Whether the Pragmatic conception of democracy is applicable outside the United States of America is a question that had already been raised even during Dewey’s life time. His visit to China, in particular, has been seen as proof that “the Pragmatic method” for bringing about democracy is inherently flawed.3 However, even if it was a failed experiment, China’s past encounter with Dewey’s Pragmatism should not be seen as absolute proof that Chinese democracy can never be Pragmatic. (...) When an experiment fails, one examines what went wrong or did not turn out as expected, and uses the additional information to improve on the next experiment. This paper reconsiders the failed “Dewey experiment” together with China’s.. (shrink)

Interviews Professor Wang, a political philosopher at Beijing University about the political reforms in China. Explanation on a democratic political system with Chinese characteristics; Confucian tradition of respect for a ruling intellectual elite; Relevance of Confucian scholar Huang Zongxi's proposal for reform.

This book examines democracy in recent Chinese-language philosophical work. It focuses on Confucian-inspired political thought in the Chinese intellectual world from after the communist revolution in China until today. The volume analyzes six significant contemporary Confucian philosophers in China and Taiwan, describing their political thought and how they connect their thought to Confucian tradition, and critiques their political proposals and views. It illustrates how Confucianism has transformed in modern times, the divergent understandings of Confucianism today, and how (...) contemporary Chinese philosophers understand democracy, as well as their criticisms of Western political thought. (shrink)

This paper argues for the pragmatic construction of Confucian democracy by showing that Chinese philosophers who wish to see Confucianism flourish again as a positive dimension of Chinese civilization need to approach it pragmatically and democratically, otherwise their love of the past is at the expense of something else Confucius held in equal esteem, love of learning. Chinese philosophers who desire democracy for China would do well to learn from the earlier failures of the iconoclastic (...) Westernizers, and realize that a Chinese democracy cannot come about by ignoring or dismissing such an important part of China's history, its Confucian tradition. The best chances for democracy in China lie in transforming that tradition without destroying it. Eagerness to learn from others must be united with a proper appreciation of one's own past to nurture democracy as a way of life. (shrink)

Journal of Chinese Philosophy, EarlyView.

This chapter explores the relevance of Dewey’s philosophy of democracy for China within the context of Dewey’s historical visit to China and continuing debates about his influence among the Chinese. Dewey’s pragmatism illuminates certain problems in the contemporary discourses about China’s democratization, including questions whether Chinese culture is an obstacle to democratization and the strengths of a Deweyan approach to articulating a Confucian democracy that could work in China. Dewey’s emphasis on experimentation in social reforms and (...) his fallibilism regarding the political institutions of democracy open up new possibilities for China’s democratization and suggest where one might look to discover the indigenous conditions—the varied experiments being conducted in local governance and civil society—from which a Chinese democracy might be born. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Chinese Science Fiction during the Post-Mao Cultural Thaw by Hua LiShaoming DuanHua Li. Chinese Science Fiction during the Post-Mao Cultural Thaw. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2021. 248 pp., hardcover, $68.00. ISBN 9781487508234.Chinese Science Fiction during the Post-Mao Cultural Thaw focuses on the years after Mao Zedong's demise, from 1976 to 1983, during which China's politics and culture underwent unusual changes. Li's book is a (...) laudable scholarly endeavor that provides readers with a new interpretation of science fiction (SF) during the post-Mao era. Li connects the production of Chinese SF to a wider context, including mainstream literary perspectives, domestic political demands and predicaments, changing international relations, and Western SF traditions. From my point of view, this book contributes to existing scholarship in four different ways.First, Li offers an explanation for the launching of the "Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign" in 1983, and for the withering of SF in the 1980s, that is different from that of many other scholars. According to Zhan Ling, Chinese [End Page 270] officials liked art that closely connected to politics in the 1980s.1 Yet SF writers were very interested in thriller themes during this period, pursuing literary value while neglecting political significance. Science fiction deviated from reality, which went against Deng Xiaoping's idea of "seeking truth from facts," proposed in 1978. For these reasons, Zhan argues, SF was labeled as "bourgeois literature" in the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign and severely criticized.2 Wu Yan offers another explanation, focusing on how, in 1983, renowned scientist Qian Xuesen published an article in People's Daily that accuses then-current SF of being "specimens of pseudoscience" and misleading teenagers.3 Qian's viewpoint caught Deng's attention; he claimed in the same year that SF was a pollution of science.4 Moreover, a growing number of books and films promoted sexual liberation and Western democracy at this time. Faced with this "crisis," Deng called on all levels of judicial and propaganda departments to thwart the spread of these ideas and works in society. This campaign lasted for three years, with approximately twenty-four thousand people being executed for "mental impurity." It dealt a heavy blow to SF as well, causing the number of SF writers as well as the social impact of SF to decline significantly.5Compared to Zhan and Wu, Li places more emphasis on the fact that Deng wanted to achieve political and ideological unity through this campaign. In the 1980s, many voices were opposing Deng at the top of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Although Deng was not the highest leader of the CPC in name, he controlled the standing of the CPC. Many high-level officials accused Deng of destroying socialist democracy. Deng launched the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign under the pretext of fighting the spread of "Western-inspired liberal ideas among the Chinese Populace" (14), while aiming to purge high-level dissidents from the CPC. This campaign, like Mao's Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s and 1970s, became increasingly violent and difficult to control as it went on. Many officials in the CPC took advantage of the campaign to attack people, policies, and behavior that they disliked (15). Li's account is very convincing because it aligns with the political changes that have occurred since then. Hu Yaobang was dismissed in January 1987 due to "indulging bourgeois liberalization and weakening the Party's leadership."6 As the general secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC, Hu admired the Western political system with its separation of powers and intended to establish such a system in China to achieve democratic modernization. However, his efforts were obstructed by Deng. The establishment of a modern democratic system would have signified the end of the CPC dictatorship. [End Page 271]Further, Li points out that SF in the post-Mao era lacked a critical awareness of ethical problems. SF writers of this era tended to ignore the moral and ethical implications of the use of modern technology, or they took up modern technology without the reflectiveness and attention to detail that makes modern technology something more than a normative... (shrink)

