Recent interdisciplinary research in visual stylometry employs digital image analysis algorithms to study the image features and statistics that underwrite our experience of artworks. This research brings psychologists, computer scientists, and art historians together to explore the formal image qualities that define artistic style. We introduce the field of visual stylometry, discuss it's implications for our understanding of both the nature of categories of art and the role artistic style plays in our engagement with artworks. We then discuss the (...) results of our research employing entropy analyses and discrete tonal analyses to classify paintings by school (Impressionism/Hudson River School) and medium/technique (Wyeth/egg-tempura/watercolor). (shrink)

Introduction to a symposium in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism on the 50th anniversary of Kendall Walton's "Categories of Art." Featuring papers by Madeleine Ransom, Stacie Friend, David Davies and Kendall Walton.

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Volume 78, Issue 1, Page 75-79, Winter 2020.

This essay details David Hume’s complex contextualist account of aesthetic properties. Focusing mainly on the essay “Of the standard of taste”, I argue that Hume’s account of aesthetic properties anticipates many points advanced in Kendall Walton’s 1970 essay “Categories of art”, most notably the thesis that proper detection of most aesthetic properties depends on awareness of which nonaesthetic properties are standard, contra-standard, and variable for the relevant category of art. Consequently, they both reject the position we now describe as (...) aesthetic empiricism. Yet there are also distinctive aspects of Hume’s account. Most notably, Hume holds that delicacy of imagination is involved in avoiding prejudice when perceiving nonaesthetic properties. He also proposes that aesthetic terms such as “beauty” and “elegance” capture positively valenced thick concepts because aesthetic properties are necessarily (in part) value properties. (shrink)

most famous and, arguably, most important papers in modern aesthetics. Despite this, and the various references to it and discussions of it within the literature, there are no general commentaries on this essay. In addition to outlining a general framework for approaching the article, I identify and explicate the two main exegetical issues regarding it. The first concerns how to understand Walton's main thesis that the aesthetic character of artworks is determined, in part, by their ‘correct category’. I suggest that (...) the traditional interpretation of Walton's proposal is mistaken, and defend an alternative view at length. The second issue concerns the relationship between Walton's view and competing accounts of the aesthetics of artworks. Here I suggest that Walton's position is unique, contrasting the views of both typical formalists, on the one hand, and ordinary contextualists, on the other, in philosophically significant ways. Careful reflection on this particular issue helps reveal some very important distinctions among aesthetic theories, which have not been previously drawn or emphasized. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that categories play significant roles in the appreciation of artworks. This paper argues that the correct categories of artworks are institutionally established through social processes. Section 1 examines the candidates for determining correct categories and proposes that this question should shift the focus from category membership to appreciative behaviour associated with categories. Section 2 draws on Francesco Guala’s theory of institutions to show that categories of artworks are established as rules-in-equilibrium. Section (...) 3 reviews the explanatory benefits of this institutional theory of the correct category. [Winner of the 2022 Debates in Aesthetics Essay Prize]. (shrink)

The philosophy of art and empirical aesthetics are, to all outward appearances, natural bedfellows, disciplines bound together by complimentary methodologies and the common goal of explaining a shared subject matter. Philosophers are in the business of sorting out the ontological and normative character of different categories of objects, events and behaviors, squaring up our conception of the nature of things, and clarifying the subject matter of different avenues of intellectual exploration via careful conceptual analyses of often complex conventional practices. (...) Psychologists have developed careful empirical methods for measuring and modeling behavior, methods that are fruitfully used in practice to test and evaluate hypotheses derived from our conception of the nature of our own cognitive and emotional engagement with the world. So, for all appearances, philosophy and psychology are grounded in complimentary research methods directed at the common task of sorting and testing theories about the nature of art and artistic practices, e.g. what is an artwork, what is the nature of the productive practices involved in creating these kinds of artifacts, or what is the nature of a consumer's artistic engagement with these artifacts. Unfortunately appearances can be deceptive. Despite common calls for rapprochement the two disciplines rarely meet. There are methodological and ideological reasons for this rift, and they are, not surprisingly, related. In what follows I will explore and evaluate some of the central sources of resistance on both sides this divide, introduce a model for the possibility of rapprochement, and briefly sketch the promise and pitfalls of current research in two areas, dance and film, where an active attempt at bridging the divide between philosophy and empirical aesthetics is underway. (shrink)

_Philosophy of Art_ is a textbook for undergraduate students interested in the topic of philosophical aesthetics. It introduces the techniques of analytic philosophy as well as key topics such as the representational theory of art, formalism, neo-formalism, aesthetic theories of art, neo-Wittgensteinism, the Institutional Theory of Art. as well as historical approaches to the nature of art. Throughout, abstract philosophical theories are illustrated by examples of both traditional and contemporary art including frequent reference to the avant-garde in this way enriching (...) the readers understanding of art theory as well as the appreciation of art. Unique features of the textbook are: * chapter summaries * summaries of major theories of art and suggested analyses of the important categories used when talking and thinking of art * annotated suggested readings at the ends of chapters. Also available in this series: _Epistemology_ Pb: 0-415-13043-3: £12.99 _Ethics_ Pb: 0-415-15625-4: £11.99 _Metaphysics_ Pb: 0-415-14034-X: £12.99 _Philosophy of Mind_ Pb: 0-415-13060-3: £11.99 _Philosophy of Religion_ Pb: 0-415-13214-2: £12.99. (shrink)

