In a life-span perspective, Baglio and Marchetti make the hypothesis of “the existence of multiple kinds of Theory of Mind” and urge the transition from a discrete to a dimensional approach in the study of mentalization (“ToM may vary along a quantitative and a qualitative continuum”). We resist such a plea and argue that we can stick to a discrete approach which posits just a single early-developing mindreading system, and then works out a “third-person first” perspective on mentalization, according to (...) which the understanding of other minds both ontogenetically precedes and grounds the understanding of our own minds. In this third-person first framework, Baglio and Marchetti’s claim that mentalization is “a multifaceted set of competences liable to influence -- and be influenced by -- a manifold of psychosocial aspects” is reformulated as follows: first-person mentalization evolves in an interplay of third-person mentalization, autobiographical memory and socio-communicative skills attuned by cultural variables. Let us examine these points one by one.In the first place, we take a nativist-modularist perspective on third-person mentalization (henceforth “mindreading”). After Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) groundbreaking paper, enough evidence has accumulated to endorse the hypothesis that a form of primary mindreading is not a developmental achievement, but an innate social-cognitive evolutionary adaptation (Baillargeon et al., 2013, 2014). Such adaptation is implemented... (shrink)

Composition is Identity is the thesis that a whole is, strict and literally, its parts considered collectively. Mereological Nihilism is the thesis that there are no composite objects whatsoever instead. This paper argues that they are equivalent, at least insofar as Composition is Identity is phrased in a particular way. It then addresses some consequences of such equivalence.

The paper addresses various questions about the logical and metaphysical relations between notions of parthood, location and persistence. In particular it argues that the conjunction of mereological extensionalism and multilocation, is highly problematic, if not utterly inconsistent. It thus provides an alternate route to reject multilocation, one that does not rely on Barker and Dowe's well known argument, at least for those who endorse extensionality of parthood. It then argues that other major metaphysical theses such as three-dimensionalism turn out to (...) be at odds with extensionalism. (shrink)

Multilocation – the notion of an object being at two places – is a central notion in metaphysics. According to a widespread view, multilocation is problematic but metaphysically possible. In effect, it has been claimed that in a quantum world, multilocation is not simply possible but actual. This article provides a new argument against the latter claim: there is no quantum multilocation.

This is a brief sequel to Max Black 's classic dialogue on the Identity of Indiscernibles. Interlocutor A defends the bundle theory by endorsing the view according to which Black 's world does not contain two indiscernible spheres but rather a single, bi-located sphere. His opponent, B, objects that A cannot distinguish such a world from a world with a single, uniquely located sphere, hence that the view in question adds nothing to A's original response to Black 's challenge. A (...) is simply denying that there can be worlds with two or more indiscernible entities. (shrink)

David Lewis famously endorsed Unrestricted Composition. His defense of such a controversial principle builds on the alleged innocence of mereology. This innocence defense has come under different attacks in the last decades. In this paper I pursue another line of defense, that stems from some early remarks by van Inwagen. I argue that Unrestricted Composition leads to a better metaphysics. In particular I provide new arguments for the following claims: Unrestricted Composition entails extensionality of composition, functionality of location and four-dimensionalism (...) in the metaphysics of persistence. Its endorsement yields an impressively coherent and powerful metaphysical picture. This picture shows a universe that might not be innocent but it is certainly elegant. (shrink)

Penelope Maddy has recently addressed the set-theoretic multiverse, and expressed reservations on its status and merits ([Maddy, 2017]). The purpose of the paper is to examine her concerns, by using the interpretative framework of set-theoretic naturalism. I first distinguish three main forms of 'multiversism', and then I proceed to analyse Maddy's concerns. Among other things, I take into account salient aspects of multiverse-related mathematics , in particular, research programmes in set theory for which the use of the multiverse seems to (...) be crucial, and show how one may provide responses to Maddy's concerns based on a careful analysis of 'multiverse practice'. (shrink)

Develops a critique of the concept of the attention economy from the perspectives of labour, time, and power.

It is argued, on the basis of new counterexamples, that neither knowledge nor epistemic justification (or epistemic rationality ) can reasonably be thought to be closed under logical implication. The argument includes an attempt to reconcile the fundamental intuitions of the opposing parties in the debate.

