It has been argued that the existence of faster than light particles in the context of special relativity would imply the possibility to influence the past, and that this would lead to paradox. In this paper I argue that such conclusions cannot safely be drawn without consideration of the equations of motion of such particles. I show that such equations must be non-local, that they can be deterministic, and that they can avoid the suggested paradoxes. I also discuss conservation (...) of energymomentum, and how instantaneous action at a distance can avoid similar paradoxes. *I am most grateful for helpful comments made by John Earman, and especially John Norton, who is responsible for anything that makes sense in this paper. I am also grateful for the reception of a Mellon postdoctoral fellowship, which supported me whilst doing the research for this paper. (shrink)

Viewed from a first-person perspective consciousness appears to be necessary for complex, novel human activity - but viewed from a third-person perspective consciousness appears to play no role in the activity of brains, producing a "causal paradox". To resolve this paradox one needs to distinguish consciousness of processing from consciousness accompanying processing or causing processing. Accounts of consciousness/brain causal interactions switch between first- and third-person perspectives. However, epistemically, the differences between first- and third-person access are fundamental. First- and (...) third-person accounts are complementary and mutually irreducible. (shrink)

Although the existence of tachyons is not ruled out by special relativity, it appears that causal paradoxes will arise if there are tachyons. The usual solutions to these paradoxes employ some form of the reinterpretation principle. In this paper it is argued first that the principle is incoherent, second that even if it is not, some causal paradoxes remain, and third, the most plausible “solution,” which appeals to boundary conditions of the universe, will conflict with (...) special relativity. (shrink)

Attemts to explain causal paradoxes of Quantum Mechanics (QM) have tried to solve the problems within the framework of Quantum Electrodynamics (QED). We will show, that this is impossible. The original theory of QED by Dirac (Proc Roy Soc A117:610, 1928) formulated in its preamble four preliminary requirements that the new theory should meet. The first of these requirements was that the theory must be causal. Causality is not to be derived as a consequence of the theory (...) since it was a precondition for the formulation of the theory; it has been constructed so that it be causal. Therefore, causal paradoxes logically cannot be explained within the framework of QED. To transcend this problem we should consider the following points: Dirac himself stated in his original paper (1928) that his theory was only an approximation. When he returned to improve the theory later (Proc Roy Soc A209, 1951), he noted that the new theory “involves only the ratio e / m , not e and m separately”. This is a sign that although the electromagnetic effects (whose source is e ) are magnitudes stronger than the gravitational effects (whose source is m ), the two are coupled. Already in 1919, Einstein noted that “the elementary formations which go to make up the atom” are influenced by gravitational forces. Although in that form the statement proved not to be exactly correct, the effects of gravitation on QM phenomena have been established. The conclusion is that we should seek a resolution for the causal paradoxes in the framework of the General Theory of Relativity (GTR)—in contrast to QED, which involves only the Special Theory of Relativity (STR). We show that causality is necessarily violated in GTR. This follows from the curvature of the space-time. Although those effects are very small, one cannot ignore their influence in the case of the so-called “paradox phenomena”. (shrink)

Some elementary properties of tachyons are described and then it is argued that the claim that (T) Tachyons exist, is incompatible with the truth of the Special Theory of Relativity (STR). First it is argued that from T, STR, and the negation of the principle that (Pl) Effect never precedes cause, one can derive a paradoxical conclusion, one of the so-called "causal paradoxes". An obvious response is to affirm (Pl), but then it is argued that (Pl) and (T) (...) entail that STR is false. (shrink)

Tolman's paradox arises in Lorentz-invariant theories of superluminal particles. In this paper we first try to clarify the nature of the paradox and what it means to solve it. We then analyze the various attempts made to either solve or eliminate it. We show that general consequences can be drawn which hold in essentially all paradox-free schemes proposed so far.

Jarrett (1984) and Ballentine and Jarrett (1987) have argued that violations of Jarrett's locality condition are strictly forbidden by the theory of relativity. In Ballentine and Jarrett, this claim is supported by an appeal to the fact that superluminal signalling gives rise to causal paradoxes. In this paper, it is argued that if violations of locality are permitted, certain puzzles indeed arise. The result takes the form of a set of apparent "no go" theorems. However, it is argued (...) that the results may not really show what they seem to, and that contrary to Ballentine and Jarrett, it is by no means clear that relativity forbids violations of Jarrett's locality condition. (shrink)