In theOrigin of the work of art, Heidegger claimed that the work of art opens to us thetruth of Being, the opening of the world. Two problematics arise from this. First, his idea of “world-disclosure” evoked a sense ofeverydayness(which captures, for me, the idea of credulism in perception). Second, the senses oftruth,Being, andworldare metaphysically condensed. Hence the question: how then could the “truth of Being” or the “world” that artworks reveal be experienced? Among other ways (mimesis, imagination, perception, etc.) by (...) which artworks are experienced, I choose to examine perception since it confirms this idea ofeverydayness. The questions that confront us to this effect are: can perception lead us into, to encounter, this world opened by artworks? Does the nervous/visual system suffice to enter into that world in which the artist invites us? This is where Richir becomes important. In response to the first problem, he shows that the “perception” (experience) of artworks is beyond mereeverydaynesssince artworks open for us a world that “never was” and “never will be” (i.e., “virtuality” and not a veridical sense ofeverydaynessas captured in the perceptive act that is object-related). This is because the material stuff or object given in perception is neutralized by thephantasiato become what Richir callsSache. ThisSacheis in itself a phenomenon that is disclosed in artworks. In response to the second problem, Richir shows how artworks cannot disclose just metaphysical categories ofBeing, truth, or world. The disclosure has to be phenomenological, corporeal, and affective. He therefore proposes another mode of “perception” beyondmere perceptionin a revolutionary interpretation of the husserlian “perceptive”phantasia.With this, he shows how the aforementioned metaphysical condensations are liveable in experience. I concretize this with an illustration from the theater. Finally, I suggest participation as a phenomenological approach that can make both Heidegger’s and Richir’s intuitions meaningful. (shrink)

It is the aim of this work to examine the pivotal role of Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717-1768) as a judge of classical sculpture and as a major contributor to German art criticism. John Harry North seeks to identify the key features of his treatment of classical beauty, particularly in his famous descriptions of large-scale classical sculpture. Five case studies are offered to demonstrate the academic classicism that formed the core of his philosophy of art. North aims to establish Winckelmann's place (...) in the development of the German language. His prose contributed to a literary style that was suitable for the expression of an emotional response to visual experiences. His use of rhetoric in the assessment of classical art, however, make his judgements propagandist rather than analytical. The published works of Winckelmann, his draft essays and his collected private correspondence are advanced as criteria in the evaluation of his impact on the development of German classicism that culminated in the Weimar group of poets and writers. His Grecophile enthusiasm, however, led him to introduce stylistic categories in the development of classical marble sculpture that are no longer regarded as truly reflecting the evolution of Greco-Roman art. Thus his historicity and his classification of styles remain in doubt. Winckelmann proposed that the training of modern artists should concentrate on the observation and imitation of classical models instead of looking to nature as the source of inspiration. This plan succeeded to some extent in the generation that followed his untimely death. Throughout the succeeding century, artists and their sponsors did favour classical models and developed stylistic classicism in European freestanding sculpture, in painting and in architecture. (shrink)

The Definition of Art A definition of art attempts to spell out what the word “art” means. In everyday life, we sometimes debate whether something qualifies as art: Can video games be considered artworks? Should my 6-year-old painting belong to the same category as Wallis’ Hold House Port Mear Square Island (see picture)? Is the … Continue reading Definition of Art →.

This article provides a brief systemic analysis of the key concepts of the so-called new science of art developed by the Austrian art historian Hans Sedlmayr. The result of Seldmayr’s pursuits are reflected in creation of his own philosophy of art and culture based on a particular worldview. The cognition of the whole, along with individual and unique, underlies this science. Understanding is the goal of scientific knowledge for Sedlmayr. It suggests not only abstract knowledge, but peculiar existential experience as (...) well. Sedlmayr interprets the understanding of artwork as its contemplation, which in turn, is identical to its actualization or presence. In Seldlmayr’s art of science, epistemologies and ontologies merge into each other. He interprets artworks simultaneously as the event and as the social organism, which overcomes the linearity of time and fragmentation of plurality. This artificial complex system, built on the paradoxical identity of the single and plenty, is both finite and infinite. Sedlmayr’s views encompass classical and nonclassical approach towards cognition of the whole. He relies on the principles of monism, seeking to reduce all concepts to a single basis, single point of singularity that designates the synthesis of all the moments of the whole and can be expressed by a single category. The main category, which resembles the center of the opposites, is the “midpoint”. The aforementioned ideas are consistent and logical only in such scientific worldview that identifies ontology and epistemology, which implies the unity of contemplation and phenomenon of the artwork. Therefore, in Sedlmayr's constructions, actualization or revival of the artwork is identical with its comprehension. The systemic approach towards the artwork reflected in the theoretical works of Sedlmayr extends the boundaries of art science and converges with philosophy. (shrink)

