Relearning and remembering are usually seen as two distinct cognitive processes in contemporary philosophy of memory. In particular, relearning is sometimes regarded as a kind of memory error. This paper aims to address two questions. First, is relearning a kind of memory error? Second, how to draw a distinction (if any) properly between relearning and remembering? My answer to the first question is a conditional ‘yes’—it depends on whether relearning can be falsidical and whether metacognitive monitoring counts as a part (...) of memory process. My answer to the second question appeals to a gradualist account, according to which the distinction between relearning and remembering is not an absolute yes-or-no affair, but a matter of degrees. (shrink)

Does ‘remembering that p’ entail ‘knowing that p’? The widely-accepted epistemic theory of memory answers affirmatively. This paper purports to reveal the tension between ETM and the prevailing anti-luck epistemology. Central to my argument is the fact that we often ‘vaguely remember’ a fact, of which one plausible interpretation is that our true memory-based beliefs formed in this way could easily have been false. Drawing on prominent theories of misremembering in philosophy of psychology, I will construct cases where the subject (...) vaguely remembers that p while fails to meet the safety condition, which imply either that ETM is false or that safety is unnecessary for knowledge. The conclusion reached in this paper will be a conditional: if veritic epistemic luck is incompatible with knowledge, then ‘remembering that p’ does not entail ‘knowing that p’. (shrink)

Zhu Xi is the most important of the twelfth-century neo-Confucianists. Some consider him second only to Confucius himself in his importance to Chinese philosophy as a whole, since it is his interpretation of Confucius that has been canonical since his lifetime. This short book, modeled after the Burton Watson "Basic Writings" volumes for Zhuangzi, Xunzi, and Han Feizi, is an accessible, one-volume introduction to Zhu Xi's influential philosophical system designed especially for course use. In "classifying" Zhu Xi's conversations in the (...) Classified Conversations of Master Zhu, Li Jingde dedicated the first thirteen chapters to conversations explaining his general philosophical system. Readers are introduced to his metaphysics of principle (li), psychophysical stuff (qi), spiritual beings (guishen), human nature (xing), mind-heart (xin), and emotions (qing); and to his program of self-cultivation-that is, the curriculum that Confucians should follow to attain moral perfection. Gardner argues that these chapters constitute the best overview of Zhu Xi's basic philosophical teachings, and selections from them form the basis of his volume. Occasionally, they are supplemented with passages from the Collected Literary Writings of Master Zhu and from Zhu's commentaries on the Classics. (shrink)

Memory is ordinarily taken to be one of the most fundamental sources of knowledge. However, memory sceptics argue that memory is unable to provide us with knowledge about the past. In the existing literature, there are two most discussed forms of memory sceptical arguments, namely, the argument from memory reliability and the argument from underdetermination. Correspondingly, the two most representative anti-sceptical proposals nowadays attempt to disarm the two sceptical arguments by employing explanationism and disjunctivism respectively. This paper will first illustrate (...) their defects: The explanationist response fails to explain why the common-sense explanation is preferable. Besides, it succumbs to the petitio principii fallacy. The disjunctivist response fails to establish that memorial experiences are factive in paradigmatic cases. After that, a novel solution will be proposed, according to which memory sceptical arguments are self-hollowing, viz, their conclusions deprive their premises of the foundation of plausibility. (shrink)

This paper purports to disprove an orthodox view in contemporary epistemology that I call ‘the epistemic conception of memory’, which sees remembering as a kind of epistemic success, in particular, a kind of knowing. This conception is embodied in a cluster of platitudes in epistemology, including ‘remembering entails knowing’, ‘remembering is a way of knowing’, and ‘remembering is sufficiently analogous to knowing’. I will argue that this epistemic conception of memory, as a whole, should be rejected insofar as we take (...) into account some putative necessary conditions for knowledge. It will be illustrated that while many maintain that knowing must be (1) anti-luck and (2) an achievement, the two conditions do not apply to remembering. I will provide cases where the subject successfully remembers that p but lacks knowledge that p for failing to meet the two putative conditions for knowledge. Therefore, remembering is not a kind of knowing but a sui generis cognitive activity. (shrink)

