This article investigates the question why even the existence of “moral conscience” became regarded with serious doubts among radical eighteenth-century French philosophes La Mettrie, d’Holbach, Diderot, and Voltaire, from the vantage point of conceptual history. The philosophes’ stance of regarding moral conscience only as a name for certain acquired prejudices both fails to engage with the conception of moral conscience upheld by their theistic opponents and stands in a sharp contrast to the moral thought of Protestant reformation, (...) which – less than two centuries earlier – had elevated moral conscience to a position of an infallible moral authority. The article argues, however, that, in spite of the opposition between these two conceptions of conscience, they might be connected, and that the former might have even been a consequence of the latter. It will be shown that the pre-Reformation conception of moral conscience, crystallized in Aquinas, presents it being based on our natural attraction to “the human good”. However, as this conception was not created by medieval theologians, but was inherited from non-theistic ancient philosophy, in principle it would have been as compatible with the deistic and atheistic worldviews of the philosophes as the other ancient philosophical concepts, such as “the human good” and “human nature”, that the philosophes continued using in their original, teleological senses. Having presented a brief overview of the history of moral conscience, the article proceeds to show how the Protestant reformers removed the attraction to the human good from moral conscience while making its normative guidance infallible. The article will suggest that, due to the prevalence of this, exclusively theological, conception of moral conscience in the intellectual environment shaped by Protestantism, several British thinkers of the seventeenth century, including Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, who could not endorse the theological aspects of moral conscience, gradually reduced it into a mere acquired “sentiment”. As their philosophy was a major influence on the philosophes, the article concludes that the loss of a rational justification for moral conscience in the works of the British philosophers could have also been what motivated the philosophes to question moral conscience. (shrink)

Background -- The moral manualists -- Initiating reform : Odon Lottin -- Retrieving Scripture and charity : Fritz Tillman and Gérard Gilleman -- Synthesis : Bernard Häring -- The neo-manualists -- New foundations for moral reasoning, 1970-89 -- New foundations for a theological anthropology, 1980-2000 -- Toward a global discourse on suffering and solidarity -- Afterword: The encyclicals of Pope Benedict XVI.

ABSTRACTThis chapter looks briefly at the religious roots of the notion of ‘conscience’ in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, before examining the rise in the early-modern period of a ‘naturalizing’ approach that tries to explain our moral capacities in purely empirical terms, by reference to our natural inclinations and drives. The problem with this approach, highlighted by Joseph Butler, is that it fails to account for the authority or ‘normativity’ of the deliverances of conscience. An examination of the naturalistic approaches (...) of J.S. Mill, Charles Darwin and Sigmund Freud shows that none of them manages to escape the difficulty. It is suggested in conclusion that only a traditional theistic framework may be adequate for doing justice to the role of conscience in our lives. (shrink)

This authoritative study explores the relation of John Henry Newman's idea of conscience to what he called conscience "in the ordinary sense of the word." Grave argues that a proper understanding of this distinction is essential to a satisfactory understanding of Newman's thought wherever the notion of conscience enters into it. He examines some neglected difficulties in this area such as the relation between individual conscience and the authority of the church, and the matter of rights (...) of conscience. (shrink)

Conscience is an idea that has significant currency in liberal democratic societies. Yet contemporary moral philosophical scholarship on conscience is surprisingly sparse. This paper seeks to offer a rigorous philosophical account of the role of conscience in moral life with a view to informing debates about the ethics of conscientious objection in medicine. I argue that conscience is concerned with a commitment to moral integrity and that restrictions on freedom of conscience prevent agents from living (...) a moral life. In section one I argue that conscience is a principle of moral awareness in rational agents, and that it yields an awareness of the personal nature of moral obligation. Conscience also monitors the coherence between an agent’s identity-conferring beliefs and intentions and their practical actions. In section two I consider how human beings are harmed when they are forced to violate their conscience. Restrictions on the exercise of conscience prevent people from living in accord with their own considered understanding of the requirements of morality and undermine one’s capacity for moral agency. This article concludes with a consideration of how a robust theory of conscience can inform our understanding of conscientious objection in medicine. I argue that it is in the interest of individual practitioners and the medical profession generally to foster moral agency among doctors. This provides a prima facie justification for permitting at least some kinds of conscientious objection. (shrink)