This book reinterprets classical Chinese philosophical tradition along the conceptual line of human dignity. Through extensive textual evidence, it illustrates that classical Confucianism, Mohism and Daoism contained rich notions of dignity, which laid the foundation for human rights and political liberty in China, even though, historically, liberal democracy failed to grow out of the authoritarian soil in China. The book critically examines the causes that might have prevented the classical schools from developing a liberal tradition, while affirming their (...) positive contributions to the human dignity concept. Analysing the inadequacies of the western concept of human dignity, the text covers relevant teachings of Kongzi, Mengzi, Xunzi, Mozi, Laozi and Zhuangzi (in comparison with Rousseau). While the Confucian notions of humanity (Ren), righteousness (Yi), and gentleman (Junzi) bear most directly on the conception of dignity, Mohism and Daoism provide salutary corrections to the ossification of the orthodox Confucian practice (Li). (shrink)

In the early twentieth century, China was on the brink of change. Different ideologies - those of radicalism, conservatism, liberalism, and social democracy - were much debated in political and intellectual circles. Whereas previous works have analyzed these trends in isolation, Edmund S. K. Fung shows how they related to one another and how intellectuals in China engaged according to their cultural and political persuasions. The author argues that it is this interrelatedness and interplay between different schools of thought (...) that are central to the understanding of Chinese modernity, for many of the debates that began in the Republican era still resonate in China today. The book charts the development of these ideologies and explores the work and influence of the intellectuals who were associated with them. In its challenge to previous scholarship and the breadth of its approach, the book makes a major contribution to the study of Chinese political philosophy and intellectual history. (shrink)

Opening Democracy in Contemporary Confucian Philosophy, David Elstein identifies himself, correctly, to be filling a gap in English-language scholarship. That gap, as the title partly suggests, is a lack of Anglophone accounts of contemporary Sinophone Confucian views of democracy. We have in English a robust discussion of the relationship between Confucianism and democracy, but there is very little connection between that discourse and the same discussion occurring amongst scholars in Chinese. Thus one of the main aims (...) here is to communicate the Sinophone discussion to readers otherwise cut off from it, and to evaluate its arguments.Elstein selects six thinkers from Taiwan and Mainland China for his... (shrink)

The articles in this collection were all selected from the first five volumes of the Journal of Dialectics of Nature published by the Chinese Academy of Sciences between 1979 and 1985. The Journal was established in 1979 as a comprehensive theoretical publication concerning the history, philosophy and sociology of the natural sciences. It began publication as a response to China's reform, particularly the policy of opening to the outside world. Chinese scholars began to undertake distinctive, original research in (...) these fields. This collection provides a cross-section of their efforts during the initial phase. To enable western scholars to understand the historical process of this change in Chinese academics, Yu Guangyuan's `On the Emancipation of the Mind' and Xu Liangying's `Essay on the Role of Science and Democracy in Society' have been included in this collection. Three of the papers included on the philosophy of science are discussions of philosophical issues in cosmology and biology by scientists themselves. The remaining four are written by philosophers of science and discuss information and cognition, homeostasis and Chinese traditional medicine, the I Ching (Yi Jing) and mathematics, etc. Papers have been selected on the history of both classical and modern science and technology, the most distinctive of which are macro-comparisons of the development of science in China and the west. Some papers discuss the issue of the demarcation of periods in the history of science, the history of ancient Chinese mathematics, astronomy, metallurgy, machinery, medicine, etc. Others discuss the history of modern physics and biology, the history of historiography of science in China and the history of regional development of Chinese science and technology. Also included are biographies of three post-eighteenth-century Chinese scholars, Li Shanlan (1811-1882), Hua Hengfang (1833–1902), and Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940), who contributed greatly to the introduction of western science and scholarship to China. In addition, three short papers have been included introducing the interactions between Chinese scholars and three great western scientists, Niels Bohr, Norbert Wiener, and Robert A. Millikan. (shrink)

