Informed consent is ethically incomplete and should be redefined as empowered consent. This essay challenges theoretical assumptions of the value of informed consent in light of substantial evidence of its failure in clinical practice and questions the continued emphasis on autonomy as the primary ethical justification for the practice of consent in health care. Human dignity—rather than autonomy—is advanced from a nursing ethics perspective as a preferred justification for consent practices in health care. The adequacy of an ethic of obligation (...) (namely, principlism) as the dominant theoretical lens for recognising and responding to persistent problems in consent practices is also reconsidered. A feminist empowerment framework is adopted as an alternative ethical theory to principlism and is advanced as a more practical and complete lens for examining the concept and context of consent in health care. To accomplish this, the three leading conceptions of informed consent are overviewed, followed by a feminist critique to reveal practical problems with each of them. The need for a language change from informed to empowered consent is strongly considered. Implications for consent activities in clinical practice are reviewed with focused discussion on the need for greater role clarity for all involved in consent—beyond and inclusive of the patient‐physician dyad, as the practice and improvement of consent is necessarily a transdisciplinary endeavour. Specific concrete and practical recommendations for leveraging nursing expertise in this space are presented. Perhaps what is most needed in the discourse and practice of consent in health care is nursing. (shrink)

This paper examines the resilience of farmers markets in Michigan to the system shock of the global COVID-19 pandemic, questioning how the response fits into market goals of food sovereignty. Adapting to shifting public health recommendations and uncertainty, managers implemented new policies to create a safe shopping experience and expand food access. As consumers directed their shopping to farmers markets looking for safer outdoor shopping, local products, and foods in short supply at grocery stores, market sales skyrocketed with vendors reporting (...) selling more than ever before, but the longevity of this change remains unclear. Our data collected via semi-structured interviews with market managers and vendors, and survey data from customers from 2020 to 21, suggest that despite the widespread impact of COVID-19, there is not sufficient evidence consumers will continue to shop at farmers markets at the rates they did in 2020-21. Furthermore, reasons consumers flocked to farmers markets do not align with market priorities for increased food sovereignty, as increased sales alone are not a sufficient driver for this goal. We question how markets can contribute to broader sustainability goals or serve as alternatives to capitalist and industrial modes of agricultural production, problematizing the role of markets in the food sovereignty movement. (shrink)

Those who do not exist cannot be harmed. If someone is not worse off than she otherwise would have been, she is not harmed. Together, these claims entail that the individuals in non-identity cases are not harmed, because no one who exists is made worse off. While these claims might be true at the individual level, their truth does not preclude our having harm-based concerns about future persons in general. These concerns are justified when we recognize the responsibility we have (...) over certain offices that persons come to fill. By positing an account of de dicto harm and arguing for its moral relevance, I provide a solution to the non- identity problem that coheres nicely with our intuitions regarding harm, responsibility, and obligations to future persons. (shrink)

Though largely a theoretical endeavour, environmental ethics also has a practical agenda to help humans achieve environmental sustainability. Environmental ethicists have extensively debated the grounds, contents and implications of our moral obligations to nonhuman nature, offering up different notions of an ‘environmental ethic’ with the presumption that, if humans adopt such an environmental ethic, they will then engage in less environmentally damaging behaviours. We assess this presumption, drawing on psychological research to discuss whether or under what conditions an environmental ethic (...) might engender pro-environmental behaviour. We focus discussion on three lines of scholarship in the environmental ethics literature, on 1) intrinsic value, 2) care ethics, and 3) the land ethic. We conclude by commenting generally on both the limits and transformative potential of an environmental ethic in its larger sociocultural context. (shrink)

We seek to bring Black bodies and lives into full view within the enterprise of Indigenous health research to interrogate the unquestioned good that is taken to characterize contemporary Indigenous health research. We articulate a Black bioethics that is not premised upon a false logic of beneficence, rather we think through a Black bioethics premised upon an unconditional love for the Black body. We achieve this by examining the accounts of two Black mothers, fictional and factual rendering visible the racial (...) violence Black bodies have been subjected to. We call for a Black bioethics that reimagines the Black body as beautiful and belonging—to both someone and somewhere. (shrink)