An orthodox view in epistemology holds that propositional knowledge is an absolute ‘yes or no’ affair, viz, propositional knowledge is ungradable. Call this view epistemic absolutism. This thesis purports to challenge this absolutist orthodoxy and develop an underexplored position—epistemic gradualism, which was initially proposed by Stephen Hetherington. As opposed to epistemic absolutism, epistemic gradualism argues that propositional knowledge can come in degrees. This thesis will examine motivations for endorsing absolutism and then, drawing on Hetherington’s original objections to absolutism, prove that (...) absolutism is ill-grounded. In particular, I will explain why the primary ground for insisting absolutism, to wit, linguistic evidence from ordinary English language, fails to entail that knowledge-that is an ungradable concept. After that, I will revisit Hetherington’s two versions of gradualist theories—both will be revealed to be defective. Moreover, the current model of the debate between absolutism and gradualism constructed by Hetherington will give rise to an equivocal attitude towards the gradability of knowledge. That is, there is a prevailing equivocal view which agrees that knowledge can be improved by virtue of better justification but denies that knowledge is, by and large, a gradable concept. This thesis proposes to remodel the debate between absolutism and gradualism by basing it on a dispute about whether knowledge has a cut-off point distinguishing knowledge from everything that falls short of knowledge. Succinctly put, whether propositional knowledge has a threshold. It will be argued that gradualism, so interpreted, should deny that knowledge has a threshold, and treat knowledge as a spectrum concept analogous to ‘red’, ‘warm’, and so forth. The theoretical merits of this new model of the debate and the reconstructed gradualism will be shown. With a better-constructed gradualist account of knowledge in play, I will demonstrate how gradualism enjoys advantages over absolutism by illustrating gradualism’s potential applications in solving epistemological issues that absolutism finds difficult to address. For example, issues related to epistemic luck, faultless disagreements, scepticism, and the relationship between different types of knowledge. (shrink)

Epistemic absolutism is an orthodox view that propositional knowledge is an ungradable concept. Absolutism is primarily grounded in our ungradable uses of “knows” in ordinary language. This paper advances a thorough objection to the linguistic argument for absolutism. My objection consists of two parts. Firstly, arguments for absolutism provided by Jason Stanley and Julien Dutant will be refuted respectively. After that, two more general refutation-strategies will be proposed: counterevidence against absolutism can be found in both English and non-English languages; the (...) linguistic argument for absolutism is subject to a methodological mistake as the linguistic usages of “knows” cannot accurately reflect its conceptual nature. Therefore, we should give epistemic gradualism, as opposed to absolutism, a more serious consideration. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to provide a new solution to the radical sceptical paradox. A sceptical paradox purports to indicate the inconsistency within our fundamental epistemological commitments that are all seemingly plausible. Typically, sceptics employ an intuitively appealing epistemic principle (e.g., the closure principle, the underdetermination principle) to derive the sceptical conclusion. This paper will reveal a dilemma intrinsic to the sceptical paradox, which I refer to as the self-hollowing problem of radical scepticism. That is, on the one (...) hand, if the sceptical conclusion turns out to be true, then the epistemic principle employed by sceptics would lose its foundation of plausibility; on the other hand, if the sceptical conclusion does not follow, then the sceptical problem would not arise. In either case, the so-called sceptical paradox cannot be a genuine paradox. This new solution has three theoretical merits: it is undercutting, less theory-laden, and widely applicable. (shrink)

Recently there has been extensive debate over whether “belief is weak”, viz, whether the epistemic standard for belief is lower than for assertion or knowledge. While most current studies focus on notions such as “ordinary belief” and “outright belief”, this paper purports to advance this debate by investigating a specific type of belief; memory belief. It is argued that (outright) beliefs formed on the basis of episodic memories are “weak” due to two forms of “entitlement inequality”. My key argument is (...) thus twofold. First, by rejecting the epistemic theory of memory, I argue that one can be entitled to belief but not to knowledge. Second, by scrutinising a recent defence of the belief norm of assertion, it will be demonstrated that belief is weaker than assertion, as long as we expect one to match words with deeds. (shrink)

The core thesis of anti-luck epistemology is the incompatibility thesis, that is, knowledge is incompatible with veritic epistemic luck. Traditionally, anti-luck epistemologists hold that there are two distinct types of veritic epistemic luck, viz, intervening luck and environmental luck. The former occurs when something luckily intervenes between the subject’s belief and the target fact, which renders the subject’s belief luckily true. The latter can be found in cases where the subject’s belief is luckily true when she is in an unfriendly (...) epistemic environment. This paper purports to show that there is another long-neglected type of veritic epistemic luck—I name it ‘interpretative luck’. It refers to the type of luck occurring when the subject accidentally chooses the correct interpretation of evidence and thus her belief is luckily true. I will demonstrate that no proper reasons can support the incompatibility between interpretative luck and knowledge. Instead, the price for insisting this incompatibility would be unacceptably high. Therefore, the existence of interpretative luck falsifies the incompatibility thesis of anti-luck epistemology. (shrink)