The experimental evidence for electromagnetic signals propagating with superluminal group velocity is recalled. Transformations of space and time depending on a synchronization parameter, e1, indicate the existence of a privileged inertial system. The Lorentz transformations are obtained for a particular e1≠0. No standard experiment on relativity depends on e1, but if accelerations are considered only e1=0 remains possible. The causal paradox generated by superluminal signals (SLS) in the theory of relativity does not exist in the theory with e1=0. The (...) irrelevance of SLS for the Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen paradox is pointed out. (shrink)

The article deals with some items of Gödelian time travel problem well-known as an illustration of a specific kind of causality paradox. Its first part presents “the travel into the past” according to several recent physical hypotheses, which, from theoretical standpoint, seem to make such an idea possible. The familiar concept of backward causation is also discussed; we need to accept and develop it, if we wish to escape this type of time-travel paradoxes. The second part of the contribution (...) is devoted to philosophical interpretations of the precedence in order of cause and effect, and of the relation between temporal and causal order. The author claims, that if we wish to save coherent picture of nature, it is necessary to revise the concept of causality to make it compatible with the concept of backward causation. (shrink)

I describe epistemic versions of the contrast between causal and conventionally probabilistic decision theory, including an epistemic version of Newcomb's paradox.

We examine two competing solutions to Benardete paradoxes: causal finitism, according to which nothing can have infinitely many causes, and the unsatisfiable pair diagnosis (UPD), according to which such paradoxes are logically impossible and no metaphysical thesis need be adopted to avoid them. We argue that the UPD enjoys notable theoretical advantages over causal finitism. Causal finitists, however, have levelled two main objections to the UPD. First, they urge that the UPD requires positing a ‘mysterious (...) force’ that prevents paradoxes from arising. Since such a force is implausible, the UPD is in trouble. Second, they employ recombination or patchwork principles to argue that paradoxical situations would be possible if causal finitism were false. Since such situations are not possible, causal finitism is true, and so a substantive metaphysical thesis is needed to avoid the paradoxes. We argue that the UPD proponent can successfully respond to these objections. (shrink)

The chronological order of the events along a spacelike path is not invariant under Lorentz transformations, as is well known. This led to an early conviction that tachyons would give rise to causal anomalies. A relativistic version of the Stückelberg-Feynman “switching procedure” (SWP) has been invoked as the suitable tool to eliminate those anomalies. The application of the SWP does eliminate the motions backwards in time, but interchanges the roles ofsource anddetector. This fact triggered the proposal of a host (...) of causal “paradoxes.” Till now, however, it has not been recognized that such paradoxes can be sensibly discussed (and completely solved, at least “in microphysics”)only after the tachyon relativistic mechanics has been properly developed. We start by showing how to apply the SWP, both in the case ofordinary special relativity and in the case with tachyons. Then we carefully exploit the kinematics of the tachyon exchange between to (ordinary) bodies. Being finally able to tackle the tachyon causality problem, we successively solve the paradoxes of : (i) Tolman-Regge, (ii) Pirani, (iii) Edmonds, and (iv) Bell. Finally, we discuss a further, new paradox associated with the transmission of signals by modulated tachyon beams. (shrink)

This paper discusses Simpson's paradox and the problem of positive relevance in probabilistic causality. It is argued that Cartwright's solution to Simpson's paradox fails because it ignores one crucial form of the paradox. After clarifying different forms of the paradox, it is shown that any adequate solution to the paradox must allow a cause to be both a negative cause and a positive cause of..

Causal reasoning is an aspect of learning, reasoning, and decision-making that involves the cognitive ability to discover relationships between causal relata, learn and understand these causal relationships, and make use of this causal knowledge in prediction, explanation, decision-making, and reasoning in terms of counterfactuals. Can we fully automate causal reasoning? One might feel inclined, on the basis of certain groundbreaking advances in causal epistemology, to reply in the affirmative. The aim of this paper is (...) to demonstrate that one still has good skeptical grounds for resisting any conclusions in favour of the automation of causal reasoning. If by causal reasoning is meant the entirety of the process through which we discover causal relationships and make use of this knowledge in prediction, explanation, decision-making, and reasoning in terms of counterfactuals, then one relies besides on tacit knowledge, as might be constituted by or derived from the epistemic faculty virtues and abilities of the causal reasoner, the value systems and character traits of the causal reasoner, the implicit knowledge base available to the causal reasoner, and the habits that sustain our causal reasoning practices. While certain aspects of causal reasoning may be axiomatized and formalized and algorithms may be implemented to approximate causal reasoning, one has to remain skeptical about whether causal reasoning may be fully automated. This demonstration will involve an engagement with Meno’s Paradox. (shrink)

All quantum-physical and cosmological causal/non-causal dilemmas have superluminally causal solutions if existents are processual by extension-change impact-transfer. Fixing the extent of applicability of mathematics to physics demonstrates Universal Causality for cosmogenetic theories. Whether the cosmos is of finite or infinite content, the Gravitational Coalescence Paradox in cosmogenetic theories yields a philosophical cosmology of infinite-eternal continuous creation: specifically, the Gravitational Coalescence Cosmology.