The paper inquires the category of _performance_ in Hannah Arendt. Her concept of the political eludes the tradition-inherited approach and subtracts the praxis from instrumental reason. Arendt revisits the political experiences of ancient Greek cities, where tragedy and assembly, theater and agora, provide the propitious space for action. She avoids the instrumental approach of _homo faber_, conceptualizes action as performance and shows its connaturality with the performing arts, to the detriment of the productive ones. In “What is Freedom?” Arendt understands (...) political freedom as a “worldly fact”, and assesses the Machiavellian _virtù_ as public excellence: as _performance on stage_. (shrink)

This study will focus on a systematic exemplification of the notion of art and artwork based on Hegels aesthetics. It opposes two forms of skepticism which (1) question the possibility and value of a definition of art and (2) reject the category of the artwork for art is regarded as a process rather than a material thing. As such it is no longer something that can be conceived by seeing, hearing or touching the end product of that process. The criticism (...) of these postions results in an understanding of works of art as objects or processes with a specific structure of meaning. The study developes ideas which are related to Hegel's thought, insofar as Hegel regards the artwork as an expression of the ‘idea’, and the term ‘idea’ designates a complex semantic structure. (shrink)

In the contemporary literature, the most authoritative on the definition of art is the institutional theory that emerged as a response to the radicalizations in modern art associated with ready-made, pop art, conceptualism and other movements. In familiar versions of institutional theory, the participants in the so-called “artworld” (Arthur Danto's term) are enumerated “rhapsodically”, to use Kant's famous expression. In this context, the article is an attempt to “deduce the categories” by which art is defined, using the categorizing positions (...) of the participants in this “artworld”. In order to justify the approach and to relate the problematic to traditional philosophical issues, a brief overview of the “doctrine of categories” (Kategorienlehre) is given. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Production Determines CategoryAn Ontology of ArtMichael Weh (bio)1. Are There Singular Artworks?It is a mainstream view within the ontology of art that there are singular as well as multiple artworks, but it is also a view that is contested. In what follows, I will investigate whether the singular/multiple distinction can be sustained and will argue for a new way to determine the category to which an artwork belongs. Though (...) this seems to be an enterprise of rather theoretical concern, it has a direct practical dimension to it as well. Whether we are right to distinguish between singular and multiple artworks, and on what grounds such a distinction could be made, is of course affecting our treatment of artworks and our whole practice of exhibiting, selling, and appreciating works of art because it is based on the assumption that certain works are unique (and thus exhibited in museums and sold for considerable prices), whereas others exist in several instances (which make them widely available and not to be identified with a single object of appreciation). I hope to show that our practice of categorizing art is mostly appropriate but for different reasons than it has been suggested before.The first question to consider is, What defines a singular artwork? The most obvious characteristic is that it is singular—that is, it exists in only one instance. There is only one Mona Lisa, and there cannot be multiple instances of the Mona Lisa, whereas there can be multiple instances of Ulysses. But a little more precision is advisable. The criterion to decide whether a given work is singular cannot be if there actually is just one instance of the work.1 There might be a multiple artwork, say the novel x, of which there is only one instance—the manuscript. But this does not make x a singular artwork because there could be many copies of x, and they would all be instances of x if they fulfilled the necessary identity criteria between type and token.A copy of the Mona Lisa, on the other hand, would not—according to the common understanding of "singular artworks"—be an instance of the [End Page 84] painting but just that: a copy of the Mona Lisa. Thus, a singular artwork can only exist in one exemplar, and it is impossible that there is more than one. There can only be copies, reproductions, posters, forgeries, facsimiles, or pictures of the Mona Lisa but not an exemplar of the Mona Lisa other than the original. Talking of one exemplar or instance of the Mona Lisa might even be slightly misleading, as it is not supposed to suggest that there is some abstract entity Mona Lisa of which Leonardo's painting is the one and only possible instance. The claim is rather that in the case of singular artworks, there is no type the painting would be a token of at all but only the original physical object. The original is the work.The view that paintings and sculptures are singular artworks that are to be identified with physical objects is held by many ontologists of art, including Richard Wollheim, Jerrold Levinson, and Nicholas Wolterstorff. The view is not unchallenged, however, and some people think that what would normally be considered as singular artworks can—at least in principle—exist in several instances as well. In other words, there are no singular artworks at all. And if there could be several instances of the Mona Lisa, this not only means that the Mona Lisa is not a singular work of art but also that it is not a physical object; rather, it is an abstract object like a literary or musical work.2 This view is defended by, amongst others, Gregory Currie, Maria Reicher, and Peter Strawson.But let us first look at some reasons why one might want to insist that some artworks are concrete particulars. To begin with, this is how we deal with and think about paintings and sculptures. The assumption that, say, paintings are singular artworks is implied in our social practices concerning paintings. We put the originals in museums and not copies of them. We buy and... (shrink)