In questo lavoro si presenta un nuovo esperimento mentale che solleva un particolare problema per quello che possiamo chiamare “fisicalismo minimale” in filosofia della mente. In particolare si argomenta che il fisicalismo minimale o i) non è in grado di fornirne un resoconto adeguato dell’esperimento mentale presentato, o ii) viene costretto a fornire un resoconto che è fortemente in contrasto con la nostra immagine scientifica del mondo. Il problema sollevato è un particolare esempio di quelli che Chalmers (1996) definisce hard (...) problems in filosofia della mente. Questa è la struttura del lavoro. Nella sezione 2. si presenta l’esperimento mentale, che chiameremo di Shem-Shaun1. Nella sezione 3. illustriamo il nostro argomento principale contro il fisicalismo minimale a partire dall’esperimento mentale della sezione precedente. Nella sezione conclusiva si discutono diversi modi di controbattere all’argomento principale e le sue conseguenze per il fisicalismo. (shrink)

The present essay seeks to investigate the physical-vital sensations and feelings resulting from the contact with the artistic form. For this purpose, and from the main constellations that orbit around Nietzsche and Warburg, the essay seeks to inquire whether the work of art, as we conceive it, is capable of serving as a vital tonic or stimulant to life. Understanding sensation as friction, the mark of the organism's bodily contact with the environment, and feeling as the incorporation of this sensation (...) in terms of vital increment or decay, the essay seeks to question whether form would not be the translation in vital terms of physical forces. of the world, and therefore, a physical-biological possibility of adding vital power. In this way, more than serving the aesthetic enjoyment, the work would rather be the materialization of a historical way of life, and, therefore, thirsty for the will to power. Key-words: Form; Body; Power. (shrink)

We present sequent calculi for normal modal logics where modal and propositional behaviours are separated, and we prove a cut elimination theorem for the basic system K, so as completeness theorems both for K itself and for its most popular enrichments. MSC: 03B45, 03F05.

Leo Strauss (1899-1973), uno dei maggiori protagonisti della filosofia politica del Novecento, considera Hobbes il vero fondatore della filosofia politica moderna. The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (1936) costituisce l’opera più importante della critica straussiana alla modernità politica e rappresenta “il primo tentativo di una emancipazione radicale dal pregiudizio moderno”, come ebbe a scrivere lo stesso Strauss in una lettera a Alexandre Kojève del 9 maggio 1935. Lo Hobbes di Strauss è un filosofo morale che costruisce un’antropologia pessimistica, scevra da ogni (...) finalismo, fondata sullo studio delle passioni umane, non dei presupposti scientifico-meccanicistici o naturalistici dell’agire, centrandola sulla paura della morte violenta intesa come una passione razionale in grado di fondare la teoria di uno Stato il cui unico scopo è la sicurezza, cioè l’effettività dell’efficacia razionale. Il primo confronto di Strauss con Hobbes avviene, in forma mediata, attraverso la discussione di Der Begriff des “Politischen” (1932) di Carl Schmitt e prosegue fino al capitolo dedicato al filosofo inglese in Diritto naturale e storia (1953) in cui, sostituendo alla nozione di “legge” la nozione di “diritto” inteso come “pretesa soggettiva”, si esplicita la concezione moderna e individualistica del diritto naturale. In Die Religionskritik Spinozas (1930) è presente un capitolo consacrato espressamente alla critica hobbesiana della religione nel quale Strauss analizza il ruolo svolto dal conflitto teologico-politico, che diventa un conflitto eminentemente politico - e solo secondariamente teologico. In Die Religionskritik des Hobbes (1933-1934) Strauss dimostra come Hobbes intraprenda un’approfondita critica della religione rivelata passando dall’epicureismo al secolo radicale dei Lumi, concludendo che la salvezza e la dannazione dell’uomo sono affatto “terrestri” e che soltanto la scienza e la politica consentono all’uomo di sopravvivere in un mondo incomprensibile. Il volume si chiude con un’appendice che ripercorre il rapporto tra Strauss e Schmitt e la pubblicazione di due testi inediti in lingua italiana. (shrink)

El A. es profesor en la Universidad de Pavía , donde enseña Literatura Latina Tardo Antigua e Historia de la Lengua Latina; su centro de interés se ubica en las relaciones entre cultura clásica y literatura cristiana. El libro nos ofrece una visión de conjunto de la literatura tardo antigua en lengua latina, lo que significa, a su vez, una instantánea de las transformaciones que sacuden a la sociedad de la parte occidental del Imperio, entre los siglos III al VI, (...) es decir, entre la crisis social y económica que preanuncia la decadencia y las primeras manifestaciones de la cultura monacal. (shrink)