Pietsch, Chelsea In a claim of negligence, plaintiffs must be able to prove that they have suffered some sort of damage or loss. Proving damage is usually a straightforward task which involves making a comparison between the plaintiff's position before and after the alleged negligence. However, what damage has been done if a doctor's negligence results in the conception and subsequent birth of a child? Is it ever possible to conceive of life as damage? These questions must ultimately be (...) addressed in wrongful birth claims where parents seek compensation for the conception and/or birth of a life that would not have existed but for the doctor's negligent advice or treatment. However, they are not as easy for judges to answer as you may think. Judges have a duty to resolve such matters - not with reference to vague notions of 'common sense' or 'community interests' - but in accordance with established law. However, what if there is no statute or precedent that speaks on the matter? How should judges resolve such 'novel' issues? Can judges rely on 'common sense' or arguments about 'community interests' in these limited circumstances? The question of whether or not a child may be categorised as damage for the purpose of satisfying a claim in negligence is such an issue. In this essay I acknowledge that, in the absence of guiding legal rules and principles, judges have no choice but to resolve novel questions on grounds of policy considerations. I suggest, however, that a distinction should be made between legal and public policy and that reliance on the former, not the latter, may be used to assert that children are blessings, not injuries. While it may be morally desirable for the issue to end there, this is not the case. Legal policy has also developed the notion of reproductive autonomy in such a way that suggests the opposite may also be true. In an attempt to resolve these conflicting values, I propose the damage in wrongful birth cases is not the conception and/or birth of a child but rather a doctor's infringement on their patient's reproductive autonomy, which warrants legal recognition in the form of compensation. (shrink)

We’re often unsure what morality requires, but we need to act anyway. There is a growing philosophical literature on how to navigate moral uncertainty. But much of it asks how to rationally pursue the goal of acting morally, using decision-theoretic models to address that question. I argue that using these popular approaches leaves some central and pressing questions about moral uncertainty unaddressed. To help us make sense of experiences of moral uncertainty, we should shift away from focusing on what it’s (...) rational to do when facing moral uncertainty, and instead look directly at what it’s moral to do about moral uncertainty—for example, how risk averse we morally ought to be, or which personal sacrifices we’re morally obligated to make in order to reduce our risk of moral wrongdoing. And orthodox, expectation-maximizing, decision-theoretic models aren’t well-suited to this task—in part because they presuppose the answers to some important moral questions. For example, if approaching moral uncertainty in a moral way requires us to “maximize expected moral rightness,” that’s, itself, a contentious claim about the demands of morality—one that requires significant moral argument, and that I ultimately suggest is mistaken. Of course, it’s possible to opt, instead, for a variety of alternative decision-theoretic models. But, in order to choose between proposed decision-theoretic models, and select one that is well-suited to handling these cases, we first would need to settle more foundational, moral questions—about, for example, what we should be willing to give up in order to reduce the risk that we’re acting wrongly. Decision theory may be able to formalize the conclusions of these deliberations, but it is not a substitute for them, and it won’t be able to settle the right answers in advance. For now, when we discuss moral uncertainty, we need to wade directly into moral debate, without the aid of decision theory’s formalism. (shrink)