The subtle and complex relation between Confucianism and modern democracy has long been a controversial issue, and it is now again becoming a topical issue in the process of political modernization in contemporary China. This paper argues that there are some quite basic early Confucian values and principles that are not only compatible with democracy, but also may become the theoretic foundation of modern democracy in China. Early Confucianism considers 'the people's will' as the direct representative of (...) 'Heaven's will', with which it legitimizes political power. Confucian theory of 'human nature is good' endorses equal potential good for every man. These principles can be used in reasoning towards a system of democracy. In terms of decision-making, the Confucian 'Doctrine of the Mean' accords with certain democratic principles. The independent personality and committed individualism advocated by early Confucianism is a required civic merit in a democratic society. These fundamental Confucian principles, through contemporary hermeneutics, may provide a philosophic grounding for democracy and support the construction of a democratic system with a Chinese dimension. To get democracy rooted in the spirit of traditional Chinese culture will benefit the healthy and smooth development of democracy in China. (shrink)

Yet this perfectionist theme of Confucianism did not begin with these masters. Instead, they were working within and in response to a longstanding political tradition that can be traced back to the mythical beginning of Chinese civilization according to which the legendary sage-kings established a realm of peace, prosperity and harmony. One can hardly ascertain the historical truth of these myths, but the historical imagination of these sage-king nonetheless informed Confucianism's foundational understanding of the nature of politics in what (...) was eventually canonized as the Five Confucian Classics. These five sets of books contain the stories, sayings and poetry of the ancient sagely leaders, which are deemed as the default authoritative source of wisdom by Confucians throughout the ages. (shrink)

Jiwei Ci’s Democracy in China: The Coming Crisis presents an extraordinarily rich set of ideas regarding the important subject of the prospect of democracy in China. The book argues that it is in the interest of the Chinese Communist Party to immediately begin to prepare China for democracy, as that is the only way to save the party and China from imminent crises of legitimacy, governance, and stability. Drawing upon Tocqueville’s discussion of equality of conditions in (...) America, Ci argues that as China has already more or less become a society of equality of conditions, it already has a democratic society, which will inevitably exert enormous pressures for political democratization, thereby creating serious legitimacy and stability crises for the regime. In my view, Ci overstates the relevance of Tocqueville’s America for China, and his claim that there is a democratic society in China is disputable. In grounding his case for democracy in China, Ci also appeals to a larger species of argument—the argument from social circumstances to political regime, of which Tocqueville’s argument is an example. This is the argument that once a kind of society has become entrenched and is no longer amenable to a political regime’s effort to remake it, it is the political regime that must make itself fit the state of society. I argue that this argument is also problematic. (shrink)

Sun Yatsen was a revolutionary activist, theoretician, and leader of the Guomindang . His Three Principles of the People, from which these lectures are excerpted, was his theoretical manifesto. The three principles are: Nationalism , Democracy , and People's Livelihood . Our concern here is with the second of these. If we were to follow Sun's own discussion in the first paragraph of our selection, we might well translate minquan as "people's power," but "democracy" has become the standard (...) translation for this term, and we have chosen to follow this convention. His understanding of quan, which in most other essays we have translated as "rights," as "power" is a central element of his thought that helps to explain his lack of interest in promoting further freedom for individual Chinese, as discussed below. Sun's formulations were extremely influential; see the essays by Luo Longji, Zhou Fohai, and Zhang Junmai for both amplification and criticism. (shrink)

Current approaches to contemporary political philosophy are disproportionately western, and the need for more diverse and global perspectives is urgent. To address this imbalance Colin J. Lewis and Jennifer Kling take up a series of contemporary topics in political philosophy and consider how the application of classical Chinese thought can engender new insights and enable progress on some of the thorniest sociopolitical issues. They argue that classical Chinese political theories and views have much to say that is relevant (...) to our contemporary life, and buttress their argument with case studies. Each chapter takes up a particular contemporary sociopolitical issue, describes standard Western approaches to it, and then applies classical Chinese thought to the task of either re-framing it, or suggesting a novel solution. -/- The book engages with and makes progress on several current sociopolitical issues, including the construction and deconstruction of political narratives, the legal standing of robots, the relationships between people, communities, and the environment, the funding (or defunding) of police, the status of private militias, and the question of justified revolution in liberal democracies, among others. While classical Chinese philosophy has been previously dismissed in some circles as inaccessible or banal, Lewis and Kling argue that, to the contrary, it is a powerful lens through which to view and dissect today's challenges. (shrink)