The issue of conscience and authority has long been on the agenda of moral philosophy. In particular, the views of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes came to the fore when there was freedom of religion and conscience. Their views continue to influence the moral philosophers of today's world. In terms of organizing and maintaining individual and social relationships, different perspectives from past to present have been made possible by taking into account the common life practices. In today's world, (...) the social configurations that have changed compared to the past and the problems arising from the encounter of different ethnic and social groups have caused re-emergence of solidarity in a common theme. The concept of cultural relativism, which is one of these common themes, refers to the evaluation of exposed judgments within the internal dynamics of culture. On the other hand, shaping of universal human rights and social solidarity on an intercultural ground makes the existence of an additional theme inevitable in terms of harmony and sustainability: conscience. Conscience is related to the commonization of the common living commitments and being in solidarity in sustaining social relations. Predicating the relations to be formed on the basis of conscience upon an essentialist foundation does not run parallel to the continuous reshaping of solidarity in practical life. In the absence of essentialist truths, and outside the original ethnic relativity, a new and sustainable togetherness starts to be shaped within these practices. Therefore, one of the themes that will spring to mind will be the values education. There are studies that include the answers given to the questions that come to mind about the theoretical possibilities of this and the determination and interpretation of the values already positioned in the practical structures. (shrink)

Conscience-based refusals by health care professionals to provide care to eligible patients are problematic, given the monopoly such professionals hold on the provision of such services. This article reviews standard ethical arguments in support of conscientious refuser accommodation and finds them wanting. It discusses proposed compromise solutions involving efforts aimed at testing the genuineness and reasonability of refusals and rejects those solutions too. A number of jurisdictions have introduced policies requiring conscientious refusers to provide effective referrals. These policies have (...) turned out to be unworkable. They subject patients to a health care delivery lottery, which is incompatible with the fundamental values of medical professionalism. This paper sheds light on transnational efforts aimed at undermining progress made in reproductive health by means of conscientious refusal accommodation claims. The view that the accommodation of conscientious refusers is indefensible on consequentialist ethical grounds, as well as on grounds related to medical professionalism itself, is defended. (shrink)

This examination of a fundamental but often neglected aspect of the intellectual history of early modern Europe brings together philosophers, historians and political theorists from Great Britain, Canada, the United States, Australia, France and Germany. Despite the diversity of disciplines and national traditions represented, the individual contributions show a remarkable convergence around three themes: changes in the modes of moral education in early modern Europe, the emergence of new relations between conscience and law (particularly the law of the state), (...) and the shared continuities and discontinuities of both Roman Catholic and Protestant moral culture in relation to their medieval past. (shrink)

Mamardašvili did not develop a systematic philosophy that treats separately the various traditional disciplines of philosophy such as epistemology, logic, ethics, aesthetics etc. On the contrary, isolated from the direct influences of other currents of thought that might otherwise have given his own a different direction, Mamardašvili concentrated his attention on the very act of thought, the vitality of which had been undermined in philosophical understandings, including both Hegelian-Marxist attempts to situate the subject in history and re-appropriations of the Cartesian (...) cogito. In this paper I will outline the most pertinent elements of Mamardašvili’s attempt to find a unified subject of knowledge and action and attempt to show how in his view consciousness and conscience are indissoluble. (shrink)