Works of art are usually meant to elicit psychological effects from their audiences whereas paradigmatic technical artifacts such as hammers or cars are rather meant to produce physical effects when used. This suggests that works of art and technical artifacts are sharply different entities. However, recent developments in the cognitive sciences and the philosophy of technology have individuated special artifacts, namely cognitive and affective artifacts, which also generate psychological effects. In particular, affective artifacts, which have the capacity to alter the (...) affective condition of agents, seem to share crucial features with works of art. Can we subsume works of art under that kind? I will argue that we cannot. Still, comparing art with affective artifacts will help us to clarify the relationship between art and technology, and to introduce a new category, namely the experiential artifact, which can properly encompass works of art. (shrink)

Citing works by Marcel Duchamp and others, this article argues that the transformation of what Danto termed a mere real thing into an artwork, and of an artwork into a mere real thing, are not symmetrical operations. It argues that mere real things and artworks not only belong to different categories, but that these categories are themselves of different kinds—the former being closed, and the latter open. Viewing mere real things through the lens of art leads to confusion. (...) Amending Goodman’s question, ‘When is art?’, this article suggests that one can only arrive at working definitions of what constitutes both an artwork and a mere real thing on the basis of contingent function. The adequate analysis of any given thing or action necessitates viewing it in accordance with an appropriate paradigm, whether that of an artwork, a thought experiment, or even a prank. Adequate analysis requires disciplinary dexterity, deference when appropriate, and multi-disciplinary attention best achieved through collaboration. (shrink)

Ci sono molti tipi di cataloghi d’arte. Alcuni presentano collezioni museali o raccolte private, altri le opere d’arte espo- ste in mostre temporanee, altri l’opera (completa o parziale) di qualche artista. Alcuni cataloghi listano soltanto le opere d’arte, altri mostrano alcuni aspetti dei contesti espositivi in cui le opere sono presentate al pubblico – installazioni permanenti di musei, o allestimenti temporanei in gallerie d’arte, per esempio. Tutti i cataloghi d’arte sono strumenti per comunicare al pubblico informazioni: i cataloghi possono essere (...) costituiti da semplici liste di autori e titoli di opere, materiali utilizzati per comporle e anni in cui sono state create, ma anche da volumi con saggi che contestualizzano le opere catalogate, o da volumi che, tramite gli accostamenti visivi di alcune opere alle altre e una grafica studiata, ne fanno risaltare certi aspetti, presentandoci le opere sotto particolari punti di vista. Di solito, i cataloghi d’arte presentano immagini delle opere di cui trattano. Generalmente, i contenuti di un catalogo d’arte sono descritti grazie all’uso di categorie che individuano, per esempio, i media che accomunano certe opere (dipinti, sculture, fotografie, installazioni, e così via), i periodi storici in cui le opere sono state prodotte, e gli stili artistici che le caratterizzano (classico, ellenistico, barocco, rococò, e così via). Categorie artistiche come quelle di frequente riportate nei cataloghi sono oggetto di un saggio del filosofo Kendall Walton, Categories of Art [1970], che avanza una spiegazione acuta ed efficace del ruolo che le nostre conoscenze rivestono nell’apprezzamento delle opere d’arte. In questo capitolo ricostruirò alcuni argomenti di Walton. Il mio obiettivo è mostrare come una migliore comprensione di che cosa siano le categorie artistiche e di come riconosciamo che un’opera appartiene a una certa categoria artistica possa aiutarci a gettare luce sul potenziale comunicativo dei cataloghi d’arte. (shrink)

Much contemporary art seems morally out of control. Yet, philosophers seem to have trouble finding the right way to morally evaluate works of art. The debate between autonomists and moralists, I argue, has turned into a stalemate due to two mistaken assumptions. Against these assumptions, I argue that the moral nature of a work's contents does not transfer to the work and that, if we are to morally evaluate works we should try to conceive of them as moral agents. Ethical (...) autonomism holds that art's autonomy consists in its demand that art appreciators take up an artistic attitude. A work's agency then is in how it merits their audiences' attitudinal switch. Ethical autonomism allows for the moral assessment of art works without giving up their autonomy, by viewing artistic merit as a moral category and art-relevant moral evaluation as having the form of art criticism. (shrink)

The ontology of artworks tells us that a work of art, for example, a painting, cannot be identified as either physical or mental object. By the same token, this paper argues the working of art or artistic labor cannot be identified as either physical or mental labor. However, the works and workings of art are regarded as either physical or mental in the prevailing aesthetic theory. The main reason is that classical Western metaphysics is bifurcated. However, traditional Chinese division of (...) ontological categories is not a bifurcation but a trifurcation, which consists of dao道, xiang象, and qi器. This tripartite distinction avoids substantivism, while at the same time providing a framework that encompasses both the objective and the subjective face of the art work, by means of a dynamic exchange between the two poles. This paper shifts our perspective from classical Western metaphysics to traditional Chinese metaphysics and sets up a dialogue between Chinese and Western aesthetics. The ontological status of works and workings of art is neither physical nor mental, but the “betweenness” of the two. (shrink)