It is widely thought that Bayesian confirmation theory has provided a solution to Hempel's Paradox (the Ravens Paradox). I discuss one well‐known example of this approach, by John Mackie, and argue that it is unconvincing. I then suggest an alternative solution, which shows that the Bayesian approach is altogether mistaken. Nicod's Condition should be rejected because a generalisation is not confirmed by any of its instances if it is not law‐like. And even law‐like non‐basic empirical generalisations, which are expressions of (...) assumed underlying causal regularities, are not so confirmed if they are absurd in the light of our causal background knowledge or if their instances are not also possible instances of the relevant causal claim. (shrink)

There are three questions associated with Simpson’s Paradox (SP): (i) Why is SP paradoxical? (ii) What conditions generate SP?, and (iii) What should be done about SP? By developing a logic-based account of SP, it is argued that (i) and (ii) must be divorced from (iii). This account shows that (i) and (ii) have nothing to do with causality, which plays a role only in addressing (iii). A counterexample is also presented against the causal account. Finally, the causal (...) and logic-based approaches are compared by means of an experiment to show that SP is not basically causal. (shrink)

Parmenides’ Poem on Nature contains a proof that the world could not have come into being in time, because no explanation could be given for why it would do so at a given time. This same proof reappears in the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, where it is directed against Newtonian absolute time. Newtonians, Leibniz explains, believe that time is homogeneous and absolute, but this makes it inexplicable how God could have chosen to create the world on a given day. Similarly, in his (...) correspondence with Schrödinger in the 1930s, Einstein suggests that certain quantum mechanical occurrences, such as the spontaneous decay of a radioactive atom, are absurd, because they cannot be assigned a definite location in time. In Schrödinger’s version of Einstein’s argument, we must say that the cat dies twice: first, inside the box; yet, second, when we open the box. But both accounts cannot be true. Since each of the authors discussed was aware of the approach of his predecessors, they share a structure. In this article, I develop a unified account of all three. (shrink)

This paper argues for a claim made by Maria Carla Galavotti that the use of indeterministic causality involves one in Simpson's paradox. It is shown specifically that a consideration of Hesslow's well-known counter-example leads to Simpson's paradox.

In this article, I conduct a selective reading of Difference and Repetition that intertwines with The Logic of Sense, specifically in relation to the concept of paradox, underscoring how Deleuze's work itself is a performance of the necessity of paradoxical thinking and the insistence on an image of thought which incorporates paradox as its central feature. I argue that para-sense anticipates the centrality of paradox in Logic of Sense, just as the obscure, unilluminated element of Ideas anticipates the significance of (...) non-sense for the proliferation of sense therein. Likewise, the dark precursor as that which enables communication between different kinds bears a resemblance to the idea of the quasi-cause that we find in The Logic of Sense. Paradox, the paradoxical instant and para-sense, as figures which help us to cultivate and maintain the discordant relations of passion to thought, the corporeal and incorporeal, and word and thing, unfix our thinking so that we can allow ourselves to be more thoroughly immersed in the multiplicities and intensities that surround us. This is the possibility of a kind of doubling that is not based on the sterility of representation, but rather the genitality of learning and proliferation of sense. (shrink)

In Nozick’s rendition of the decision situation given in Newcomb’s Paradox dominance and the principle of maximum expected utility recommend different strategies. While evidential decision theory seems to be split over which principle to apply and how to interpret the principles in the first place, causal decision theory seems to go for the solution recommended by dominance. As a reply to the CDT proposal by Wolfgang Spohn, who opts for “one-boxing” by employing reflexive decision graphs, I will draw on (...) the framework of causal knowledge patterns, i.e., Bayes net causal models, augmented by non-causal knowledge, to finally arrive at “one-boxing” – more intuitively and more closely to what actually is in Nozick’s story. This proposal allows the careful re-examination of all relevant concepts in the original story and might cast new light on the following questions: How may causality in general be understood to allow causal inference from hybrid patterns encoding subjective knowledge? How can the notion of prediction be analyzed – philosophically and formally? And what’s the decision-maker’s conceptualization of the situation he will act upon? (shrink)