Conscience is an early phenomenon in everyone's life, but a philosophic knowledge of it is altogether different. Mr. Witte presents this exposition of a knotty subject to MODERN SCHOOLMAN readers.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 65.3 (2004) 455-474 [Access article in PDF] "Conscience the Ground of Consciousness": The Moral Epistemology of Coleridge's Aids to Reflection Jeffrey Hipolito Everett Community College. It will hardly come as a shock to the readers of this journal that Kant has been the philosophical gatekeeper of all those who have come after him and that the scale of his achievement was recognized (...) even by his immediate peers and the generation which followed them.1 It may be rather more surprising that Samuel Taylor Coleridge belongs among the most interesting members of that second generation, comparable to Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Hegel in the originality of his response—not because of the Biographia Literaria (1817), the book for which he is now most famous, but because of the stream of work that followed the publication of the revised Friend (1818). Though the Collected Coleridge project has made available a mass of previously unpublished material, which in turn has stimulated a great deal of interesting research, one must still agree with Elinor Shaffer's recent assessment that "we have no accurate or adequate conception of the late Coleridge from 1819 to his death in 1834."2 Shaffer's range of dates is not accidental, indicating that the revised [End Page 455] Friend (and, more specifically, the break with Schelling) marks the beginning of the "late" Coleridge. In the "Essays on Method" that were a part of the revised Friend (1818) Coleridge effectively freed himself of Schelling's Idealism, which is so notoriously crucial to philosophical chapters of the Biographia, by moving away from the latter's metaphysics of the Absolute towards a metaphysics grounded in an ongoing and in principle unending exploration of "inquiry" itself.3 Though it did not appear until 1825, Aids to Reflection was the first book published by Coleridge following the revised Friend. It was his most popular and influential work during the nineteenth century, but it has been read almost exclusively in strictly theological terms. The implicit contention that the "middle" Coleridge of the Biographia was philosophical and that the "late," post-Biographia Coleridge turned to theology as a refuge from the Biographia's failure was ratified by Thomas McFarland's classic argument concerning the late Coleridge's "trinitarian resolution" to the problems that the middle Coleridge could not solve.4 One pernicious effect of this view (which is more nuanced than I have presented it here) is that until fairly recently it was still possible to describe Aids to Reflection as simply "an effort to argue away the terrifying import of The Ancient Mariner, which would lead us, since it jars our moral feelings, to hatred of God."5I argue in this essay that although Aids to Reflection employs theological vocabulary it is more than—indeed, cannot rightly be considered—an exercise in dogmatic Christian apologetics. More specifically, I will show that the book includes a vigorous engagement with Kant's moral philosophy not primarily by undercutting the metaphysical basis of the critical project's architectonic, though this is an ancillary effect, but by putting pressure on the model of judgment that underlies Kantian ethics.The importance of Kant to Coleridge's intellectual development is not a secret. Coleridge himself describes the way Kant "took possession of me as [End Page 456] with a giant's hand," though he confesses he "could never believe it was possible for him to have meant no more by his Noumenon, or THING IN ITSELF, than his mere words express" and that he even "entertained doubts likewise, whether in his own mind, he even laid all the stress, which he appears to do on the moral postulates."6 Kant's impact on Coleridge was primarily due to his status as a logician and a moral philosopher. Thus Coleridge contends in a letter of 1820 that "Kant will demonstrate to you, that this [Christian] Faith is... grounded on Postulates authorized & substantiated solely by the Moral Being,"7 and adds in another letter five years later that he... (shrink)

Linda Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory takes as its foundation “exemplars of goodness identified directly by the emotion of admiration.” This paper’s basic question is whether Zagzebski’s trust in the emotion of admiration is well-founded. In other words, do we have good reason to trust that those we admire on conscientious reflection warrant our admiration, such that we will not be led astray? The paper’s thesis is that Zagzebski’s theory would be stronger with a more fully developed account of conscience. (...) The paper outlines and discusses Zagzebski’s theory, articulates the epistemic challenge that the theory confronts, and proposes a sketch of an account of conscience that supplements Zagzebski’s account of conscientiousness. (shrink)

In an era of confessional conflict, the conscience served as a powerful mediator between God and man, directing and judging moral actions. This work aims to convey the breadth of the conscience's jurisdiction, analyzing its impact upon a variety of important aspects of early modern society: political allegiance the genre of "advice to princes" religious conformity slavery the regulation of sexual behavior gender roles and the intellectual methods of scientists.