Almost one-third of all U.S. Americans believe that Jesus Christ will return to Earth in the next 40 years, thereby signaling the end of the world. The prevalence of this end-times theology has meant that sustainability initiatives are often met with indifference, resistance, or even hostility from a significant portion of the American population. One of the ways that the scientific community can respond to this is by making scientific discourse, particularly as related to sustainability, more palatable to end-times believers. (...) In this paper, I apply a historical–ecological framework, which emphasizes the interdisciplinary study of landscapes to understand long-term human–environment interactions, to three millennial religious groups that formed communes in nineteenth century America. The Shakers, Inspirationalists, and Mormons all blended deep beliefs in end-times theology with agricultural practices that were arguably more sustainable than those in use in the mainstream, and their ability to reconcile eschatology with sustainability provides us with potential lessons. By examining the history, doctrines, and agroecology of these nineteenth century communes, I propose communication strategies based in autonomy, institutional support, multigenerational narratives, and anthropocentricism as potential pathways for a more productive dialogue between advocates of sustainability initiatives and end-times believers in the modern United States. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IntroductionSchelling and the EnvironmentChelsea C. Harry (bio)Scientists overwhelmingly agree that climate change is anthropogenic, caused by our greenhouse gas emissions.1 Given the evidence that exists, we should be able to convince ourselves to change the everyday behaviors resulting in these emissions. If we hope to save ourselves, other animals, plants, and the environment from a devastating future, then why would we continue to use fossil fuels?The answer here is (...) not an easy one. And yet, the ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle, provides us with a possible cause. In his most famous work on ethics,2 Aristotle argued that being weak-willed, suffering from what he called, “akrasia,” is the reason we do things that we know we shouldn’t do. It is a condition that results when desire wins over reason. For example, I eat a chocolate bar when I know I should eat a salad because my desire for chocolate wins over what I have reasoned to be best for my health. Simply put, reason might be what distinguishes us from other animals and plants, but it is not always our most powerful faculty. It stands both to experience and to reason, then, that rational decision might not be what is going to get us out of this climate crisis. Then, what is?In this special issue, we hear from five contemporary scholars of the 18th–19th century German philosopher, F.W.J. Schelling, an oft-called “protean thinker” whose prolific, sometimes creative, and diverse works spanned over seventy years. A onetime roommate of Hegel and Hölderlin, Schelling’s works are lesser-known outside specialist circles, and yet one finds that his prescient insights continue to have much to offer. This is especially true vis-à-vis the climate crisis, as Schelling was the first post-Kantian philosopher to take nature seriously. He eschewed the modern, Kantian, and post-Kantian trend to focus on [End Page 1] ipseity, the self, and on what we as humans can rationally know. Instead, he returned to metaphysics and argued for a wholistic conception and experience of life—all life. For Schelling, humans are rational as an expression of nature, rather than as an exception to nature. As John Sallis put it so well as he argued for the Platonic influence in Schelling: “For what Schelling rewrites within the text of modern philosophy is a discourse on nature.”3 Sallis then reminds us that in Schelling’s 1809 text, Philosophical Investigations of the Essence of Human Freedom (“Die Freiheitschrift”), he openly criticizes post-Cartesian philosophy generally for its exclusion of nature; “All modern European philosophy since it began with Descartes has this common defect, that nature does not exist for it and that it lacks a living ground.”4 Schelling’s intention was to resolve the defect, and because of his efforts in this regard, his work has something to say to us about our relationship to the environment.The idea to think about what Schelling can offer us in our current climate crisis is hardly new. In 2014, the North American Schelling Society (NASS), hosted by Bruce Matthews and Bard College, thematized its third international conference on “Schelling in the Anthropocene,” asking scholars to think beyond modern philosophy’s legacy of the human/nature divide and to discuss Schelling’s contribution to the anthropogenic environmental crisis we currently face. Since then, published work on this topic includes: Bruce Matthews’s, “Schelling in the Anthropocene,”5 Christopher Lauer’s, “Confronting the Anthropocene,” 6 and Vincent Lee’s, “Schelling and the Sixth Extinction.”7 Other journals have published special issues on related topics, including McGrath et al. Schelling After Theory special issue of Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy, McGrath et al. The Many Faces of F.W.J. Schelling special issue of Analecta Hermeneutica, Tritten et al. Nature, Speculation, and the Return to Schelling special issue of Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, and Bahoh, et al. Philosophies of Nature special issue of Comparative and Continental Philosophy. While this is by no means an exhaustive list, other contemporary thinkers who have been part of this conversation include: Kyla Bruff, Charlotte Alderwick, Manfred Frank, Markus Gabriel, Iain Grant,8 Lore... (shrink)