Elizabeth Chloe Romanis argues that surrogacy, uterine transplantation (UTx) and ectogestation belong to a genus of ‘assisted gestative technologies” (“AGTs”).1 These technologies are conceptually distinct from assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) in that they support gestation rather than conception. Romanis argues that they also raise some overlapping ethical and policy issues that are best appreciated by ‘considering these technologies together’, thus placing the issues that AGT’s share at the forefront of ethical analysis. The neologism ‘AGTs’ picks out a distinctive and important (...) category of technologies, and there is value in considering the ethical parallels between various AGT’s. However, the category of AGTs should provide neither the only nor the main level of ethical analysis. Surrogacy, UTx and ectogestation share important parallels not only with each other but also with other practices; indeed, some of these parallels are stronger than those AGT’s share with each other. Consider ectogestation. One striking implication of ‘artificial placentas’ is that they may make it possible to terminate a pregnancy without causing the death of the fetus. This is noteworthy in part because it threatens to disrupt one influential defence of abortion rights: that they are protected by something like a moral right to bodily integrity. Once fetuses can be transferred to artificial wombs, bodily integrity would no longer support a …. (shrink)

Traditional monist theories of art fail to account for the diversity of objects that intuitively strike many as belonging to the category art. Some today argue that the solution to this problem requires the adoption of some version of pluralism to account for the diversity of art. We examine one recent attempt, which holds that the correct account of art must recognize the plurality of concepts of art. However, we criticize this account of concept pluralism as being unable to offer (...) an explanation of why some concept is an art concept. Instead, many of the disagreements over the definition of art could be reconciled by recognizing that works of art can be valued in a plurality of ways. By recognizing a plurality of values for art, we claim further that the definition of art becomes a non-issue. (shrink)

Drawing on texts in psychology, philosophy, and literature the paper argues that art avails us of a distance from ourselves. Art has a potential to change our perspective on monstrosity and to make us question our moral categories and presuppositions. The study focuses on a single painting by Paul Gavarni, Two Pierrots Looking into a Box (1852), which I have discovered holds two images in one representation. I turn to Gavarni's work in order to prompt a literal gestalt shift (...) in my readers. I direct the readers' viewing so that, at first, Gavarni's pierrots appear as handsome, albeit licentious youths, but then, through a shift in focus, I reveal their hideous, monstrous profiles. At this point, I argue that if we treat Gavarni's pierrots and the sorts of desires that they represent with single-minded opprobrium, then we run the risk of perpetuating the ugliness we scorn. There is, then, a double change in vision, which I seek to effect. The first one is the alteration of the visual, and the second, of the ethical perspective. The latter has to do with a realization that Gavarni's Pierrots can elicit from us — depending on how we see them — either complicity or reprehension, which is not so much a commentary on the drawing, as it is a reflection on ourselves (our biases, opinions, desires, values, etc.). The phenomenon that underlies the change in how we see what Gavarni portrays and how we, thereafter, relate to what we notice — the malleability of the human psyche — is what allows for and calls the many masking images we, ourselves, wear and perceive. The final question that I address in the paper is whether we can claim mastery over those images, which mask the monstrous or whether, if we do, then far from getting rid of the callous, the cruel, and the inhumane, we stand the risk of giving these expressions a freer playground? (shrink)

In this second article, I look at the history of the creation of the “Encyclopedia of Artistic Terminology” within the State Academy of the Artistic Sciences. I analyze various versions of the encyclopedia’s conception proposed by Wassily Kandinsky and Gustav Shpet and also at the theoretical bases for these conceptions. I then show how the work on the Encyclopedia was connected with the institutional transformations in the Academy. A key factor in the work on the Encyclopedia was the extensive discussions (...) of the fundamental aesthetic terms that took place in the Philosophy Department and in sections of GAKhN. As the dynamics of the discussions also determined changes in the conception of the Encyclopedia, so work on it shifted more and more from a project for creating a new system of aesthetic concepts to a reconstruction of the “history of concepts.” Such a transition marked the main vector of the development of European discussions about aesthetic concepts—from the creation of systems of aesthetic categories to historical reflection on the semantic transformations of categories. In conclusion, I investigate the cessation of work on the Encyclopedia in 1929 in response to the outside ideological pressure and the elimination of the possibility for autonomous theoretical work within the walls of the Academy. (shrink)