Tachyon paradoxes, including causality paradoxes, have persisted within tachyon theories and left little hope for the existence of observable tachyons. This paper presents a way to solve the causality paradoxes, along with two other paradoxes, by the introduction of an absolute frame of reference in which a tachyon effect may never precede its cause. Relativity for ordinary matter is unaffected by this, even if the tachyons couple to ordinary particles. Violations of the principle of relativity due (...) to the absolute frame would appear only in the case of free tachyons. (shrink)

Introduction: The law of causality and its methodology -- Recent causal realism in quantum physics -- The law of causality : Hume, Quine and quantum physics -- Ontological and probabilistic causalisms -- Laplacean causalism in quantum physics -- Ontological commitment in quantum physics -- Causality in some quantum experiments -- Interpretations of important results in quantum physics -- Causality in the EPR paradox: Part 1. The physics -- Causality in the EPR paradox: Part 2. The physical ontology -- Causality (...) in a new double slit experiment and in EPR -- Causality in the special theory of relativity -- Micro-physical and cosmic causal continuity -- Conclusion: Causal ubiquity in the micro-world. (shrink)

Recent attempts to resolve the Paradox of the Gatecrasher rest on a now familiar distinction between individual and bare statistical evidence. This paper investigates two such approaches, the causal approach to individual evidence and a recently influential (and award-winning) modal account that explicates individual evidence in terms of Nozick's notion of sensitivity. This paper offers counterexamples to both approaches, explicates a problem concerning necessary truths for the sensitivity account, and argues that either view is implausibly committed to the impossibility (...) of no-fault wrongful convictions. The paper finally concludes that the distinction between individual and bare statistical evidence cannot be maintained in terms of causation or sensitivity. We have to look elsewhere for a solution of the Paradox of the Gatecrasher. (shrink)

We use two logical resources, namely, the notion of recursively defined function and the Benardete-Yablo paradox, together with some inherent features of causality and time, as usually conceived, to derive two results: that no ungrounded causal chain exists and that time has a beginning.

I will use paradox as a guide to metaphysical grounding, a kind of non-causal explanation that has recently shown itself to play a pivotal role in philosophical inquiry. Specifically, I will analyze the grounding structure of the Predestination paradox, the regresses of Carroll and Bradley, Russell's paradox and the Liar, Yablo's paradox, Zeno's paradoxes, and a novel omega plus one variant of Yablo's paradox, and thus find reason for the following: We should continue to characterize grounding as asymmetrical (...) and irreflexive. We should change our understanding of the transitivity of grounding in a certain sense. We should require foundationality in a new, generalized sense, that has well-foundedness as its limit case. Meta-grounding is important. The polarity of grounding can be crucial. Thus we will learn a lot about structural properties of grounding from considering the various paradoxes. On the way, grounding will also turn out to be relevant to the diagnosis (if not the solution) of paradox. All the paradoxes under consideration will turn out to be breaches of some standard requirement on grounding, which makes uniform solutions of large groups of these paradoxes more desirable. In sum, bringing together paradox and grounding will be shown to be of considerable value to philosophy.1. (shrink)