The reception of the thought of René Girard in theological discourse has been anything but uniform. Some have praised his theory for its simplicity and the scope of its explanatory power, while others have critiqued its apparent negative anthropology and claim to universality. Girard is known for articulating what he has termed “mimetic theory” and, more controversially, for arguing that the mimetic desire particular to human beings leads to violence, which can only be attenuated by a sacrificial system that has (...) arisen alongside human culture. Girard has faced numerous critiques against his theory in general, and has received backlash for his suspicion of and subsequent distancing from, the language of sacrifice.... (shrink)

Adam Kolber argues against retributivist theories of punishment, based on considerations of moral uncertainty. In this reply, I suggest that Kolber’s argument will not have the implications he supposes, in part because, if it’s able to raise difficulties for retributivism, similar problems will arise for a wide variety of other approaches to punishment.

This article addresses meter in the Hurrian parables from Boğazköy. Bachvarova has characterized this text as having four stressed syllables per line; others have suggested that the pattern of unstressed syllables may also contribute to the meter, although the widely variable line lengths pose a problem for an isosyllabic meter. I offer evidence for a meter consisting of four stressed syllables per line, with one to three unstressed syllables between stressed syllables. I further reconcile a syllable-counting meter with the observed (...) variability in line length by positing that lines are in groups of two to three, forming semantic units. Within these groups, the average difference in syllable count between lines is significantly lower than it is between non-grouped lines. The similarity within groups of lines suggests that, despite apparent differences based on the orthography, lines within groups may have matched exactly in number of syllables. Postulating this exact match, I offer three phonetic interpretations of the orthography that build on phonological characteristics discussed by Wilhelm and Wegner : 1) an underlying glottal stop producing disyllabicity of sequences and potentially other plene vowel sequences as well; 2) elision at word boundaries where the first word ended with a vowel and the following word began with a vowel; 3) a monosyllabic realization of a word-internal sequence of a high vowel followed by another vowel. Such a syllable-counting meter provides a new line of evidence for the phonology of Hurrian as well as contributing to the metrical characteristics that can be found in poetry of the ancient Near East. (shrink)

Pietsch, Chelsea The definition and meaning of mercy from the point of view of life-ending decisions or euthanasia is discussed. The different ways in which mercy can be interpreted are highlighted.

This paper offers a new psychological reading of the Pyrrhonian Skeptic and their way of life (the so-called Skeptic Way). The Pyrrhonist, I suggest, has three peculiar psychological hallmarks: (1) she is psychologically compelled to inquire after the truth, (2) she is persistently and repeatedly disturbed by anomaly in the facts, and (3) she is able to achieve tranquility (_ataraxia_) as a result of suspension of judgment (_epochē_). This new psychological interpretation has two payoffs. First, it helps us resolve the (...) “inquiry problem”—how can the Pyrrhonist possibly engage in genuine inquiry into the truth, when it also seems to the Pyrrhonist that holding beliefs of any kind, but particularly evaluative beliefs, causes psychological disturbance? Second, it allows us to appreciate a new kind of value for Pyrrhonism, what I term _psychological value_. We can discern two distinct types of _ataraxia_, both a moderate type resulting from the simple, temporary cessation of inquiry and a more significant, enduring type achieved by failing to hold any evaluative beliefs. On the whole, the Pyrrhonist fares better than the non-Pyrrhonist by acquiring both forms of _ataraxia_ more regularly. (shrink)

Despite the prominent argument for equal educational opportunity for women inWe examine carefully Plato’s argument for the equal nature of women in.

This is a translation of the second chapter of F.W.J. Schelling's Abhandlungen zur Erlaüterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre. It is preceded by a brief introduction in which I situate the chapter within Schelling's oeuvre and suggest that it is not only an early articulation of Schellingian Naturphilosophie, but also prescient, anticipating Schelling's later positive philosophy.