The body of this paper is devoted to tracing out some aspects of the development of the idea of conscience in the Church of England in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Surely, it may seem, a subject of limited interest to the readers of this journal! Yet I hope they will find otherwise. I chose to describe this phase of the history of conscience in the West because it illustrates a decisive shift in ideas about (...) class='Hi'>conscience which has occurred in many Western cultures besides England's: the belief that the individual ought in many cases to seek the aid of others in forming his moral judgments gives way to the belief that he ought to be self‐reliant in such matters. A knowledge of this shift can advance the philosophical understanding of the idea of conscience and the work to be done in the comparative study of conscience ‘East‘and ‘West.'. (shrink)

Quelle lumière l'idée d'athéisme et la figure de l'athée jettent-elle sur les concepts de tolérance, de liberté de conscience et de laïcité? Pour répondre à cette question, cet ouvrage fait le choix d'éclairer le présent par une perspective historique, en analysant la manière dont l'athéisme est apparu et s'est développé dans le questionnement théologico-politique et philosophique depuis le XVIIe siècle."--Page 4 of cover.

In Remnants of Auschwitz, Giorgio Agamben argues that every ethical doctrine that claims to be founded on the notions of responsibility and guilt, even if ‘interiorized and moved outside law’ in the form of moral conscience, is necessarily ‘insufficient and opaque’. Indeed, one of the basic intents of the book is to profane and to neutralize the notions of guilt and responsibility as the paradigms of ethical thought, and to remove the idea of conscience from the sphere of (...) ethics. In this article, my aim is to bring out some ‘opacities’ that occur in Agamben’s own analyses. To Agamben, the ‘witness-remnant’ is an ethical notion that shows the way beyond the interiorized juridical categories of conscience, whereas I argue that both the witness and the remnant are notions intimately and even inseparably linked with the western history of conscience. Conscience has been a witness from the very beginning of its appearance in the classical period of Greece. In the Christian era, moreover, conscience became a remnant, even the remnant, remaining of the original moral integrity that had been lost by humankind in the Fall. At the end of the article, I argue that instead of succeeding in profaning the theological/ juridical notion of conscience, Agamben’s ‘witness-remnant’ merely secularizes it in the Schmittian sense. (shrink)

It is argued that, in reworking the sentimentalist tradition of Hutcheson and Hume, Smith endeavours to tackle some of its main problems, i.e. the weakness of the foundation it provides for moral duty and its possible reduction of moral beliefs to subjective feelings. Smith addresses these problems by recovering, through his doctrine of the impartial spectator, the traditional notion of conscience, which had been given a secondary role by Hutcheson and had been entirely dropped by Hume. It is argued (...) that, in so doing, Smith reconnects to Butler’s reflection on the authority of conscience. However, Smith offers an original account of the genesis of conscience, and of its normative power, and insists much more on the role of general norms of justice. (shrink)

Moral moments -- The neurotic and the penitent -- True, false, and feigned penance -- Fame without conscience -- Cain and conscience -- Feminine paradoxes -- Sincere hypocrisy -- The poetical consience -- Envoi : spiritual sophistry.

In a seventeenth-century English landscape populated with towering political and philosophical figures like Hobbes, Harrington, Cromwell, Milton, and Locke, William Penn remains in many ways a man apart. Yet despite being widely neglected by scholars, he was a sophisticated political thinker who contributed mightily to the theory and practice of religious liberty in the early modern Atlantic world. In this long-awaited intellectual biography of William Penn, Andrew R. Murphy presents a nuanced portrait of this remarkable entrepreneur, philosopher, Quaker, and politician.Liberty, (...) Conscience, and Toleration focuses on the major political episodes that attracted William Penn's sustained attention as a political thinker and actor: the controversy over the Second Conventicle Act, the Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis, the founding and settlement of Pennsylvania, and the contentious reign of James II. Through a careful examination of writings published in the midst of the religious and political conflicts of Restoration and Revolutionary England, Murphy contextualizes the development of Penn's thought in England and America, illuminating the mutual interconnections between Penn's political thought and his colonizing venture in America. An early advocate of representative institutions and religious freedom, William Penn remains a singular figure in the history of liberty of conscience. His political theorizing provides a window into the increasingly vocal, organized, and philosophically sophisticated tolerationist movement that gained strength over the second half of the seventeenth century. Not only did Penn attempt to articulate principles of religious liberty as a Quaker in England, but he actually governed an American polity and experienced firsthand the complex relationship between political theory and political practice. Murphy's insightful analysis shows Penn's ongoing significance to the broader study of Anglo-American political theory and practice, ultimately pointing scholars toward a new way of understanding the enterprise of political theory itself. (shrink)