In recent years, Philosophy Departments at universities in China and worldwide have experienced a renaissance in discussion on Confucian thought. As the country draws from indigenous traditions, rather than leaning completely on the importation of Western liberalism and Marxism, Confucianism has critical implications for politics, ethics, and law in modern China. At the same time, democracy never left the conversation. Democratic concepts cannot be ignored and must be disposed of, acknowledged, or incorporated. The relationship between Confucianism and democracy (...) has been described by various authors as one of conflict, critique, compatibility, and hybridity. In this article, we examine a compatibility model, in which compatibility between Confucianism and democracy can be divided into four types: soft, hard, coexistence, and integration. We examine compatibility by examining “what is compatible” and “how compatibility can be achieved” so as to design speculative models for what a contemporary Confucian government would look like. Our focus is mainly political philosophy in order to explain the effect of cross-pollination of Confucian and democratic thought on political society. (shrink)

Western democracies have become neoliberal with all the disproportions of economic and political power that have emerged in capitalist society. The power acquired in the free market not only deforms the integrity of society and economic and political balance, but also it has become virtually impossible for democracy as a form of government to exist. As the scale of the free market became global, the economic entity has also gone global creating disproportions that have led Western democracies to be (...) ruled by economic entities rather than political ones. However, proper education, the use of new economic decentralisation trends, changing the role of politicians and the activity of citizens, and emerging new possibilities of digital democracy give us a glimpse of how to use the opportunities of the free market for strengthening democracies. At the same time, the reforms that have taken place in China in recent years have paradoxically shown that neoliberalism can also have positive aspects for society, which, as a new balance of economic and political capital, can be applied in the West as well. (shrink)

In China, political philosophy is still a comparatively new academic discipline. While there is no such phrase as "political philosophy" in ancient Chinese texts, there are elements within them that could be considered part of that field. Central questions of Chinese ancient political philosophy include the legitimacy of the source of political power, the foundation of moral rationality for the use of political power, and the purpose of political activities. This book explores the ideas of rights, the foundations (...) of law, transference of power, democracy and other topic as debated in ancient times. Focusing on important political thinkers in Chinese history, such as Kongzi, Laozi, Xu Fuguan, Liang Qichao and Li Dazhao, the book explains characteristics that are particular to China, such as the system of abdication, the general will of the people, and the society of Great Harmony. While making comparisons between Chinese and Western political philosophy, the book also discusses how to establish a Chinese modern state and how to promote Chinese culture today so that it can influence more and more people around the world. The book will be a valuable reference for scholars of Chinese philosophy, political philosophy and Chinese culture. (shrink)

The resurgent interest in Dewey’s work and the growing popularity of his approach in Chinese education, as evidenced in the thirty-seven-volume translation of his collected works and other scholarly initiatives in the past few years,1 present a fundamental paradox. While Dewey’s educational philosophy is inextricably situated in and for the maintenance of democracy, China is still a largely nondemocratic country with what seems to be a growing tendency to retreat back to autocracy with the rise of President Xi. (...) This apparent contradiction could suggest a number of possible developments in opposing directions. On the one hand, it could herald another full or partial rejection of Dewey’s progressive and liberal... (shrink)

Joseph Chan and Sungmoon Kim take me to task for my understanding and uses of Tocqueville, and because of the resemblance they claim to see between one of my major arguments and modernization theory. I think their charges are mistaken or misplaced. Chan and Kim reject my claims that China is already, in a meaningful sense and to a substantial degree, a democratic society, and that, unless such a society is matched by political democratization, a major legitimation crisis is almost (...) inevitable in the foreseeable future. I try to show that they are wrong in their assessment of the state of Chinese society and in their dismissal of the crisis tendencies that only timely democratization can help avert. Chan and Kim completely misconstrue what my prudential argument for democracy in China means, and what it does not, and I explain why. Finally, I reaffirm, over Chan’s objections, the view that the fundamental choice regarding political legitimacy in China today lies between the Mandate of Heaven and democracy, given the demise of communism, and I restate this view in terms of the concept of sovereignty. (shrink)

