In this highly original and important book, the author analyzes one of the fundamental questions of international relations: what causes war? Drawing on historical, statistical, and philosophical perspectives to produce an innovative theory, the author rejects the simplistic notion that war can be explained by some straightforward formula, yet demonstrates that there are basic similarities among the diverse origins of wars. Comparing various narrative accounts of the origins of wars, the author shows that enquiry into the causes of (...) war is inseparable from the question of responsibility. (shrink)

Since the beginning of its history philosophy deals with the question for the meaning of war. This question, however, was always understood as the question for the causes of war: Why is there war? Where does it come from? The article presupposes that only this question and the attempts to respond to it can shed light onto the interpretation of the historical reality of war, which is finally the only reason to reflect on its causation. The article refers to (...) a set of notions and texts, which belong to a discourse on war unfolding through the centuries of European thinking. These notions are: contradictions, body, justice, nature, right, politics, and morals. Even if this sequence is only one possible sequence of the philosophical reflection on warfare, I consider it to be one of greater importance. We see, how a plurality of causes creates a context, in which we could try to analyze actual events: For it is evident that no war has only one reason. And the article has finally one other intention, namely to show that probably every possible sequence of causes of war will have the same consequence. This con-sequence will be the final destruction of the world, the coming of the ash. (shrink)

In December 2019, President Trump pardoned Eddie Gallagher, a Navy Seal convicted of war crimes committed while serving in Iraq in 2017. Did Gallagher commit these crimes because he is a bad person, or were his actions the result of situational factors, such as stress and fatigue? These different explanations of Gallagher’s crimes reflect two ways of thinking about the causes of war crimes and how to prevent them: character-based views and situationist accounts. Character-based views attribute war crimes to (...) failures of individual military personnel to live up to military virtues, whereas situationist accounts focus on external factors (such as battlefield stress) as the primary cause of war crimes. While both situationist and character accounts highlight important aspects of the causes of war crimes, in this article I argue that they do not account for the fact that war crimes can (and have) come to be seen as compatible with military virtues. By not acknowledging this fact, these accounts of war crimes fail to address the fact that some of the most egregious war crimes occurred not because military personnel failed to embody the military virtues of their institution, but because they embodied them all too well. (shrink)

The article presents a systemic and historical view of wars taking into account the generalization of modern concepts about their nature and causes. The generalization is produced on the basis of a political and sociological apparatus with such basic concepts as: "concerns" of different types (including "interests", "motives", "goals", "values"), an extension of the challenge-response scheme (A. Toynbee), positive and negative "reinforcement" (Thorndike-Skinner), and "support structures" (A. Stinchcombe). All the concerns related to wars are based on the social universals (...) of M. Weber and M. Mann: power-security, power-dominance, prestige-dignity-legitimacy, and wealth-resources-access to resources. Geopolitical concerns (regarding control over territories), symbolic stakes, and concerns with maintaining the international order are considered. The prioritization of relevant concerns changes in both the long run of social evolution and the short run of dynamics of interactions. The article considers spiral dynamics as a dynamic model of the cause of unintended wars "that no one wanted." Relevant decisions and actions of rulers and elites related to war are analyzed in the context of fast and slow thinking according to D. Kahneman. The general principles of social interaction and social evolution allow us to judge the conditions that increase and decrease the probability of new wars, as well as the regularities of the dynamics and termination of wars. Empirical generalizations of the characteristics of wars in world history made by modern specialists (S. Van Evera, G. Cashman, etc.) are discussed. It is shown what role wars play in the co-evolution of social, mental, and techno-natural orders, as well as in social evolution in general. (shrink)