This two‐part article examines the very limited engagement by philosophers with museums, and proposes analysis under six headings: cultural variety, taxonomy, and epistemology in Part I, and teleology, ethics, and therapeutics and aesthetics in Part II. The article establishes that fundamental categories of museums established in the 19th century – of art, of anthropology, of history, of natural history, of science and technology – still persist. Among them, it distinguishes between hegemonic (predominantly Western) and subaltern (minority or Indigenous) museums (...) worldwide. It argues that relations between hegemonic and subaltern museums are often agonistic, and are compromised by claims of universalism on the part of proponents of the former. The article observes that most discussion of museums focuses exclusively and misleadingly on their public exhibition function, and contends that scholarship – not exhibition – is central to all museums. However, that predominantly taxonomic scholarship, while innovative and central to a dominant epistemology based on the observation of tangible things in the 19th century, was compromised by the epistemic shift to abstraction and experimentation in the 20th, which resulted in a loss of initiative and authority. Although epistemological changes currently in progress favor a renewed attention to tangible things as complex matrices to which museums ought to contribute significantly, the fundamental taxonomy of museums by collection type is a clog on the ability of museum scholars to engage with and themselves produce big ideas. In order to function well as sites of scholarship in the future, museums will have to be far more adaptable and attentive to a wider range of things and ideas (including Indigenous ideas incompatible with Western assumptions) than their existing collection divisions permit. (shrink)

93 Categories of Art -- 94 The Role of Theory in Aesthetics -- 95 Art and Natural Selection -- 96 Feminism in Context -- Contributors.

Primarily because of recent studies , there has been a revaluation of Kierkegaard’s view of art and the aesthetic. This article distinguishes between the ethical aesthetics of the pseudonym B in Either/Or and Kierkegaard’s theological aesthetics. It will show that, while imagination and appropriation are core concepts in both forms of aesthetics, that Kierkegaard’s view of radical transcendence – the qualitative distinction between God and human beings – is the norm only for his theological aesthetics. As a central anthropological category, (...) imagination ensures the necessary condition that art is important regardless of the stage of life . Kierkegaard is not an iconoclast; it is not the image that is at issue but the use to which it is put . Hermeneutically, the relationship between the work of art and the public has to do with appropriation, with response. Radical transcendence is the norm for the use of the imagination and art in the Christian religion and also determines indirect communication by connecting it to Christology. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present a process-based ontology of art following John Dewey’s concepts of experience and rhythm. I will adopt a pragmatist and embodied point of view within an adverbialist framework. I will defend the idea of an artistic way of experiencing – a subtype of aesthetic experience – as something which allows us to assign the ontological category of art to an object or event. The adverbial features of this artistic way of experiencing will be (...) characterized as being rhythmic in nature. This goal will be achieved in three steps. First, I will explain and elaborate on the concept of adverbialism. Second, the importance of rhythm in experience will be taken into account through a close reading of Dewey’s philosophy and by incorporating the nuances of the Pre-Socratic idea of rhuthmos, as well as some recent findings about brain and bodily oscillations from cognitive science. Third, to conclude I will propose four necessary but not sufficient features of the rhythmic engagement enacted while an artistic way of experiencing takes place: a necessary degree of object or event awareness, a positive feedback dynamic, a loosening of the sense of agency, and being attentionally demanding. (shrink)

Kendall Walton’s “Categories of Art” seeks to situate aesthetic properties contextually. As such, certain knowledge is required to fully appreciate the aesthetic properties of a work, and without that knowledge the ‘correct’ or ‘true’ aesthetic properties of a work cannot be appreciated. The aim of this paper is to show that the way Walton conceives of his categories and art categorization is difficult to square with certain kinds of aesthetic experience—kinds of experience that seems to defy this claim (...) of category-dependence for aesthetic properties. The argument will be advanced for category-free aesthetic experience by considering Barry C. Smith’s account of wine-tasting and his description of his wine drinking ‘epiphany’. (shrink)

In aesthetics a misleading idea of autonomy prevails: art is autonomous because it does not serve any heteronomous purposes. This conviction is deeply rooted in the philosophy of art from Romanticism to Heidegger and Adorno. However, it is not convincing because art is functional in various ways. It can have a variety of very different purposes – including some that the artist does not approve. Against this background, the article focuses on a peculiarity of modern aesthetics which has not been (...) noticed so far: the development of the modern concept of art has made the category of the mistake almost disappear. Works of art are taken to be something given which is not supposed to be examined for mistakes but to be explained and made understandable by the artistic decisions they are based on. By reflecting this peculiarity, the author develops an understanding of the autonomy of art as a normative artistic competence, which is compatible with the functionality of works of art and can help to clarify the social importance of art. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the practice of categorizing works of art and its relationship to art criticism. How a work of art is categorized influences how it is appreciated and criticized. Being frightening is a merit for horror, but a demerit for lullabies. The brushstrokes in Monet's "Impression, Sunrise" (1874) look crude when seen as a Neoclassical painting, but graceful when seen as an Impressionist painting. Many of the judgments we make about artworks are category-dependent in this way, but previous research (...) has rarely examined in depth the ontological structure of art categories, how they are generated and maintained, and how they function. This dissertation fills this gap. The proposal of this dissertation can be summarized as follows. Categories (especially genres) should be analyzed as clusters of rules that regulate the responses and behaviors of agents in the artworld. The visual mundaneness is a critical reason to consider Duchamp's "Comb" (1916) provocative, given the existence of the readymade as a set of rules that justifies such reasoning. The critical and appreciative practice of which categorization is a part is a social practice of making, declaring, proposing, reforming, and developing rules of appreciation. How we appreciate artworks, and how criticism guides our appreciation, is sensitive to how we categorize artworks. How we categorize artworks is sensitive to what categories have been set up in our community and which categories are active regarding each artwork. (shrink)