A central issue in Chinese philosophy today is the relationship between Confucianism and democracy. While some political figures have argued that Confucian values justify non-democratic forms of government, many scholars have argued that Confucianism can provide justification for democracy, though this Confucian democracy will differ substantially from liberal democracy. These scholars believe it is important for Chinese culture to develop its own conception of democracy using Confucian values, drawn mainly from Kongzi (Confucius) and (...) Mengzi (Mencius), as the basis. This essay describes some obstacles to this form of Confucian democracy. It argues that considering the political philosophies of Kongzi and Mengzi in the context of their views on personal cultivation reveals that they oppose some of the central assumptions of democracy. They do not trust the public to make good decisions, and advocate government for the people, but not by the people. These philosophies alone cannot generate democracy. (shrink)

Dictatorial China contains vivid examples of grassroots deliberative democracy on issues vital to local participants. Three elements in our case studies are relevant to programs of deliberative, participatory decision making elsewhere in the world. First, the Chinese examples have all occurred within longstanding communities. Second, the members of these communities have faced concrete issues of a type they felt they had the knowledge to resolve. And third, all of these communities had access to institutional frameworks established from above (...) that the local populace could utilize as deliberative forums. In addition, a more distinctively Chinese factor was observed in two of our case studies: collective decisions were arrived at based on “moral economy” beliefs rooted in China’s socialist past. (shrink)

Some of the authors of the essays on Chinese philosophers prefer the pin yin system of romanization for Chinese names and words, while others prefer the Wade‐Giles system. Given that both systems are in wide use today, important names and words are given in both their pin yin and Wade‐Giles formulations. The author's preference is printed first, followed by the alternative romanization within brackets.

In Western political philosophy, democracy is generally the dominant view regarding what the best form of government is, and this holds even in respect to promoting minority rights. However, I argue that there is a better theory for satisfying minority interests and rights. I amass numerous studies from the social sciences demonstrating how democracy does poorly in accounting for minority interests. I then contend that a particular hybrid view that fuses a meritocracy with democracy can do a (...) better job than democracy in accounting for minority interests and in having more equal rights and fair policies coming from the legislative and executive branches. Finally, I defend this thesis from numerous counters. (shrink)

The notion that if democracy is to flourish in East Asia it must be realized in ways that are compatible with East Asian’s Confucian norms or values is a staple conviction of Confucian scholarship. I suggest two reasons why it is unlikely and even undesirable for such a Confucianized democracy to emerge. First, 19th- and 20th-century modernization swept away or weakened the institutions which had transmitted Confucian practices in the past, undermining claims that there is an enduring Confucian (...) communitarian or cultural heritage today that democratic institutions have to adapt themselves to—or that a Confucian cultural spirit can be revived. Second, 20th-century East Asian statist regimes rationalized Confucianism for national ideologies meant to bind their citizens’ loyalties to developmentalist goals. Memories of this now delegitimized, statist Confucianism have contributed to the further marginalization of Confucian norms, and to their dissociation from democratic values, in today’s pluralistic democracies in East Asia. This essay argues that a Confucian conviction politics developed within the frame of East Asia’s actually existing liberal democracies provides a better course for advocates of Confucianism in democratic politics. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article argues that Anglophone works on Chinese democracy have tended to build their analyses on assumptions that tradition is either a premodern phenomenon unrelated to China’s democratization process, a hindrance that should be gotten rid of if China is to democratize, a static phenomenon that cannot but appear antiquated with regard to a dynamic, fast-paced modern China, or an object from which modern agents can freely draw. In order to challenge these assumptions, this article suggests that modernity (...) and democracy were translated into a Chinese milieu already ripe with Gadamerian prejudices: prejudices that not only modified the meaning of modernity and democracy, but also provided the very conditions without which modernity and democracy would not have been meaningful or understood at all. Max Ko-wu Huang’s work can contribute to our understanding of the role played by various traditions in the process of translating democracy during the transitional period of modern Chin... (shrink)

ExcerptThis paper aims to demonstrate how political study in China contributes to and facilitates debates among Chinese and Western authors by fostering a plural understanding of political science generally, conceptually, and methodologically that goes beyond the simple dichotomization of democracy and authoritarianism. Over the last four decades (1978 to the present), Chinese political study has been shaped by two indigenized schools, among others: historical political study (lishi zhengzhi xue 历史政治学) and fieldwork political study (tianye zhengzhi xue 田野政治学). (...) Some stimulating debates have unfolded in these two narratives by simultaneously reintroducing history and reconceptualizing Chinese politics through straightforward fieldwork. These two indigenized approaches include epistemological, ontological, theoretical, and methodological aspects, and the spontaneous reconstruction of the “Chinese school” rebalances both the “scope conditions” and Chineseness of the discipline. Should these two conceivable branches not be purely descriptive, the question remains whether they represent the future trajectory of Chinese political study or merely a transient occurrence during China’s transitional stage. (shrink)