Tolstoy’s War and Peace is a magnificent work; as any such work, it can be read in a variety of ways and be found to teach us important lessons at a number of independent levels. Here I want to look at it as an extended meditation on historical causality---and, by implication, on causality, period. So I will not be taking it for granted that it is a novel; I will be treating it as if it were an outcome of the (...) conceptual reflection philosophers engage in---though, when all is said and done, I will be able to shed light on some of its structural features as a novel. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Causes of WarBertrand RussellRussell’s authorship of this anonymously published entry in An Encylopaedia of Pacifism (London: Chatto & Windus, 1937), pp. 12–13, has only just come to light, thanks to the recent sale at auction of a letter to him from Aldous Huxley. If this determination had been made earlier, the text would have featured in Papers 21. In acknowledging receipt of “Causes of War” on 14 (...) December 1936, Huxley, the volume’s editor, also wondered whether Russell would like to examine his subject “at greater length—say in 1,000 words” (internet print, ra3 1,850). The original editorial plan, to which Russell must have adhered, allocated a single page to each topic, which ranged alphabetically from “Armaments, Private Manufacture of”, to “Women in Modern War, Position of”. But as Huxley explained, such compression was “impossible” for some subjects. Russell evidently declined the offer (no reply is extant), for his published contribution amounted to 300 words only. It nevertheless lucidly distils a complex and contested issue. In the spirit of the publishing enterprise Russell had joined, “Causes of War” is also somewhat didactic. Yet there is little hint of either the psychological predispositions towards war he also regarded as crucial, or the absolute pacifist doctrines he had recently embraced and elaborated in Which Way to Peace? (1936). The latter ground, however, was well covered elsewhere, in entries on “Force” and “Non-Violence”, most explicitly, but also in those disparaging armed revolution, for example, or the use of sanctions to enforce international law.The two cross references at the end of Russell’s entry are probably not authorial. The text presented below is the only known version, from the cheap softcover edition of the Encyclopaedia (priced 6d ) published by Chatto & Windus under the auspices of the Peace Pledge Union—the British pacifist group of which both Huxley and Russell were sponsors, along with, in all likelihood, other of the work’s anonymous contributors. [End Page 83]CAUSES OF WARThe main causes of war are of three kinds (1) the pursuit of wealth, (2) the pursuit of glory, (3) the advocacy of a creed. Usually all three are combined in varying proportions, as, for example in the Book of Joshua. The economic motive has various forms:a. Occupation of fruitful territory—e.g. Whites and Indians in United States.b. Plunder—e.g. Romans in Asia Minor; Cortez and Pisarro.c. Trade—e.g. English and Dutch in seventeenth century.d. Markets and fields for investment—most modern imperialist wars.e. Raw materials—e.g. Japan in China, France and Germany as regards Lorraine.The notion of glory is usually dynastic or governmental—for example, the ancient Assyrians and Persians, and eighteenth-century wars so far as the Continent of Europe is concerned. But it can be made popular by propaganda, and always has been made so since the French Revolution.Creed wars may be religious or political; usually they are both. They almost always also have economic motives. The early Mohammedans, for example, had economic motives (a) and (b); the Protestants wished to secure church lands and revenues; and so on. The English Civil War combined religious and political motives in equal measure. The Albigensian crusade was, on the part of the instigators, more economic than political. The French revolutionary wars, the American Civil War, and the various civil wars since 1815, involved important politico-economic issues, and were all, in a greater or less degree, creed wars.The main causes predisposing to modern war are: first, the competition between States for markets and raw materials; secondly, the competition between classes as regards the distribution of the national wealth. These two causes are intertwined, because different governments stand for different economic systems. (See Economic Reform and Pacifism; Education and Peace.) [End Page 84]Bertrand RussellIntroduced by andrew g. bone Russell Research Centre / McMaster U. [email protected] © 2023 Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster University... (shrink)

Hobbesian war primarily arises not because material resources are scarce; or because humans ruthlessly seek survival before all else; or because we are naturally selfish, competitive, or aggressive brutes. Rather, it arises because we are fragile, fearful, impressionable, and psychologically prickly creatures susceptible to ideological manipulation, whose anger can become irrationally inflamed by even trivial slights to our glory. The primary source of war, according to Hobbes, is disagreement, because we read into it the most inflammatory signs of contempt. Both (...) cause and remedy are therefore primarily ideological: The Leviathan's primary function is to settle the meaning of the most controversial words implicated in social life, minimize public disagreement, neutralize glory, magnify the fear of death, and root out subversive doctrines. Managing interstate conflict, in turn, requires not only coercive power, but also the soft power required to shape characters and defuse the effects of status competition. (shrink)