Conscience rests within the heart of equity, yet it is a manifestly nebulous and contradictory concept. In particular, equity has never been clear about exactly whose conscience we are concerned with: the Chancellor or judge, or the court, or the defendant? Furthermore, in some lights conscience appears to compel obedience to the authority of law, whilst in others it gives expression to ethical drives that escape the formal strictures of legal rules. Contextualised within the broader history of (...) ideas of Western modernity, this article sets out to understand the rhetorical significance of conscience in equity, making the argument that its disparate and contradictory modes of expression do not undermine its significance, and instead are essential to its construction of juridical obligations. By invoking conscience as a contradictory expression of both vertical state authority and personal ethical autonomy, equity asserts not only a unique normative structure, but also a distinct mode of power. (shrink)

This chapter begins by tracing the development of the notion of conscience in the Western philosophical tradition and then addresses questions regarding the supposed authority or normativity of conscience. The relation between the idea of conscience and the notions of guilt and shame is examined, which in turn leads on to the question of whether the concepts of guilt and shame inhabit essentially different ethical landscapes. The chapter concludes by looking at the contribution of psychoanalytic thinking to (...) our modern understanding of the phenomena of conscience, guilt and shame, and by asking why the resulting insights have been so imperfectly assimilated into contemporary anglophone moral philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Conscience and Calling: Ethical Reflections on Catholic Women's Church Vocations by Anne E. PatrickMary M. Doyle RocheConscience and Calling: Ethical Reflections on Catholic Women's Church Vocations Anne E. Patrick NEW YORK AND LONDON: BLOOMSBURY T&T CLARK, 2013. 197 PP. $24.95In Conscience and Calling, Anne Patrick weaves together insights into women's moral agency, vocational discernment, and historical narratives of religious women's engagement with clerical authority. Taking up (...) James Gustafson's question, "What is God enabling and requiring us to be and to do?" she offers a nuanced view of virtuous discernment and action in the context of the "ecclesial oppression" of women. Patrick asks, "What is correct 'church practice' for female moral agents in view of the institutionalized injustice toward women in Catholicism?" (59).Chapter 1 begins with cases of conflict between women's religious congregations and clerical leadership. In the first case, Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary protested intolerable living conditions at a parish in Brooklyn, New [End Page 201] York, in 1939. When repeated requests for heat fell on the pastor's deaf ears, the sisters requested to leave the parish and were told that they would then also have to leave another thriving ministry in the diocese. The sisters acquiesced to this decision in a spirit of obedience and did not publicize the real reason for their departure. Fifty years later in Miami, Florida, when another conflict arose, the sisters involved discerned a very different response to injustice, one marked by concern for "justice, honesty, and personal responsibility." The model of a "good sister" had shifted from an emphasis on obedience and institutional loyalty toward shared responsibility for ministry and leadership.Chapter 2 surveys the landscape of women's engagement with the Church and its structures of leadership and adapts H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture to sketch five "types": women against the Church; women content with the Church; women above the Church; women and Church in paradox; and women transforming Church. Patrick proposes the transformationist model as the approach that most adequately meets the challenges that women face in the Church today; she calls on those who adopt this approach to live in creative tension with the Church and with those who follow the other models, to espouse justice and mutuality in organizational structures, and to be self-critical. Chapter 3 recounts the history of the National Assembly of Religious Women through this transformational lens.Chapter 4 proposes a "framework for love" that builds on Margaret Farley's ethic of commitment to envision an ethic of vocation that elicits "active receptivity," values the contributions of institutions, practices egalitarianism, and keeps justice and love in dialectical relationship. The "myth" of vocation (the notion that vocation is a "thing" to be discovered and pursued, like one's destiny or soul mate) is balanced by the "mystery" of vocation that engages ongoing, lifelong discernment. Controversial cases involving women religious illustrate this kind of discernment and women's striving to live justly and faithfully. The final chapter, "Vocation in a Transformed Social Context," recounts the Vatican Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith's visitation of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious, a case that has changed the landscape for women's discernment once again. Patrick calls the Church to live out its rhetorical commitment to the dignity of women by opening all church ministries so that women might serve and lead.Conscience and Calling tells an important story about how women religious have discerned the signs of the times and imagined new vocations in the Church and the world. Though the focus here is on women in the American Catholic Church, Patrick's contribution should pave the way for sharing religious women's stories in the global context to further enrich a Christian vision of virtue and vocation for those navigating ecclesial politics and practicing ministry in particular. [End Page 202]Mary M. Doyle RocheCollege of the Holy CrossCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Through Narcissus' Glass Darkly presents a genealogy and critique of the ideal of conscience in modern philosophical theology, particularly in the writings of ...