Those of us who have followed Fred Dretske's lead with regard to epistemic closure and its impact on skepticism have been half-wrong for the last four decades. But those who have opposed our Dretskean stance, contextualists in particular, have been just wrong. We have been half-right. Dretske rightly claimed that epistemic status is not closed under logical implication. Unlike the Dretskean cases, the new counterexamples to closure offered here render every form of contextualist pro-closure maneuvering useless. But there is a (...) way of going wrong under Dretske's lead. As the paper argues, Cartesian skepticism thrives on closure failure in a way that is yet to be acknowledged in the literature. The skeptic can make do with principles which are weaker than the familiar closure principles. But I will further claim that this is only a momentary reprieve for the skeptic. As it turns out, one of the weaker principles on which a skeptical modus tollens must rest can be shown false. (shrink)

Different disciplines converge to trace language evolution from motor skills. The human ability to use tools has been advocated as a fundamental step toward the emergence of linguistic processes in the brain. Neuropsychological and neuroimaging research has established that linguistic functions and tool-use are mediated by partially overlapping brain networks. Yet, scholars still theoretically debate whether the relationship between tool-use and language is contingent or functionally relevant, since empirical evidence is critically missing. Here, we measured both linguistic production and tool-use (...) abilities in the same participants, as well as manual and linguistic motor skills. A path analysis ruling out unspecific contributions from manual or linguistic motor skills, showed that motor proficiency using a tool lawfully predicts differences in individual linguistic production. In addition, more complex tool-use reveals stronger association between linguistic production and tool mastery. These findings establish the existence of shared cognitive processes between tool-use and language. (shrink)

This is the text of the Claudio Rozzoni's interview with Jorge Molder that took place in Portuguese on June 21, 2018, at the artist's atelier in Lisbon. English translation by Claudio Rozzoni.

This book covers Husserl’s stance on the philosopher and the history of philosophy, whether or not such a history is part of the philosophical attitude itself, and if so, how Husserl’s phenomenology might weigh in on such matters. Firstly, this text spells out some of the manifold ways in which the history of philosophy works its way in Husserl’s phenomenology, showing how concepts, methods and problems drawn from various Ancient and Modern philosophical traditions (Platonism, Aristotelianism, Sophistry, Stoicism, Scholasticism, Modern Rationalism) (...) are transformed and embedded within transcendental phenomenology itself. Secondly, it shows how a better understanding of the distinctive patterns by means of which Husserl’s phenomenology confronts the history of philosophy could be extremely significant for historians of philosophy who are interested in learning something entirely new about the unexplored horizons of such concepts, methods and problems. Finally, based on such twofold historical and philosophical approach and thanks to a substantial reinterpretation of some key phenomenological concepts such as “multiplicity”, “constitution”, “attitude” and “variation”, this book provides a novel and original reading of Husserl’s overall philosophical project in its full meaning and scope. By doing so, this volume appeals to both students and researchers and critically engages in mainstream interpretations of phenomenology, suggesting a unique take on the idea of transcendental phenomenology as a whole. (shrink)

Given two (positive) equivalence relations ∼ 1 , ∼ 2 on the set ω of natural numbers, we say that ∼ 1 is m-reducible to ∼ 2 if there exists a total recursive function h such that for every x, y ∈ ω, we have $x \sim_1 y \operatorname{iff} hx \sim_2 hy$ . We prove that the equivalence relation induced in ω by a positive precomplete numeration is complete with respect to this reducibility (and, moreover, a "uniformity property" holds). This (...) result allows us to state a classification theorem for positive equivalence relations (Theorem 2). We show that there exist nonisomorphic positive equivalence relations which are complete with respect to the above reducibility; in particular, we discuss the provable equivalence of a strong enough theory: this relation is complete with respect to reducibility but it does not correspond to a precomplete numeration. From this fact we deduce that an equivalence relation on ω can be strongly represented by a formula (see Definition 8) iff it is positive. At last, we interpret the situation from a topological point of view. Among other things, we generalize a result of Visser by showing that the topological space corresponding to a partition in e.i. sets is irreducible and we prove that the set of equivalence classes of true sentences is dense in the Lindenbaum algebra of the theory. (shrink)

In the following reflection Claudio Corradetti and Allen Wood engage in a controversy concerning the possibilities and the limits of textual interpretation. Should an interpreter still be authorized to call an author’s interpretation the logical stretch of text beyond its black printed letters? The authors offer two different standpoints on what can still be defined as textual interpretation. Whereas for Allen Wood a clear-cut separation must be kept between what a text shows and what an interpreter argues starting from (...) the text, for Claudio Corradetti such distinction remains internal to textual exegesis in so far as the interpreter’s conclusions follow a logical pattern of jus tification starting from evidential hints. (shrink)