencer à prendre la mesure de l’importance considérable de Frege, non seulement pour ce qui est de ses propres théories, mais aussi des directions de recherches qu’il a fourni à Russell, à Wittgenstein, et à Austin, qui fut mon professeur à Oxford.1 Donc, en un sens, j’appartiens à la révolution fregéenne. A (...) première vue, cette révolution consiste en la réinvention de la logique : Frege a créé.. (shrink)

Dans cet essai consacré à la pensée philosophique africaine, Harry Mbiziantouari 'nous conduit à la découverte du muntu ou l'être-homme qui se constitue dans le monde. En parlant de cette découverte il nous introduit au coeur d'un voyage d'exploration qui saisit le muntu dans son essence et dans sa conscience historique, pour en dévoiler l'aspiration la plus haute et la plus noble, qui est celle de vivre sa vie dignement et d'occuper une place de choix dans le monde actuel. (...) C'est dans le but de donner une image de l'Afrique plus responsable d'elle-même et soucieuse de l'avenir de ses enfants, que l'auteur s'engage dans une lecture critique de ce continent et de son positionnement historique : quelle Afrique voulons- nous? Quels Africains y habiteront? Cela dépendra de ce qu'ils souhaitent et désirent. Il est donc question d'une réinvention, d'une reconstruction de l'Afrique et de ses citoyens. Cependant, l'auteur ne se livre pas à une lutte intellectuelle qui mettrait l'accent sur la reconnaissance identitaire de l'Africain, mais il s'interroge plutôt sur la possibilité de penser une nouvelle identité africaine. À cet effet, il prend en considération la culture africaine aussi bien que la culture européenne. Pour lui, ces deux cultures constituent d'emblée l'héritage de l'Afrique actuelle. Ainsi, pour penser le muntu, il faut le positionner dans cet entre-deux culturel afin de bâtir l'Africain que les habitants du continent veulent être. Pour être pensé, ce dernier doit passer à travers le filtre de la critique, car penser, c'est penser autrement"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Oxford Legal Philosophy publishes the best new work in philosophically-oriented legal theory. It commissions and solicits monographs in all branches of the subject, including works on philosophical issues in all areas of public and private law, and in the national, transnational, and international realms; studies of the nature of law, legal institutions, and legal reasoning; treatments of problems in political morality as they bear on law; and explorations in the nature and development of legal philosophy itself. The series represents diverse (...) traditions of thought but always with an emphasis on rigour and originality. It sets the standard in contemporary jurisprudence.This book shows that civil disobedience is generally more defensible than private conscientious objection.Part I explores the morality of conviction and conscience. Each of these concepts informs a distinct argument for civil disobedience. The conviction argument begins with the communicative principle of conscientiousness. According to the CPC, having a conscientious moral conviction means not just acting consistently with our beliefs and judging ourselves and others by a common moral standard. It also means not seeking to evade the consequences of our beliefs and being willing to communicate them to others. The conviction argument shows that, as a constrained, communicative practice, civil disobedience has a better claim than private objection does to the protections that liberal societies give to conscientious dissent. This view reverses the standard liberal picture which sees private 'conscientious' objection as a modest act of personal belief and civil disobedience as a strategic, undemocratic act whose costs are only sometimes worth bearing.The conscience argument is narrower and shows that genuinely morally responsive civil disobedience honours the best of our moral responsibilities and is protected by a duty-based moral right of conscience.Part II translates the conviction argument and conscience argument into two legal defences. The first is a demands-of-conviction defence. The second is a necessity defence. Both of these defences apply more readily to civil disobedience than to private disobedience. Part II also examines lawful punishment, showing that, even when punishment is justifiable, civil disobedients have a moral right not to be punished. (shrink)

S'il est naturel de tenir le rêve pour une forme de vie mentale consciente, celle-ci n'en est pas moins paradoxale : bien que nos souvenirs dénotent de vives expériences visuelles et émotionnelles, le rêve a tout l'air, cependant, d'avoir lieu durant le sommeil et d'échapper complètement à notre volonté. Mais ne rêvons-nous pas le rêve en nous éveillant? Et le rêveur est-il vraiment privé de tout contrôle sur ses pensées? Enfin, si l'on pouvait empiriquement établir qu'une part significative de l'expérience (...) onirique n'est pas remémorable à l'éveil, en quel sens pourrait-on encore la dire consciente? En répondant à ces questions grâce aux données des sciences cognitives, nous serons plus largement amenés à redécouvrir la conscience. (shrink)

