A pesquisa que aqui se apresenta é uma tentativa de mostrar em que medida Schopenhauer é crítico ao antropocentrismo kantiano. Esse tema partiu de uma perspectiva ecofeminista sobre um aparente conflito entre alguns pontos da filosofia de Schopenhauer: 1) a influência de Kant sobre sua obra, 2) as evidências de machismos e, curiosamente, 3) a sua utilização por filósofos contemporâneos para pensar uma ética animal ou ambiental. O primeiro ponto, baseado em críticas à tradição moderna, sugere que Schopenhauer seja leitor (...) de uma teoria antropocêntrica. O segundo não permite ignorar que a realização de sua filosofia produz pelo menos um tipo de desigualdade. E o terceiro sugere, no sentido de diminuir os sofrimentos político-ecológicos tão presentes na atualidade, uma ética que atribui um mesmo valor moral à toda natureza ou pelo menos a todos os animais, inclusive humanos. O objetivo deste artigo é, então, investigar se, de fato, Schopenhauer é crítico ao antropocentrismo kantiano e pode ser utilizado para pensar uma ética mais igualitária e abrangente, ou se as mesmas críticas feitas a Kant por algumas teóricas ecofeministas também se aplicam ao pensamento schopenhaueriano. (shrink)

Many object-directed emotions change in intensity over time. Importantly, this sometimes happens even though the emotion’s object remains unchanged: grief over the tragic loss of a loved one, for instance, fades even though the loss remains tragic. Can a changing emotion continue to fit its unchanging object? Existing answers to this question tend to vindicate strikingly narrow visions of fitting emotional change: some, for instance, consider it uniquely fitting for grief to diminish, while others consider grief fitting only when it (...) maintains, or returns to, its originally-fitting intensity. I argue for a permissive view that can make sense of both fitting diminished emotion and fitting resurgent emotion. This view is also uniquely positioned to address the most pressing contemporary challenge for views that embrace fitting emotional change in unchanging-object cases, one forcefully pressed by Christopher Howard. (shrink)

This paper looks into the ethics of positive perspective-taking. Positive perspective-taking is, roughly, an attitudinal orientation toward an object that treats that object as sufficiently good, or in other words, as meeting one’s normative expectations. Sometimes, positive perspective-taking is both prudent and virtuous. But sometimes, positive perspective-taking–especially about injustices done to others–seems morally suspicious. When is positive perspective-taking actually morally problematic, and in those cases, what is the nature of the moral problem? I argue that a complete answer to this (...) question should appeal to moral rights: on my view, we sometimes have moral rights against others’ putting our problems into a positive perspective. A central advantage of this proposal is its ability to account for the moral asymmetry between positive perspective-taking about injustices done to oneself and positive perspective-taking about injustices done to others. (shrink)

Most states in the United States have conscience laws protecting conscientious refusal to perform some medical service. Yet many state conscience laws protect providers from being even indirectly involved with some procedure they find objectionable, which can include not only referrals but also simply informing patients of medically indicated but morally contentious options. I argue that such policies are unjust, offering too much protection for integrity in the face of competing values and patient interests. In other words, these policies grant (...) too much weight to integrity. One promising response to this concern is that in addition to integrity, the state should protect professionals so that they avoid complicity that could undermine their moral right to hold others accountable. I argue that this response fails, since it is implausible that these professionals actually lose that right in such contexts. I conclude that these policies should be restricted to better protect patient interests. (shrink)

This article points out, descriptive moral psychology of human behavior patterns in the handling, in fact, from the outset exceed the boundaries of philosophy, and Cole tried to resort to ethics Fort formalism in order to avoid this problem in practice, can not be established. • Henry Rachael is further motivation for ethical behavior and the psychological concept of Cole Castle together. Although this is certainly an important contribution to the Fort Cole, but Cole Fort critical reflection on the lack (...) of methodology adopted only; secondly that the ideology behind their psychological factors; finally made ​​sense to remedy in the treatment program: to give up on life and psychological describe their condition or results of work. Authors propose a new proposal of psychology, first identified the relationship between psychologists and their research object, this object is, as the subject of people; secondly, from the possibility of speech. Description, either by himself or a third person described in the description, will be replaced by speech interaction. Authors proposed the concept of an interactive framework of doctrine, in which Cole and Rachael • Fort Henry's theory of language games can get a different position. This article attempts to demonstrate that the descriptive psychology, in its treatment of ethical problems, seems to have transgressed the boundary line against philosophy. This problematic situation cannot be circumvented by resorting to an ethical formalism-as L. Kohlberg does in his research program. Rachael M. Henry pushes one step forward to tie the psychodynamic aspect of moral behavior with Kohlberg's concept. The present author, all in affirming the important contribution of Kohlberg to psychology, indicates the insufficiency of a mere reflection of methods in Kohlberg's works. Then he dissects the ideologemes behind Kohlberg's psychology. At last he suggests a therapeutic proposal: the demand for describing psychic life, its conditions or effects, shall be dropped. The author proposes instead a program of new psychology that derives first from the relation of psychologist to his object, the human as subject; and second, from the possibilities of speech in communicative interaction. Description, whether made by oneself or by a third person, shall be substituted by speech interactions. These interactions are considered as successful when the partners in a discussion declare themselves to be understood. Within the framework of this interactionist concept, Kohlberg's and Rachael M. Henry 's theories could assume the status of various language-games. (shrink)

Avantgarde in Halle: The Invention of Aesthetics and the Aestheticization of Christianity. The foundation of scholarly aesthetics by the Halle philosopher Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten and Georg Friedrich Meier in the middle of the 18th century took place within a milieu that was shaped by both pietism and the Enlightenment. Martin Fritz demonstrates that aesthetics in Halle itself can be considered a synthesis of pietism and Enlightenment ideas. The sensualization of basic Christian concepts is of eminent relevance for these aesthetics, (...) in order to reinvent the pietistic striving for intensive religious experiences through such „aestheticization.“ The romantic idea of „Kunstreligion“, which continues to be significant in cultural life today, is also based on this programmatic notion of aestheticization. Building on this historical background, this article’s concluding systematic considerations argue for a theological revaluation of pertinent contemporary cultural phenomena. (shrink)