All wars have causes; some have pretexts. When Polybios distinguishes between the cause, the pretext, and the beginning of war, his language sounds curiously modern. When he summarizes the causes of the Second Punic War the modern reader is not so satisfied. The war was due, in his opinion, to the indignation of Hamilcar Barca, who had to accept peace when he could have continued fighting in Sicily; to the anger of the Carthaginians, when they were forced to (...) surrender Sardinia; and to the good fortune which attended their armies in Spain. A more recent account differs from Polybios not only on matters of detail. ‘It is true that it was Hannibal's attack on Saguntum, undertaken in full knowledge of the almost inevitable consequences, that precipitated the war, but the historian must decide that, so far as attack and defence have a meaning in the clash between states, the balance of aggression must incline against Rome.’. (shrink)

This article challenges the tendency exhibited in arguments by Michael Ignatieff, Jeremy Waldron, and others to treat the Law of Armed Conflict as the only valid moral frame of reference for guiding armed rebels with just cause. To succeed, normative language and principles must reflect not only the wrongs of ‘terrorism’ and war crimes, but also the rights of legitimate rebels. However, these do not always correspond to the legal privileges of combatants. Rebels are often unlikely to gain belligerent recognition (...) and might sometimes have strong moral reasons to exceed the rights of regular combatants. Where this gives rise to tensions between morality and the LOAC, a decision is needed to determine which to follow. Setting aside the idea of suppressing just war theory altogether in favour of a more purely regulatory approach to war and reforming law in the direct light of moral theory, I question the attempt by Waldron to argue that moral weight of the legal conventions at the heart of the LOAC trump any moral reasons there might be for breaching them. Even if non-combatant immunity is, as Waldron suggests, a deadly serious convention, I argue that war is justified only if pursued for the sake of deadly serious causes which may even be serious enough to oblige agents to break the law. A political theory of the ethics of war is needed to mediate between the moral and legal in such cases where they cannot be reconciled directly. (shrink)

It might reasonably be argued that this question is one of those historical problems which form excellent subjects for the writing of essays, but which are far too complex to admit of a decisive answer, and consequently are much better left alone. No one man is responsible for a war between great powers, and the motives which influence the vast number of people, whose consent is necessary, can rarely, if ever, be identical. It is therefore comparatively easy to argue against (...) any given motive which is asserted to be the one and only reason. Certainly the writer would make no effort to rake up the ashes of this controversy, were it not that in Dr. Grundy's recent work on Thucydides a new and ingenious theory is put forward concerning the vera causa of the Peloponnesian War. (shrink)

It is no doubt often salutary, even a necessary condition of progress, that we should shelve the great problems of a preceding generation without precisely solving them; but a controversy may be shelved too soon, and I fear this may have been the case with the great ‘Thucydidean question’ as it stood in the days of Wilamowitz and Schwartz. The analysts said some wild things, and their disagreements about early and late passages, or about the range of an editor's activities, (...) have been found disheartening. For these or other reasons, since Schadewaldt's brief and stimulating book of 1929, scholars seem mostly to have stopped dissecting the text and taken to examining the qualities which Thucydides displays all through it. (shrink)

In an article in the Classical Quarterly of October, 1911, Mr. Guy Dickins criticized certain views put forward by Mr. Cornford, by the writer of the article on Greek History in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, and by myself, on the statements made by Thucydides as to the cause or causes of the Peloponnesian War. Mr. Dickins makes three statements as to the views which he supposes me to hold. Not one of the three statements is even approximately correct.

A just cause for war is a type of wrong that may make those responsible for it morally liable to military attack as a means of preventing or rectifying it. This claim has implications that conflict with assumptions of the current theory of just war.