Let’s consider the following paradox (Fodor [1989], Jackson and Petit [1988] [1992], Drestke [1988], Block [1991], Lepore and Loewer [1987], Lewis [1986], Segal and Sober [1991]): i) The intentional content of a thought (or any other intentional state) is causally relevant to its behavioural (and other) effects. ii) Intentional content is nothing but the meaning of internal representations. But, iii) Internal processors are only sensitive to the syntactic structures of internal representations, not their meanings. Therefore it seems that if we (...) want to defend the idea -absolutely plausible from an intuitive point of view- that mental / intentional states are causally responsible for behavioural outputs and we want to do it on the physicalist basis of any scientific methodology, we will have to give up the conviction that such intentional states qua intentional, i. e. as having a particular meaning, are the ones causally responsible for our behaviour. The path that takes us to mental epiphenomenalism is clear: 1) the causal powers of any event are completely determined by its physical properties; 2) although intentional properties supervene on physical properties, they can’t be identified with them; 3) intentional properties, as intentional, are not causally responsible for behaviour, because they don’t take part in the causal powers of the states to which they belong, i. e., intentional properties are epiphenomenal. Let’s consider now a different yet parallel position to the one just described. There is an important debate in cognitive science about whether the class of mechanisms to which we belong and which the computational modelling project of cognitive processes refers to is best represented by classical or connectionist approaches (McClelland, Rumelhart et. al [1986], Smolensky [1987] [1988], Fodor and Pylyshyn [1988], Pinker and Prince [1988], Clark [1989], Ramsey, Stich and Rumelhart [1991], Clark and Karmiloff-Smith [forthcoming]).In classical, serial processing models, information is encoded in terms of rules that have a linguistic character. In connectionist or parallel distributed processing (PDP) models, the causal relationships among the units that constitute the system determine how the information is processes by the network, although these units don’t have a direct semantic interpretation. But, for both, classical and connectionist models, all the computations can be explained without any reference to the content of the processed information, i.e., in both cases the properties that seem to be responsible for the system’s behaviour are ultimately physical properties nor intentional ones. This situation mirrors thus, within cognitive science, the philosophical discussion concerning the causal efficacy of semantic properties. Now, if in this debate we opt for the classical paradigm, there is a way of finding a solution to the computational version of the epiphenomenalism paradox. This solution is based mainly on the notion of supervenience or, more precisely, on the notion of mereological supervenience (Kim [1984] [1988])1 . The idea of intentional properties supervening on physical properties makes sense within the classical context because there exists an easily isolable supervenience base comprising the syntactic items in the socalled language of thought. But, what happens if we opt for the connectionist paradigm?. The situation here doesn’t seem to favour the use of the same supervenience strategy. For it has been argued (Ramsey, Stich and Garon [1991]) that beliefs, desires, and other mental states are nor, in the connectionist paradigm, individuable as weight or activation states of the system. This is because information is encoded by the network in distributed and superpositional representations, i.e., there are no straightforwardly isolable vehicles at the physical level that can be identified as the articulated supervenience base on which the semantic properties supervene2 . If this is true, then the connectionist not only loses the battle against epiphenomenalism but more drastically, seems to offer a standing invitation to eliminativism, since talk of beliefs and desires, etc. now seems to be floating free of any acceptable scientific underpinning, i.e., she has lost the necessary theoretical apparatus for supporting the intuitive idea that propositional attitudes -beliefs, desires and any mental states with semantic content- are physically realized. This second line of argumentation doesn’t take us to a paradox but to a dilemma: either we accept eliminativism, if connectionist hypothesis are correct or we defend the causal efficacy of mental states with semantic content by showing that, after all, connectionist networks are not plausible cognitive models (Davies [1991]). From my point of view, however, both lines of argumentation need to be revised. The aim of this paper is to find an account of the causal efficacy of content that avoids the aforementioned epiphenomenalist objections and that doesn’t require the discovery of inner symbols in the computational modelling of such contentful mental states. In short, the aim is to find a meeting point where a philosophical story about content and cause and the connectionist computational model can be brought together (Cfr. Clark [1989]). (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Appendix: Analysis of the Wind‐Powered Boat.

After clarifying the probabilistic conception of causality suggested by Good (1961-2), Suppes (1970), Cartwright (1979), and Skyrms (1980), we prove a sufficient condition for transitivity of causal chains. The bearing of these considerations on the units of selection problem in evolutionary theory and on the Newcomb paradox in decision theory is then discussed.

Benardete paradoxes involve infinite collections of Grim Reapers, assassins, demons, deafening peals, or even sentences. These paradoxes have recently been used in arguments for finitist metaphysical theses such as temporal finitism, causal finitism, and discrete views of time. Here we develop a new finite Benardete-like paradox. We then use this paradox to defend a companions in guilt argument that challenges recent applications of patchwork principles on behalf of the aforementioned finitist arguments. Finally, we develop another problem for (...) those applications by examining the notion of exact duplication. (shrink)

