Interdisciplinarity and Climate Change is a major new book addressing one of the most challenging questions of our time. Its unique standpoint is based on the recognition that effective and coherent interdisciplinarity is necessary to deal with the issue of climate change, and the multitude of linked phenomena which both constitute and connect to it. In the opening chapter, Roy Bhaskar makes use of the extensive resources of critical realism to articulate a comprehensive framework for multidisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity, transdisciplinarity and cross-disciplinary (...) understanding, one which duly takes account of ontological as well as epistemological considerations. Many of the subsequent chapters seek to show how this general approach can be used to make intellectual sense of the complex phenomena in and around the issue of climate change, including our response to it. Among the issues discussed, in a number of graphic and compelling studies, by a range of distinguished contributors, both activists and scholars, are: The dangers of reducing all environmental, energy and climate gas issues to questions of carbon dioxide emissions The problems of integrating natural and social scientific work and the perils of monodisciplinary tunnel vision The consequences of the neglect of issues of consumption in climate policy The desirability of a care-based ethics and of the integration of cultural considerations into climate policy The problem of relating theoretical knowledge to practical action in contemporary democratic societies Interdisciplinarity and Climate Change is essential reading for all serious students of the fight against climate change, the interactions between governmental bodies, and critical realism. (shrink)

This chapter is an edited transcription of an author-meets-critics session at the Truth 20|20 Conference, on Cheryl Misak’s book, Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers (2020, Oxford University Press). Misak provides a brief overview of Ramsey’s life and the remarkable philosophical significance of his work. Blackburn raises a biographical-philosophical question about the origins (in history and in Ramsey’s thought) of what is now called the ‘Ramsification’ of a theory, and whether this was novel with Ramsey or whether (...) the basic idea had appeared earlier in works by Newman and Russell. Hornsby raises questions about Ramsey’s work on truth, particularly to do with his stance on correspondence theories and endorsement of pragmatism. Hornsby further raises some skeptical concerns that a pragmatist account suitable for completing Ramsey’s project will ever be forthcoming. (shrink)

Frank Ramsey was a brilliant Cambridge philosopher, mathematician, and economist who died in 1930 at 26 having made landmark contributions to decision theory, game theory, mathematics, logic, semantics, philosophy of science, and the theory of truth. This rich biography tells the story of his extraordinary life and intellectual achievement.

Cheryl Misak offers a strikingly new view of the development of philosophy in the twentieth century. Pragmatism, the home-grown philosophy of America, thinks of truth not as a static relation between a sentence and the believer-independent world, but rather, a belief that works. The founders of pragmatism, Peirce and James, developed this idea in more and less objective ways. The standard story of the reception of American pragmatism in England is that Russell and Moore savaged James's theory, and that (...) pragmatism has never fully recovered. An alternative, and underappreciated, story is told here. The brilliant Cambridge mathematician, philosopher and economist, Frank Ramsey, was in the mid-1920s heavily influenced by the almost-unheard-of Peirce and was developing a pragmatist position of great promise. He then transmitted that pragmatism to his friend Wittgenstein, although had Ramsey lived past the age of 26 to see what Wittgenstein did with that position, Ramsey would not have liked what he saw. (shrink)

An underappreciated fact in the history of analytic philosophy is that American pragmatism had an early and strong influence on the Vienna Circle. The path of that influence goes from Charles Peirce to Frank Ramsey to Ludwig Wittgenstein to Moritz Schlick. That path is traced in this paper, and along the way some standard understandings of Ramsey and Wittgenstein, especially, are radically altered.

Frank Ramsey (1903-1930) is usually taken to be sympathetic to the Vienna Circle’s project. I will argue that this is not right. Ramsey was a pragmatist, and he put pragmatist objections to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, objections which also had the Vienna Circle as their target. Ramsey thought the Circle’s position (like Wittgenstein’s) was mistaken in that, instead of starting with human inquiry, it tried to construct the world out of elementary particulars and logic, and resulted in an unacceptable solipsism. This (...) paper traces the trajectory of Ramsey’s pragmatist thought, and its relationship to the early Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle. (shrink)

This paper views Bernard Williams through the lens of the pragmatist tradition. The central insight of pragmatism is that philosophy must start with human practice, in contrast to high theory or metaphysics. Williams was one of the twentieth century’s most able proponents of this insight, especially when considering the topics of ethics and the law. Williams never saw himself as a pragmatist, because he took Richard Rorty’s radical relativism to be the exemplar of the position. But I shall suggest that (...) had Williams seen himself as a more objective pragmatist, along the lines of C. S. Peirce, C. I. Lewis, or Frank Ramsey, he might have had the resources to settle vital issues on which he wavered, issues having to do with whether there is anything objective underpinning our deliberations. (shrink)