There is a substantial disagreement in the literature over whether ‘remembering’ is a normative concept. Some philosophers have attempted to defend the normativity of ‘remembering’ by highlighting its normative importance or its conceptual affinities with ‘knowing’ or ‘duties’. This paper will first reveal defects of these existing normativist arguments. After that, I will propose and defend a new normativist argument, according to which the concept ‘remembering’ is partly constituted by a paradigmatically normative concept, namely ‘rational’. To be more specific, I (...) argue that full possession of the concept of ‘remembering’ requires having an inclination to believe that ‘if S remembers that p, then S would be (at least defeasibly) rational in holding a memory-based belief that p’. This, according to a persuasive constitutive account of normative concepts, suffices to demonstrate the normative nature of remembering. (shrink)

Epistemic absolutism holds that knowledge‐that is ungradable, while epistemic gradualism argues the opposite. This paper purports to remodel the gradualism/absolutism debate. The current model initiated by Stephen Hetherington fails to capture the genuine divergence between the two views, which makes the debate equivocal, and the gradualist side lacks appeal. I propose that the remodeled debate should focus on whether knowledge‐that is a ‘threshold concept’ or a ‘spectrum concept’. That is, whether there is a threshold distinguishing knowledge from non‐knowledge. The reconstructed (...) model enjoys significant advantages as it enables the debate to be more balanced and philosophically interesting. (shrink)

I argue against mnemic reliabilism, an influential view that successful remembering must be produced by a reliable memory process. Drawing on empirical evidence from psychology and neuroscience, I refute mnemic reliabilism by demonstrating that: (1) patients with memory impairments (e.g., Alzheimer’s disease) can also successfully remember the past despite the unreliability of their corresponding memory processes; (2) some reliability-affecting factors (e.g., stress, divided attention, and insufficient encoding time) can render the memory processes of healthy individuals unreliable without preventing them from (...) occasionally resulting in successful remembering. Potential responses available for mnemic reliabilism are also evaluated. I show that those responses are susceptible to a challenge akin to the generality problem for process reliabilism. (shrink)

There is a substantial disagreement in the literature over whether ‘remembering’ is a normative concept. Some philosophers have attempted to defend the normativity of ‘remembering’ by highlighting its normative importance or its conceptual affinities with ‘knowing’ or ‘duties’. This paper will first reveal defects of these existing normativist arguments. After that, I will propose and defend a new normativist argument, according to which the concept ‘remembering’ is partly constituted by a paradigmatically normative concept, namely ‘rational’. To be more specific, I (...) argue that full possession of the concept of ‘remembering’ requires having an inclination to believe that ‘if S remembers that p, then S would be (at least defeasibly) rational in holding a memory-based belief that p’. This, according to a persuasive constitutive account of normative concepts, suffices to demonstrate the normative nature of remembering. (shrink)

Epistemological disjunctivism argues that one can have perceptual knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of factive and reflectively accessible rational support, e.g., one’s ‘seeing that p’. A well-known challenge to this view is the so-called basis problem of epistemological disjunctivism, which argues that one’s ‘seeing that p’ cannot constitute the rational support for one’s knowledge that p, as ‘seeing that p’ is just a way of ‘knowing that p’. The basis problem is taken to be based on (...) the entailment thesis, viz, ‘seeing that p’ entails ‘knowing that p’. Mainstream solutions to the basis problem take an approach rejecting the entailment thesis. This paper purports to reveal a common defect of those extant solutions. That is, they all fail to address the basis problem in the central domain of discussion of epistemological disjunctivism, i.e., what Pritchard refers to as ‘paradigmatic cases’. Moreover, even if they succeed in rejecting the entailment thesis in paradigmatic cases, they would also backfire on epistemological disjunctivism. (shrink)

An epistemological orthodox view holds that knowing that p is an absolute ‘yes-or-no’ affair rather than something that comes in degrees. The rising epistemic gradualist theory challenges this orthodoxy by arguing that knowledge-that is a gradable concept. The predominant form of argument for gradualism in the current literature is the argument from component, according to which knowledge is gradable because its various components (e.g., justification, belief, truth) are gradable. I will show that the argument from components involves a non-sequitur: the (...) alleged gradability of knowledge’s components cannot ensure the gradability of knowledge per se. The crux of this logical lacuna lies in that the argument neglects the external gradability of knowledge, viz, there is no clear-cut threshold between knowledge and lack thereof. The lacuna can be mended by seeing knowledge-that as a spectrum concept such that a more complete gradualist picture can be achieved. (shrink)