Causal modeling methods such as path analysis, used in the social and natural sciences, are also highly relevant to philosophical problems of probabilistic causation and statistical explanation. We show how these methods can be effectively used (1) to improve and extend Salmon's S-R basis for statistical explanation, and (2) to repair Cartwright's resolution of Simpson's paradox, clarifying the relationship between statistical and causal claims.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.2 (2000) 343-346 [Access article in PDF] The Paradox Topos Lisa Gorton As William Egginton points out, 1 when Dante and Beatrice step outside the cosmos, they step into another set of concentric spheres. 2 These surround our (supposedly) geocentric cosmos, and yet they center upon God. The image affronts our logic of space. If these concentric spheres encompass us, how can they (...) center upon something somewhere else? The notion seems to turn space inside-out. But Dante's spatial paradox is not in truth a paradox of space. Instead, it is a spiritual paradox, set in terms of space. When Dante and Beatrice step outside the cosmos, they step outside space into an old philosophical topos, a spatial image of God. For that reason, Dante's image is not really akin to the spatial paradoxes of modern astrophysics, although Egginton's comparison of the two does provoke some fascinating comments upon medieval concepts of space. Egginton assesses Dante's paradox in light of medieval debates about space, place, and God. However, he overlooks the most important source for Dante's paradox--the symbolic geometry of Neoplatonic philosophy. 3Neoplatonic philosophers use spatial forms to imagine spiritual relationships. They develop a symbolic geometry, a spatial language of thought, which borrows nothing from physical space but its shapes: the center, the circle, and concentric spheres. Neoplatonists use this symbolic geometry because it offers a spatial way to imagine the relationship between a cause and its effect, without importing time differences into that relationship. In this way they seek to avoid the problems of time and causality, which the creation-myth in Timaeus introduced into Plato's philosophy: how and when could a timeless being make time? 4 [End Page 343]Plotinus, the first Neoplatonist, uses symbolic geometry to design an "Intellectual Cosmos," which he treats as quite distinct from our physical cosmos. 5 He imagines the source of life as a center: The Highest cannot be divided and allotted... thus a centre is an independent unity; everything within the circle has its own term in the centre, and to the centre the radii each bring their own. (Enneads, V. 1. 11). The "Highest" exists as the center of this "Intellectual Cosmos." Plotinus treats a center's geometric qualities as metaphysical attributes. Like an undimensioned central point, the "Highest" does not exist in space or time, and yet space and time radiate from it as a circumference radiates from its center.The bare symbolic space of Plotinus's "Intellectual Cosmos" has emotional connotations. Plotinus holds that "the center of a circle is distinctively a point of rest" (Enneads II. 2. 1). Lesser beings must turn sequentially through all the angles their center holds altogether at once: There is, we may put it, something that is centre; about it, a circle of light shed from it; round centre and first circle alike, another circle, light from light; outside that again, not another circle of light but one which, lacking light of its own, must borrow. (Enneads, IV. 3. 17) In Plotinus's "Intellectual Cosmos" life emanates from the center in concentric spheres. 6Dante and Beatrice step into such an "Intellectual Cosmos" when they step outside the physical world. They step into a spatial image that stands outside time and space, at the spiritual center of the poem, when they step into spheres that center upon a light too bright to look upon. Dante wonders where that center could be, and Beatrice responds to his silent question: "The nature of the universe, which holds the center still and moves all else around it, begins here as if from its turning point" (XXVII, 106-9). Egginton comments, "Dante's description of this absolute center as the origin of all movement and force in the universe" is "an 'eerie' likeness of what he [the modern astrophysicist, Robert Osserman] terms the retro-verse." More relevantly, it also refers to the "Intellectual Cosmos" of Neoplatonic philosophy, where the "Highest" is a center of rest, the starting point of light, movement, and life. [End Page 344]Plotinus... (shrink)

Despite having been solved numerous times, the surprise quiz paradox persists in the intellectual imagination as a riddle. This dialogue aims to dispel the fallacies of the paradox in an intuitive way through the causal format of a dialogue. Along the way, two contributions are made to the literature. Even if the student knew there would be a quiz at the end of a quizless Thursday, the fact that the quiz will be a surprise Friday would provide a Gettier-style (...) defeater for his supposed knowledge that he will have a quiz Friday. In addition, pace Sorensen (1988), the dialogue explains why the temporal retention of knowledge is essential to the puzzle and not a mere accident. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to argue that there is indeterminacy in causation. I present three types of cases in which it is indeterminate whether an event c caused another event e: (1) cases of absence causation recently discussed by Bernstein and by Swanson, (2) cases leading to Sorites paradoxes for causation, and (3) cases where c and e occur in certain indeterministic causal structures and it is therefore indeterminate whether there is a causal relation between (...) them. These cases, I argue, provide strong evidence that indeterminacy is an important general feature of the causal relation and that philosophical theorizing about causation should take this observation into account. (shrink)

I distinguish paradoxes and hypodoxes among the conundrums of time travel. I introduce ‘hypodoxes’ as a term for seemingly consistent conundrums that seem to be related to various paradoxes, as the Truth-teller is related to the Liar. In this article, I briefly compare paradoxes and hypodoxes of time travel with Liar paradoxes and Truth-teller hypodoxes. I also discuss Lewis’ treatment of time travel paradoxes, which I characterise as a Laissez Faire theory of time travel. Time (...) travel paradoxes are impossible according to Laissez Faire theories, while it seems hypodoxes are possible. (shrink)