The method and criteria that are used for detecting the aesthetic value in works of art are among the key themes of aesthetic epistemology. The object of this study is to attempt a rational reconstruction of the background of art criticism. In tradition Western thought, aesthetic value lies in archieving unity in complexity, unitas multiplex. In the 20th century, this duality was enriched by a third category, intensity. In 1989, Tomáš Kulka suggested that these three categorical features could be detected (...) within works of art by applying a falsification proving method to the aesthetic value. Kulka described an intuitive process of assessing the aesthetic value of works of art by finding possible alternations that would contribute to improving and/or damaging the work of art. The number of possibilities thus found may lead us to recognize the aesthetic value of the work of art. This paper addresses Kulka's concept, emphasizing some of its potential problematic aspects and concluding with a suggested percentage modification of Kulka's concept that might better correspond with an practical background in assessing the aesthetic value of works of art. (shrink)

The standpoint of this paper is the distinguished Ode to Sport from Pierre de Coubertin, specifically the second part of the elegy, the one concerning beauty. Starting with ?O Sport, you are Beauty!?, Pierre de Coubertin mentions, beyond beauty, an assemblage of aesthetic categories such as sublime, abject, balance, proportion, harmony, rhythm and grace. He also mentions strength, power and suppleness. Although the first quoted categories are general categories of aesthetics, it seems quite relevant to emphasize the (...) need of the author to introduce specific categories that fits to body movement and sport, such as strength, power and suppleness. There is no doubt that the first group of categories also fits to sport and body movement, but it equally fits to different forms of art, while strength, power and suppleness can only be literally applied to sport and performing arts. The purpose of this paper is to analyze strength as an aesthetic category of sport, developing three main arguments: the feeling of achievement and its conservation, the fight against gravity and the multiple forms of strength?s expression. It is concluded that strength can improve the communicative power of sport and its emotional appeal. In sports such as gymnastics, diving or synchronized swimming, the appreciation of strength exhibited by the athletes communicates to the observer some king of ease and lightness that enhances the aesthetic judgment. In other sports like weightlifting, sumo or rugby, effort and heaviness are stamped on the athlete's faces, what contributes to a sort of communion between the observer and the athlete that can also improve the aesthetic experience. (shrink)

This paper examines one component of Stephen Mumford’s case for the claim that we should regard sport, art and the aesthetic as more closely connected than has tended to be the case, under the influence of the work of David Best, in recent years. Mumford’s rejection of what I call ‘the drama argument’ is examined in detail and it is argued that all but one element of his case fails to do the job he envisages.

This article deals with the problem of death and the end of art. The discourse on the subject is still ongoing only due to the authority of Hegel, several contemporary authors and above all – this is my main thesis – a metaphorical projection inscribed in our language and the concept of art itself. This allows us to perceive organic features in art, thus contributing to the ease with which one can formulate a thesis on end or death. However, as (...) I point out, these categories become highly problematic when any artistic phenomenon is described. The aim of the paper is to shed the light on these metaphors. (shrink)

The question of whether the term ”art,” or art as an array of objects, can be defined depends upon the sense of “art” and its extension. The generic sense of “art” is its broadest meaning having its widest extension. I argue that the term is very much like the generic term “science.” Uses of both terms don’t depend upon rigorous definition. Rather, the terms organize an enormous number of varied and sometimes incompatible sub-categories. Most informative topics in art and (...) science are under these sub-categories. As dynamic areas of activity, art and science continue to evolve without an efficacious generic sense. We can dispense with it for these purposes. (shrink)

In the history of art drawing has played various roles, was something essentially ministerial and subordinate in relation to painting, architecture and sculpture. It was only at the root of modern painting in Renaissance that drawing was attributed quite a different function. Disegno gave Renaissance painters the chance to experiment with visualization, gave them a preview of the image, even before the final finish, and above all offered the possibility of creative searching, probing how imaginative categories may be transposed (...) to the graphics code. Thus Quattrocento very much combines disegno with meditation, and meditation was primarily related to the sphere of the intellect, and therefore disegno itself was treated as a visual notation of a thought. (shrink)