A large portion of our knowledge seems to rest on our memories, while memory scepticism poses challenges to our memory knowledge. This paper will delve into different forms of memory scepticism. The goal of this paper is twofold: First, drawing on Moon (2017) and Frise (2022), I compare and criticize various forms of sceptical arguments provided by them. Meanwhile, the two most threatening arguments are picked out: the Russellian argument and the argument from doubtful reliability. Second, I demonstrate that the (...) two arguments are essentially based on the closure principle and the underdetermination principle, respectively, and hence, Pritchard’s biscopic anti-sceptical proposal is applicable. A Pritchardean solution to the problem of memory scepticism will then be sketched out. (shrink)

It is epistemological orthodoxy that the object of propositional knowledge is the truth of propositions. This traditional view is based on what I call the ‘KT-schema’, viz, ‘S knows that p, iff, S knows that “p” is true’. The purpose of this paper is to reject the KT-schema. By showing the paradoxical upshot of the KT-schema and providing counterexamples to the KT-schema, this paper argues that ‘knowing that p’ is more than ‘knowing that “p” is true’. Consequently, we shall rethink (...) the object problem of propositional knowledge – if knowing that p is not merely knowing that ‘p’ is true, then what is indeed the object of propositional knowledge? I will also attempt to solve this problem by proposing a complementary answer: knowing that p requires at least knowing the truth of p, plus, understanding the content of p. (shrink)

An orthodox sceptical hypothesis claims that one’s belief that “I am not a brain-in-a-vat (BIV)” (or any other ordinary anti-sceptical belief) is insensitive. A form of sensitivity-based scepticism, can thus be constructed by combining this orthodox hypothesis with the sensitivity principle and the closure principle. Unlike traditional solutions to the sensitivity-based sceptical problem, this paper will propose a new solution—one which does not reject either closure or sensitivity. Instead, I argue that sceptics’ assumption that one’s ordinary anti-sceptical beliefs are insensitive (...) will give rise to self-contradiction. The orthodox sceptical hypothesis is thus revealed to be incoherent and arbitrary. Given that there is no coherent reason to presuppose our ordinary anti-sceptical beliefs to be insensitive, the argument for sensitivity-based scepticism can thus be blocked at a lower epistemological cost. (shrink)

Research based on the behavioral theory of the firm (BTOF) argues that firms will actively adopt strategic actions to respond to performance that falls below aspirations, that is performance shortfalls. However, most previous studies have focused on market-related strategic actions, paying less attention to the impact of performance shortfalls on non-market-related strategic actions, especially corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate social irresponsibility (CSI). In this study, we propose that firms facing performance shortfalls are likely to reduce CSR levels and increase (...) CSI levels. In addition, we also propose that board characteristics (board size, board age and board tenure) have a significant moderating effect on the above relationship. Empirical analyses based on an unbalanced panel data of China's listed firms from 2010 to 2018 show that our arguments are largely supported. (shrink)

Xi Chen explores the question of why there has been a dramatic rise in and routinization of social protests in China since the early 1990s. Drawing on case studies, in-depth interviews and a unique data set of about 1,000 government records of collective petitions, this book examines how the political structure in Reform China has encouraged Chinese farmers, workers, pensioners, disabled people and demobilized soldiers to pursue their interests and claim their rights by staging collective protests. Chen suggests that routinized (...) contentious bargaining between the government and ordinary people has remedied the weaknesses of the Chinese political system and contributed to the regime's resilience. Social Protest and Contentious Authoritarianism in China challenges the conventional wisdom that authoritarian regimes always repress popular collective protest and that popular collective action tends to destabilize authoritarian regimes. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose a method to design the pseudorandom number generator using three kinds of four-wing memristive hyperchaotic systems with different dimensions as multientropy sources. The principle of this method is to obtain pseudorandom numbers with good randomness by coupling XOR operation on the three kinds of FWMHSs with different dimensions. In order to prove its potential application in secure communication, the security of PRNG based on this scheme is analyzed from the perspective of cryptography. In addition, PRNG (...) has passed the NIST 800.22 and ENT test, which shows that PRNG has good statistical characteristics. Finally, an image encryption algorithm based on PRNG is adopted. In the encryption algorithm, the optimized Arnold matrix scrambling method and the diffusion processing based on XOR are used to obtain the final encrypted image. Through the evaluation of encryption performance, it is concluded that there is no direct relationship between the pristine image and encrypted image. The results show that the proposed image encryption scheme has good statistical output characteristics and security performance in line with cryptography. (shrink)