Heidegger tries to explain our emotional life applying three schemes: causal explanation, mental internalisation of emotions and metaphorical expression. None of the three schemes explains emotion though. Either because the causal nexus does not always occur or because objects and people in the external world are carriers of emotional agents or because language is already on a metaphorical level. Moreover, how is it possible that there are presently emotions constituting our life without our being aware of their existence? (...) From the analysis of boredom in its three varieties (“bored by X”, “get oneself bored”, and “it is boring”) we will get to the depth where emotions lie, trying to rouse them and to keep them awake. Although it surfaces with the force and energy of the present, every emotion has its past and future constitution. How can we understand the future of a present emotion along with its past? (shrink)

In order to refute the widely held belief that the game known as ‘Newcomb's paradox’ is physically nonsensical and impossible to imagine (e.g. because it involves backward causation), I tell a story in which the game is realized in a classical, deterministic universe in a physically plausible way. The predictor is a collection of beings which are by many orders of magnitude smaller than the player and which can, with their exquisite measurement techniques, observe the particles in the player's body (...) so accurately that they can predict his choice (in much the same way as we can predict the motion of celestial bodies). I argue that the player, by choosing whether to take only one box or both boxes, influences whether or not, in the past, the predictor put a million pounds into the second box. Yet, I establish that no causal paradox can arise in this set-up. (shrink)

The most potentially powerful objection to the possibility oftime travel stems from the fact that it can, under the right conditions, give rise to closedcausal loops, and closed causal loops can be turned into self-defeating causal chains;folks killing their infant selves, setting out to destroy the world before they were born,and the like. It used to be thought that such chains present paradoxes; the receivedwisdom nowadays is that they give rise to physical anomalies in the form of (...) inexplicably correlated events. I argue against the received wisdom. I can find nothing in them that argues against the possibility (even, the probability) of time travel. (shrink)

Simpson’s paradox (SP) is a statistical phenomenon where the association between two variables reverses, disappears, or emerges, after conditioning on a third variable. It has been proposed (by, e.g., Judea Pearl) that SP should be analyzed using the framework of graphical causal models (i.e., causal DAGs) in which SP is diagnosed as a symptom of confounding bias. This paper contends that this confounding-based analysis cannot fully capture SP: there are cases of SP that cannot be explained away in (...) terms of confounding. Previous works have argued that some cases of SP do not require causal analysis at all. Despite being a logically valid counterexample, we argue that this type of cases poses only a limited challenge to Pearl’s analysis of SP. In our view, a more powerful challenge to Pearl comes from cases of SP that do require causal analysis but can arise without confounding. We demonstrate with examples that accidental associations due to genetic drift, the use of inappropriate aggregate variables as causes, and interactions between units (i.e., inter-unit causation) can all give rise to SP of this type. The discussion is also extended to the amalgamation paradox (of which SP is a special form) which can occur due to the use of non-collapsible association measures, in the absence of confounding. (shrink)

This comment discusses the suggestions made in Mahoney’s “Constructivist Set-Theoretic Analysis: An Alternative to Essentialist Social Science” (2023). Mahoney presents an approach to cases of intersectionality or confounding which produce causal results unlike those that result from traditional net effects causal modeling. He presents it as an alternative to “essentialism,” which he describes as a cognitive error. These alternatives have the same problems as those he attributes to net effects analysis, with one exception: the method does allow for (...) the identification of subpopulations with different causal mechanisms producing different outcomes for this subpopulation. (shrink)

By force of _causes precede effects_, causality contributes to the temporal meaning of discourse. In case of semantic causal relations, this contribution is straightforward, but in case of epistemic causal relations, it is not. In order to gain insight into the semantics of epistemic causal relations, paradoxical cases are analyzed of text fragments in which temporal and causal meaning seem to be irreconcilable. A solution is proposed consisting of several parts: First, an analysis of epistemic (...) class='Hi'>causal coherence relations, in which the effect sentence is argued to be a _belief_ sentence. Secondly, a method for deriving causal coherence relations. And thirdly, a format for representing temporal meaning in which contributions of tense and causality can be reconciled. Finally, it is argued that _understanding_ epistemically causally connected sequences is not equal to being persuaded to _believing_ them. The difference is shown to be expressible in the representation format proposed. (shrink)

This article examines Simpson's paradox as applied to the theory of probabilites and percentages. The author discusses possible flaws in the paradox and compares it to the Sure Thing Principle, statistical inference, causal inference and probabilistic analyses of causation.