The article examines the provisions of the catechisms of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church regarding the war and its challenges, as well as the defense of the Motherland. A comparative analysis of relevant thematic instructions in the Catechism “Christ is our Easter” (published in 2011), the Catechism for youth “We walk with Christ” (published in 2021) and the “Catechism of the Christian Warrior” (published in 2022) was carried out. It was determined that the provisions of the UGCC's own fundamental doctrinal (...) documents, its Catechisms, regarding the problems of war and defense of the Motherland, were formed, clarified and supplemented according to the circumstances and needs of the time. The catechism of the UGCC “Christ is our Easter” contains general Christian considerations on the subject under consideration, which are principled, establishing, and refer to how civilized peoples should conduct themselves. The catechism for youth, created in the previous years of the undeclared Russian Federation's “hybrid” war against Ukraine, covers the issues related to the war and the defense of the Motherland in a substantive way and closer to current Ukrainian realities, although it still has some idealistic approach. The Catechism of the Christian Warrior, the preparation of which was completed and the publication was carried out during the full-scale military offensive of the aggressor, is a set of thorough and competent advises for Ukrainian soldiers, where things are called by their names, and there are no provisions that can cause doubts due to experience and be problematically achievable for implementation. Therefore, it is concluded that especially this Catechism, together with and in addition to the two previous ones, is a useful and timely contribution of the UGCC to the instruction of Ukrainians during the war, and therefore to Ukraine's victory over the enemy. (shrink)

The conduct of hostilities is very bad for the environment, yet relatively little attention has been focused on environmental military ethics by just war theorists and revisionist philosophers of war. Contemporary ecological concerns pose significant challenges to jus in bello. I begin by briefly surveying existing literature on environmental justice during wartime. While these jus in bello environmental issues have been addressed only sparsely by just war theorists, environmental jus ad bellum has rarely been tackled within JWT or the morality (...) of war. In line with the theme of this special issue, I focus my discussion of war and the natural environment primarily on the jus ad bellum level. I set out with the presumption against the use of force, and its possible exceptions. The principal question raised is whether environmental harm can trigger a new justification for war. Beyond just cause, I consider what might be a proportionate response to “environmental aggression,” or negligent harm to nature. The use of force is clearly justified in response to military attacks, against the natural environment or otherwise. Where harm to nature or its inhabitants are not caused by military aggression, just war theory criteria point in favor of responding via measures short of war. Finally, I suggest that responding by means that are not themselves harmful to nature serves to fulfill the further jus ad bellum criterion of “right intention.”. (shrink)

Moral agential neuroenhancement can transform us into better people. However, critics of MB raise four central objections to MANEs use: It destroys moral freedom; it kills one moral agent and replaces them with another, better agent; it carries significant risk of infection and illness; it benefits society but not the enhanced person; and it’s wrong to experiment on nonconsenting persons. Herein, I defend MANE’s use for prisoners of war fighting unjustly. First, the permissibility of killing unjust combatants entails that, in (...) cases where MANE is equally or more likely as termination to reduce moral recidivism in unjust combatants, then MANE is morally justified. Second, the relevant infections and illnesses caused by MANE are less bad than death, so MANE leaves unjust POWs better off than the alternative. Third, just as incarceration is often permissible despite benefitting society but not the incarcerated, the same holds for unjust POWs. Fourth, we should accept a broader construal of “benefit” that includes moral benefits. Thus, 3 and 4 are false when applied to unjust POWs. Fifth, medical experimentation likely to help nonconsenting persons is sometimes permissible. Because MANE is likely to help unjust POWs irrespective of their consent or lack thereof, its use is permissible. Sixth, basic principles of proper medical care support the use of MANE on unjust POWs as pro tanto morally obligatory. I conclude that militaries should therefore begin to employ MANE for unjust POWs. (shrink)

‘Organisational failure’ is central to medical ethics. In the National Health Service (NHS), we usually examine failures at hospital level. We have had around 100 hospital inquiries since the first in 1969, into Ely Hospital, Cardiff. This year, we had the Ockenden Report into Shrewsbury and Telford Hospital. Last year, we had the Outram Inquiry into West Suffolk Hospital. In 2020, the James Inquiry into Ian Paterson. And, before that, Morecombe Bay, Gosport War Memorial, Mid Staffordshire, Liverpool Community Health, Winterbourne (...) View, Anthony Ledward, Stoke Mandeville, Bristol Royal Infirmary and so on. As Taylor says, these reports teach us clinical failure usually has an institutional setting and that blaming individuals overlooks working ‘culture’. They have also led to: (a) new regulatory bodies to manage, investigate and improve NHS standards, (b) new codes of conduct to mandate reporting of serious accidents—backed up by the Whistle-blower’s Act and explicit statutory duties of disclosure, (c) root cause analysis to encourage consistent investigations so we can learn from reliable data and (d) new ‘Speaking Up Guardians’ and a Patient Safety Commissioner to encourage informal discussion about patient safety. What is so surprising is how little these inquiries and reforms have achieved on the larger scale. Of course, we must …. (shrink)