A survey of twentieth-century Catholic moral theology with an overarching argument against conscience-centered Christian ethics.

In "Confronting the Truth", Hogan gives readers a balanced, clearly written examination of conscience in the Catholic tradition.

Humans experience a profound and indescribable emotion when they unearth artifacts from ancient times. Scientific disciplines like paleontology and archaeology reflect our curiosity and desire to understand the natural world’s past and evolutionary history. Physics also invests significant effort in exploring the origin and evolution of the universe. In social life, the study field of humanities also has journals about art history, such as the Art History or Journal of Art History. Through our shared thoughts and efforts to restore humanities (...) for the cause of ecological and biological conservation, we have discovered a picture of a kingfisher taken nearly a century ago by A. F. Skutch in The Condor. Obtaining such a vivid, genuine, and emotionally evocative image was no easy task. This image has the power to stir the thoughts and awaken the conscience of the viewer, emphasizing the importance of a vibrant environment. (shrink)

Comment et en quoi la réflexion sur la théorie de l'Histoire et de l'État de Hegel peut-elle éclairer les peuples africains et leurs États, aujourd'hui plongés dans une crise profonde? Cet ouvrage aborde de manière systématique et critique la pensée hégélienne de l'histoire et de l'État en y faisant ressortir les enseignements qui peuvent aider les peuples africains et leurs États à la réinvention de leur conscience historique et à la construction d'une destinée libératrice. Il intéressera non seulement les (...) professeurs, les étudiants en philosophie de l'Histoire, philosophie du droit et philosophie politique, mais également, de manière plus large, tous ceux - politologues, juristes, historiens, etc. - qui peuvent être intéressés par la pensée de Hegel et soucieux d'un changement démocratique dans les États africains."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Hegel’s conception of Spirit does not subordinate difference to sameness, in a way that would make it unusable for a genuinely intersubjective idealism directed to a comprehensive account of the contemporary world. A close analysis of the logic of recognition and the dialectic of conscience in the Phenomenology of Spirit demonstrates that the unity of Spirit emerges in and through conflict, and is forged in the process whereby particular encounters between differently situated individuals reveal and establish the emerging character (...) and significance of the stances they uniquely occupy. (shrink)

Cet article étudie le rapport particulier établi par Plotin entre deux notions, l’antilêpsis et la phantasia, pour penser la prise de conscience par l’âme de certains «objets» et de certaines activités. Car celle-ci pose un problème que Plotin a formulé clairement, à la fin du traité 10 (V, 1), sans lui trouver encore de solution absolument satisfaisante. Si l’antilêpsis a besoin de la phantasia pour s’exercer, peut-il en être de même pour les activités supérieures de l’âme dont elle voudrait (...) prendre conscience, puisque la phantasia se rattache à la sensation dont elle est issue? La question est alors de savoir si les réalités supérieures échappent à toute conscience ou si cette dernière peut les saisir, au moins sous la forme qui lui est propre. On cherchera ici à exposer les aspects principaux de ce problème, mais surtout, à partir de textes tirés des traités 27 (IV, 3) et 46 (I, 4), à saisir la solution que Plotin lui apporte. (shrink)

Review of book on the nature of conscience and history of development of ideas about it.

