Composition is Identity is the thesis that a whole is, strict and literally, its parts considered collectively. Mereological Nihilism is the thesis that there are no composite objects whatsoever instead. This paper argues that they are equivalent, at least insofar as Composition is Identity is phrased in a particular way. It then addresses some consequences of such equivalence.

This paper provides new arguments for the following claim: either strong composition as identity cannot retain the full strength of both the logical principles of one-one identity and its semantical principles or it only delivers cases of boring composition in that it entails mereological nihilism.

In this paper, we focus on two related reductive theses in metaphysics—Humean Supervenience and Composition as Identity—and on their status in light of the indications coming from science, in particular quantum mechanics. While defenders of these reductive theses claim that they can be updated so as to resist the quantum evidence, we provide arguments against this contention. We claim that physics gives us reason for thinking that both Humean Supervenience and Composition as Identity are at least contingently false, as the (...) very process of composition determines, at least in some cases, the nature of composed systems. The argument has essentially to do with the fact that denying the reductive theses in question allows one to provide better explanations for the quantum evidence. (shrink)

For fifty years the philosophy of language has been experiencing a stalemating conflict between the old descriptive and internalist orthodoxy (advocated by philosophers such as Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Strawson, and Searle) and the new causal-referential and externalist orthodoxy (mainly endorsed by Kripke, Putnam, and Kaplan). Although the latter is dominant among specialists, the former retains a discomforting intuitive plausibility. The ultimate goal of this book is to overcome the stalemate by means of a non-naïve return to the old descriptivist-internalist orthodoxy. (...) Concerning proper names, this means introducing second-order description-rules capable of systemizing descriptions of the proper name’s cluster to provide us with the right changeable conditions of satisfaction for its application. Such rules can explain how a proper name can become a rigid designator while remaining descriptive, disarming Kripke's and Donnellan’s main objections. In the last chapter, this new perspective is extended to indexicals in a discussion of David Kaplan’s and John Perry’s views, and of general terms, in a discussion of Hilary Putnam’s externalism. (shrink)

Both extended simples and unextended complexes have been extensively discussed and widely used in metaphysics and philosophy of physics. However, the characterizations of such notions are not entirely satisfactory inasmuch as they rely on a mereological notion of extension that is too simplistic. According to such a mereological notion, being extended boils down to having a mereologically complex exact location. In this paper, I make a detailed plea to supplement this notion of extension with a different one that is phrased (...) in terms of measure theory. This proposal has significant philosophical payoffs. I provide new characterizations of both extended simples and unextended complexes, that help re-evaluating the question of whether such entities are metaphysically possible. Finally, I advance several suggestions as to how different notions of extension relate, first, to one another and, second, to mereological structure. (shrink)

This paper provides the first thorough assessment of a physics-based answer, the Bound State Answer, to the Special Composition Question. According to the BSA some objects compose something if they are in a common bound state. The reasons to endorse such an answer, in particular, motivations coming from empirical adequacy and conservativeness, precision, simplicity, and parsimony, are critically addressed. I then go on to compare the BSA to other moderate answers to the SCQ and consider whether objections raised against such (...) answers can be raised against the BSA as well. I finally relate the discussion with mereological pluralism. (shrink)

Resumen: El artículo busca observar el hecho religioso mapuche, a partir de la reflexión de Rudolf Otto respecto de lo numinoso y lo santo. Para ello se utiliza su metodología de análisis fenomenológico aplicada a los conceptos de mysterium, tremendum y fascinans o las dimensiones del temor, incorporadas en la cultura mapuche. Se concluye que el análisis de estos diversos momentos de la experiencia santo-numinoso en la vida religiosa del mapuche, permite constatar el dinamismo existente en la idea religiosa del (...) mapuche, lo que a su vez representa adecuadamente la relación entre el hombre religioso y lo santo.: This article seeks to observe the Mapuche religious fact, starting from Rudolf Otto’s reflection on the numinous and the holy. For this, it uses its methodology of phenomenological analysis applied to the concepts of mysterium, tremendum and fascinans or the dimensions of fear, incorporated in the Mapuche culture. It is concluded that the analysis of these different moments of the saint-numinous experience in the religious life of the mapuche, allows to verify the dynamism existing in the religious idea of ​​the mapuche, which in turn represents adequately the relationship between religious man and the Holy. (shrink)

The paper addresses various questions about the logical and metaphysical relations between notions of parthood, location and persistence. In particular it argues that the conjunction of mereological extensionalism and multilocation, is highly problematic, if not utterly inconsistent. It thus provides an alternate route to reject multilocation, one that does not rely on Barker and Dowe's well known argument, at least for those who endorse extensionality of parthood. It then argues that other major metaphysical theses such as three-dimensionalism turn out to (...) be at odds with extensionalism. (shrink)