The outbreak of COVID-19 is a public health crisis that has had a profound impact on society. Stigma is a common phenomenon in the prevalence and spread of infectious diseases. In the crisis caused by the pandemic, widespread public stigma has influenced social groups. This study explores the negative emotions arousal effect from online public stigmatization during the COVID-19 pandemic and the impact on social cooperation. We constructed a model based on the literature and tested it on a sample of (...) 313 participants from the group being stigmatized. The results demonstrate: (1) relevance and stigma perception promote negative emotions, including anxiety, anger, and grief; (2) the arousal of anger and grief leads to a rise in the altruistic tendency within the stigmatized group; and (3) stigmatization-induced negative emotions have a complete mediating effect between perceived relevance and altruistic tendency, as well as perceived stigma and altruistic tendency. For a country and nation, external stigma will promote the group becoming more united and mutual help. One wish to pass the buck but end up helping others unintentionally. We should not simply blame others, including countries, regions, and groups under the outbreak of COVID-19, and everyone should be cautious with the words and actions in the Internet public sphere. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of ethical leadership on followers’ subjective and objective career success from a P-E fit perspective. Specifically, the mediating effects of demands-abilities fit, needs-supplies fit, and person-organization fit in the relationship between ethical leadership and employee subjective and objective career success were investigated. We collected two-wave data from 160 employees and used hierarchical regressions to test the hypotheses. The findings revealed that ethical leadership had a positive effect on employee career satisfaction, (...) mobility, and promotability. Moreover, employee demands-abilities fit mediated the relationship between ethical leadership and career mobility and promotability; needs-supplies fit and person-organization fit mediated the relationship between ethical leadership and employee career satisfaction. Theoretical and empirical implications were discussed. (shrink)

Understanding the implication of point cloud is still challenging in the aim of classification or segmentation for point cloud due to its irregular and sparse structure. As we have known, PointNet architecture as a ground-breaking work for point cloud process can learn shape features directly on unordered 3D point cloud and has achieved favorable performance, such as 86% mean accuracy and 89.2% overall accuracy for classification task, respectively. However, this model fails to consider the fine-grained semantic information of local structure (...) for point cloud. Then, a multiscale receptive fields graph attention network by means of semantic features of local patch for point cloud is proposed in this paper, and the learned feature map for our network can well capture the abundant features information of point cloud. The proposed MRFGAT architecture is tested on ModelNet datasets, and results show it achieves state-of-the-art performance in shape classification tasks, such as it outperforms GAPNet model by 0.1% in terms of OA and compete with DGCNN model in terms of MA. (shrink)

The original target tracking algorithm based on a single model has long been unable to meet the complex and changeable characteristics of the target, and then there are problems such as poor tracking accuracy, target loss, and model mismatch. The interactive multimodel algorithm uses multiple motion models to track the target, obtains the degree of adaptation between the actual motion state of the target and each model according to the calculated likelihood function, and then combines the updated weight values of (...) each filter to obtain a weighted sum. Therefore, the interactive multimodel algorithm can achieve better performance. This paper proposes an improved interactive multimodel algorithm that can achieve player tracking and trajectory feature matching. First, this paper proposes an improved Kalman filtering algorithm. This method is developed from the unbiased conversion measurement Kalman filter, which can obtain more accurate target state and covariance estimation. Secondly, using the parallel processing mode of the IMM algorithm to efficiently solve the data association between multiple filters, the IMM-IKF model is proposed. Finally, in order to solve the problem of low computational efficiency and high mismatch rate in image feature point matching, a method of introducing a minimum spanning tree in two-view matching is proposed. Experimental results show that the improved IMM-IKF algorithm can quickly respond to changes in the target state and can find the matching path with the lowest matching cost. In the case of ensuring the matching accuracy, the real-time performance of image matching is ensured. (shrink)