In the preface to this excellent book, Fraser MacBride says he decided to write it because he had "become convinced that there is far more to find out and far more to learn from the history of early analytic philosophy". He is right; the history of early analytic philosophy holds insights for us today, and most of them lie outside of what MacBride calls our "cartoon histories." In punchy prose, he mines gems from what one of his heroes, Frank (...) Ramsey, called "that great muddle the theory of universals."The subtitle of the book carries considerable weight. This is not just a much-needed genealogy of the theory of universals and particulars. It is a re-think of the beginnings of analytic philosophy. The standard... (shrink)

In 1925, the 22 year old Frank Ramsey read a provocative paper to the Apostles titled “On There Being No Discussable Subject”. Many of the papers presented to this ‘Cambridge Conversazione Society’ were not terribly serious, and most have left minimal trace. But after Ramsey died in 1930 just shy of his 27th birthday, this paper was pulled from his manuscript remains by Richard Braithwaite, and printed in the posthumously-published The Foundations of Mathematics, under the title “Epilogue”. A snappy (...) passage from it has been taken to express Ramsey’s view on ethics:most of us would agree that the objectivity of good was a thing we had... (shrink)

In this lecture I argue that it is not possible for social scientists or others engaged in making causal claims about the world to be neutral with respect to the question of what causation is. One need not be in possession of a full-blown account, but one must know whether or not, in saying that something is the cause of a given outcome, one intends to say that it has actively produced or generated that outcome. Following Brian Ellis, I refer (...) to accounts according to which the answer would be ‘No’ as ‘passivist’. One is free to be a passivist, but it is not possible to be neither a passivist nor an anti-passivist. (shrink)

A review of Cheryl Misak's biography of Frank Ramsey.

A book review of Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers, by Cheryl Misak (OUP, 2020).

Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.

There is no doubt about the relevance of Cheryl Misak's Cambridge Pragmatism, the accuracy with which she has brought to light documents, diaries, manuscripts, and letters, the readability of her writing and at the same time the strength of her theses. One of the many merits of her remarkable work is, I think, the light she sheds on how Ludwig Wittgenstein was exposed to pragmatism in 1929, chiefly thanks to Frank Ramsey, and on how pragmatist seeds continued to (...) shape his later work, in spite of his open aversion to the pragmatist Weltanschauung. In what follows, however, I will only briefly touch on the subject of Ramsey and Wittgenstein (on which I expanded elsewhere: Boncompagni 2016a:... (shrink)

No chance of seeing her for another fortnight and it is 11 days since I saw her. Went solitary walk felt miserable but to some extent staved it off by reflecting on |$\langle$|Continuum Problem|$\rangle$|1The occasion for this review article on the life and accomplishments of Frank Ramsey is the publication in the last eight years of three important books: a biography of Frank Ramsey by his sister, Margaret Paul, a book by Steven Methven on aspects of Ramsey’s philosophy, (...) and the recent biography of Ramsey written by Cheryl Misak. In a companion piece [Mancosu, 2020] I discuss Ramsey’s contacts with logicians in continental Europe and publish previously unpublished letters from Ramsey to Abraham Fraenkel and to Heinrich Behmann.1. INTRODUCTIONFrank Plumpton Ramsey (1903–1930) will be well known to the readers of this journal. His contributions to philosophy, mathematics, and economics have left a lasting legacy. In mathematical logic and philosophy of mathematics, Ramsey’s solution to the paradoxes by means of a simple theory of types [1926a] and Ramsey’s theorem in combinatorics (both finite and infinite [1930]) are among Ramsey’s most celebrated contributions. Ramsey is a key presence in accounts of Wittgenstein’s, Russell’s, and Moore’s lives and work. It is well known that it was Ramsey who translated the Tractatus into English and wrote what is still considered a very insightful review [1923] of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein mentioned the importance of his conversations with Ramsey in 1929 in Cambridge as having influenced his transition to the views presented in the Philosophical Investigations. Ramsey also contributed, in 1924, to the second edition of Principia Mathematica (see [Linsky, 2011]). While Ramsey’s friendship with Moore does not have an analogous concrete precipitate as the work on the Tractatus or Principia Mathematica, it is evident from the correspondence and other documents that Ramsey’s work in philosophy (truth, propositions, universals, etc.) influenced Moore. Of course, the direction of influence goes also the other way around. Wittgenstein, Russell, and Moore, among others, were essential in shaping Ramsey’s approach to philosophy. (shrink)

Book Symposium on Cheryl Misak's Cambridge Pragmatism: From Peirce and James to Ramsey and WittgensteinCheryl Misak's Cambridge Pragmatism is posited on the thought that the link between belief and action is a pragmatist hallmark. It is this central commitment that Misak sees running through the work of the towering figures of the two Cambridges—C.S. Peirce, William James, Bertrand Russell, Frank Ramsey, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. It is on this basis that Misak holds that these figures can be termed 'pragmatists.' (...) My objective in this comment is to make two arguments in light of Misak's hallmark thesis. The first argument is that if Misak is right, then the term 'Cambridge... (shrink)