Amid a far-reaching convergence of Western and Chinese cultures, utilitarianism has become a 'hot' new philosophical and ethical topic in China. I call the various different ideas associated with this new academic theme Chinese neo-utilitarianism. Chinese Neo-utilitarianism is an attempt to combine Marxism, the Western ethical tradition and the Chinese tradition to create a new approach different from that of complete Westernization, or the pure Chinese tradition or Marxism so as to bring the greatest happiness (...) for the greatest number of present-day Chinese people. ;We can trace the ideas of Chinese Neo-utilitarianism back in history, finding a Chinese utilitarian tradition differing somewhat from the Western moral philosophy of utilitarianism. Three key aspects of the Chinese utilitarian tradition are debates over the concepts of Yi and Li, Jing and Quan, and Gongli and Sili. The debate over Yi and Li concerns which is the ultimate standard for moral decision. The concepts of Jing and Quan address the question: is there an eternal moral standard or principle applicable in any circumstances? The discussion on the concepts of Gongli and Sili focuses on how or whether we can follow Yi and obtain Li; and how we can get Li in a moral way. If Gongli, the public interest, is Yi or the ultimate good is Li as Gongli, whose interests are to count? How is Gongli to be distributed ethically? Will neo-utilitarianism or neo-Confucian 'sageliness within and kingliness without' with science and democracy best serve the needs of modernization today? (shrink)

Confucius is finally rehabilitated. Party dignitaries kneel at his ancestral shrine. The benevolent Confucian is a new image of China for the outside, and for Chinese dealing with the collapse of ideology and the moral fabric of their society. The word tianxia is usually translated “all under Heaven.” It has a complicated history and a complicated contemporary appropriation in a desperate ideology-cum-PR campaign. The tianxia-idea is that China has for millennia been a government of all under heaven. It was (...) such a government in the past, is one today, and offers the whole world its benevolent alternative to liberalism and democracy. More than one contributor to this strong collection of interesting essays suspects that the Confucian revival is an act of desperation. As soft power, Confucianism may be no match for global capitalism. Soft power is not readily synthesized by official campaign. Its genuine source is in everyday life, and the life of ordinary Chinese is without much resonance beyond its borders. The whole world uses Chinese electronics, though almost none but the Chinese read their books, watch their television, or listen to their music. The world’s love affair with China is fixated on the economic numbers and is no less capricious. It has never been clear whether tianxia means a cultural realm without political boundaries, as is urged by modern ideologists, or is just another word for China, which is how modern Chinese dictionaries explain it. On the official account, membership in “all under Heaven” is a matter of shared culture, sustained by affective ties rather than coercion, but it is a culture that values order over freedom, ethics over law, and authority over democracy and human rights. Outsiders worry that tianxia is the cloak of a rising hegemon. However, the important audience for lofty talk of tianxia may be internal. Whether foreigners really trust it may be less urgent than for the Chinese to believe it about themselves. Postsocialist China has no unifying vision and has yet to honestly scrutinize official socialism. The new discourse of tianxia speaks to their need for a vision of their place in the world. The image of a tianxia government of benevolent authority may be more useful for identity within China than for offering the world a viable alternative to democracy and human rights. (shrink)

Confucius proposes the view of human beings as moral agents that have to behave according to their own individual thinking and reflection. In Analects, I, 4, one of his disciples says: “Have I passed on to others anything that I have not tried out myself?” And in Analects, XIII, 23, Confucius says: “The gentleman agrees with others without being an echo.” That is, when one agrees with others it is because using his (today we will say “his or her”) own (...) understanding he (or she) has arrived at the same conclusions. In Analects, XV, 16, he is quite explicit: “When a man is not in the habit of saying: What shall I think of this? What shall I think of this? I can indeed do nothing with him.” In this sense it is clear that he believes in moral autonomy and in human equality. Contrary to what a lot of scholars think, he is not a communitarian thinker; he is a philosopher who wants people to think by themselves. From this early time in the History of China he was proposing what Socrates defended in Athens; the importance of an internal moral conscience. So, if we can speak about Enlightenment in the Greek world, we cansay that Confucius was an enlightenment figure in the Chinese world. In this sense I believe we can conclude that Confucius is not a good example to argue for “Asian Values”. On the contrary, Confucius presents a universalistic theory that strengthens the position of the individual and of his or her self-cultivation. And if one of the objectives of education is that individuals can think by themselves, don’t we have to conclude that the political implication of this theory for the modern world is democracy? (shrink)