In this chapter, I add to the new body of philosophical literature that addresses African approaches to just war by reflecting on some topics that have yet to be considered and by advancing different perspectives. My approach is two-fold. First, I spell out a foundational African ethic, according to which one must treat people’s capacity to relate communally with respect. Second, I derive principles from it to govern the use of force and violence, and compare and contrast their implications for (...) war with other recent African views and especially with some prominent accounts in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. I argue that the approaches to military conflict prescribed by the Afro-communal ethic and its derivative principles differ, and in some prima facie plausible ways, from the views of thinkers that include Thomas Hurka, David Luban, Larry May, Jeff McMahan, and Michael Walzer. In particular, I conclude that the African perspectives ground some interesting and under-explored approaches to just causes for war that merit consideration, including the ideas that military conflict could in principle be justified in order to protect a people’s culture or to correct an aggressor’s vice. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Origins of War: A Catholic Perspective by Matthew A. ShadleJoyce Kloc BabyakThe Origins of War: A Catholic Perspective Matthew A. Shadle Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011.246pp. $29.95Matthew A. Shadle’s The Origins of War, in Georgetown University Press’s Moral Traditions series, makes a genuinely fresh contribution to contemporary scholarship on Christianity and war. This is not a work on the morality of war, just war theory, or (...) alternatives to that theory. Instead, Shadle directs our attention to Christian understandings of war’s origins. Through a rich and careful analysis of the early tradition’s treatment of the origin of war in light of its overall understanding of human existence, Shadle sets the stage for his examination of the decentering of Christianity in modernity and the implication of this for assumptions about humanity and human possibilities that became encoded in both political theory and Catholic writings on war. In the process, Shadle offers us not only a primer on international theory but also an account of the transition of fundamental liberal assumptions from their beginnings as anti-Christian to their twentieth-century embrace by Catholic theologians and a thoughtful new approach to understanding the causes of war today.Making his case serially, Shadle moves from biblical and early Christian thought on the origins of war to the Middle Ages and onward. He argues that the overriding context for a Christian understanding of the origins of war is the Christian worldview that sees human life in a theological framework (25), and he locates the impulse to war in the human struggle between sin and grace (5). With modernity, however, war has come to be seen as a result not of sin but of unresolved conflicts, clashes of interest and power—all viewed in materialist rather than transcendent terms. Moving into the twentieth century, he demonstrates that Roman Catholic writings on war, including church writings, have adopted a liberal framework for articulating positions on the causes of war. This liberal framework has in turn supported the hope that international institutions will be able to resolve the conflicts of interests that lead to war by fostering dialogue across divides but at the same time have also led away from the more fundamental Christian view that sees war as the result of sin.Shadle criticizes the liberal optimism that has infused Catholic writings with the hope that international structures will succeed at preventing war. Linking [End Page 215] that optimism to dominant versions of international relations theory, he argues instead for a new version of international relations theory known as “constructivism.” This theory challenges presumptions of earlier versions of international relations theory and sees war as the result of “a clash of the identities, interests, and norms of states... all of which are socially constructed by both domestic and international factors” (86). In Shadle’s view, constructivism is a theory that is more compatible with traditional Christian views on the origin of war as well as contemporary Catholic theology because it focuses on clashes in socially constructed (though not entirely relativistic) identities and values as causes of war. Avoiding war on this view will take more than relying on international structures such as the United Nations to resolve conflicts by translating conflicting interests into terms erroneously presumed to be accessible to all.The Origins of War: A Catholic Perspective deserves serious study. From its careful account of the biblical and early Christian understanding of the origin of war to its analysis of the ways that liberal assumptions came to undergird Catholic writings on war, it sheds new light on how assumptions about the origins of war influence all aspects of our thinking about war. And it is in the end provocative. Shadle’s historicist orientation reminds us that the liberal optimism that undervalued the role of sin as a cause of war was itself tempting because of the challenges of the time and dominant political theories. Yet Shadle’s preference for constructivism is no less historically shaped. Liberalism’s fit with Catholic understanding of human existence has certainly been strained, but it remains to be seen whether a historicist, constructivist set of assumptions can do... (shrink)