Recent years have witnessed intensive efforts to specify which requirements ethical artificial intelligence (AI) must meet. General guidelines for ethical AI consider a varying number of principles important. A frequent novel element in these guidelines, that we have bundled together under the term explicability, aims to reduce the black-box character of machine learning algorithms. The centrality of this element invites reflection on the conceptual relation between explicability and the four bioethical principles. This is important because the application of general ethical (...) frameworks to clinical decision-making entails conceptual questions: Is explicability a free-standing principle? Is it already covered by the well-established four bioethical principles? Or is it an independent value that needs to be recognized as such in medical practice? We discuss these questions in a conceptual-ethical analysis, which builds upon the findings of an empirical document analysis. On the example of the medical specialty of radiology, we analyze the position of radiological associations on the ethical use of medical AI. We address three questions: Are there references to explicability or a similar concept? What are the reasons for such inclusion? Which ethical concepts are referred to? (shrink)

Institutions can be strong or weak. But what does this mean? Equilibrium theories equate institutions with behavioural regularities. In contrast, rule theories explicate them in terms of a standard that people are supposed to meet. I propose that, when an institution is weak, a discrepancy exists between the regularity and the standard or rule. To capture this discrepancy, I present a hybrid theory, the Rules-and-Equilibria Theory. According to this theory, institutions are rule-governed behavioural regularities. The Rules-and-Equilibria Theory provides the basis (...) for two measures of institutional strength. First, institutions that pertain to coordination games solve problems of information. Their strength is primarily a matter of the expected degree of compliance. Second, institutions that concern mixed-motive games solve problems of motivation. Their strength can be measured in terms of the weight people attribute to its rule. (shrink)

Environmental health research produces scientific knowledge about environmental hazards crucial for public health and environmental justice movements that seek to prevent or reduce exposure to these hazards. The environment in environmental health research is conceptualized as the range of possible social, biological, chemical, and/or physical hazards or risks to human health, some of which merit study due to factors such as their probability and severity, the feasibility of their remediation, and injustice in their distribution. This paper explores the ethics of (...) identifying the relevant environment for environmental health research, as judgments involved in defining an environmental hazard or risk, judgments of that hazard or risk's probability, severity, and/ or injustice, as well as the feasibility of its remediation, all ought to appeal to non-epistemic as well as epistemic values. I illustrate by discussing the case of environmental lead, a housing-related hazard that remains unjustly distributed by race and class and is particularly dangerous to children. Examining a controversy in environmental health research ethics where researchers tested multiple levels of lead abatement in lead-contaminated households, I argue that the broader perspective on the ethics of environmental health research provided in the first part of this paper may have helped prevent this controversy. (shrink)

Contents, We are the Church, New Congregationalism / Harold D. Hunter; Faustino Teixeira; Miroslav Volf. -- Healing and deliverance / Cheryl Bridges Johns; Vergil Elizondo; Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel. -- Tongues and prophecy / Frank D. Macchia; Hermann Ha ring; Michael Welker. --Praying in the spirit / Steven J. Land; Constantine Fouskas; David Power. -- Born again, baptism and the spirit / Juan Sepu lveda; James D. G. Dunn; Michel Quesnel.

"Der Beitrag verhandelt den Begriff des Muts und beginnt diese Verhandlung ausgehend von der Frage, wie eine Kategorie, die die Geschichte der Philosophie zu durchziehen scheint, gegenwärtig an Relevanz und Einfluss verlieren kann. Er identifiziert den Grund dafür in der aristotelischen Bestimmung des Muts als männlich-militärischer Tugend und setzt dieser Bestimmung in der Folge eine Neubestimmung entgegen, die zu denken versucht, was weiblicher Mut sein kann. The paper discusses the concept of courage, starting from the question of how it is (...) possible that a category, which seems to permeate the history of philosophy, currently loses its relevance and influence. It identifies the rea- son for this in the Aristotelian definition of courage as a male and military virtue, and subsequently confronts it with a new definition, trying to imagine what female courage could be like. ". (shrink)

