With the publication recently of two valuable studies on Attic demes, we are now more fully aware of what we know, and do not know, of the deme. With Osborne's work, we now have some idea of the tendency of Athenians to own and maintain property in the deme of origin, but the role of marriage in consolidating property in that deme is more difficult to assess. In contrast to Osborne's focus on the ancestral deme, this brief study will concentrate (...) on the deme into which the woman married; such a deme will be termed the deme of marriage or the marital deme. The study will focus particularly on the families who contracted more than one alliance for their kinswomen into the same outside deme and will emphasize the importance of siblings in securing and maintaining these alliances in the marital deme. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Family in Greek HistoryCheryl Anne CoxCynthia B. Patterson. The Family in Greek History. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998. 286 pp. 6 figs. Cloth, $35.The purpose of Cynthia Patterson's book is to view family structures and family interests and ideals in the historical development of the Greek polis. In her study she takes us through nineteenth-century scholarship, the worlds of Homer and Hesiod, and the societies of (...) Sparta, Gortyn, and Athens as well.In chapter 1, "The Nineteenth-Century Paradigm of Greek Family History," she explores how Bachofen, Fustel de Coulanges, Henry Maine, Louis Morgan, and Friedrich Engels theorized that matriarchy gave way to patriarchy, patrilineality, and agnation. In this context monogamy was the instrument of the patriarchal state, which subjugated women and forced them into the private sphere of the household. This paradigm saw its way into the studies of Grote, whose political history overlooked the contributions of women in Greece; and into those of Mahaffy, who emphasized the social inferiority of women. It is a paradigm that has also influenced, in the twentieth century, the seminal studies on the Greek family by Lacey and Pomeroy. Needless to say, Patterson attempts to dispel this paradigm.In chapter 2, "The Family in Homer and Hesiod," she emphasizes that there is no evidence of patrilineal clans in Homeric society. Public interest, rather, centered on marriage and the oikos, the individual household. In Hesiod the corporate clan was not heir to a man's possessions, and there is little attention given to lineage and ancestors.In chapter 3, "Early Greek Law and the Family," Patterson looks at early law in Sparta, Gortyn, and Athens. For Sparta, she concludes that Spartan marriages [End Page 153] were the result of traditional household strategy, that is, property devolving to legitimate children. For Gortyn, the household was the center of social and economic order. There is no evidence of evolution from a clan-based society to one of private property. For pre-Solonian Athens, again there is no evidence of clans, while the extended kin group of Athens, the anchisteia, was nonagnatic. Solon restricted the bastard, or nothos, from the household, a move which brought the oikos into clearer focus. Patterson ends her discussion by stating that the public interest in securing a husband for an heiress was articulated through the anchisteia.In chapter 4, "Marriage and Adultery in Democratic Athens," she turns her attention to how the polis was interested in the effects of adultery, or moicheia, on the household. She insists that although there was no formal definition of marriage, and although there were no certificates or registers, marriage was not vague because it was recognized through communally witnessed rituals. If marriage can be seen to have been a social process, we may dispel the widespread notion that it was vague. (On the other hand, I would counter, if we view marriage as social process, then during that process witnesses die or are called liars; marriage can come under attack.) Adultery received the public interest, she continues, because it was a violation of the women of the household--here clearly supporting the traditional definition of moicheia as pertaining to a man's kinswomen, not just his wife. This interconnection between household and polis is reflected by Plato's Laws, in which the state tries to reconcile its interest in the household with its concern for unruly passions.With chapter 5, "Adultery Onstage and in Court," Patterson turns her attention to certain tragedies, comedies, and orations. By focusing on the Oresteia she concludes that Clytemnestra's adultery was a crime against the household. In Sophocles' Electra, the playwright is pessimistic as to whether the killing of Aegisthus can restore the household, while Euripides, in his Electra, points out how adultery can contaminate the next generation. In his comedies Aristophanes feels that punishment against adultery is justified. In the orations the moichos, such as Alcibiades, Agoratus, or Timarchus, is viewed as having sinned against the polis. With Aristotle, however, we find that the philosopher has less interest in the public consequences of adultery.Aristotle's separation of household from politics is taken up again in chapter 6, "Public and... (shrink)

Andocides is generally not considered one of the best orators. To point up his flawed style, scholars have discussed a notoriously vindictive and humorous section in Andocides 1: in 124ff. Andocides describes the profligate lifestyle of his prosecutor, Callias III the Ceryx, the son of Hipponicus II and dadouchos of the Eleusinian Mysteries.