This book is a contribution both to Aristotle studies and to the philosophy of nature, and not only offers a thorough text based account of time as modally potentiality in Aristotle’s account, but also clarifies the process of “actualizing time” as taking time and looks at the implications of conceiving a world without actual time. It speaks to the resurgence of interest in Aristotle’s natural philosophy and will become an important resource for anyone interested in Aristotle’s theory of time, of (...) its relationship to Aristotle’s larger project in the Physics, and to time’s place in the broader scope of Aristotelian natural science. Graduate students and scholars researching in this area especially will find the authors arguments provocative, a welcome addition to other recent publications on Aristotle’s Treatise on Time. ​. (shrink)

Horror movies have discovered an easy recipe for making people creepy: alter their eyes. Instead of normal eyes, zombies’ eyes are vacantly white, vampires’ eyes glow with the color of blood, and those possessed by demons are cavernously black. In the Academy Award winning Pan’s Labyrinth, director Guillermo del Toro created the creepiest of all creatures by entirely removing its eyes from its face, placing them instead in the palms of its hands. The unease induced by altering eyes may help (...) to explain the uncanny valley, which is the eeriness of robots that are almost—but not quite—human. Much research has explored the uncanny valley, including the research reported by MacDorman & Entezari, which focuses on individual differences that might predict the eeriness of humanlike robots. In their paper, they suggest that a full understanding of this phenomenon needs to synthesize individual differences with features of the robot. One theory that links these two concepts is mind perception, which past research highlights as essential to the uncanny valley. Mind perception is linked to both individual differences—autism—and to features of the robot—the eyes—and can provide a deeper understanding of this arresting phenomenon. In this paper, we present original data that links uncanniness to the eyes through aberrant perceptions of mind. (shrink)

Moral judgment has typically been characterized as a conflict between emotion and reason. In recent years, a central concern has been determining which process is the chief contributor to moral behavior. While classic moral theorists claimed that moral evaluations stem from consciously controlled cognitive processes, recent research indicates that affective processes may be driving moral behavior. Here, we propose a new way of thinking about emotion within the context of moral judgment, one in which affect is generated and transformed by (...) both automatic and controlled processes, and moral evaluations are shifted accordingly. We begin with a review of how existing theories in psychology and neuroscience address the interaction between emotion and cognition, and how these theories may inform the study of moral judgment. We then describe how brain regions involved in both affective processing and moral judgment overlap and may make distinct contributions to the moral evaluation process. Finally, we discuss how this way of thinking about emotion can be reconciled with current theories in moral psychology before mapping out future directions in the study of moral behavior. (shrink)

This paper sets out to put Kenneth Burke’s thought on language as representative of symbolic action into conversation with Aimé Césaire’s epic poem, Cahier d’un retour au pays natal. The paper is divided into three main sections that set the stage for Burke and Césaire’s work to converse. The first section lays out an overview of Kenneth Burke’s thought on language paying particular attention to his definition of man, understanding of symbolism and symbolic action, and thoughts on poetry and poetics. (...) The second section provides a working history of African philosophy, the Négritude movement, Césaire as a philosopher, politician, and poet, and provides an overview of main themes and intentions present in Cahier. The third section works to put Burke and Césaire into conversation by using Burke’s understanding of symbolic action and his notion of order and identification to examine key passages from Césaire’s Cahier. The paper works to present an informative and textured engagement between the work of Kenneth Burke and Aimé Césaire. (shrink)

A commentary on “Men and Abortion Decisions,” by John Hardwig, in the March‐April 2015 issue.

Nostalgia, a sentimental longing for one’s past, can serve as a resource for individuals coping with discomforting experiences. The experience of bereavement poses psychological and physical risks....