The article is aimed at a philosophical study of the foundations/causes of war. Its background is a definition of the Russian-Ukrainian full-scale warfare as an irreconcilable existential conflict of the "Russian world" between the "Russian world" and the national world of Ukraine. Methodological specific of the article is reliance on the everydayness of a boundary situation of war to define the cultural world, as well as cultural identity as concepts that get existential meaning. Philosophy potential is used to clarify (...) the key question for today's war discourse about why the parties to the conflict are determined to take military actions, but not to resolve the conflict through peace negotiations. The answer is sought by comparing two ontologies of the world that there are in Habermas' communicative theory of action and Heidegger's fundamental ontology. Each of them provides an alternative concept of understanding and, accordingly, different foundations for its truth theory. This also provides a perspective, firstly, to distinguish two alternative positions of participants in the discourse of war – "internal" one as "being in a culture at war" and another of an "external" observer. Secondly, this distinction helps to explain why war as a conflict of cultural worlds could be considered from different philosophical points of view, namely from the position of the philosophy of communicative action, as well as in the context of existential analysis of being. Examination of the explanatory potential of both approaches is carried out on the basis of a comparison of different concepts of the world, fundamental to each of philosophers. It is done by clarifications of basics of two ontologies of understanding and, accordingly, of their theories of truth. The article indicates that the theory of truth in communicative philosophy is based on the regulative idea of the unity of the objective world. Instead, with reference to examples from Charles Taylor and Jean-Luc Nancy, the author claims that the fundamental ontology can be reinterpreted in terms of the plurality of being-in-common of people in sovereign cultural worlds. Accordingly, the interaction of representatives of different cultural identities under certain political conditions, i.e., official propaganda can turn into a radical disagreement of different existential understandings of the meaning of being, into a war of cultural worlds that cannot be overcome by just negotiations at the level of competent communication. The article ends with an open question about searching for ways to unify the mentioned ontological approaches. (shrink)

The centrality of glory, contempt, and revengefulness to Leviathan’s account of war is highlighted by three contextual features: Hobbes’s displacement of the traditional conception of glory as intrinsically intersubjective and comparative; his incorporation of the Aristotelian view that revengefulness is provoked by expressions of mere contempt; and the evolution of his account between 1640 and 1651. An archeology of Leviathan’s famous chapter thirteen confirms that Hobbes’s thesis throughout his career was that disagreement is the universal cause of war because prickly, (...) glory-seeking humans view its expression as a sign of contempt: although Leviathan abandons Hobbes’s previous argument that war is primarily rooted in vainglorious individuals pursuing domination, Leviathan’s ‘glory’ argument for war is a descendent of the older ‘comparison’, not ‘vanity’, argument. (shrink)

The article discusses the diversity of the subject field of the philosophy of war as well as the internal integrity of the discipline, united by the focus on the philosophical understanding of the phenomenon of war. The author shows the role of H. Lloyd, who influenced K. Clausewitz, H. Jomini and their followers’ interpretation of the meaning and content of the subject area of the philosophy of war. In the abundance of specific topics addressed by philosophers of this field, the (...) following topics should be noted: the issue of victory and defeat and their interpretation as well as the issue of historical memory. This problem is projected on contemporaneity and reflects the deep connection between peace and war, the dialectic of their relations. The interpretation of certain military and political events is of real interest in the light of the processes of distortion of historical events that have radically affected the course of history. An analysis of the motives and causes of this process is supposes to reconstruct an objective picture of relations between the subjects of international relations in various periods of history. The author finds answers in already existing concepts that have been developed in our time. It is important to mention the project of the French philosopher Charles Renouvier, who put forward the concept of “uchronia,” which became the starting point for the consideration of historical events in the “subjunctive mood.” This genre of historiosophical fantasy was picked up by famous followers – by the former President of France V. Giscard d’Estaing and others. The article provides eyewitness accounts of historical events (in particular, the campaign of Napoleon in Russia) that are historical facts and help to understand the true state of things. The article demonstrates that the philosophical study of the problem of war is important for understanding the origins and essence of relations arising from the transition between peaceful and military states. (shrink)