Mindsets are shifting where the work areas of the students vary. The class furniture will vary from size and shape of tables, to couches, to a variety of chairs. Students must have the freedom to make choices to take ownership of their learning. This means that mistakes will happen. The classroom should be a comfortable learning environment.

Currently, there is no authoritative credentialing process for individuals engaged in ethics practice, no accreditation system that sets minimum education standards for programs aiming to prepare these individuals for their work, and little evidence available that any particular training model is actually achieving its pedagogical goals. At the same time, a number of healthcare organizations and universities now routinely offer post-graduate programs, clinical fellowships and in-house training specifically devised to prepare graduates for ethics practice. However, while their numbers appear to (...) be growing, information about these programs is limited. In this paper, we describe the goals, content and strategies of three educational programs offered in Ontario, Canada. These case studies highlight the diversity of ethics education available to those who engage in ethics practice and underscore the need to take this variety into account in the development of future education standards that would specify minimally acceptable educational requirements. (shrink)

We agree with White, Jankowski, and Shelton (2014) that professionalization of health care ethics practice requires serious consideration of a written examination to assess core knowledge competenc...

Presents a plethora of approaches to developing human potential in areas not conventionally addressed. Organized in two parts, this international collection of essays provides viable educational alternatives to those currently holding sway in an era of high-stakes accountability.

In my dissertation I develop a series of guidelines for responsibly and respectfully navigating varying facets of aesthetic activity involving fat communities. I argue that fat people's engagement with the aesthetic can be used to foster community, resist anti-fat bias, and move towards fat justice. Moreover, I argue that considering representations and treatment of fat people in the production of art must be done carefully in order to avoid perpetuating negative stereotypes and anti-fat bias. My project aims to improve the (...) visibility of fat people, ensuring that fat communities can determine how and when they are seen in ways that affirm their identities and experiences. My project is broken down into four chapters, each of which tackles a different dimension of aesthetic engagement and activity. In the first, I develop a framework called "responsible aesthetic agency" for creators to use when depicting fat people in their work. I intend responsible aesthetic agency to be a way for creators to meet their bare minimum ethical obligations to fat people, and as such this framework is a precursor to Jeremy Fried's aesthetic allyship. I use this framework to argue that artists must attend to the narrative webs in which a work exists when designing their new work's narrative, and that fat people must be active participants in this design and in the realization of said narratives. My second chapter addresses how individuals can use aesthetic agency to advocate for themselves and their communities. I argue that beauty labor can be used to help dismantle anti-fat bias. Using Kathleen LeBesco's framework of agency and identity, coupled with Jeannine Gailey's assessment of the unique perception of fatness as simultaneously hypervisible and hyperinvisible, I argue that participants in the "Fuck Flattering!" movement shape their identities and advocate for fat communities by forcing society to acknowledge their visibility and worth. In my third chapter, I consider representations of fatness in popular media, arguing that we can best achieve fat visibility through centering imperfect representations of fatness. I use Anne Eaton's "Taste in Bodies and Fat Oppression" as a starting point. In this paper, Eaton argues that distaste for fat bodies has an affective element of disgust that we must address to mitigate anti-fatness. Eaton argues that we must habitually engage with vivid and engaging representations that encourage us to see fat bodies as likable and attractive. I argue that while this approach has worthwhile aims, it risks leaving behind those fat bodies which we cannot bring ourselves to see as likeable or attractive. To better combat our distaste for fat bodies, I argue that we must show fat people as complexly as we show thin characters onscreen, highlighting the pluralities of ways to exist as a fat person. Lastly, in my fourth chapter I discuss how to appropriately engage with marginalized communities as a member of a dominant group or identity. I examine the co-optation of the body positivity movement, outline the ethical harms that result from said co-optation, and discuss potential avenues for moving forward with the movement given its co-optation. I argue that in order to fully address the myriad levels of goals of the original body positivity movement, none of these three alternatives is sufficient, as each misses a crucial element of the original body positivity movement or asks participants to have too narrow of an attitude towards their own body. Given the shortcomings of these movements, I argue we should move forward from the body positivity movement’s co-optation by employing a modified framework of Aubrey Gordon’s concept of fat justice, one which also makes room to recognize the importance of fat people being able to experiment with beauty and see themselves as beautiful. (shrink)