Our moral judgments are fallible, and we’re often uncertain what morality requires. I argue that, in the face of these challenges, it’s not only rational to use effective procedures for trying to be moral – we have a moral responsibility to do so, and being reckless when navigating moral uncertainty, is, itself, a form of moral wrongdoing. These strategic requirements present a large class of under-explored norms of morality. I use these norms to address moral and social questions concerning, for (...) example, interpersonal toleration, exceptions to moral rules in high-stakes cases, and principal-agent relationships (such as those between lawyers and clients). -/- (email for full text). (shrink)

In three studies, we examined food as an elicitor of nostalgia. Study 1 participants visualised eating either a nostalgic or regularly consumed food. Study 2 participants visualised consuming 12 foods. Study 3 participants consumed 12 flavour samples. Following their food experiences, all participants responded to questions regarding the profile of food-evoked nostalgia (i.e. autobiographical relevance, arousal, familiarity, positive and negative emotions) and several psychological functions (i.e. positive affect, self-esteem, social connectedness, meaning in life). Study 2 and 3 participants also reported (...) their state nostalgia. Results revealed that food is a powerful elicitor of nostalgia. Food-evoked nostalgia has a similar contextual profile to previously examined elicitors, but is a predominantly positive emotional experience. Food-evoked nostalgia served multiple psychological functions and predicted greater state nostalgia. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article considers the second treatise of Schelling's Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre, a lesser-known work from the early Schelling. Here, Schelling proposes to defend the critical position insofar as it purports to be a system based on human reason, but instead he issues a backhanded critique of the assumption on behalf of the critical philosophers to try and limit the bounds of pure reason by means of their own use of reason. Schelling then offers an alternative (...) way to think about the relationship of mind and matter in nature. This article argues that Schelling's actual explanation of the critical philosophy as a position founded by reasonable minds ultimately belies his promise to defend it, thus calling into question that Schelling's thought prior to 1800 was a mere reiteration of Kantian/Fichtean transcendentalism. (shrink)

Aristotle claimed that man is by nature social. Later philosophers challenged this assertion, questioning whether man is necessarily social or simply socialized. Ibn Bājja, a twelfth-century philosopher from Muslim Spain, and Martin Heidegger, a twentieth-century German philosopher, approached this question in paradoxical terms, claiming in their respective works that despite having been born into social origins (a necessary framework of existential and social conditions), human beings are able—and even mandated—to escape these origins, and thus society, to some degree. Through Ibn (...) Bājja’s book, The Governance of the Solitary, and a portion of Heidegger’s magnum opus, Being and Time, I present what each of these thinkers posit to be a person’s social origins, and the respective epistemological justifications they provide to suggest that man should work to depart from them. To conclude, I appropriate the claims of Ibn Bājja and Heidegger to address the “real world” plausibility and potential benefits—both to society and to man himself—of man’s departure from society. (shrink)

Limit Cinema explores how contemporary global cinema represents the relationship between humans and nature. During the 21st century this relationship has become increasingly fraught due to proliferating social and environmental crises; recent films from Lars von Trier's Melancholia (2011) to Apichatpong Weerasethakul's Uncle Boonmee Who Can Recall His Past Lives (2010) address these problems by reflecting or renegotiating the terms of our engagement with the natural world. In this spirit, this book proposes a new film philosophy for the Anthropocene. It (...) argues that certain contemporary films attempt to transgress the limits of human experience, and that such 'limit cinema' has the potential to help us rethink our relationship with nature. Posing a new and timely alternative to the process philosophies that have become orthodox in the fields of film philosophy and ecocriticism, Limit Cinema revitalizes the philosophy of Georges Bataille and puts forward a new reading of his notion of transgression in the context of our current environmental crisis. To that end, Limit Cinema brings Bataille into conversation with more recent discussions in the humanities that seek less anthropocentric modes of thought, including posthumanism, speculative realism, and other theories associated with the nonhuman turn. The problems at stake are global in scale, and the book therefore engages with cinema from a range of national and cultural contexts. From Ben Wheatley's psychological thrillers to Nettie Wild's eco-documentaries, limit cinema pushes against the boundaries of thought and encourages an ethical engagement with perspectives beyond the human. (shrink)

Discusses the concept of justice, its role in daily life, differing views of justice, how governments achieve justice, and individuals and organizations that have worked for justice.