Discussions about determinables and determinates, on the one hand, and discussions about (formal) theories of location, on the other, have thus far proceeded without any visible interaction, in substantive mutual neglect. This paper aims to remedy this situation of neglect. It explicitly relates (theories of) determinables and (theories of) location. First, I argue that some well known principles of location turn out to be instances of principles relating determinables and determinates. Building on this I then argue that theories of location (...) present formidable counterexamples to those principles about determinables and determinates. One such counterexample in particular is used as an argument against disjunctivism. Finally, I relate the entire discussion to yet another crucial debate in metaphysics, that of metaphysical indeterminacy. (shrink)

This is a brief sequel to Max Black 's classic dialogue on the Identity of Indiscernibles. Interlocutor A defends the bundle theory by endorsing the view according to which Black 's world does not contain two indiscernible spheres but rather a single, bi-located sphere. His opponent, B, objects that A cannot distinguish such a world from a world with a single, uniquely located sphere, hence that the view in question adds nothing to A's original response to Black 's challenge. A (...) is simply denying that there can be worlds with two or more indiscernible entities. (shrink)

According to the Determinable Based Account of metaphysical indeterminacy, there is MI when there is an indeterminate state of affairs, roughly a state of affairs in which a constituent object x has a determinable property but fails to have a unique determinate of that determinable. There are different ways in which x might have a determinable but no unique determinate: x has no determinate—gappy MI, or x has more than one determinate—glutty MI. Talk of determinables and determinates is usually constructed (...) as relative to levels of determination. In this paper I first provide a formal construction for determinables and determinates that pays crucial attention to intermediate levels of determination, and then explore the consequences for the DBA of introducing such intermediate levels. In particular, I argue that intermediate levels of determination highlight crucial differences between gappy and glutty cases of MI, and allow one to introduce a third way of indeterminacy, glappy MI. (shrink)

David Lewis famously endorsed Unrestricted Composition. His defense of such a controversial principle builds on the alleged innocence of mereology. This innocence defense has come under different attacks in the last decades. In this paper I pursue another line of defense, that stems from some early remarks by van Inwagen. I argue that Unrestricted Composition leads to a better metaphysics. In particular I provide new arguments for the following claims: Unrestricted Composition entails extensionality of composition, functionality of location and four-dimensionalism (...) in the metaphysics of persistence. Its endorsement yields an impressively coherent and powerful metaphysical picture. This picture shows a universe that might not be innocent but it is certainly elegant. (shrink)

Composition as Identity is the thesis that a whole is, strictly and literally, identical to its parts, considered collectively. McDaniel [2008] argues against CAI in that it prohibits emergent properties. Recently Sider [2014] exploited the resources of plural logic and extensional mereology to undermine McDaniel’s argument. He shows that CAI identifies extensionally equivalent pluralities – he calls it the Collapse Principle – and then shows how this identification rescues CAI from the emergentist argument. In this paper I first give a (...) new generalized version of both the arguments. It is more general in that it does not presuppose an atomistic mereology. I then go on to argue that the consequences of CP are rather radical. It entails mereological nihilism, the view that there are only mereological atoms. I finally show that, given a mild assumption about property instantiation, namely that there are no un-instantiated properties, this argument entails that CAI and emergent properties are incompatible after all. (shrink)

The paper presents a thorough exploration of the problem of persistence in a relativistic context. Using formal methods such as mereology, formal theories of location and the so called intrinsic formulation of special relativity we provide a new, more rigorous and more comprehensive taxonomy of persisting entities. This new taxonomy differs significantly from the ones that are present in the recent literature.

La extraordinaria pretensión de la praxiología -- La abstracción y los límites de la imaginación paradigmática -- Epistemología y economía -- La contradicción, vicio formal o cifra de contenido? -- Nudos y vacios, el fundamento pragmático de los principios lógicos -- Ambigüedad y comunicación -- Cómo ve la ciencia un filósofo -- "Las teorías de la relatividad de Alberto Einstein y sus implicaciones filosóficas" -- Educación y lenguaje.

The arrow paradox is an argument purported to show that objects do not really move. The two main metaphysics of motion, the At–At theory of motion and velocity primitivism, solve the paradox differently. It is argued that neither solution is completely satisfactory. In particular it is contended that there are no decisive arguments in favor of the claim that velocity as it is constructed in the At–At theory is a truly instantaneous property, which is a crucial assumption to solve the (...) paradox. If so the At–At theory faces the threat that most of our physical theories turn out to be non-Markovian. Finally it is considered whether all those threats and paradoxes are dispelled if only a new metaphysics of persistence is taken into account, namely four-dimensionalism. (shrink)

We present a new thought experiment that raises a threat for Minimal Physicalism, i.e. the thesis according to which mental properties supervene on physical properties. Our proposal is an example of the so called hard problems in philosophy of mind, in particular the problem of maximal consciousness. We do not however presuppose anything about its very nature apart from the minimal, weak assumption that it is determined by first order mental properties. We argue that either Minimal Physicalism is unable to (...) give an adequate account of the new thought experiment we present or has to explain the fact that two numerically distinct but physically indistinguishable individuals have different maximal consciousness due to their spatial location. We contend that this last conclusion is strongly at variance with our contemporary scientific image of the world. (shrink)

In recent years, one of the main thrusts of set-theoretic research has been the investigation of maximality principles for V, the universe of sets. The Hyperuniverse Programme (HP) has formulated several maximality principles, which express the maximality of V both in height and width. The paper provides an overview of the principles which have been investigated so far in the programme, as well as of the logical and model-theoretic tools which are needed to formulate them mathematically, and also briefly shows (...) how optimal principles, among those available, may be selected in a justifiable way. (shrink)

El artículo presenta los resultados de una investigación empírica que busca caracterizar el campo de las ciencias sociales en Chile, en el período 2000-2006, en cuanto a su proceso cognitivo, comparando entre las disciplinas. Para ello se constituyó un corpus de 479 publicaciones en las cuales se re..