Hegel’s account of conscience at the conclusion to the chapter on morality in the Philosophy of Right has had more than its share of detractors. Theunissen tries to explain why the account is “so meager,” Findlay deems it “thoroughly scandalous,” and Tugendhat goes so far as to label it the pinnacle of a “no longer merely conceptual, but rather moral perversion.” Even commentators committed to rescuing Hegel’s discussion of conscience from such extreme reproaches agree that it is “one-sided” (...) and “problematic.” The source of this widespread conclusion about Hegel’s political incorrectness is not difficult to discern. In the wake of the nationalistic excesses and horrors of the last two centuries, there is an understandable suspicion about the motivations underlying claims that “the state cannot recognize conscience in its distinctive. form, that is, as subjective knowing”. When Hegel declares that the “formal subjectivity” of conscience, as the final achievement of morality, is “on the verge of turning into something evil”, he seems clearly out of step with the reigning liberal political traditions, traditions that regard the individual’s freedom to abide by his or her conscience as both an unassailable right and an inherent good. (shrink)

The lack of moral conscience in contemporary society is frequently noted and lamented, but how valid is the idea of "conscience" today? Does it have a referent, or is the concept merely rhetorical? Guyton B. Hammond proposes in this book that the concept is valid, but that for its utopian possibilities to be recovered it must be revised.

Conscience is often referred to yet not understood. This text develops a theory of cognition around a model of conscience, the ACTWith model. It represents a synthesis of results from contemporary neuroscience with traditional philosophy, building from Jamesian insights into the emergence of the self to narrative identity, all the while motivated by a single mechanism as represented in the ACTWith model. Emphasis is placed on clarifying historical expressions and demonstrations of conscience - Socrates, Heidegger, Kant, M.L. (...) King - in light of the ACTWith model, while at once turning these resources to developing the basic architecture. In the end, this text aims to enrich moral theory by improving our understanding of moral cognition, while at once providing a useful tool in everyday moral practice and self-development. (shrink)

Debate over whether health care institutions or individual providers should have a legally protected right to conscientiously refuse to offer legal services to patients who request them has grown exponentially due to the increasing legalization of morally contested services. This debate is particularly acute for Catholic health care providers. We elucidate Catholic teaching regarding the nature of conscience and the intrinsic value of being free to act in accord with one’s conscience. We then outline the primary positions defended (...) in this debate and respond to critics of Catholic teaching. In so doing, we show how Catholic health care providers’ claims to conscientiously refuse to offer specific health care services are not essentially faith-based, but are founded upon publicly defensible reasons. We also address the question of whether conscientiously refusing health care providers may become complicit in moral wrongdoing or potentially cause scandal by means of disclosure or referral to another provider. (shrink)

Conscience-based refusals by health care professionals to provide care to eligible patients are problematic, given the monopoly such professionals hold on the provision of such services. This article reviews standard ethical arguments in support of conscientious refuser accommodation and finds them wanting. It discusses proposed compromise solutions involving efforts aimed at testing the genuineness and reasonability of refusals and rejects those solutions too. A number of jurisdictions have introduced policies requiring conscientious refusers to provide effective referrals. These policies have (...) turned out to be unworkable. They subject patients to a health care delivery lottery, which is incompatible with the fundamental values of medical professionalism. This paper sheds light on transnational efforts aimed at undermining progress made in reproductive health by means of conscientious refusal accommodation claims. The view that the accommodation of conscientious refusers is indefensible on consequentialist ethical grounds, as well as on grounds related to medical professionalism itself, is defended. (shrink)

This essay first describes the distinctively American character of the life and thought of Josiah Royce, conceiving of Royce as equal parts Puritan and pioneer. Next, the author’s recent experience teaching Royce’s philosophy of loyalty in China is discussed, highlighting pedagogical challenges encountered and techniques employed to navigate these hurdles. A summary of Royce’s philosophy of loyalty is given, incorporating examples used in the classroom. It is shown that upon applying Royce’s philosophy of loyalty to real life situations, resonances between (...) classical Chinese (Confucian) and classical American moral philosophies emerge. It is argued that Royce’s philosophy of loyalty cuts across cultural lines, serving as a viable and valuable theoretical resource for negotiating contemporary moral dilemmas, irrespective of geographical location. (shrink)