This article studies Madame de Lambert's early eighteenth-century views on aging, and especially the aging of women, by contextualizing them in a twofold way: It understands them as a response to La Rochefoucauld's skepticism concerning aging, women, and the aging of women; It understands them as being closely connected to a long series of scattered remarks concerning esteem, self-esteem, and honnêteté in Lambert's moral essays. Whereas La Rochefoucauld describes aging as a decline of intellectual, emotional, and physical powers (...) and is suspicious of the mechanisms of esteem and self-esteem, Lambert develops a view of aging as offering the chance to become more independent of the judgment of others, especially the chance for women to become more independent of the judgment of men. As she argues, aging offers women the possibility of cultivating genuinely estimable intellectual and emotional qualities that attract the justified esteem essential for a stable friendship, as well as the opportunity to develop a form of self-esteem that is based on respect for one's own capacities of judgment. (shrink)

In Cameroon, a monumental "statue of liberty" is made from scrap metal. In Congo, a thriving popular music incorporates piercing screams and carnal dances. When these and other instantiations of the aesthetics of Africa and its diasporas are taken into account, how are ideas of beauty reconfigured? Scholars and artists take up that question in this invigorating, lavishly illustrated collection, which includes more than one hundred color images. Exploring sculpture, music, fiction, food, photography, fashion, and urban design, the contributors engage (...) with and depart from canonical aesthetic theories as they demonstrate that beauty cannot be understood apart from ugliness. Highlighting how ideas of beauty are manifest and how they mutate, travel, and combine across time and distance, continental and diasporic writers examine the work of a Senegalese sculptor inspired by Leni Riefenstahl's photographs of Nuba warriors; a rich Afro-Brazilian aesthetic incorporating aspects of African, Jamaican, and American cultures; and African Americans' Africanization of the Santería movement in the United States. They consider the fraught, intricate spaces of the urban landscape in postcolonial South Africa; the intense pleasures of eating on Réunion; and the shockingly graphic images on painted plywood boards advertising "morality" plays along the streets of Ghana. And they analyze the increasingly ritualized wedding feasts in Cameroon as well as the limits of an explicitly "African" aesthetics. Two short stories by the Mozambican writer Mia Couto gesture toward what beauty might be in the context of political failure and postcolonial disillusionment. Together the essays suggest that beauty is in some sense future-oriented and that taking beauty in Africa and its diasporas seriously is a way of rekindling hope. Contributors. Rita Barnard, Kamari Maxine Clarke, Mia Couto, Mark Gevisser, Simon Gikandi, Michelle Gilbert, Isabel Hofmeyr, William Kentridge, Dominique Malaquais, Achille Mbembe, Cheryl-Ann Michael, Celestin Monga, Sarah Nuttall, Patricia Pinho, Rodney Place, Els van der Plas, Pippa Stein, Françoise Vergès. (shrink)

In Cameroon, a monumental “statue of liberty” is made from scrap metal. In Congo, a thriving popular music incorporates piercing screams and carnal dances. When these and other instantiations of the aesthetics of Africa and its diasporas are taken into account, how are ideas of beauty reconfigured? Scholars and artists take up that question in this invigorating, lavishly illustrated collection, which includes more than one hundred color images. Exploring sculpture, music, fiction, food, photography, fashion, and urban design, the contributors engage (...) with and depart from canonical aesthetic theories as they demonstrate that beauty cannot be understood apart from ugliness. Highlighting how ideas of beauty are manifest and how they mutate, travel, and combine across time and distance, continental and diasporic writers examine the work of a Senegalese sculptor inspired by Leni Riefenstahl’s photographs of Nuba warriors; a rich Afro-Brazilian aesthetic incorporating aspects of African, Jamaican, and American cultures; and African Americans’ Africanization of the Santería movement in the United States. They consider the fraught, intricate spaces of the urban landscape in postcolonial South Africa; the intense pleasures of eating on Réunion; and the shockingly graphic images on painted plywood boards advertising “morality” plays along the streets of Ghana. And they analyze the increasingly ritualized wedding feasts in Cameroon as well as the limits of an explicitly “African” aesthetics. Two short stories by the Mozambican writer Mia Couto gesture toward what beauty might be in the context of political failure and postcolonial disillusionment. Together the essays suggest that beauty is in some sense future-oriented and that taking beauty in Africa and its diasporas seriously is a way of rekindling hope. Contributors. Rita Barnard, Kamari Maxine Clarke, Mia Couto, Mark Gevisser, Simon Gikandi, Michelle Gilbert, Isabel Hofmeyr, William Kentridge, Dominique Malaquais, Achille Mbembe, Cheryl-Ann Michael, Celestin Monga, Sarah Nuttall, Patricia Pinho, Rodney Place, Els van der Plas, Pippa Stein, Françoise Vergès. (shrink)