In their development of causal decision theory, Allan Gibbard and William Harper advocate a particular method for calculating the expected utility of an action, a method based upon the probabilities of certain counterfactuals. Gibbard and Harper then employ their method to support a two-box solution to Newcomb’s paradox. This paper argues against some of Gibbard and Harper’s key claims concerning the truth-values and probabilities of counterfactuals involved in expected utility calculations, thereby disputing their analysis of Newcomb’s Paradox. If we (...) are right, then Gibbard and Harper’s method of calculating expected utility does not adequately represent rational choice. (shrink)

This book is an introduction to The Metaphysicist, the second Information Philosopher website, a work in progress on some classical questions in philosophy that 20th-century logical positivists and analytic language philosophers dis-solved as pseudo-problems. -/- The Metaphysicist analyzes the information content in twenty classic problems in metaphysics - Abstract Entities, Being and Becoming, Causality, Chance, Change, Coinciding Objects, Composition (Parts and Wholes), Constitution, Free Will or Determinism, God and Immortality, Identity, Individuation, Mind-Body Problem, Modality, Necessity or Contingency, Persistence, Possibility and (...) Actuality, Space and Time, Truth, Universals, Vagueness, and the 20th-century problem of WaveParticle Duality. -/- The Metaphysicist also includes pages on the classic paradoxes and puzzles used for millennia to wrestle with these metaphysical problems The Debtor’s Paradox, Dion and Theon, The Growing Argument, The Infinite Regress, The Problem of the Many, The Ship of Theseus, The Sorites Puzzle, The Statue and the Clay, and Tibbles, the Cat. -/- Information philosophy is a new philosophical methodology that goes “beyond logic and language” to the underlying information structures in the cosmos, in the world, in biological systems, and in the human mind - structures without which logic, language, and science would be impossible. (shrink)

Pharmacogenetics and pharmacogenomics are related facets of cutting edge therapeutic research in a field that relates pharmacological properties to the genetic characteristics of human beings. An optimistic interpretation suggests that “One-Size-Fits-All” therapeutics, whose effects can only be predicted in probabilistic terms, will give way eventually to individual tailor-made therapies with entirely predictable properties in each patient. Yet the concept of anticipating individual pharmacotherapeutic response appears to disregard some of the fundamental limitations of causal understanding in the biological world of (...) structure–action relationships. It is not simply a problem of confronting complexity – which might be overcome in time with advances in biotechnology and computing power – but the inescapable paradox of the genetic characteristics of individuals within the human species. The aleatory process of evolution ensures that with the exception of monozygotic twins, every human being is genetically unique. At the same time there appears to be more in common than divides. Pharmacogenomics provides a climate in which to explore and better understand the variable causal relationships between genetic element, protein and therapeutic or toxic actions, but can only do so in abstraction. Thus␣predictive power may be enhanced but is ultimately constrained by insuperable probabilistic considerations. (shrink)

There are three questions associated with Simpson’s paradox (SP): (i) Why is SP paradoxical? (ii) What conditions generate SP? and (iii) How to proceed when confronted with SP? An adequate analysis of the paradox starts by distinguishing these three questions. Then, by developing a formal account of SP, and substantiating it with a counterexample to causal accounts, we argue that there are no causal factors at play in answering questions (i) and (ii). Causality enters only in connection with (...) action. (shrink)

Economics presents the paradox of the entropy of the law of diminishing returns and infinity of the substitution effect. Resolution assumes the substitution effect is greater than diminishing returns. Technology presupposing entropy, introduced is a new paradox of entropic technology generating infinite growth. Resolution assumes serial substitution of technologies, generating an infinite continuum. Physics and economics contest mechanic entropy and organic growth conceptions. A mechanic conception resolves set disjunctives exclusively, every set disjoined from a contiguous set, constituting entropy. An organic (...) conception resolves set disjunctives inclusively, every set conjoined with a contiguous set, constituting growth. Causally each instance of something decreases the preexistent set of all possible instances by one, dying. Functionally each instance of something increases the postexistent set of all possible instances by one, living. Economists have the advantage here. Endlessly divisible, substance is something constituted of nothing, ungoverned by the law of conservation of energy. Physicists implicitly concede this assuming substance emerges from a Big Bang. Alas lunch is not free. Product of an economic growth equation being endless and non-repetitive, calculation is irrational, rendering growth economics irrelevant. Calculation requires marginal analysis, sequences initiating anywhere within a set governed by conservation of energy and entropy converging in parallel upon a common limit, “the unseen hand.” Energy conserved, however, economic growth is bounded. (shrink)