This article investigates the formal purpose of declaring wars for Hugo Grotius. Grotius was adamant that states always use justification in a duplicitous way to conceal their real motivation to go to war. As such, the purpose of declaration is not to assert the just cause of war. Rather, what any public declaration does, is provide recognition that confers legal validation to the disputing parties. The legal rules of war were described by the law of nations and occasionally permitted states (...) to commit certain ‘war crimes’ with impunity. For Grotius, this was not a moral sanctioning of such crimes but rather a means to prevent the occurrence of wars, which such endless repudiations risked causing or exacerbating. Grotius’s concern for the effects of war is conspicuous; and recounting his maxim that war should always be a last resort, this article argues that declaration of war has a distinct moral purpose for Grotius. In fact, public declaration of war is, together with constraints on the conduct of war, a ‘principle of moderation’ Grotius insists should be upheld in times of war. Declaration of war gives the parties avenues to seek peace and reconciliation, and, therefore has a humanitarian purpose for Grotius by ultimately seeking to prevent the disparaging effects of war. Even in wars that do not demand a public declaration, such as those regulated by natural law such as punitive wars or defensive wars, Grotius cautions that declarations of war are advisable. The remaining lingering issue is how to engage with unlawful enemy combatants, such as pirates - a distinct problem that the international community still faces with increasing regularity. Grotius was certainly aware of the legal consequences of recognising belligerency we cannot possible hope to build moral relations with, and, this article claims, ‘unlawful’ enemies ultimately demarcates the boundary of international society. (shrink)

A Defence of Chemical Warfare J B S Haldane Originally published in 1925 "Mr Haldane’s brilliant study." Times Leading Article "A book to be read by every intelligent adult." Spectator. This volume discusses the use of chemical weapons during the Second World War from the scientific viewpoint of the eminent bio-chemist, J B S Haldane and attempts to predict their use in conflicts of the future. 84pp Paris or the Future of War B H Liddell Hart Originally published in 1925. (...) "…a gem of close-thinking and deduction." Observer Liddell Hart was one of the twentieth century’s most respected military historians. In this volume he analyzes the causes of war, and the future of war, as well as examining the air, naval and army weapon and the evolution of "New Model Armies". 84pp. Janus: The Conquest of War A Psychological Inquiry William McDougall Originally published in 1927 "Among all the volumes in this series, none, I think is so weighty and impressive as this…" Evening Standard This volume covers lessons of the Great War, the Causes of War, Preventives of War, League to Enforce Peace, and International Air Force as a Prevention of War. 132pp Sinon Or the Future of Politics Edgar Ansel Mowrer Originally published in 1930 A striking analysis of politics and their future from a national and international standpoint. 86pp Typhoeus Or the Future of Socialism Arthur Shadwell Originally published in 1929 "Invaluable, a miracle of compression and illumination."Yorkshire Post This volume provides an analysis of the aims and prospects of Socialism, both in its political and economic aspects. 112pp. (shrink)

The Problem of War argues that the different perspectives of Christians and Darwinians on the nature and causes of warfare reveal them to be playing the same game, offering not so much scientific or empirical explanations but rival value-laden analyses, suggesting we have less a science-religion conflict and more one between two rival religious visions - Christianity and a form of secular Darwinian humanism.

Nearly four decades after a revolution, experiencing one of the longest wars in contemporary history, facing political and ideological threats by regional radicals such as ISIS and the Taliban, and having succeeded in negotiations with six world powers over her nuclear program, Iran appears as an experienced Muslim country seeking to build bridges with its Sunni neighbours as well as with the West. "Ethics of War and Peace in Iran and Shi'i Islam explores the wide spectrum of theoretical approaches and (...) practical attitudes concerning the justifications, causes and conduct of war in Iranian-Shi'i culture. By examining primary and secondary sources, and investigating longer lasting factors and questions over circumstantial ones, Mohammad Jafar Amir Mahallati seeks to understand modern Iranian responses to war and peace. His work is the first in its field to look into the ethics of war and peace in Iran and Shi'i Islam. It provides a prism through which the binary source of the Iranian national and religious identity informs Iranian responses to modernity. By doing so, the author reveals that a civilization-conscious soul in modern Iran is re-emerging. (shrink)