In questo lavoro si presenta un nuovo esperimento mentale che solleva un particolare problema per quello che possiamo chiamare “fisicalismo minimale” in filosofia della mente. In particolare si argomenta che il fisicalismo minimale o i) non è in grado di fornirne un resoconto adeguato dell’esperimento mentale presentato, o ii) viene costretto a fornire un resoconto che è fortemente in contrasto con la nostra immagine scientifica del mondo. Il problema sollevato è un particolare esempio di quelli che Chalmers (1996) definisce hard (...) problems in filosofia della mente. Questa è la struttura del lavoro. Nella sezione 2. si presenta l’esperimento mentale, che chiameremo di Shem-Shaun1. Nella sezione 3. illustriamo il nostro argomento principale contro il fisicalismo minimale a partire dall’esperimento mentale della sezione precedente. Nella sezione conclusiva si discutono diversi modi di controbattere all’argomento principale e le sue conseguenze per il fisicalismo. (shrink)

In this article we follow the reception made by Augustine of Hippo of the Manichean myth; in this we see his visceral reaction against the doctrine of Mani, since –in addition to the apologetic elements properly– there is a clear attempt to take psychological distance from a religious experience that marked it in depth, in every way. In this controversial context we can also discern central aspects of a text that had liturgical value and which, as such, was of capital (...) importance to the Manichaean communities. This Augustinian reading has as horizon the near collapse of the Roman Empire of the West and the ever-increasing confrontation of Constantinople with Persian Empire, the mobility of its borders and the partly political and partly religious persecutions that Manichaeism underwent. (shrink)

This article discusses the account of Kant's view of concept formation that Alberto Vanzo has put forward in "Kant e la formazione dei concetti" (Trento: Verifiche, 2012).

The aim of the paper is to discuss the basic concepts developed in Ferraris’ book Documentalità, in particular the first two items of the conceptual triad trace-registration-inscription. The alleged priority of icnology on semiotics can hardly be justified; due to the overlooking of the notions of rule and code, the law of the production of traces remains obscure. On the other hand, the notion of registration as presence of traces in the mind conflicts whit some of our knowledge about the (...) brain and cannot avoid a logical circularity, since the trace is defined as something which can exist only if a mind is recognizing it as such. (shrink)

In this paper, we address an infamous argument against divisibility that dates back to Zeno. There has been an incredible amount of discussion on how to understand the critical notions of divisibility, extension, and infinite divisibility that are crucial for the very formulation of the argument. The paper provides new and rigorous definitions of those notions using the formal theories of parthood and location. Also, it provides a new solution to the paradox of divisibility which does not face some threats (...) that can possibly undermine the standard Lebesgue measure solution to such a paradox. (shrink)

El presente ensayo pretende cubrir una de las tendencias del pensamiento reaccionario chileno, partiendo de la hipótesis de la imposibilidad de un conservadurismo no católico, debido a la mengua del secularismo en Chile, por la persistencia de la teología política ultramontana, desde el padre Rafael Valdivieso hasta el historicismo católico-romántico de Jaime Eyzaguirre. El archivo principal de este trabajo muestra la confluencia entre la tesis de Palacios sobre la “raza chilena”, el portalianismo dialéctico y anti-intelectualista de Edwards y Encina, y (...) la belicología militar afincada en la doctrina de la guerra total de Ludendorff entre los intelectuales castrenses chilenos. Finalmente, intento una mirada estructural, apoyada en el marxismo y el psicoanálisis, para explicar la forma en que la “jerga de la autenticidad” chilena (el término es de Adorno) recubre la negatividad destructiva del lazo social inherente a las formaciones capitalistas. Las fantasías nacionales del conservantismo chileno, si bien en crisis durante el período neoliberal, renacen ahora como alternativas probables de interpelación ideológica para la comunidad letrada del fascismo en peligro. _Palabras clave: _Ideario conservador-católico - Raza chilena - Catexis del ser nacional - Jerga de la autenticidad - Negatividad capitalista - Ideología. (shrink)

Are there those who confuse an automobile with its driver? We laugh at such a question. Are there those who cannot distinguish the “known” from the act of their “knowing”? Our laughter quickly fades. For our answer, we do not have to go directly to the jungles and the caves; our enumeration could begin with famous names of science. People who wield the surgical instruments of their discipline with the subtlest precision start to beat about with primitive conceptual clubs as (...) soon as discussion hits upon questions concerning consciousness and its accurate investigation. (shrink)