My purpose, broadly construed, is a simple one; to interpret Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art" in the light of his early work on the nature of phenomenology and philosophy. My method will therefore be to present certain key elements of Heidegger's early understanding of phenomenology and philosophy, and then to trace these elements, and certain challenges which arise from them, into their development in Being and Time. Following this I will enquire into how these considerations should guide (...) our interpretations of "The Origin of the Work of Art" and evaluate how "The Origin of the Work of Art" presents a different perspective, and perhaps a new answer, to earlier concerns. My thesis is that, within "The Origin of the Work of Art", Heidegger develops a more radical understanding of the insight which first allowed him to reply to the neo-Kantian attacks on phenomenology and which led him to break away from Husserlian phenomenology. This insight/innovation is the transformation of categorial intuition into pre-ontological understanding, as discussed in the work of commentators such as Theodore Kisiel. From the insights of intentionality and categorial intuition follows the explicit necessity of human finitude as later understood as Dasein's thrown-being-in-the-world. This finitude leads to what I call the riddle of Gelassenheit, meaning how, faced with the inevitability of comportment and the concealing nature of all limited disclosure, we can yet comport ourselves in such a way as to allow things to be what they are. One answer to this riddle is provided in the comportment specifically towards the undisclosed which is later to become Gelassenheit proper, but which also appears in the techne of the artist which points to the origin of our pre-ontological understanding in the fundamental event of disclosure/concealment that occurs in art. (shrink)

The position of immoralism in analytic aesthetics and the philosophy of art holds that a work's moral defects can sometimes contribute to its artistic value. This position has suffered massive criticism in recent years. In support of immoralism, I present in this paper a new argument by examining immorality in the artistic genre of transgressive art. I argue that in the category of transgressive art, due to the nature of immorality that is a transgressive and liberating force against morality's authority, (...) being immoral can contribute directly to an artwork's artistic value by contributing to the realization of its artistic aim. (shrink)

In his Ideas I (1913), with his thought experiment of world-annihilation, Husserl becomes persuaded that the beings of which we are conscious do not simply lie ‘out there’ in themselves, enjoying an independent (realistic) existence. Our experience of beings in a world, qua total horizon of beings, is the achievement of our intentional consciousness, which unfolds its overall constitutive possibilities. It is because of this that in our everyday meaningful comportments, we are always intentionally correlated with what is “Vorhanden” for (...) us. In what we know as Ideas II, Husserl sought to offer concrete analyses of such intentional constitutions. He distinguished three fundamental spheres of intentional objectities: inanimate material nature, animate or psychic nature, and spirit or culturality. These constitute, as Husserl puts it, three different regions of Being, comprising beings that are meaningfully given in the three corresponding kinds of intentional correlation. Thus, he divided the problem of intentional constitution into three corresponding sub-problems. Now, according to Husserl’s Phenomenology, some intentional interdependence holds between these three regions of Being. In the way the matter was approached in Chap. 5 of the present book, the region of inanimate material nature, which comprises the nature-things (Naturdinge), is presented as being the most fundamental. The constitution of animate-psychic nature is, in its turn, thought of as presupposing inanimate nature-thinghood as its intentional foundation. Spirit and culturality, finally, presupposes the first and, somehow, the second region. It is generally thought that Husserl was of the view that, for us, primordial consciousness is the perceptual experience of nature-things; simple sensory perceptual things. That is, on the lowest level of our conscious life, we are intentionally correlated with simple perceptually appearing things. Our experience of cultural beings or, more broadly speaking, things of value (goods) like tools, books, etc., is intentionally derivative and founded upon the former. In his Being and Time (1927), Heidegger, who had already been influenced by Husserl’s discussion of the aforementioned ontological regions, claimed that primordially, intentional experience presents us with a world where equipment and other beings like us appear. Moreover, the givenness of beings as nature-things, or simply as sensory perceptual beings, is the result of a theoretical construction. In what I would like to call “standard” or “received” Heideggerian criticism of Husserl’s Phenomenology, it is held that Husserl starts his analysis at a high level of theoretical intentionality. What Husserl takes as primordial intentionality, the story goes, is an experience that is possible only as attentive-observational and thematic givenness of beings; nature-things can appear only in ‘elaborate’ derivative experience of such a kind. In addition, in this judgmental constitution of nature-things, the properties attributed to them appear to belong to science. This thesis, Heidegger maintains, makes Phenomenology unfaithful to its very dictum that calls us to remain close “to the things themselves.” If Phenomenology were to stay close to how things indeed are, it would discover that primordially, we are not correlated with theoretically constituted vorhanden nature-things, but with zuhanden equipment of different kinds. Positing nature-things or perceptual things as the ultimate fundament of intentional givenness moves us away from the original sense of Phenomenology and accepts phenomenologically unjustified prejudices. (shrink)

Genetically engineered organisms have been at the center of ethical debates among the public and regulators over their potential risks and benefits to the environment and society. Unlike the currently commercial GE crops that express resistance or tolerance to pesticides or herbicides, a new GE crop produces two bioactive nutrients and docosahexaenoic acid ) that heretofore have largely been produced only in aquatic environments. This represents a novel category of risk to ecosystem functioning. The present paper describes why growing oilseed (...) crops engineered to produce EPA and DHA means introducing into a terrestrial ecosystem a pair of highly bioactive nutrients that are novel to terrestrial ecosystems and why that may have ecological and physiological consequences. More importantly perhaps, this paper argues that discussion of this novel risk represents an opportunity to examine the way the debate over genetically modified crops is being conducted. (shrink)