"What can guilt, the painful sting of the bad conscience, tell us about who we are as human beings? Being Guilty seeks to answer this question through an examination of the views of Kant, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Paul Rée, Nietzsche, and Heidegger on guilt, freedom, responsibility, and conscience. The concept of guilt has not received sufficient attention from scholars of the history of German philosophy. Being Guilty addresses this lacuna and shows how the philosophers' arguments can be more deeply (...) grasped once read in their historical context. A main claim of the book is that this history could be read as proceeding dialectically. Thus, in Kant, Schelling, and Schopenhauer, we find variations on the idea that guilt is justified because the human agent is a free cause of his or her own being-a causa sui-and thus responsible for his or her "ontological guilt." In contrast, in Rée and Nietzsche these ideas are rejected and the conclusion is reached that guilt is not justified, but is explainable psychologically. Finally, in Heidegger we find a synthesis of sorts, where the idea of causa sui is rejected, but ontological guilt is retained and guilt is seen as possible, because for Heidegger a condition of possibility of guilt is that we are ontologically guilty yet not causa sui. In the process of unfolding this trajectory, the various philosophers' views on these and many other issues are examined in detail"--. (shrink)

This slender volume contains a rapid sketch of the development of the notions of conscience and synderesis in medieval thought. Its timeliness is vouched for by the fact that conscience, to which appeal is so often made today, has not been thus far a major theme of modern philosophy. Much of the book's information is quarried from O. Lottin's classic study, Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, whose findings have been restated in terms that are meant (...) to be "psychologically" accessible to the modern mind. The Preface calls attention to the undue neglect of medieval philosophy on the part of twentieth-century thinkers, many of whom still cling to the view that philosophy died with Aristotle and came to life again only with Descartes. It also laments the "party spirit" that once tended to characterize the Neo-Scholastic movement, as well as the one-sided emphasis on Thomas Aquinas within that movement. Potts has accordingly sought to broaden the scope of his inquiry by taking into consideration five widely different authors through whose writings one begins to glimpse the subtlety of the medieval teaching on this important topic: Jerome, who introduced the word "synderesis" into the debate ; Peter Lombard, whose Sentences provided the mandatory point of departure for all subsequent discussions of the subject; Philip the Chancellor, the author of the first medieval treatise on conscience; and, finally, Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas, two of the writers who contributed most significantly to the further elaboration of the doctrine. By the author's own admission, numerous other theologians, whose names are listed in an appendix, could have been included in the roster or substituted for the ones that are included. The book is divided into two even parts, the first of which presents an analysis of the thought of each of the five theologians mentioned, and the second a selection of representative texts from their works. For the convenience of teachers, a "programme for a medieval-philosophy course on conscience" has been added under Appendix 2. (shrink)

Conscience is an idea that has significant currency in liberal democratic societies. Yet contemporary moral philosophical scholarship on conscience is surprisingly sparse. This paper seeks to offer a rigorous philosophical account of the role of conscience in moral life with a view to informing debates about the ethics of conscientious objection in medicine. I argue that conscience is concerned with a commitment to moral integrity and that restrictions on freedom of conscience prevent agents from living (...) a moral life. In section one I argue that conscience is a principle of moral awareness in rational agents, and that it yields an awareness of the personal nature of moral obligation. Conscience also monitors the coherence between an agent’s identity-conferring beliefs and intentions and their practical actions. In section two I consider how human beings are harmed when they are forced to violate their conscience. Restrictions on the exercise of conscience prevent people from living in accord with their own considered understanding of the requirements of morality and undermine one’s capacity for moral agency. This article concludes with a consideration of how a robust theory of conscience can inform our understanding of conscientious objection in medicine. I argue that it is in the interest of individual practitioners and the medical profession generally to foster moral agency among doctors. This provides a prima facie justification for permitting at least some kinds of conscientious objection. (shrink)