My focus is on the contemporary astrobiological activity of Messaging ExtraTerrestrial Intelligence (METI). This intentional astrobiological signaling typically involves embedding digital communications in powerful radio signals and transmitting those signals out into the cosmos in an explicit effort to make contact with extraterrestrial others. Some who criticize METI express concern that contact with technologically advanced extraterrestrial life could be seriously harmful to Earth or humanity. One popular response to this critique of messaging is an appeal to causal impotence sometimes referred (...) to as the ‘Barn Door’ Argument—we are already engaged in many other detectable activities not intended for cosmic communication. If the Barn Door Argument is correct, then those who engage in messaging arguably have a moral excuse. They are permitted to continue messaging because there is no point in abstaining. I develop three ways in which the claim of causal impotence in the Barn Door Argument could be understood. I evaluate each of these in turn and demonstrate that only one is appropriate to contemporary messaging. However, this interpretation does not generate the moral excuse on which the proponents of the Barn Door Argument rely; thus, the argument fails. Finally, I entertain and respond to candidate objections. (shrink)

Theorizing the outcomes of future cities operated under the various business and technologies of different global corporations, How to Run a City Like Amazon and Other Fables offers not only an entertaining collection of ideas, but also a view to how else we might communicate research ideas and theory. Implicitly, the collection puts strain on the relevance of the academic publishing model for real-world research dissemination and public engagement. Being freely available online in PDF format on the independent publisher Meatspace (...) Press's website, and featuring a variously successful mix of fact and fiction, How to Run a City Like Amazon challenges notions of genre and form, as well as the hierarchies of high... (shrink)

This paper revisits the dynamic discussion about journalism’s role in representing and amplifying disability arts at the 2019 Cripping the Arts Symposium. Chronicling the dialogue of the “Representation” panel which included artists, arts and culture critics, journalists, and scholars, it reveals how arts and culture coverage contributes to the cultivation of disability, D/deaf, and mad art. Given that the relationship between journalism and disability communities continues to be fractured in Canada, speakers were invited to reflect on journalism and disability arts (...) in relation to their own engagement with media as subjects, authors, and critics of disability arts reviews. The methods for presentation were cripped in multiple ways to provide the fullest access possible. The panel concluded with examples of ableist fault lines in representation practices where the disabled figure is an absent “ghost” in journalistic representation, warnings against journalistic reliance on traditional and objective narratives, and a call for artists to claim and write their own stories. Ultimately, disabled, D/deaf, and mad artists need both control over artistic endeavours and output and influence over representation. This article reconnects journalism and disability communities, ultimately demonstrating that representation is a critical, co-constitutive process that can become more aesthetically and politically oriented toward social justice in its focus on disability, D/deaf, and mad arts. (shrink)

Pedigreed breeding often leads to severe health problems for, say, those dogs who exist as a result of the practice. It is also the case that virtually all of those unhealthy animals would not exist at all if it were not for the practice of pedigreed breeding. If those animals have lives worth living, then it follows that they are not harmed by the practice—assuming that a life worth living is better than no life at all. It would seem, then, (...) that the standard account of harm cannot account for the wrongness of our intentionally creating pets with lower welfare. I argue that there is an overlooked aspect of harm that, when coupled with our responsibilities as animal caretakers, entails that we ought to cease the practice of pedigreed breeding for the sake of future pets, even if many actual pets are not made worse off by the practice. (shrink)

Employing a constructionist framework of emotion, this study examines whether parental language during emotion belief discussions predicts parents’ self-reported beliefs about emotion and child emotion regulation (ER). 102 parents of children ages 8 through 12 participated in focus groups about emotion beliefs, and nine months later, completed questionnaires on their emotion beliefs and child ER. Focus group content was analyzed for positive and negative emotion talk, cognitive process talk, and an established linguistic marker of psychological distancing. Parents’ positive emotion talk (...) and parental linguistic distancing when discussing their child’s (but not their own) emotion experiences positively predicted beliefs about children’s emotional capabilities. Finally, negative emotion talk negatively predicted parental beliefs about children’s capacity to control their own emotions and the value of anger expression as well as child ER. Current findings contribute to our understanding of how parental communication patterns about emotions may influence emotion beliefs and child emotion development. (shrink)