The aesthetic functional education of film art lies in the fact that Chinese people of their background in traditional culture, can be influenced and infected by truth, goodness, and beauty through excellent film works and develop empathy in the ritualized activity of watching movies. The animation film "30,000 Miles from Chang’an" combines historical narrative previous historical cultural and artistic aesthetics, presenting a colorful world of aesthetic education. The film is based on traditional poetry, and is conducive to unique narrative art (...) techniques, presenting history and reality to the audience to the extensive greatest. The audience cannot appreciate the prosperity of the heyday of the Tang Dynasty from the film pictures only appreciate the charm of Tang Dynasty poetry, which enhances the audience's understanding and recognition of Chinese traditional culture. This movie provides the audience with an animated film with an opportunity to explore information about the original history that is told as a true story through this film through the traditional culture of China and enrich the audience's aesthetic experience and cultural literacy. Interestingly, the film system of China and the socialist film system were established at this stage and exerted a continuous influence on the political, economic, social, and cultural fields. (shrink)

Information-sharing behavior is affected by identity recognition perception. The current study aims to delve into the impact of familiarity and anonymity on information-sharing behavior, and the mediating role of intrinsic motivations on WeChat Moments. We hypothesized a mediator role of intrinsic motivations in the relationship between an individual’s perceptions and information sharing. Based on the self-determination theory, a model was created and tested using a sample of 531 frequent users. In this study, these users were asked to use WeChat Moments, (...) the most popular mobile private social networking site in China. The results demonstrate the significance of familiarity and identifiability in an interpersonal relationship, when using social networking sites. Moreover, the influence of perceived anonymity on information-sharing behavior, which is entirely mediated by intrinsic motivation has been validated from an empirical perspective. Our findings extend previous studies by showing the totally mediated effect of perceived anonymity on information-sharing behavior on WeChat Moments and the influential mechanism of intrinsic motivation. The results will inform researchers about the importance of incorporating the interpersonal structural features and intrinsic motivation of social networking sites into future studies on online information-sharing behavior. Important ways to promote attention and share information involve building a familiar relationship with communities and equipping oneself with off-line relations. Final indications for future developments are provided, with a special emphasis on the development of these findings in various social networking sites contexts. (shrink)

Graffiti, as a form of artistic and social expression, has long been entangled in debates concerning its legitimacy, ethics, and cultural significance. Initially serving as a medium for creative expression and social communication, graffiti has evolved from an act of defiance to a widely recognized form of urban artistry. However, this transformation raises deeper philosophical and theological questions about the nature of artistic legitimacy, the moral implications of public space utilization, and the tension between transgression and sacred expression. Is graffiti (...) an act of rebellion against authority, or does it serve as a reflection of deeper existential and spiritual inquiries? Rooted in historical traditions of visual storytelling, from prehistoric cave paintings to religious iconography, graffiti occupies a unique space between vandalism and sacred art. Its presence in urban landscapes often symbolizes dissent and marginalized voices, yet it also engages with the broader philosophical discourse on freedom, moral agency, and the sanctity of public expression. The increasing acceptance of graffiti as a legitimate art form further complicates the boundary between crime and creative expression, raising ethical concerns about ownership, space, and cultural identity. This study explores graffiti’s evolution through a lens of religious and philosophical reflection, analyzing its role in shaping public consciousness, its intersection with ethical discourse on transgression and creativity, and its potential as a medium for spiritual and social transformation. By tracing graffiti’s historical roots, examining the debates surrounding its moral and aesthetic value, and considering its future trajectory in the democratization of public space, this paper argues that graffiti should not be viewed solely through the dichotomy of legality and illegality. Instead, it should be examined as an evolving cultural and philosophical phenomenon that challenges conventional notions of art, morality, and the human search for meaning in public expression. Future research should further explore graffiti as a contemporary manifestation of sacred and profane spaces, its parallels with religious artistic traditions, and its role in redefining ethical and spiritual engagement with the urban environment. (shrink)

The idea of conducting “upstream public engagement,” using nanotechnology as a test case, has been subject to criticism for its lack of any link to the political system. Drawing on the theoretical tools provided by Habermas, this article seeks to explore such a “link”, focusing specifically on the capacity of civil society organizations to distil, raise and transmit societal concerns in an amplified form to the public spheres at the European Union level. Based on content analysis and semi-structured interviews with (...) relevant actors, this article examines the evolution of CSO approaches towards nanotechnology over the past decade and investigates whether and how upstream public engagement could contribute to more vibrant public spheres and facilitate the formation of communicative power. The answer to these questions is twofold: on the one hand, moving public engagement “upstream” enables CSOs to be better informed and to become part of the debates more quickly. A “green alliance” is taking shape, which calls for more stringent regulation on nanomaterials. On the other hand, upstream public engagement has turned out to be unsuccessful in generating substantial and sustained interest. A number of CSOs have quit this field in frustration at the tokenistic engagement and out of fatigue after the intense lobbying battle for Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals. (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment & Responsibility, EarlyView.