Past interpretations of the debate between Confucian meritocrats and Confucian democrats tend to center around abstract discussions of meritocratic versus democratic values. Yet, given the difficulties involved in settling on a common definition of “democracy” or “meritocracy,” such abstract discussions often end up talking past each other. In this article, I seek to offer a more precise framing of the debate by surveying the preferred institutional arrangement of one Confucian democrat, Sungmoon Kim, and that of two Confucian meritocrats, Daniel (...) Bell and Tongdong Bai. What I find is that contrary to the claim made by Kim’s theory of pragmatic Confucian democracy, the electoral representative government he favors does not enjoy a legitimacy premium over the kind of hybrid regime envisioned by Bell or Bai under pluralistic societal circumstances. I further demonstrate that it is also difficult for Confucian democrats to justify electoral representative government through either the Confucian ideal of political relationship marked by the public’s willing endorsement of their rulers, or a notion of political equality reconstructed from Mencius’s inclusionary ideal of sagehood. (shrink)

This article discusses the introduction of the Western concept of democracy to China from the late nineteenth century to the first two decades of the twentieth century and the formation of the Chinese concept of democracy. It suggests that the modern Chinese concept of democracy underwent two formational phases. At the beginning, the traditional elite tended to interpret Western democracy in terms of republicanism. During the New Culture Movement, the new generation of intellectuals began (...) a selective reconstruction of the notion of democracy, which resulted in the modern Chinese view of democracy characterized by popular participation and elections. With funding from several research grants, we have created a database of texts related to modern Chinese political thought. By carrying out a frequency count and meaning analysis of the terms gonghe and minzhu, this article examines the roots of the replacement of the concept of republicanism by democracy from the perspective of intellectual history. (shrink)

EDITOR’S ABSTRACTIn this article, Huang discusses the process whereby the concept of democracy was translated into the Chinese context during the transitional period of modern China. He asserts that while democracy was rooted in a pessimistic conception of human nature and epistemology in the West, Chinese intellectuals rather tended toward an optimistic view of both, a fact that brought them closer to the Rousseauian tradition of democratic thought. However, Huang also sees signs of a Millianism with (...) Chinese characteristics in the thought of Yan Fu and Liang Qichao. (shrink)

This essay aims to provide a philosophical analysis of the Chinese concept of cheng (sincerity) as a political virtue that could be incorporated to ground a duty of civility in liberal deliberative democracy. It is argued here that the virtue of sincerity is an essential feature of the liberal political culture taken for granted by Rawls in his theory of public reason. Ideal procedures and public discourse are not sufficient to generate civic virtues. The goal of this essay (...) is to show how, in the Chinese conception, the root of civility lies in the virtue of Cheng, which can provide the moral grounding for a duty of civility that is essential to sustaining the stability and overcoming the problem of defection from support of the common good in pluralistic states. (shrink)

In the 1920s, John Dewey's followers in China, led by his student Hu Shih, attempted to put his pragmatism into practice in their quest for democracy. This essay compares Hu Shih's thought, especially his emphasis on pragmatism as method, with Dewey's philosophical positions and evaluates Hu's achievement as a pragmatist in the context of the tumultuous times he lived in. It assesses Hu's claim that the means to democracy lies in education rather than politics, since democracy as (...) a way of life requires a cultural renewal beyond institutional changes. It argues that a problem‐centered approach to social change does not preclude radical action, even revolution. But pragmatism is against gratuitous use of violence in the service of wholesale and abstract ideals advocated by various “isms.” While Hu's experiment of democracy in China is a significant episode in the history of pragmatism, its “failure” does not prove that there are inherent flaws in the pragmatist method, that pragmatism is unviable for China. The failure needs to be understood in the context of the pragmatist conception of experiment, in which failures are to be expected; what is important is to learn from them to achieve better results in the next stage of inquiry. Hu Shih's pragmatism contains lessons for pragmatists and for those interested in the continued quest for democracy in China—the experiment continues. (shrink)

This paper explores both some of the concepts John Dewey exposed while in China in the 1920’s and considers why his idea of democracy did not thrive in China. In the lectures Dewey delivered in China he focused on the strength of democracy, from the perspective of political science, social science, philosophy and education. Dewey clarified the democratic way of thinking, doing and living to the Chinese people. Of these topics, he considered the philosophy of education and (...) social and political philosophy to be the most important. Through his speeches, he underlined the importance of reflective thinking and reasoning in constructing human intelligence and lively inquiries. In the early part of the 20th century, both Dewey’s pragmatism and Marx’s communism were honored and speculated. While both Dewey and Marx promoted similar aims for human beings, that is, the creation of a society for the common good, their means were substantially different. For Dewey, such a result could only be obtained by a gradual construction of communicative social relationships; for Marx, a radical revolution was necessary to get expunge the old currently dominant parties. With regards to their relationship to working for the common good, for many Chinese, Dewey’s philosophies and ideas were unclear, overly complicated, and inefficient, while Marx pointed out a concrete destination, a clearly designed and expedient wayto implement an egalitarian society. (shrink)