The intention of this essay does not, I fear, readily fit into any of the previous categories of ethical or moral philosophy. I am not concerned here with the Good, with values, or with the question of their recognition, foundation, and justification; nor am I concerned with duties and virtues. The linguistic and/or logical structure of ethical judgments, too, is outside my subject, as is the problem of Free Will.

From Abraham to Abu Ghraib, from the dissenting prophets to Darfur, he probes history, the Bible and the works of contemporary thinkers for ideas about both ...

ABSTRACT The article examines Old English claims to catholic ‘liberty of conscience’ and the way in which this engendered a discussion of English liberties in Ireland. Old English representatives sought to ground their claims to ‘liberty of conscience’ in established practice, custom and law. Their claims to ‘liberty of conscience’ also brought into play the vocabulary of corporate and parliamentary liberty. In response, New English protestants turned to ideas of duty and citizenship, which were equally embedded in (...) conceptions of English liberties. They argued that a catholic ‘conscience’ sat in opposition to ideas of duty to the king and the commonwealth. In doing so, the New English questioned both the basis and extent of the liberties possessed by the Old English. Such an exchange, this article argues, is illustrative of the way in which an English pairing of liberties, with ideas of duty and active citizenship, opened up an area of dispute involving a shared set of political concepts and vocabulary. (shrink)

An innovative and original study of the history, moral phenomenology and reliability of the concept of conscience.

: The film "Who Should Survive?: One of the Choices on Our Conscience" contains a dramatization of the death of an infant with Down syndrome as the result of the parents' decision not to have a congenital intestinal obstruction surgically corrected. The dramatization was based on two similar cases at The Johns Hopkins Hospital and was financed by the Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., Foundation. When "Who Should Survive?" was exhibited in 1971, the public reaction was generally critical of the (...) parents' decision and the physicians' inaction. Although technological developments in medicine were a necessary condition for the production of this film and its unanticipated reception, they were not a sufficient condition. The proximate cause was a changed understanding of the capabilities of individuals with Down syndrome. Part of the impetus for this change was data showing the adverse effects of institutionalization on normal children. (shrink)

First in the Phenomenology and then in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel rejects Fichte’s notion of conscience on the grounds that it leads to despair (since the agent can never be sufficiently well-informed to know that he is doing the “right” thing). He also criticizes Fichtean conscience as purely “formal” and “abstract” and compatible with any content, which it can obtain only arbitrarily from the manifold of one’s natural drives and inclinations. For Hegel, there is (...) an unresolvable tension between the claimed “universality” of a conscientious deed and the natural particularity of every moral agent, which ultimately leads to ethical egoism and hypocrisy. The aim of this paper is to show, first, that Hegel misrepresents key aspects of Fichte’s position and, second, that Fichte possesses the resources to respond successfully to most of Hegel’s criticisms. In order to grasp this one must closely examine Fichte’s subtle and often misunderstand account of moral deliberation and conscientious decision-making and the relation of the same to his larger account of I-hood. (shrink)

Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) fut directement impliqué dans presque tous les grands débats philosophiques en Allemagne au tournant du XIXe et du XXe siècle : sur le rapport entre psychologie et logique, sur les conditions transcendantales de la conscience de soi, sur l'historicité de l'existence humaine, sur l'herméneutique et la question du sens, sur la philosophie de la compréhension ou encore sur la signification philosophique de la vie (de l'existence) et des valeurs. Certains de ces débats, notamment celui sur l'autonomie (...) cognitive des sciences humaines, ont été inaugurés par Dilthey lui-même. L'une des problématiques où un nouveau dialogue avec sa pensée pourrait se nouer aujourd'hui serait sans aucun doute, précisément, la question de la possibilité de la réconciliation des études objectives de l'histoire avec l'expérience que l'homme fait de l'historicité radicale de sa compréhension. En effet, Dilthey n'accepte pas que l'homme puisse se dérober à sa responsabilité face à l'histoire sous prétexte que l'histoire, elle, s'est déjà dérobée à sa compréhension. Tout au contraire : c'est parce qu'il en est responsable que l'homme ne peut se dérober à la compréhension de l'histoire, même si le chemin de la compréhension est long et pénible. (shrink)