Plastik - einige Wahrnehmungen über Form und Gestalt aus Pygmalions bildendem Träume ist ein unveränderter, hochwertiger Nachdruck der Originalausgabe aus dem Jahr 1778. Hansebooks ist Herausgeber von Literatur zu unterschiedlichen Themengebieten wie Forschung und Wissenschaft, Reisen und Expeditionen, Kochen und Ernährung, Medizin und weiteren Genres. Der Schwerpunkt des Verlages liegt auf dem Erhalt historischer Literatur. Viele Werke historischer Schriftsteller und Wissenschaftler sind heute nur noch als Antiquitäten erhältlich. Hansebooks verlegt diese Bücher neu und trägt damit zum Erhalt selten gewordener Literatur (...) und historischem Wissen auch für die Zukunft bei. (shrink)

Human persons exist longer than a single moment in time; they persist through time. However, so far it has not been possible to make this natural and widespread assumption metaphysically comprehensible. The philosophical debate on personal identity is rather stuck in a dilemma: reductionist theories explain personal identity away, while non-reductionist theories fail to give any informative account at all. This chapter argues that this dilemma emerges from an underlying commitment, shared by both sides of in the debate, to an (...) ontology which that gives the priority to static unchanging things. The claim defended here is that the dilemma of personal identity can be overcome if we acknowledge the biological nature of human persons and switch to a process- ontological framework that takes process and change to be ontologically primary. Human persons are biological higher-order processes, rather than things, and their identity conditions can be scientifically investigated. (shrink)

Focusing on the corporate social responsibility (CSR) implementation process, we analyze how institutional complexity that arises from tensions between social and environmental elements and economic and technical concerns is managed by CSR managers. We further question how these micro-level processes interact with organizational-level processes over time. Our research is a 24-month qualitative process study in which we followed CSR managers. The study’s results allow us to distinguish between four strategies that CSR managers use to promote CSR implementation and to cope (...) with tensions. Our results further indicate that organizational characteristics influence the intensity with which these strategies are applied and that the intensity of strategy application affects organizational behavior in the course of time. Through the discussion of these findings, our study contributes to the research on micro-level processes that occur in response to complex institutional demands as well as to the development of a comprehensive, multilevel approach to CSR implementation. (shrink)

ABSTRACTContemporary accounts of knowing one’s own mental states can be instructively supplemented by early modern accounts that understand self-knowledge as an important factor for flourishing human life. This article argues that in the early modern French moralists, one finds diverging conceptions of how knowing one’s own personal qualities could constitute a kind of human excellence: François de la Rochefoucauld argues that the value of knowing one’s own character faults could contribute to an attitude of self-acceptance that liberates one from the (...) effort of deceiving oneself and others. Madeleine de Scudéry argues that knowing one’s own character faults could be an incentive for self-cultivation that leads to the development of character traits that are naturally good. Anne-Thérèse de Lambert concurs with Scudéry’s insight and develops it further. According to Lambert, self-knowledge is crucial for developing character traits that give rise to the natural right of bei... (shrink)

How many individuals are present where we see a pregnant individual? Within a substance ontological framework, there are exactly two possible answers to this question. The standard answer—two individuals—is typically championed by scholars endorsing the predominant Containment View of pregnancy, according to which the foetus resides in the gestating organism like in a container. The alternative answer—one individual—has recently found support in the Parthood View, according to which the foetus is a part of the gestating organism. Here I propose a (...) third answer: a pregnant individual is neither two individuals nor one individual but something in between one and two. This is because organisms are better understood as processes than as substances. With a special focus on the Parthood View, I explain why a Process View of pregnancy, according to which a pregnant individual is a bifurcating hypercomplex process, surpasses the substance ontological approaches. (shrink)