The article deals with the concept of war in modern political realism. Realism claims to have an original notion of war, which distinguishes it from empirical war studies and from other schools in international relations theory. Realism does not have a strict formal definition of war like empirical studies do, it focuses on understanding the causes and nature of war instead. The distinction between realism and other international relations theories like idealism, Marxism or constructivism consists in the realist notion (...) of politics. Realism understands politics as an eternal struggle for power that underlies all social life, while war is the most intense manifestation of this struggle. Thus, the possibility of war cannot be eradicated. The article shows the normative aspects of such understanding of war. Realism, unlike pacifism or just war theory, is less enthusiastic about ethical or legal regulation of war; furthermore, it shows the dangers that may be caused by political moralism and “criminalization” of war. On the other hand, realism fails to provide a set of norms or principles that would surpass the just war principles. The realist principles of national interest and prudence are as vague, unclear and prone to misuse as classic just war principles are. Author draws a conclusion that to be able to create a valid set of principles of war, realism needs to further converge with international relations theory schools and “enlarge” the set of its base theoretical notions. (shrink)

This book analyses the influences of ideas of honor on the causes, conduct, and endings of wars from Ancient Greece through to the present-day war in Iraq. It does this through a series of historical case studies. In the process, it highlights both the differences and the similarities between the various eras under study, and draws conclusions about the relevance of honor to war in the modern era. Each chapter looks at a particular period in history and is divided (...) into nine sections: Honor and virtue in the relevant period; Honor and the causes of war; Honor as a motivation for fighting; Honors and rewards; Death and honor; Honor and the conduct of war; Honor and the enemy; Honor and the ending of wars; Women and honor. The book makes use of original archival research and interviews with serving military officers, as well as secondary source material. Its subject will be of interest not merely to students of military history, military ethics, security studies and international relations, and anthropology/sociology/philosophy/history of ideas. (shrink)

In this book Uwe Steinhoff describes and explains the basic tenets of just war theory and gives a precise, succinct and highly critical account of its present status and of the most important and controversial current debates surrounding it. Rejecting certain in effect medieval assumptions of traditional just war theory and advancing a liberal outlook, Steinhoff argues that every single individual is a legitimate authority and has under certain circumstances the right to declare war on others or the state. He (...) also argues that the just cause cannot be established independently of the other criteria of jus ad bellum (the justification of entering a war), except for right intention, which he interprets more leniently than the tradition does. Turning to jus in bello (which governs the conduct of a war) he criticizes the Doctrine of Double Effect and concludes that insofar as wars kill innocents, and be it as "collateral damage", they cannot be just but at best justified as the lesser evil. Steinhoff gives particular attention to the question why soldiers, allegedly, are legitimate targets and civilians not. Discussing four approaches to the explanation of the difference he argues that the four principles underlying them all need to be taken into account and outlines how their weighing can proceed if applied to concrete cases. The resulting approach does not square the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets with the distinction between soldiers and civilians, which has extremely important consequences for the conduct of war. Finally, Steinhoff analyses the concept of terrorism and argues that some forms of "terrorism" are actually not terrorism at all and that even terrorism proper can under certain circumstances be justified. (shrink)

Visiting China in May, Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama marked the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war by expressing 'sincere repentance for our past... including aggression and colonial rule that caused unbearable suffering and sorrow for many people in your country and other Asian nations'.

This article asks whether a country that suffers from serious environmental problems caused by another country could have a just cause for a defensive war? Danish philosopher Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen has argued that under certain conditions extreme poverty may give a just cause for a country to defensive war, if that poverty is caused by other countries. This raises the question whether the victims of environmental damages could also have a similar right to self-defense. Although the article concerns justice of war, (...) we will concentrate only on the issue of what can be just causes of war, instead of evaluating the entire justification of war. This is to say that we will limit our discussion to the question concerning just cause and leave aside more general questions concerning justness and moral permissibility of war. Our aim is to list the questions that must be made and settled if defensive war in the case of serious environmental problems is said to have (or not to have) a just cause. We will argue that there are three questions that are most important in this context. They are the question concerning liability, the question of collective responsibility, and the question whether environmental harms may create a “sufficient reason” for raising a war. (shrink)