This paper responds to the generous comments by Alexander Klein and Cheryl Misak on my “American Pragmatism and the Vienna Circle: The Early Years”. First, besides offering some clarification of my original thesis, I argue that Jerusalem was not liable to the anti-Spencerian criticisms by James that Klein adduces in the course of defending James against the charge of psychologism. Then I investigate the impact of Wittgenstein’s Ramsey-derived pragmatism, importantly foregrounded by Misak, on the Vienna Circle and argue that (...) it was mainly limited to Schlick but not recognized as pragmatist, also leaving unaffected the impact of James’s pragmatism on Frank, Hahn and Neurath specified in my original paper. That said, Klein’s and Misak’s comments add significantly to our understanding of long-neglected transatlantic philosophical connections in the early twentieth century. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the ways in which epistemic anxiety promotes well-being, specifically by examining the positive contributions that feelings of epistemic anxiety make toward intellectually virtuous inquiry. While the prospects for connecting the concept of epistemic anxiety to the two most prominent accounts of intellectual virtue, i.e., “virtue-reliabilism” and “virtue-responsibilism”, are promising, I primarily focus on whether the capacity for epistemic anxiety counts as an intellectual virtue in the reliabilist sense. As I argue, there is a close yet (...) unexplored connection between feelings of epistemic anxiety and the form of inference commonly known as “Inference to the Best Explanation” (IBE). Specifically, I argue that both the recognition that some fact requires an explanation—a necessary first step in applying IBE—and the subsequent motivation to employ IBE are typically facilitated by feelings of epistemic anxiety. So, provided IBE is truth-conducive the capacity for epistemic anxiety should count as an intellectual virtue in the reliabilist sense. After outlining my main argument, I address the challenge that the capacity for epistemic anxiety has the potential to be misleading. To respond to this challenge, I discuss how our recognition that a fact requires an explanation must in part be a species of practical knowledge, rather than theoretical knowledge. For the agent to skillfully distinguish between facts that require an explanation and facts that do not, she must develop the virtuous disposition to feel the appropriate amount of epistemic anxiety. Despite the many negative aspects associated with anxiety, as I conclude, being disposed to feel the appropriate amount of epistemic anxiety is ultimately good for us. (shrink)

This volume unites various contributions reflecting the intellectual interests exhibited by Professor Herman Parret (Institute of Philosophy, Leuven), who has continued to observe, and often critically assess, ongoing developments in pragmatics throughout his career. In fact, Parret's contributions to philosophical and empirical/linguistic pragmatics present substantive proposals in the epistemics of communication, while simultaneously offering meta-comments on the ideological premises of extant pragmatic analyses. In a lengthy introduction, an overview is provided of his achievements in promoting an integrated, "maximalist" pragmatics, as (...) well as of the links between his own work in philosophy of language and in semiotics and aesthetics. The remaining 12 essays address relevant pragmatic themes or look into the relation between pragmatics and neighboring disciplines. They deal with grammatical deixis (Brisard, Ikegami) and mood (van der Auwera & Schalley), performativity (Harnish, Holdcroft), speech-act types and their praxeological dimensions (Roulet, Van Overbeke), Wittgensteinian language games (Marques, Parisi), cultural and intercultural identities (Vandenabeele, Verschueren), and the visual arts (Wildgen). (shrink)

Was ist und wie funktioniert praktische Normativität? Können Soll-Sätze aus Ist-Sätzen abgeleitet werden? Gibt es so etwas wie objektive Werte und moralische Tatsachen? Oder beziehen sich normative Aussagen in Wirklichkeit auf mentale Vorgänge in den Subjekten? Welchen Geltungsanspruch haben normative Überzeugungen im Allgemeinen und moralische Überzeugungen im Besonderen? Welche Rolle spielen Wünsche, Emotionen und die (reine) praktische Vernunft? Erkennen wir moralische Regeln und Eigenschaften intuitiv? Beruht alle Moral nur auf Übereinkunft? Diese und weitere Fragen und Probleme sind heute Gegenstand einer (...) umfangreichen, interdisziplinär geführten Normativitäts-Debatte. Auf systematischer Ebene diskutieren Internalisten und Externalisten über das Wesen praktischer Gründe, Realisten und Antirealisten über den ontologischen Status praktischer Normen sowie Kognitivisten und Non-Kognitivisten über die Wahrheitsfähigkeit normativer Aussagen und die Art und Weise, wie das praktisch Gesollte erkannt werden kann. Geführt werden diese Debatten unter Rückgriff auf Positionen, die je nach Selbstverständnis der Teilnehmer aristotelisch, humeanisch, kantisch, utilitaristisch oder pragmatistisch sind. Dieser Band möchte dazu beitragen, Vertreter der unterschiedlichsten Konzeptionen praktischer Normativität in einen konstruktiven Dialog miteinander zu bringen. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Of Water and the Spirit: Ritual, Magic, and Initiation in the Life of an African Shaman. Malidoma Patrick Someé. New York: G.P Putnam's Sons, 1994. 311pp. $22.95 (cloth).

This paper argues that the deconstructionist reading of Heidegger does not take fully into account the subtleties of his account of temporality. These subtleties include the mutually effacing character of being and temporality which allows for the event of disclosure to happen. The paper concludes that Heidegger's version of temporality can be upheld without conflating it with a view of time defined merely as flux.

What is responsibility? -- Being responsible -- Being responsible in your community.