Sea-level rise (SLR) is a threat to coastal areas and there is growing interest in how social values, risk perception and fairness can inform adaptation. This study applies these three concepts to an urban community at risk of SLR in Botany Bay, Australia. The study engaged diverse groups of residents via an online survey. Cluster analysis identified four interpretive communities: two groups value work-life balance, are concerned about SLR and would likely engage in collective adaptation. The third group value everything (...) about Botany Bay and are active in organisations that could prove to be an important outreach. The fourth group were older men, disengaged from both SLR and policy but could respond to individual consultation and targeted communication. Thus, multifarious approaches can engage diverse communities in fair decision-making and transform community-facilitated adaptation. (shrink)

Testing assumptions proposed by Frenzel’s reciprocal model of teacher emotions (e.g., Frenzel, 2014 ), this study explored relations between teachers’ appraisals concerning the attainment and importance of their teaching goals, and their emotions. Specifically, we addressed teachers’ goals of high student performance, motivation, discipline, and high-quality teacher–student relationship and three key discrete emotions, namely, enjoyment, anger, and anxiety, during teaching. We had 244 secondary school teachers (70.1% female) self-report their goal attainment and importance appraisals and emotional experiences with respect to (...) up to three different classes they currently taught. Results from single- and two-level multivariate multiple regression analyses largely supported the relevance of the goal attainment appraisals for teachers’ emotions both on the between-person and the within-person level. Goal importance appraisals proved to be of secondary relevance. On the between-person level, those teachers who positively appraised the attainment of motivation, discipline, and teacher–student relationship quality proved to report more enjoyment and less anxiety and anger. On the within-person level, teachers reported enjoying teaching those classes more, which they perceived as better performing, more motivated and disciplined, and with whom they had a better relationship. Anger and anxiety were negatively linked to appraisals pertaining to the attainment of discipline and teacher–student relationship quality. Across both analysis perspectives, teacher–student relationship quality attainment showed particularly strong links with all three emotions. Because teachers’ subjective evaluations regarding student behaviors were shown to be highly relevant for their emotions, we conclude that teachers could be supported in modifying their emotional experiences through cognitive reappraisal. Interventions targeting teachers’ relationships with students, and their cognitive judgments thereof, seem particularly promising. (shrink)

Ask a non-philosopher whether it’s rational to be moral, and she will likely think the answer is relatively clear: intuitively, what is moral is often at odds with what is rational. For example, although giving a dollar to a needy stranger would be a moral thing to do, the rational thing to do would be to keep it for yourself. Among professional philosophers, by contrast, the answer is not so obvious. Philosophers have subtle views of rationality and morality. Seldom, if (...) ever, do they understand norms of rationality as straightforwardly implying that we single-mindedly pursue our own self-interest, narrowly construed, and seldom, if ever, do they understand norms of morality as straightforwardly implying that we should always help others, regardless of our circumstances. -/- Among philosophers, then, the proposal that it is rationally permissible, or even required, to be moral, is not dismissed out of hand in light of apparent counterexamples. I propose that philosophers should take the same open-minded attitude to the proposal that virtue is compatible with, or even necessary for, well-being. Philosophers have sometimes denied that virtue is necessary for well-being on much the same grounds that our envisioned person on the street dismissed the possibility that morality may be rationally required: by pointing out apparent counterexamples (Haybron 2007: 5–11; see Chapter 15 by Besser-Jones, this volume). But, just like the question “is it rational to be moral?” the question “is virtue compatible with, or even required for, well-being?” cannot be dismissed so easily, because apparent counterexamples depend on only intuitive, commonsense, pre-theoretical understandings of virtue and well-being. -/- Any claim about the relationship between virtue and well-being must take the form of a con- ditional—for example: if this account of virtue and this account of well-being are correct, then virtue is necessary for (or compatible with, or the best bet for achieving, etc.) well-being.2 This point sets the structure for this chapter. In this chapter, I will (1) sketch an account of virtue, (2) develop a specific sense in which one might argue that virtue is necessary for well-being, and (3) explore the prospects for the proposal that virtue is necessary for well-being, discussing some of the main accounts of well-being in turn. I will argue that on some (though not all) accounts of well-being, there is reason to think that, when we more fully develop an account of the (fundamental, direct, intrinsic) contributors to well-being, we may discover that virtue is indeed necessary for well-being. (shrink)