How much injustice and oppression must be tolerated before a revolution is justified? In theory, the United States’ political structure, by design, makes the question of revolution obsolete: by putting political power into the hands of the people via democratic mechanisms such as voting, the division of power among separate branches of government, and representative influence and control, there should be no need for revolution because everything the government does either has the consent of the people or is (relatively swiftly) (...) checked by their dissent. In practice, the United States’ political structure has failed to bring about such democratic justice. Given structural, systemic failures of justice (which promise to be ongoing), it is worth asking when, if ever, a revolution in the United States would be justified. To begin answering this question, we first turn to three traditional theories of revolution prominent in Western political theory, all of which have serious theoretical and practical problems, many of which are exacerbated by the contemporary American context in which our discussion is situated. We conclude that, if the aim of revolution is to bring about justice more equally enjoyed by all, then classic Western justifications of revolution are deeply flawed and possibly untenable. We propose a Confucian-inspired account of revolution, which promises to provide criteria for engaging in revolution that are neither solely directly democratic nor completely rights-based. This relational, virtue-theoretic account of revolution enables us to take into consideration not only the role of government, the nature of the ruler, and the nature of the governed, but also the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the governed. We contend that our proposal provides more, and better, resources for thinking through when, and under what conditions, a revolution would be justified in the contemporary United States. (shrink)

Confucianism has been historically intertwined with authoritarianism in general and monarchy in specific. Various contemporary attempts to reconcile Confucianism with democracy have yielded controversial results mostly due to the theoretical tension between the authoritarian character of the former and the liberal one of the latter. This article seeks to develop an alternative route to Confucian democracy by drawing from Huang Zongxi’s 黃宗羲 Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince. In this well-known work, Huang argues for a (...) form of limited government that is built upon laws, political protection of academic freedom, good institutional designs, and separation of governmental powers. While these features seem to qualify Huang only as a defective liberal, this article argues that they are in much coherence with the insights of republicanism concerning good governance. This article will argue that the republican themes embodied in Waiting for the Dawn can justify and support a particular form of Confucian republican democracy. (shrink)

During the thirty years of Construction, studies in the history of Chinese philosophy have achieved great results, but not a few problems still remain. Those problems such as the problem of the subject matter, characteristics, and scope of the history of Chinese philosophy, the problem of the relationship between the study of the history of philosophy and real politics, the problem of evaluating the history of the ancient philosophers and their thought systems, the problem of critically inheriting the (...) philosophical legacy, etc. may be subsumed under the general heading of the problem of the methodology of the history of philosophy, which in more concrete terms involves the question of how to use dialectical materialism and historical materialism in the study and synthesis of the history of the development of Chinese philosophical thought, revealing its objective laws. These problems have not been just discovered today. They have been discussed and debated now for a long time, but they have not yet been resolved. It could even be said that because of circumstances lacking in intellectual democracy, the more these problems were debated, the farther they strayed from the truth. The cause has been that the "high-level theoretical demands" of those such as Chen Boda and Guan Feng, who were continually cracking the whip and issuing warnings from their intellectual platform, did not allow you to really solve these problems. And in the hands of the "gang of four" the history of Chinese philosophy had even fallen to the level of being a tainted, filthy study of history. For this reason, as today we return to discussing the problem of the methodology of the history of philosophy, we must first use a proper line of thought to encourage intellectual, scholarly democracy and thoroughly liberate thought. Without such a premise, it will be impossible to fully examine and scientifically solve any philosophical social science problem at all. (shrink)

Mou Zongsan was one of the most important Chinese philosophers of the twentieth century, yet his political thought is given little attention. This is unfortunate, because his political philosophy presents significant challenges to liberal views on freedom and the basis for democracy. Mou rejects the liberal understanding of freedom as absence of interference, and instead argues for a limited conception of positive freedom in government that includes teaching basic moral values. He bases democracy on the Confucian idea (...) of respect for humanity's universal moral potential. At the same time, Mou also provides an alternative to many current conceptions of Confucian democracy, which favor pragmatist and communitarian interpretations. Mou's thought thus illustrates how Chinese conceptions of Confucian democracy frequently differ from those in English-language scholarship. The goal of this article is to examine how Mou creatively interpreted Confucian thought to develop a unique New Confucian theory of democracy that neither uncritically accepts liberalism nor discounts the importance of liberal features such as individual freedom and rights. It also considers major objections to Mou's view of democracy and his possible responses. (shrink)